








THE NOVEL AT WORK 




























For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in 
them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do 
preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect 
that bred them … Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God’s image; 
but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, 










I declare that this thesis is my own account of my own 
research. It contains as its main content work that has 
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The novel’s ability to portray and protest the political is generally well 
recognized. More controversial is how, and with what effects, the assertive nature 
of political critique combines with the open-ended qualities of artistic expression. 
Such is the problem confronting this thesis. My inquiry is based on a selection of 
early to mid-twentieth century counter-totalitarian novels, drawn from across 
Western Europe and Russia, and representing a variety of different literary styles 
and political commitments. In the case of Western Europe, my selected authors 
are Ignazio Silone, Arthur Koestler and George Orwell; for Russia, they are 
Yevgeny Zamyatin, Andrei Platonov, Mikhail Bulgakov, Vasily Grossman and 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.  
How we ‘read’ the artistic/political relationship is important as it influences how 
we approach texts, the kinds of questions we ask, and the nature of the 
conclusions we reach. These issues find a theoretical home in the debate on 
politically committed art, where theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Jacques 
Rancière oppose the overt commitments of authors such as Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Bertolt Brecht. My contention is that the abstractions of this debate obscure the 
density of the relationship, both as it is experienced by authors and as it may 
strike us as readers. Hence I argue for a grounded approach to the issue: that is, 
one that is attentive to the detail of texts situated in all the specificity of their 
political, historical circumstances.  
For my guide to the literary practices of the novel, I turn to Mikhail Bakhtin, 
focusing on the dialogic and polyphonic, the parodic and subversive, and the 
time/space settings of chronotope. These elements show how the political can be 
expressed in an evocative and/or subversive way. At the same time, Bakhtin’s 
binary distinctions—the monological and dialogical; the centripetal and 
centrifugal qualities of language; and the notions of finalizability and 
unfinalizability—invite further reflection, for they promote an oppositional 




with which I am critically engaged. In concluding, I expand on the intricate 
intersections between finalizability and unfinalizability; the carrying power of the 
texts’ imaginative calls; and the force of their emotional narratives.  
The inquiry is broad-ranging and interdisciplinary, drawing variously on the 
insights of literary theory, philosophy and political analysis. It aims to be of 
interest to all those broadly concerned with fiction’s powers to speak to the 
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Preface: a biographical fragment 
Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to 
all we know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, 
and all there ever will be to know and understand. (Michael Scott, The 
Warlock, p. 320).  
Thus Michael Scott, the novelist, cribs from Albert Einstein, theoretical physicist. 
His affirmation resonates for my thesis, for I too chase the nexus between 
imagination and knowledge, although in a very limited way. My focus is strictly 
restricted in time, place and subject, being centred on the relationship between 
artistic expression and political discourse in a small selection of mid-twentieth 
century counter-totalitarian novels. Let me explain how I came to be interested in 
this matter in the first instance. On reaching the end of my inquiry, I realize just 
how longstanding the origins are, and how much they influence how I read the 
texts, the kinds of questions I ask, and the nature of the conclusions I reach. The 
underlying factor, I have come to suppose, is a notion of the mid-twentieth 
century as a time of fissure and trauma, and of literature as a form of imaginary 
re-presentation capable of speaking to that sense of fissure and trauma. Although 
my area of concentration has shifted over time, away from war and trauma and 
toward ideology and the totalitarian phenomenon, an explanation of the early 
origins to my interest may be useful in the reading of the thesis. 
I was born in England in 1943, late enough to be safe from the war, early enough 
to be surrounded by its memories and memorials. My post-war childhood was an 
orderly thing. In the mornings there was grocery shopping and household tasks; in 
the afternoons a rest followed by the three o’clock walk and tea; in the evenings, 
reading and preparation of the main meal, supper. My household job was dusting 
the sitting room. A cold room, as I remember it. The only source of heat was the 
coal fire and that was full of last night’s soot, waiting for the twists of newspaper, 
kindling and lumps of coal to be coaxed into life in the evening. Most of the time 
I didn’t dust. Door shut, I sat on the chair by the bookshelf and pulled out my 
parents’ volumes. At the bottom, where the shelves were widest, was the family 
photo album. The photos, first sepia and then black and white, were stuck in with 
photo corners that kept coming adrift. As I remember them now, those images 
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started back in Wales, the country of my father’s birth, showing various treks and 
mountain climbs, and then recorded something of his and my mother’s 
courtship—again we have the mountains but this time in Europe; he at ease, she 
trying to play her part—and moved on to display the arrival of each of us four 
children, born between 1937 and 1946. After that the pictures take us back to 
Wales, showing the family on holiday by a cold sea—grey horizons and frozen 
hands on tin mugs—and later still, from the early fifties on, we are in Europe on 
the two-week holiday that was planned and saved for from one year to the next. 
On those European trips we drove through the calm of the long fields of France in 
my father’s Vauxhall 25 with one or more of our heads stuck through the sunroof 
depending on who was most carsick. In the villages, children ran out and gave us 
the V sign. We drove southeast to get to my father’s beloved mountains in 
Switzerland and Austria passing through cities with jagged streetscapes and 
gaping holes where people had once followed the daily patterns of their lives. The 
war, yes of course, the war. Something that was only present in our photo album 
through its absence. Even from the shelter of the car and the safety of English 
privilege, I knew that the Europe we visited, a shattered, recovering Europe, was 
different from the Europe of the early photos, when the cityscapes, monuments 
and cathedrals would, I thought, have had a more settled and established, even 
innocent, appearance, as through their durability could be taken for granted. 
Somehow the shape of the narrative that I had learned to trust, predictable and 
resolvable, had been torn apart, in a way that I did not understand and troubled my 
consciousness. 
Much of our family conversation surrounded the war years but in a matter-of-fact, 
practical kind of way, with my parents recalling the nightly trips to the air-raid 
shelters, the doodlebugs whose engines cut out just before they dropped their 
bombs and you knew you were ‘for it’, the wartime speeches, the rationing, and 
the deals done with a local farmer to obtain milk for a growing family. All this 
talk, this matter of fact talk of the unbelievable, took place against the familial and 
predictable rhythms of my day. Despite, or perhaps because of, these securities, I 
was haunted by notions of ruination and loss, of times before and times after. My 
father’s Home Guard jacket hanging in the cupboard under the stairs, the 
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underground shelter in the garden, the war memorial by the church and the sight 
of London’s bombed out terraces, all twisted and turned in on each other, spoke to 
the reality of the war years. So did the authoritative accounts of those who 
surrounded me. But the experiential reality of my small and ordered world denied 
it. 
All this explains my interest in the mid-twentieth century. But why my focus on 
fiction? Is there anything else to this apart from a bookish childhood? I think so, for 
the fairy stories to which I was introduced at an early age affirmed that the 
mystical could exist with the ordinary, and terror with peace. Baba Yaga’s terrible 
hut, with its chicken legs for stilts and human bones for bolts, with its oven for 
cooking children, penetrated deep into my childhood consciousness and shaped 
how I saw and interpreted the world around me and shaped how I saw and 
interpreted the world around me. On my walks to the river I followed an 
overgrown path where there was a hut, leaning to one side, with windows like 
squinty eyes. Abandoned, surrounded by silence, creepy. My mother said it was 
once used to house people suffering from the plague. No one dared to come close 
to it. Not even, it seemed, the demolition teams centuries later. The hut, the terror, 
the turning away of the civilized world. Click goes the door and in walk the 
innocent, thousands of them. The images live on. Baba Yaga flew on a mortar and 
pestle, using her broom to erase her movements—busy, busy, with her jutting chin 
and bony legs. Evil covers its tracks.  
In The Uses of Enchantment Bruno Bettelheim (1976) suggests that fairy-tales 
allow children to grapple with their fears in a safe environment, enabling them to 
‘become adult’ with a greater sense of meaning and purpose. But I have not 
outgrown my child reader, not at all. Small and imperious, she is right there in the 
thick of things, conducting my mental and emotional orchestra. Ian McEwan’s 
Black Dogs can hurl me right back into my childhood apprehensions, vividly 
recreating my sense of the yawning gulf between ‘time before’ and ‘time after’. 
The novel records how a couple are on a walking holiday in Europe immediately 
post-war. The woman, June, who has gone ahead, is approached by two massive 
black dogs, horrible embodiments of evil. Her friend, the narrator, recounts how 
 4 
she ‘sometimes used to see them, really see them, on the retina in the giddy 
seconds before sleep … the bigger one trailing blood on the white stones’:   
They are crossing the shadow line and going deeper, where the sun never 
reaches … crossing the river in the dead of the night, and forcing a way up 
the other side to cross the Causse; and as sleep rolls in they are receding 
from her, black stains in the grey of the dawn, fading as they move into the 
foothills of the mountains, from where they will return to haunt us 
somewhere in Europe, in another time. (Black Dogs, pp. 171-2) 
In my ‘adult’ grown up way, I have studied history and sociology, retaining my 
interest in the mid-twentieth century as a time of massive social and political 
upheaval. But I have increasingly moved away from war and genocide to focus on 
the totalitarian phenomenon itself. I want to know how aspiration can turn into 
destruction, utopia into totalizing oppression, and hope into despair; how fascism 
and Stalinism are both similar and different; and, most of all, what a totalizing 
ideology might imply for the independence of thought, language and literature.  
In continuing my life-time habit of turning to fiction for insights, I have wondered 
what novels like Darkness at Noon (1940/1994) and Nineteen Eighty-Four 
(1949/2000) might illuminate about the nature of ideology that academic texts 
such as Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/1967) or Karl 
Popper’s The Poverty of Historicism (1957/1986) do not (and vice versa). This 
has led me to reflect deeply on the distinctiveness of the novel as a literary genre, 
its blurred boundaries with academic and/or documentary modes, and, most of all, 
its fusion of discourses, artistic and political, as authors variously draw on, modify 
and develop the literary practices of the novel in expressing their political and 
philosophical commitments. Such are the issues surrounding this inquiry, which 





Mapping the issues 
Almost certainly, we are moving into an age of totalitarian dictatorships. The 
autonomous individual is going to be stamped out of existence. But this 
means that literature, at least as we know it, must suffer at least a temporary 
death. The literature of liberalism is coming to an end and the literature of 
totalitarianism is barely imaginable. (Orwell, 1940/2000, p. 131) 
So writes George Orwell at the outset of the Second World War. His fears for the 
future of thought, language and literature are set against the simultaneous rise of 
fascism across Western European and Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Across the 
affected nations, official ideology forced its way deep into the social and cultural 
activities of society—into schools, churches, artists’ guilds and universities—
leading to the persecution of authors and the destruction of books, the erosion of 
professional and personal integrity, and a radical challenge to the nature of 
creative work. That Orwell turned out to be wrong—that the independence of 
language and literature survives in democratic nations—is indebted to the fact that 
his own works, as part of a new ‘counter-totalitarian’ genre of novels, drew on the 
arts of fiction to portray and protest events.1 
This genre represents a distinctive and far-reaching move in the history of 
political fiction, demonstrating the power of the novel and the courage and 
determination of authors. My interests, though, lie in the dynamics of the texts 
themselves, where I focus on the challenges involved in speaking politically in a 
literary kind of way. The nub of the issue relates to the combination of two 
distinct and potentially opposing styles of discourse: on the one hand, the open 
and creative nature of the artistic, and on the other, the systematizing and assertive 
qualities of the political (see van Delden and Grenier, 2012). Let me illustrate 
with further reference to Orwell’s essays, this time a piece written in 1946, where 
he reflects on both the importance and the difficulties of political writing. He 
starts by commenting that: 
                                                 
1
 In calling this genre ‘counter-totalitarian’ (rather than the more customary term, ‘anti-
totalitarian’), I underscore that its authors were not just making the case ‘anti’ but also countering 
developments by signalling alternatives. I discuss the problematic notion of ‘totalitarianism’ later 
in this chapter.  
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What I have wanted to do throughout the past ten years is to make political 
writing into an art. My starting point is always a feeling of partisanship, a 
sense of injustice. … But I could not do the work of writing a book … if it 
were not also an aesthetic experience. So long as I am alive and well I shall 
continue to feel strongly about prose style, to love the surface of the earth, 
and to take pleasure in solid objects and scraps of useless information. 
(Orwell, 1946a/2000, pp. 5-6) 
In this essay, Orwell explains that he writes aesthetically, inspired by his 
‘perception of beauty in the outside world … pleasure in words and their right 
arrangement’, but also politically, where he is driven by his desire to ‘push the 
world in a certain direction, to alter other people’s ideas of the kind of society 
they should strive for’ (pp. 3-4). Essentially, this signals a relationship that is 
productive yet vexed, enmeshed yet fractured, for Orwell’s desire to ‘expose a lie’ 
does not necessarily sit well with his aesthetic, even while deeply sustained by it. 
It is the density of the relationship that absorbs me. How might literature ‘speak 
truth’ to the political in a way that resonates over time and space? What sorts of 
opportunities and difficulties are involved? And how do we, the readers, respond 
to its various artistic/political combinations? Such are the questions underpinning 
this inquiry. 2 
As will be further explained below, my exploration of these issues is based on a 
selection of early to mid-twentieth century counter-totalitarian novels, with a 
focus on works centrally concerned with ideology. I have also aimed to cover 
distinct historical circumstances, and on this basis stretch the inquiry across both 
Russia and Western Europe.3 In the case of Russia, I distinguish between an early 
and post-Stalinist wave of oppositional writing. For the earlier period, I have 
selected Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924/1993), Andrei Platonov’s The 
Foundation Pit (1930/2009), and Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita 
(1939/2007); for the later years, Vasily Grossman’s Everything Flows 
(1970/2009) and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s In the First Circle (1978/2009) and 
                                                 
2 A note on terminology: I use the term ‘artistic’ to refer to the broad field of creative endeavour, 
and the ‘literary’ in drawing particular attention to the practices of the novel. On occasions, I 
introduce the term ‘aesthetic’, either because this is the concept used in the relevant literature 
and/or to refer to the principles by which we come to appreciate a work of art.  
3
 At the same time, in setting boundaries around the study, I exclude the works from Eastern 
Europe, notably Milan Kundera’s The Joke, for these were written at a later period when the 
hopes, doubts and aspirations of the early revolutionary years trailed an established history behind 
them. 
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Cancer Ward (1971). For Western Europe, I focus on the 1930s and 1940s, when 
there was a surge of counter-totalitarian writing. My chosen texts are Ignazio 
Silone’s Bread and Wine (1937/200), Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon 
(1940/1994) and George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945/1951) and Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949/200).  
While I am interested in these texts in their own right—and will spend much of 
my time detailing just how they undertake their literary/political work—the end 
purpose of my discussion is to contribute to our understanding of the density of 
the artistic/political relationship, both as it arises in these texts and at a more 
general level of conceptualization as pertaining to the traditions and practices of 
the novel. This endeavour depends on certain key theoretical and methodological 
considerations, and I outline these before further detailing my choice of texts.  
Theoretical and methodological considerations 
How we interpret the artistic/political relationship is important, as it influences 
how we approach texts, the kinds of questions we ask, and the nature of the 
conclusions we reach. If, for example, we see political commitment as necessarily 
antithetical to artistic practice, we will react differently to a work such as Nineteen 
Eighty-Four than if we surmise that the political can complement or even enhance 
the artistic. The theoretical background to this issue can be found in the 
longstanding debate on politically committed art, where protagonists variously 
query whether the political and the artistic can intersect in a compelling and lively 
way, or, alternately, stand to contradict and undermine each other (see, for 
example, Sartre 1948/2001; Brecht 1949/1964; Adorno 1970/2004, 1973/2007; 
Rancière 2010, 2011). My contention is that these debates, pitched at a high level 
of abstraction, do not sufficiently illuminate the dense interplay between the 
artistic and the political, both as it is experienced by authors and as it may strike 
us as readers.  
On this basis, I argue for a ‘grounded’ approach to the artistic/political 
relationship. By this, I mean one that arises from a close and attentive reading of 
texts situated in all the particularity of their immediate circumstances. While the 
notion borrows from its specialized (and disputed) meaning in sociology, it carries 
 8 
none of the formal requirements of data analysis, coding, and theoretical 
elaboration required there (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Rather it assumes an 
interactive relationship between text and reader; an immersion in the text; a 
rejection of a priori reasoning; and a considered attempt to understand the nature 
of the political issues in which texts are involved and the many and varied ways in 
which these issues are given literary expression. Given the close links between 
method and conceptualization, I suggest that such an approach can help inform 
how we visualize the artistic/political relationship in the first instance. 
I also submit that the complexity of the artistic/political relationship is obscured in 
much contemporary literary criticism, as, for example, when form is divorced 
from content, the creative role of the author is downplayed, or texts are treated as 
objects subject to the independent skills of deconstruction. Against such 
approaches, I visualize authorship as an active process, a doing, a speaking across 
time and space. The political, too, I see as a process, a commitment, where there 
are sides to be taken and convictions put on record. Mine, then, is neither the 
close reading typified by Formalism or the New Criticism, nor the kind of 
ideological de-construction characteristic of post-Marxist approaches, nor the de-
coding of a Derridean approach. Rather it is an ‘ordinary’ reading: that is, it is one 
that reflects on how works might appeal to us, the everyday readers, untrained in 
specialized literary critique. While this mirrors my own non-specialist position, I 
also defend the value of such a reading on the basis that, in its ordinary way, it has 
the capacity to illuminate how literary texts resonate in the homes and offices 
where they are variously pondered, absorbed, criticized, put aside and/or 
treasured: that is, in those everyday places where they take on their unpredictable 
impacts independent of specialized critique.4  
My account draws variously on the insights of literary theory, history and politics. 
I recognize the difficulties. As Martin van Delden comments, an interdisciplinary 
approach can entail ‘importing concepts from other disciplines without the need to 
                                                 
4 Rita Felski (2011, p. 574) assists my case for an ‘ordinary’ reading when she points out that 
under various forms of deconstruction ‘the critic probes for meanings inaccessible to authors as 
well as ordinary readers’. With this, she advocates an approach that is ‘less censorious of ordinary 
experiences of reading, including their stubborn persistence in the margins of professional 
criticism’ (p. 585)   
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examine them properly’ (van Delden and Grenier, 2016, p. 236). At the same 
time, and as his colleague Yvon Grenier notes, disciplines can learn a great deal 
from each other, and, in their exchange of ideas come to ‘appreciate the diversity 
of forms of knowledge and creativity beyond the academic disciplines’ (van 
Delden and Grenier, 2016, p. 237). So my hope is that in spanning across the 
disciplines, I better understand the particular ‘forms of knowledge and creativity’ 
invested in the selected texts together with their capacities to resound across time 
and space.  
While our interpretations of the artistic/political relationship have implications 
across the creative arts, including music, theatre, film and the visual arts, my 
focus is specifically on the traditions and practices of the novel. As Martha 
Nussbaum (1990, pp. 228-9) reflects, literary texts produce ‘certain sorts of 
practical activity in the reader that can be invoked in no other way,’ and that for 
this to occur ‘we need a story of a certain kind, with characters of a certain type’. 
To gain an understanding of these literary practices, I need a detailed appreciation 
of the novelist’s tools of trade, and for this I turn to the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. 
His approach to the novel is highly productive for my purposes, for it concentrates 
not on the rules of language, but on the ‘single and decisively soft’ phenomenon 
of human consciousness (Emerson, 1997, p. 127). Further, he imposes no 
ideological or stylistic straitjacket on how we might consider the novel as a 
literary form, but instead—and in contrast to either Marxist approaches (e.g. 
Lukács, 1937/1983) or the Formalists’ close attention to the techniques of art (e.g. 
Shklovsky, 1917/1988)—positions the novel as an ongoing conversation between 
author, text and reader.  
In drawing on the detail of Bakhtin’s insights, I focus on dialogism and 
polyphony, parody and the carnivalesque, and the imaginative possibilities of 
‘chronotope’ (the novelistic representation of the relationship between time and 
place). All these illuminate how the novel, by virtue of its traditions, can express 
political ideas in a literary kind of way. At the same time, Bakhtin’s contrasts 
between the monological and dialogical, the centripetal and centrifugal qualities 
of language, and the notions of finalizability and unfinalizability, invite further 
reflection, for they suggest an oppositional relationship between the artistic and 
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the political, and thus form part of the problematic with which I am critically 
engaged.  
Benefiting from Bakhtin’s insights, and with the aim of better understanding the 
density of the artistic/political relationship, I ask three questions of the selected 
novels. First, what are the political and philosophical themes circulating within 
these works? Second, how do the chosen authors draw on, disrupt and/or extend 
the traditions of the novel in expressing their convictions? Third, what might these 
combinations of the political and the literary suggest about a text’s capacity to 
resonate across time and space? The last is the most speculative of my questions, 
given that our own temporal and physical positions radically influence how we 
interpret the ‘represented world’ of the novel (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 253). It is 
also the most fundamental of my issues, for the life of the literary/political project 
depends on its ability to appeal beyond its immediate historical location. I revisit 
this issue at the end of Chapter Three, and explain how I intend to deal with the 
problem of interpretation. 
The selected texts 
Rationale for choice  
Let me now return to the selected texts, first explaining the rationale for my 
selection and then offering an overview of the works. In the first instance, I 
underline that my selection represents a wide number of works in terms of where 
they are located, what their major interests are, and how these are expressed in 
literary and political terms. At one end of the spectrum, there are the transparently 
political novels of Orwell and Koestler, examples of Susan Suleiman’s roman à 
thèse as works that ‘signal themselves to the reader as primarily didactic in intent, 
seeking to demonstrate the validity of a political, philosophical or religious 
doctrine’ (Suleiman, 1983, p. 7) At the other, are the novels of Platonov and 
Bulgakov, characterized by their ambiguity and inference, with their resistance to 
the orthodoxies of the times expressed through their literary form as well as their 
political/philosophical content. The selected texts are also widely separated in 
terms of time and place: Zamyatin’s We, for example, was written before Stalin 
took control; Cancer Ward some forty years later in the early post-Stalinist years; 
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and Nineteen Eighty-Four in the intervening years in the relatively ‘democratic’ 
space of British society.5     
I acknowledge that covering such a wide span of works inevitably leads to a lack 
of depth as far as any particular work is concerned. When I read the scholarly 
work on individual texts and writers, particularly that relating to the work of the 
early Russian authors, I am sadly aware of my own superficiality. All I can plead 
is that in covering such a broad span of works, and as both a ‘generalist’ and an 
‘ordinary’ reader, I hope to knit together a complex story across a broad literary 
and political canvass. My attention returns always to the underlying relationship 
between the artistic and the political as different imperatives, with the artistic 
representing the drive toward creativity, and the political the urge for 
commitment. I am interested to know what the contrasts between the texts might 
suggest about the dynamics of this relationship; what their most significant 
differences are in this respect; and if there are underlying factors that might unite 
the texts, thus illuminating how the artistic and the political can come to resonate 
across time and space. 
There are a number of existing commentaries on the selected novels. Currently, 
there is a growing body of scholarship on Platonov, where the works of Philip 
Bullock (e.g. 2005, 2013, 2014) and Thomas Seifrid (1992, 2009) are particularly 
important. For commentaries on the early Russian authors, I am particularly 
indebted to Bullock’s (2011) comparisons of Platonov, Bulgakov and Zamyatin; 
and Laura Weeks’ (1996) edited collection of essays on The Master and 
Margarita. In relation to the Western European authors, there is the enormous 
volume of work on Orwell, where I have benefited from Morris Dickstein’s 
detailed discussions of Animal Farm (2007) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (2004), 
and Bernard Crick’s far-reaching analysis of Nineteen Eighty-Four (2007). There 
are also discussions of various groupings of these works as exemplars of the 
political novel. Irving Howe’s seminal Politics and the Novel (1957/2002) has 
chapters on each of Bread and Wine, Darkness at Noon and Nineteen Eighty-
                                                 
5
 An obvious point: all these books are written by men. This is not a matter of research design; 
merely a reflection of the state of play at that time. The implications are further noted on p. 16.  
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Four. Other authors, most particularly E. H. Booker (1994a and 1994b) and Erica 
Gottlieb (2001), have discussed a number of the selected works as representatives 
of the dystopian genre, and I am indebted to their insights too. There has not, 
however, been any similar grouping of the selected novels. My approach is also 
distinctive in that I do not write, as it were, ‘in defence’ of the political or 
dystopian novel, but in the attempt to explore how, and with what effects, the 
artistic and the political may coincide in any given case.  
I emphasize that my choice is indicative only, designed for the purposes of 
illustration rather than an account of the political literature of the period. With my 
focus on the political and ideological, I do not consider writings on the Holocaust, 
since these involve a very different form of analysis.6 By the same token, I have 
omitted the Russian works dedicated to life in the camps, Solzhenitsyn’s One Day 
in the Life of Ivan Denisovich and Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales being the 
most important cases. Even with these exclusions, any comprehensive review 
would have needed to cover many more texts, particularly in the case of Russia, 
where there is a long and continuing tradition of dissent. Important omissions in 
the period under consideration include Grossman’s epic Life and Fate, Boris 
Pasternak’s Dr Zhivago, Ilya Ehrenberg’s The Thaw, Anatoly Rybakov’s Children 
of the Arbat, Vladimir Dudinstev’s Not by Bread Alone, and Sasha Sokolov’s 
School for Fools.
7 
In the case of Western Europe, I have not included the novels 
of Aldous Huxley, André Malraux and Viktor Serge. In some of these cases, 
politico-ideological issues are less central than they are in the selected texts, in 
some they provide the setting of the plot rather than the object of the story, in 
others the portrayals simply seem less cogent. All such appraisals are subjective 
and I do not claim to have selected the ‘best’ or ‘only’ works, simply a 
sufficiently varied number to allow reflection on the different manifestations of 
the relationship between the artistic and the political. 
                                                 
6
 For discussion, see Clendinnen 1998, Franklin 2011, Friedländer 1992, and Lang 2000, among 
many others. 
7
 Critical works of the nineteenth century include Alexander Herzen’s autobiography, My Past and 
Thoughts (1861) and his novel, Who is to Blame? (1846), Ivan Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons 
(1862) and Nikolai Chernyshesvky’s What is to be Done? (1863). Important counter-totalitarian 
works written after the 1970s include Aleksandr Zinoviev’s The Yawning Heights, Vasily 
Aksyonov’s The Burn, Andrei Bitov’s Pushkin House and Vladimir Voinovich’s Moscow 2042. 
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I also stress that this is not a comparative literary study. In so far as I draw 
distinctions between the two groups of novels these relate to their historical and 
politico-ideological context. Nevertheless, I take this opportunity to acknowledge 
the extensive literature on the distinctiveness of the Russian tradition (see Garrard 
1983, Gasperetti 1997, Emerson 2008, and Lieber 2011, among others). In her 
contribution to the subject, Emma Lieber (2011, pp. 22-8) attributes the 
singularity of the Russian novel to its ‘spirit of playfulness’, ‘devil-may-care 
uninhibited ebullience’, ‘resistance to limits and (especially) endings’, ‘messianic 
ambition’ and ‘unusual commitment to interior life in all of its spontaneity and 
contradictoriness’. She suggests this is reflected in Bakhtin’s view of the novel, as 
‘intrinsically subversive, committed to diversity, [and] imbued with the spirit of 
parody and carnival’, with this being ‘fundamentally different from ‘the vision of 
order and communal discipline often seen as characteristic of the English novel’ 
(p. 21). In my reading of the selected texts, and as subsequent chapters will 
illustrate, these literary qualities are demonstrated across the two regions, and 
vary both between and within the novels.  
As a final note on my selection of the texts, I acknowledge that with the exception 
of Orwell and Koestler’s works, I have to rely on translations, as my language 
skills are effectively limited to English. I submit that the difficulties are partially 
offset by the high calibre of the translations themselves, with scholars such as 
Robert Chandler (for The Foundation Pit and Everything Flows), and Richard 
Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (for The Master and Margarita) bringing their 
in-depth knowledge of language, history and national traditions to the selected 
works. I also re-emphasize that my inquiry is not of a specialized literary kind, 
aimed at the formal structure and wording of the texts, but of a broad-ranging, 
interdisciplinary nature, centred on the texts’ political and ideological concerns 
and their main forms of literary expression.  
Overview of the texts 
I now offer a brief overview of the novels. The single most important difference 
between the two groups of works is that the Western European novels were 
largely written from outside the systems of persecution they describe and the 
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Russian from within.8 This follows a much older pattern wherein artistic freedoms 
in Russia have always been strictly provisional. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, rulers allowed the intelligentsia a degree of latitude, including contact 
with the West, as they attempted to build the nation’s intellectual and 
technological capital. But they reacted defensively and punitively when 
criticized—as, for example, did Catherine the Great in response to Radishchev’s 
critique of serfdom in A Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow. Twentieth-
century developments represent a tightening of these older controls, with the 
selected texts subject to the heightened contest between art and politics in the 
post-revolutionary era. With the exception of The Master and Margarita, which 
appeared in a censored form in the late sixties, none of the works considered here 
were published in the Soviet Union until the mid 1980s. 9     
Completed in 1921, Zamyatin’s We (1924/1993) was the first fictional work to be 
banned under Lenin’s new censorship laws. It is set in a highly organized, 
technological society (OneState), where the inhabitants are known by numbers, 
and the city is built of glass, allowing authorities to supervise the public and strip 
them of all vestiges of imagination and dissent. Written some seven to ten years 
later, The Foundation Pit (1930/2009) takes place in a no-man’s land somewhere 
in Russia, with the devastations of enforced labour, the collectivization of 
agriculture and degraded ideology at the centre of the book. Like We, it critiques 
rationality and utilitarianism, with the hero, Voshchev, searching for meaning and 
finding none. Bulgakov’s major work, The Master and Margarita (1930/2007), 
which was written during the worst of the Stalinist years, protests and parodies the 
cultural and literary restrictions of Stalinist Russia, through its combination of 
humour, irony and metaphysical speculation. 
Solzhenitsyn and Grossman, composing in the uncertain two decades following 
Stalin’s death, look back over the damage to Russia, her people and traditions. 
                                                 
8
 Gottlieb (2001) suggests that dystopian novels written under totalitarian conditions tend to be 
situated in the present, while those that located outside are situated in the future. For a critical 
analysis of her arguments as they relate to the We and The Foundation Pit, see Springate 2009.  
9
 When referring to the Russian texts where there is a large gap between the dates in which they 
were first completed and then later published, I refer to the completion date in my citations. Such 
is the case in The Foundation Pit, The Master and Margarita, and several of Bakhtin’s essays. 
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Both Solzhenitsyn’s novels have an autobiographical base. In the First Circle 
(1978/2009) describes a prison outside Moscow where the scientists and 
engineers taken out of the labour camps to do security work for the regime have to 
decide whether to assist the authorities to incarcerate others, or refuse and get sent 
back to the much worse conditions of the inner camps. Cancer Ward (1971) is set 
in the mid-1950s, a couple of years after Stalin died but when his machinery of 
surveillance and espionage was still intact. Using the setting of a hospital ward in 
which the patients are suffering from malignant tumours, it explores the 
responsibilities of those directly or indirectly implicated in Stalin’s great purge. 
Grossman’s Everything Flows (1970/2009), a short and experimental work, 
describes the experiences, memories and relationships of Ivan Grigoryevich, an 
elderly man who has to find his way in an unfamiliar world after thirty years in 
the Gulag. In its distinctive way it combines an account of the historical record 
with a philosophical inquiry into culpability, judgement and freedom.  
The Western European novels sit more closely together than their Russian 
counterparts, being written between 1937 and 1949, when there was a surge of 
similar writing. They too blend the literary and the political, combining personal 
experience and conviction with historical events and trends. Silone’s Bread and 
Wine (1937/2000), the second of his Abruzzo Trilogy, tells the part-
autobiographical story of Pietro Spina, a young communist revolutionary, exiled 
from a number of countries across Europe. The essence of the story is idealism, 
disillusionment and ideological uncertainty, central features of Silone’s own life.10 
Centred on the Moscow trials (1936-8), Koestler’s Darkness at Noon (1940/1994) 
describes the arrest, interrogation and execution of Rubashov, an old style but 
sceptical Bolshevik. Its driving force is Koestler’s fury over the perversion of the 
original revolutionary ideal. Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945/1951) is the classic 
anti-Stalinist text, while his Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949/2000) takes us into the 
post-totalitarian Oceania, where O’Brien looks forward to a time when there will 
be ‘no art, no literature, no science … no distinction between beauty and 
                                                 
10
 Fontamara, the first of the series, deals with the brutality of the vigilantes; Seed in the Snow, the 
last, with the hero’s quest for peace away from revolutionary activity. Bread and Wine is the most 
critical for my purposes, as it is the work that deals most centrally with the relationship between 
different forms of totalising ideology.  
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ugliness’, and the future will resemble ‘a boot stamping on the human face—
forever’ (p. 280). 
Like their Russian counterparts, the Western European texts are preoccupied with 
the failure of the Soviet experiment. Totalitarianism Nazi-style was well 
publicized in the west, re-parcelled as the actions of the enemy. The authors did 
not need to alert the public to its dangers. Instead—and this is particularly true of 
Orwell and Koestler—they concentrated on developments under Stalin, which, 
with their claim to act on behalf of principles long cherished by the Left, were 
seen to pose the greater challenge to social democracy. As John Rodden says in 
his ‘open letter’ to Orwell:  
You were always rather uninterested in the crimes of Hitler because Hitler 
was an obvious fascist on the other side. You were far more concerned with 
the behaviour of Stalin. (Rodden, 2007b, p. 186) 
An important point: all these books are written by males, and the role women play 
within them is distinctly limited. Courageous female representatives are found 
only in We, The Master and Margarita and Nineteen Eighty-Four. In some 
instances—I single out In the First Circle and Bread and Wine—women play a 
stereotypically female role, foil to male truths and ambitions, and this has caused 
me considerable frustration. However, with my focus on the artistic/political 
relationship (itself gendered, but in highly complex cross-cutting ways), and in 
concentrating on the ‘totalitarian’ notion as my major theme, I have decided to 
leave this matter alone, simply underlining that because a text is emancipatory in 
one context, it is by no means necessarily so in another. 11    
Across the regions, the selected texts probe the mechanisms of totalizing control, 
the threats to intellectual integrity, the origins of totalizing ideology, and the 
conditions of freedom. To situate these works in purely dystopian or dissident 
terms is to miss the point, for they were not so much making a case against 
political developments as vitally immersed within them. In all cases, there is a 
kind of ‘working out’, a use of the novel to make sense of what is happening and 
                                                 
11
 For an extensive discussion of the complexities of gender, utopia and prose in Platonov’s works, 
see Bullock (2005) The Feminine in the Prose of Andrey Platonov. 
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what the future might hold. Speaking to the seriousness of such an endeavour, 
Howe reflects how:  
Writer and reader [may] enter into an uneasy compact to expose their ideas 
to a furious action … and to find some common recognition, some 
supervening human bond over and beyond ideas. (Howe, 1957/2002, p. 24) 
To illuminate what is at issue for the selected texts, I devote the rest of this 
introductory chapter to three major historical/theoretical issues. The first concerns 
the broad sweep of developments, where I take the many similarities between 
fascism and Stalinism as the critical factor; the second, the contested notion of 
totalitarianism, where there are marked differences in scholarly interpretation; the 
third, the relationship between the historical ‘real’ and its textual representation, 
where I face the question of exactly what the selected texts do when they re-create 
the past and/or project the future. These issues are a step removed from my core 
interest in the art/politics dynamic; however, I contend that an understanding of 
them is essential to any grounded appreciation of the novels in situ. 
Historical matters 
The broad sweep of developments 
In describing the situation in Europe in the 1930s, Mark Mazower suggests that: 
Liberalism looked tired, the organized Left had been smashed and the sole 
struggles over ideology and governance were taking place within the 
Right—among authoritarians, traditional conservatives, technocrats and 
radical right-wing extremists. (Mazower, 1999, p. 27) 
The fascist-style movements spreading across the continent included the Falange 
in Spain, Austrofascism in Austria, the Metaxas Regime in Greece, the Ustaša in 
Croatia, and the Estado Nova in Portugal under Salazar, as well as the pivotal 
developments in Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. Capturing the amoeba-like 
spread of fascism, originating in local sites and extending through the body 
politic, Robert Paxton (2005) maps the various stages through which a ‘fully-
fledged’ fascism evolved. First, the emergence of the movement in widespread 
popular grievances underpinned by disenchantment with the democratic process; 
second, a ‘taking root’ of these grievances with vigilante groups asserting political 
ownership over them; third, the obtaining of power, whereby fascist groups 
monopolize the political process with the assistance of existing political and 
military elites; fourth, the exercise of totalizing power; and finally, ‘radicalization 
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or entropy’ whereby fascism either becomes more radical (as in the case of Nazi 
Germany) or reverts to a more traditional form of authoritarian rule (Mussolini’s 
Italy).12  
Mussolini’s regime forms the background to Silone’s novels, where the 
Blackshirts wiped out opposition in the cities and provinces, and the secret police 
infiltrated most aspects of public and social life. The early stages of the process 
are portrayed in Fontamara, the first of his Abruzzi Trilogy, where the upper 
echelons of the Fascist hierarchy are shown to be organized and calculative, and 
the vigilantes on whom they rely, disenfranchised and brutal. The narrator 
recounts that: 
Besides, we knew those men in black shirts. To give themselves courage 
they came at night. Most stank of wine, and yet, if we looked them straight 
in the eye, most of them looked away. … When you met them in the street in 
daylight they were obsequious, but at night and in groups they were evil, 
malicious, treacherous. They have always been in the service of authority 
and always will be. (Fontamara, 1933/2000, p. 113)
 
 
The absolutist cast of fascism, with its quest to extinguish the distinction between 
public and private life, is one of the key signifiers of the totalitarian phenomenon. 
The Doctrine of Fascism is quite explicit: ‘everything is in the State, and nothing 
human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State’ (Mussolini, 
1935, np). Further: 
Fascism sees … individuals and generations bound together by a moral law, 
with common traditions and a mission which, suppressing the instinct for life 
closed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds up a higher life, founded on duty, a 
life free from the limitations of time and space, in which the individual, by 
self-sacrifice, the renunciation of self-interest, by death itself, can achieve 




Isaiah Berlin (1957/2002, p. 179) points out that once the ‘real’ self is seen to 
coincide with a social totality, a dictator is able to ‘ignore the actual wishes of 
men or societies … on behalf, of their “real” selves, in the secure knowledge that 
whatever is the true goal of man … must be identified with … the free choice of 
                                                 
12 Paxton (2005, p. 218) describes fascism as ‘a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive 
preoccupation with community decline, humiliation or victimhood and by compensatory cults of 
unity, energy and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working 
in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and 
pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing 
and external expansion’. 
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his ‘true’, albeit often submerged and inarticulate will’. Hence such developments 
also, and thereby, took aim at the qualities of the western novel with their central 
investment in the interiority and distinctiveness of the individual. The 
implications of this—which, critically, are also reproduced in Soviet ideology—
reverberate through the selected texts, with the characters confronting the State’s 
totalizing invasions of their private lives, and struggling to express the last 
vestiges of freedom available to them. In We, D-503 agrees to an operation to 
excise his imagination; in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith succumbs to 
O’Brien; in Bread and Wine, Spina flees in defeat; The issue here is not whether 
the totalitarian bid ever was or could be realized in practice; rather it is what it 
portends, the kind of society to which it points. And on this, the novels offer few 
if any lines of escape for their protagonists. In artistic/political terms, their 
response is a counter demonstration, an artistic protest, and a fundamental refusal 
of the terms of all forms of totalizing ideology.  
As fascism tightened its grip over Europe, so totalitarianism Stalin-style took hold 
in the Soviet Union. Under Stalin, it was the authoritarian components of Lenin’s 
mixed legacy—the establishment of the Cheka in 1917, the accompanying decree 
giving the Bolsheviks control over all newsprint, and the Red Terror of 1918—
that were continued and accentuated, while the democratic hopes earlier voiced 
under Lenin’s April Theses, most particularly his cry ‘all power to the Soviets!’ 
were dashed. Within a relatively short period, the independent influence of the 
Soviets had been abolished and affairs of state came to rest entirely with the 
Politburo (which had originally been established to respond to questions requiring 
an urgent response). Propaganda and espionage were coordinated under the 
OGPU (Obyedinyonnoye gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravleniye), later 
transformed into the NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del). Political 
opposition was eliminated from both ends of the political spectrum. Trotsky, 
Kamenev and Zinoviev were ejected from the Central Committee in 1927, and 
Bukharin two years later when he advocated a return to Lenin's New Economic 
Policy (NEP).  
Stripped back, Stalin’s reformulation of Marxism-Leninism as ‘socialism in one 
country’ retained the traditional Marxist proposition that history was formed 
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through class struggle, that capitalism would eventually collapse through the 
weight of its internal contradictions, and that a revolutionary proletariat would 
one day lead the world to socialism. What changed was the manifest privileging 
of industrial progress over egalitarian ideals, with everything to be subordinated 
to the drive to turn Russia into a highly industrialized nation with up-to-date 
technology and a well-educated workforce. As noted by Fitzpatrick, when the 
NEP was dropped in favour of Stalin’s First Five Year Plan (1928-32), the notion 
of ‘backwardness’ became ‘a very important word in the Soviet Communist 
lexicon’:   
It stood for everything that belonged to old Russia and needed to be changed 
in the name of progress and culture. Religion, a form of superstition, was 
backward. Peasant farming was backward. Small-scale private trade was 
backward … it was the Communists’ task to turn backward, petty-bourgeois 
Russia into a socialist, urbanized industrialized giant with modern 
technology and a literate workforce. (Fitzpatrick, 1994, p. 15)  
The devastations wrought on peasant farming and the established patterns of rural 
existence are at the centre of Platonov’s The Foundation Pit. Here Platonov, who 
had worked as a land reclamation expert in outlying districts in the 1920s, 
describes how the peasants were burning their grains and eating their animals to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of the Party, and how the rural 
community of his novel had come to resemble a ‘collective-farm orphanhood 
standing in the wind of the roads, with a pile of dead stock in the middle of them’ 
(The Foundation Pit, p. 65).13 
Stalin’s terror was spread throughout society, with its victims including Kulaks, 
priests, private businessmen, and virtually anyone declared an ‘enemy of the 
people’. It included three major phases: the forced collectivization of agriculture 
in the early years, the widespread use of police surveillance and interrogation in 
the urban centres in the middle of the decade, and the Great Purges of 1937-1938. 
                                                 
13 Stalin’s industrializing drive produced real social and economic gains. Robert Service (2009, p. 
191) notes that the proportion of males aged between nine and forty-nine able to read and write 
rose from forty per cent in 1897 to ninety-four per cent in 1939, that there was a dramatic rise in 
the number of schools and educational institutions, with workers and ex-peasants able to buy 
reading materials at minimal cost, and that the state provided multiple inexpensive recreational 
facilities, with each medium sized town having its own theatre; and the public spaces laid aside for 
families to enjoy leisure-time walks.  
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The Gulag is extensively represented in the Russian texts, for Stalin’s forced 
labour camps were not hermetically sealed from the rest of society as were the 
Nazi Death Camps, but part of its social and political fabric. Anne Applebaum 
(2003, pp. xv-xvi) records how the meaning of Gulag expanded over time to 
include ‘the Soviet repressive itself, the set of procedures that prisoners once 
called the ''meat grinder'': the arrests, the interrogations, the transport in unheated 
cattle cars, the forced labour, the destruction of families, the years spent in exile, 
the early and unnecessary deaths’.  
In the fascist and communist nations, the State endeavoured to direct art, 
literature, film and theatre to its own purposes. In Italy, disciplinary powers were 
jointly invested in the Ministry for the Press and the Secret Police; in Germany, 
the Propaganda Ministry took control of all forms of written communication as 
well as public meetings, art, music, film and radio; in Russia, the secret police and 
the Union of Writers monitored and disciplined writers, with socialist realism 
enforced as the sole legitimate style from 1934 onward. These developments, 
more than any other, are essential to an understanding of the work of the selected 
texts. This is not just in the case of the Russian authors, who risked their lives and 
professional security in writing, but also more broadly in that both groups of 
writers, Russian and Western European, faced a political/ideological situation 
with the potential to undermine the centre of intellectual and artistic life. Hence in 
defending liberties in society at large, authors thereby defended fiction as they had 
come to know it; equally, in defending fiction they thereby defended social and 
political freedoms for society as a whole.  
Totalitarianism: a contested but useful notion? 
So far I have used the term ‘totalitarianism’ in a broad sense to refer to the 
centralization of state power, mass propaganda, the systematic deployment of the 
secret police, and the widespread use of terror. Most significantly, totalitarianism 
can be seen to involve ambitious cultural/ideological projects designed to recruit 
artists and writers to the purposes of the State (as will be further discussed in 
Chapter Four). However, there are significant disagreements in history and 
political science over the utility of the notion. Those arguing in favour of the 
concept concentrate on the invincibility of political power and the similarities 
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between the Stalinist and fascist regimes; those who argue against focus on the 
fractures, divisions and inefficiencies within the state machinery, citizens’ actions 
in either complying or resisting, and the differences between the regimes. These 
contrasting interpretations are important both in modifying my global references 
to ‘totalitarianism’ and in raising the question of where the fictional texts stand on 
the broad spectrum of representations. A brief review follows.14 
Hannah Arendt provides the foundational ‘totalitarian’ case for political science. 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/1967) she depicts totalitarianism as a 
monolithic form of political domination intent on imposing a prescribed pattern of 
thought, belief and behaviour on its subjects and eliminating all forms of diversity 
and dissent. In a metaphysical way, she gestures to its fanatical sense of purpose 
and claim to be the servant of history: ‘it is the monstrous yet seemingly 
answerable claim of totalitarian rule that, far from being “lawless”, it goes to the 
sources of authority from which positive laws receive their ultimate legitimation’ 
(Arendt, 1951/1967, p. 460). On her analysis, the phenomenon differs from all 
other forms of political oppression, including ‘despotism, tyranny and 
dictatorship’, for: 
Whenever it came to power it developed entirely new political institutions 
and destroyed all social, legal and political institutions of the country … 
transformed the classes into masses, supplanted the party system, not by 
one-party dictatorships, but by a mass movement, shifted the centre of power 
from the army to the police, and established a foreign policy openly directed 
toward world domination. (Arendt, 1951/1967, p. 460) 
Arendt’s position is echoed in the contemporaneous accounts of ‘totalitarian’ 
authors such as Merle Fainsod (1953) and Leonard Schapiro (1960). Opposition 
to their views emerged from the mid-1960s onward, with critics underlining the 
political use of the notion in cold war rhetoric.15 In a recent contribution, Slavoj 
Žižek (2011) contends that the theory of totalitarianism, as applied to the Stalinist 
regime, has always worked to guarantee the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic 
                                                 
14
 In these discussions, comparisons are most often drawn between the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, 
with Mussolini’s Italy seen as an authoritarian, but never fully ‘totalitarian’, state. Such arguments 
are made on the basis of Mussolini’s economic, cultural and/or foreign policies (see in particular, 
Arendt 1951/1967). Hence when I refer to Italy’s ‘totalizing’ ideology, I indicate the philosophical 
basis on which Italian fascism attempted to eradicate the distinction between public and private 
life, as noted above. 
15 For review and discussion of these earlier developments see Barber 1969 and Burrowes 1969.  
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hegemony. Even at its worst, he maintains, Stalinism had some vestige of an 
emancipatory potential. Abott Gleason (1995) similarly shows how the totalitarian 
notion has served a variety of political purposes in the West. His analysis traces 
the first formal development of the concept in the writings of Giovanni Gentile in 
the 1920s; its statist rendering in the work of Carl Schmitt, which was later 
abandoned in the ‘totalizing’ drive of the Nazi regime; and the popular usage of 
the term after the Second World War, where the concept enabled the hostility 
previously directed at Mussolini’s Italy and Nazi Germany to be transferred to the 
Soviet Union.  
From a different perspective, ‘revisionist’ historians argue against the absolutist 
thrust of the totalitarian hypothesis. Against totalizing depictions, they point to 
various inefficiencies in State machinery, levels of public acquiescence to 
centralizing controls, and the persistence of pockets of resistance throughout the 
populace (Geyer and Fitzpatrick, 2009). Gorlizki and Mommsen, for example, 
point out that in the Soviet Union there were a number of intersecting and 
competing organisations, including the Communist Party, the NKVD and the state 
cabinet, each with their own separate interests in education, culture, military 
affairs and the economy, and conclude that ‘the Soviet political order was never a 
smoothly functioning “machine” as it has been portrayed in some versions of the 
totalitarian model’ (2009, p. 84). The relationship between Lenin and Stalin’s 
regime is also subject to considerable debate among contemporary historians, with 
some arguing that Stalinism was the natural and inevitable consequence of 
Lenin’s actions (e.g. Pipes 1995), and others suggesting that there were several 
points when different paths could have been taken (e.g. Gill 2002). For Sheila 
Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 3), Stalinism is best understood as ‘the complex of 
institutions, structures, and rituals that made up the habitat of Homo Sovieticus in 
the Stalin era’. Here she includes: 
Communist Party rule, Marxist-Leninist ideology, rampant bureaucracy, 
leader cults, state control over production and distribution, social 
engineering, affirmative action on behalf of workers, stigmatization of ‘class 
enemies’, police surveillance, terror, and the various informal arrangements 
whereby people at every level sought to protect themselves and obtain scarce 
goods. (Fitzpatrick, 2000, p. 3)  
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Significantly for my purposes, a number of theorists now argue for the 
incorporation of elements of both the totalitarian and revisionist approaches. 
Robert Service (2009, pp. vii-viii) suggests we need an interpretation that brings 
together the ‘red in tooth and claw’ nature of Stalinism and the ‘insubordination 
and chaos’ that accompanied its ‘harshly imposed hierarchy’ Accompanying this, 
there is a resigned acceptance of the utility of the totalitarian notion. John 
Connelly (2011, p. 819) describes it as a ‘defunct theory, useful word’, reflecting 
that ‘despite our best efforts, we never get beyond it’ while Michael Geyer (2009, 
p. 2) reflects that it is ‘deeply imbued in how historians grapple with and 
understand the two regimes’. And some time ago, Fitzpatrick reflected that: 
Ten or twelve years ago it was very useful to reflect that the model had an 
inherent bias and did not explain everything about Soviet society. Now… it 
is possibly more useful to point out that there were some things about Soviet 
society that it explained very well. (Fitzpatrick, 1986, pp. 410-11)  
How far and in what ways are these differences of interpretation reflected in the 
selected texts? In approximate terms, Zamyatin, Orwell and Koestler can be said 
to follow a ‘totalitarian’ track, capturing the momentous nature of events but not 
their complexity. Silone’s Bread and Wine is more qualified, pointing to the 
devastating effects of totalizing ideologies, whether fascist or communist. In 
partial contrast, and written directly under the political minutiae of Stalin’s 
control, The Foundation Pit and The Master and Margarita describe a chaotic 
present in which many of the ingredients described by the revisionists—party 
rule, ideology, bureaucracy, leader cults, police surveillance, terror, and the 
struggle to survive—combine in an unpredictable and alarming fashion. In these 
accounts the irrationality, unpredictability and contingent nature of institutional 
power is almost more daunting than the workings of a well-oiled machine. 
Different again, Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s novels record specific events, 
describing how individuals variously comply, resist and actively co-operate in 
events. Their novels, above all, illustrate the blurred boundaries between the inner 
and outer zones of terror.  
I end this part of the discussion with a caveat: the great majority of the authors 
were unlikely to have thought of themselves as writing in a ‘counter-totalitarian’ 
cause in the general political sense of the term. Platonov and Bulgakov were 
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writing before the notion had any general salience; Solzhenitsyn focused on 
developments in the Soviet Union, and did not generalize about their implications; 
Grossman, who travelled through the occupied zones, was alone among the 
Russian authors to speculate on the resemblances between Soviet and European 
developments. While the Western European authors were more concerned with 
totalitarianism as a political phenomenon, it was only Orwell who consistently 
talked about totalitarianism itself, declaring that: 
Every serious line of work that I have written since 1936 has been written, 
directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism as 
I understand it. (Orwell, 1946a/2000, p. 5)  
And Orwell, of course, has had a profound influence on how we have come to 
understand the nature of the totalitarian phenomenon. This brings me to the 
problematic relationship between history, text and fiction: an issue that has a 
lateral connection with the artistic/political relationship and cries out for attention.   
History, text and fiction 
Under the New Historicism (Greenblatt, 2005) and various forms of 
deconstruction (Barthes, 1967/1981), the lines between the historical and the 
fictional are redrawn so that the one is seen as an artefact of the other, and the 
difference between fiction as imaginative reconstruction and history as discipline 
is dissolved. Thus Barthes asks whether history, ‘bound to the standards of the 
“real”, and justified by the principles of “rational” exposition”,’ can really be 
distinguished from ‘imaginary narration, as we find it in the epic, the novel, and 
the drama’ (Barthes, 1967/1981, p. 261, cited by White, 1984, p. 12). This allows 
him to foreclose on any attempt to distinguish between the historical and the 
fictional, for he can dismiss any such move on the grounds that it fails to see that 
historical ‘reality’ is purely a matter of textual construction. Responding to this is 
important for my purposes, for if the historical real is simply a discursive 
construction, then neither history as discipline nor the novel as a creative genre 
can say something ‘true’ about the nature of historical circumstances, a point I 
wish to resist. 
I take my lead from the arguments of Paul Ricoeur as expressed in Memory, 
History and Forgetting (2004). Like Hayden White (1973, 1984), Ricoeur 
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acknowledges that there is no form of historical knowledge that can lay claim to 
be definitive or absolute, for our understanding is always/already infused with the 
narrative symbols through which we seek to reconstruct the past. At the same 
time, he argues for the conceptual and ethical importance of retaining a sense of 
‘what really happened’. On this basis he makes a ‘truth claim’ for history and 
memory, arguing that ‘there could be no good use of memory if there were no 
aspect of truth. So in a sense “what really happened” must keep concerning us’ 
(Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 11). But fiction, Ricoeur reminds us, cannot follow 
imagination wherever it wants to go, for it, like history, needs to narrate events in 
a manner that draws on reality and makes sense of things. Fiction and history, he 
says, ‘each concretize their respective intentionalities only by borrowing from the 
intentionality of the other’ (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 559).  
His qualification is important, most particularly in the case of historical fiction, 
which has an evident line of responsibility to the historical record. We expect an 
author to ‘get the facts right’ (in so far as they are subject to historical 
determination) and to recognize well-founded historical interpretations: hence a 
book is charged with failing as a novel if it is misleading in important historical 
respects. Further, and as the furore over Helen Demidenko’s The Hand that 
Signed the Paper illustrates, if an author of fiction makes an implicit or explicit 
claim for the credibility of a work on the basis of their experience and/or identity, 
they cannot later rescue that work on the grounds that it is ‘only fiction’ should 
those claims turn out to be false.16 Thus when Robert Manne (1995, p. 26) accuses 
Demidenko of being unable to ‘distinguish between fact and fiction, truth and 
falsity’, he is concerned with what might be called the internal veracity or ‘truth’ 
of the novel. This notion persists even in the case of a non-realist text. So when 
Geyer (2009, p. 4) complains that Orwell contributes to the image of Stalinism as 
an ‘ideologically driven, mind-altering police state’, he voices the same kind of 
                                                 
16
 Helen Demidenko is in fact Helen Darville. Her novel The Hand that Signed the Paper, 
published to great acclaim in Australia, tells the story of a Ukrainian family trying to survive the 
Stalinist purges, while also indirectly implicating Jewish communities in their own persecution. 
Darville falsely claimed to be the daughter of Ukrainian parents, saying that the book was based 
on the accounts of recorded interviews with her own relatives. The book was awarded the Miles 
Franklin Award in 1995 before the deception was revealed. 
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criticism as he might have levelled at a historical text: namely, that Orwell has got 
it wrong. 
But what, more precisely, is the nature of the ‘truth’ that is invested in a historical 
account and how might it be distinguished from that of fiction? As classically 
advanced in nineteenth century historiography, the truth of a historical 
interpretation is established through the ‘correct application of the historical 
method’ where it needs to be ‘justified by the facts’ and ‘square with the story 
related in the narrative part of the discourse’ (White, 1984, pp. 2-3). As White 
argues, the problem lies in the claim that the historian ‘finds’ the ‘real’ history 
from pre-existing facts, rather than creating history through selecting certain facts 
and arranging them in a particular way in order to tell a particular story. In 
elaborating on this in his Metahistory (1973), White maintains that historians 
draw on western narratives through telling certain kinds of stories (romance, 
satire, comedy or tragedy), filtering their account through different ideologies 
(conservative, liberal, radical and anarchist), and expressing their views through 
the use of one or more ‘poetic tropes’ (synecdoche, metaphor, metonymy, irony).  
But even granted that no absolute distinction between fiction and history can be 
drawn, the question of their differences persists, for to neglect this is to ignore the 
particular things that each one can do that the other cannot. On this, I suggest that 
if history’s archetypal form of truth resides in its capacity to make use of the 
archive in a credible and consistent way (that is, on the basis of the criteria of 
correspondence and coherence), the novel’s belongs to its capacity to portray 
historical phenomena in a way that ‘rings true’ to the internal reality of our 
subjective worlds. This is particularly important when revealing the human 
consequences of trauma, for, as Ricoeur (2004, p. 559) observes, ‘horror’ is not 
itself a ‘historical category’, and it is only the power of a literary imagination that 
can ‘give eyes to the horrified narrator’. Illustrating this evocative capacity, 
Everything Flows describes how at the end of the Ukraine famine:  
The children had heads heavy as cannon balls; thin little necks like necks of 
storks; and on their arms and legs you could see every bone. … By the 
spring they no longer had any faces at all. Some had the heads of birds with 
a little beak. (Everything Flows, pp. 130-1) 
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There is also the novel’s capacity to re-create the historical record through the 
experiences and memories of its characters. Commenting on this, David Lodge 
(2002, pp. 13-14) argues that while historiography can provide real insights into 
selected lives, ‘the more scientific the method, the more scrupulous it is in basing 
all its assertions on evidence, the less able it is to represent the density of those 
events as consciously experienced’. In contrast, the novel ‘creates fictional models 
of what it is like to be a human being moving through time and space’ (Lodge, 
2002, p. 14). Thus, for example, in Cancer Ward Kostoglotov speaks to the 
loneliness of the exiled when he says:  
Soon it will be summer, and this summer I want to sleep on a camp bed 
under the stars, to wake up at night and know by the positions of Cygnus and 
Pegasus what time it is, to live just this one summer and see the stars without 
their being blotted out by camp searchlights – and then I would be quite 
happy never to wake again. (Cancer Ward, 1971, p. 319) 
But there is more than this too, for fiction also speaks its truths through the 
fantastic, the satirical and the ironic. In We, for example, Zamyatin creates 
OneState, a glass city where the citizens ‘walk the same as always, a thousand 
heads with two fused, integrated legs, with two integrated arms, swinging wide’ 
(p. 121) and Bulgakov has Woland’s visit to Moscow stand as a lasting joke 
against the compulsory atheism of Soviet society. This, I will argue, represents a 
very particular way of speaking ‘truth’ to power: always oblique, and yet, at the 
same time, strangely evident and always compelling.  
Such representations—realist, metaphorical and satirical—provide the 
foundations for my study. My premise is that the actuality of the historical—its 
power to command, compel and kill—imposes both a political and an artistic 
imperative on the texts. Politically, works need to voice their countervailing truths 
in as compelling and convincing way as possible; artistically, they need to find 
imaginative and resonating ways of confronting the devastations of power. It is 
against this background that I interrogate the art/politics problematic, probing how 
far its abstractions can respond to the dense and demanding nature of an always 
historically-situated relationship.  
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Structure of thesis 
To return to my starting point: in exploring the counter-totalitarian literature, I am 
interested in the nature of the challenges, difficulties and opportunities involved in 
giving the artistic a political voice, and in how various literary/political 
combinations might shape our own perceptions as ‘ordinary’ readers. I have 
intimated that the complexity of these matters, central to an understanding of the 
nature of the literary/political enterprise, is obscured when form is divorced from 
content; the creative role of the author is bypassed in favour of the autonomous 
productivity of texts; and—as I shall argue in the next chapter—in many if not 
most of the theoretical abstractions surrounding the arts/politics problematic. 
Against this, I aim to contribute to a grounded understanding of the 
artistic/political relationship through a close consideration of the selected texts in 
all the specificity of their historical and political circumstances.  
I reiterate that I approach this issue as both a ‘generalist’ and an ‘ordinary’ reader, 
hoping to knit together a complex story across a broad literary and political 
canvass. As acknowledged, an in-depth account of the individual texts is sadly 
lacking, with my study riding on the insights of scholars who have spent years 
studying the depths and complexities of the selected texts, with this being 
particularly the case in relation to the early Russian authors. My attention, as I 
have said, concerns the underlying relationship between the artistic and the 
political as different imperatives, where I explore the dynamics of their 
intersections and ponder if there are qualities that might unite the texts across their 
differences, thus illuminating how the artistic and the political might come to 
resonate across time and space. 
In part this is an open inquiry, reflecting on the nature of the political and 
philosophical themes circulating in the novels, exploring how these are given a 
literary voice, and speculating on how various political/literary combinations 
might influence a work’s capacity to attract and sustain the lively interest of 
readers. A considerable proportion of the study is thus dedicated to exposition, 
that is, to the exploration and illustration of just how the texts do their 
artistic/political work. At the same time, the thesis is also an argument: an 
argument against ex-cathedra statements, an argument against binary oppositions, 
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and an argument against the assumption that a political discourse is necessarily 
antithetical to the artistic life of a text.  
This interlocking sequence of exposition and argument unfolds over the course of 
the thesis. Chapter Two focuses on the art/politics problematic, expanding on the 
issues raised earlier in this discussion; Chapter Three explains how I intend to 
draw on Bakhtin’s work, expanding on the perplexities as well as the richness of 
his insights. At the end of this chapter, I have a rich foundation on which to 
approach the texts, and several unanswered questions, with these centred on 
Bakhtin’s notions of unfinalizability, polyphony and a polyphonic truth. 
Following that, I discuss the novels in four bands, each representing a different set 
of responses to different political and literary circumstances. Chapter Four 
considers The Foundation Pit and The Master and Margarita as examples of 
works produced in the early to mid-Stalinist period; Chapter Five takes Bread and 
Wine, Darkness at Noon and Animal Farm as representatives of texts responding 
to the ideological crisis facing the European Left; Chapter Six reflects on In The 
First Circle, Cancer Ward and Everything Flows as part of the dissenting 
literature in the immediate post-Stalinist period; Chapter Seven compares We and 
Ninety Eighty-Four as examples of manifestly dystopian works. The final chapter 
draws the threads together and offers a series of suggestions about the qualities 





Contested territory: art and politics 
The great novelists are philosophical novelists; that is, the contrary of thesis-
writers. (Albert Camus, 1955/2000, p. 92) 
The novelist’s universe would lack depth if it were not discovered in a 
movement to transcend it. (Jean-Paul Sartre, 1948/2001, p. 45) 
There is a significant difference in emphasis in these two citations: Camus wants 
the novel to raise far-reaching philosophical issues; Sartre desires it to transcend 
the universe as currently known. Such differences form the theoretical 
background to my study: the point of my departure and the place to which I return 
in concluding. This chapter sketches the contours of this highly contested terrain, 
concentrating on those perspectives that have most influenced my approach. The 
discussion falls into four parts. First, a brief exposition of the underlying 
problematic, particularly as relates to the novel; second, detailed attention to 
Milan Kundera’s (1988, 1996, 2007) extended case against the politicized novel; 
third, a review of the wider debate on politically committed art; fourth, an 
explanation of the reasons for my own approach. I do not attempt any full 
exposition of the views involved, all of which trail a long history behind them, but 
simply flag their implications for my reading of the selected texts. As an epilogue 
to the chapter, I describe the 1966 trial of the Russian authors Yuri Daniel and 
Andrei Sinyavsky, a historic event that speaks to the shaping powers of fiction 
and the courage and conviction of the authors.1   
The underlying problematic 
That there is seen to be a tension between the artistic and the political in the first 
instance owes itself to their juxtaposition as two different forms of epistemology 
or logic. Illustrating this, Marten van Delden and Yvon Grenier (2012, p. 5) 
suggest that an artistic logic is characterized by its ‘keenness to cultivate various 
                                                 
1
 In setting parameters around the study, I distinguish the art/politics debate from the related 
argument as to whether or not art can/should serve a morally educative purpose, where the 
Formalists early challenged the ethically oriented positions of authors such as Leo Tolstoy 
(1898/1996) and Mathew Arnold (1869/2009). For contemporary discussions of the issue, see 
Booth 1988, Carey 2006, Jansen 2015, Nussbaum 1990 and Krapp 2002, among many others. 
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kinds of ambivalence’ and by ‘its welcome of the paradoxes that result from the 
simultaneous consideration of multiple views, sentiments and perspectives’. In 
contrast, a political logic ‘shuns irresolution and ambivalence’, favours ‘fairly 
symmetrical and impervious narratives’, and tends to look for ‘closure [and] 
action … rather than purely reflective or contemplative activities’ (p. 3). 
Similarly, Anne Surma (2012, p. 5) suggests that while the aim of an ‘art text’ is 
to ‘explore ideas and questions relating to the complexity of human experiences, 
actions, events and their interaction’, that of a ‘political text’ is to ‘offer singular 
answers to how best to interpret and manage those experiences, actions, events 
and their interaction’. Critically, Surma (2012, p. 5) also problematizes the 
distinction, arguing that ‘notwithstanding their different cultural positioning, some 
kind of interplay between producer, text, reader … is common to both’. 
The close intermeshing of the artistic and the political is integral to the novel as a 
literary form, given its grounding in its social and political circumstances. This by 
virtue of its origins: Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote has its hero reading so 
much about chivalry that he sets out to revive it; written just over a century later, 
Jonathon Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726) can be read as a satirical account of 
European government and much else besides. However, I submit that the potential 
tension between the artistic and the political as contrasting epistemologies is 
likely to be most marked in works with a specifically political content, where I 
refer broadly to the circulation of power and ideology, with all of their 
implications for our personal, social and political lives. 2  This is because in 
speaking about such matters we tend to speak about them in a political kind of 
way: that is, we set priorities, examine values, and suggest that the world should 
be ordered according to particular principles. In consequence, a political logic 
inescapably enters the artistic fabric of the text, influencing how ideas are 
presented and characters are portrayed, with this exposing authors to an inherently 
unsettled, and always-contested, domain. 
                                                 
2
 In establishing an approximate territory for the political novel, I follow Howe’s (1957/2002, p. 
17) description of it as one in which ‘political ideas play a dominant role or in which the political 
milieu is the dominant setting … or a novel which permits this assumption without thereby 
suffering any radical distortion’.  
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In building on the insights of van Delden and Grenier, I position the artistic and 
the political as ‘imperatives’, with this corresponding to, but expanding, their 
notion of the two as distinct ‘logics’. In this respect, I point to their inner energy, 
their driving forces, whereby the artistic represents the push towards creativity 
and expressing something in and for itself, and the political, the urge for 
commitment, for settling around particular values, views and priorities, with 
literary expression being largely a means to an end. Under this construction, there 
is a productive tension between the two elements, with the ‘in-itself’ of creativity 
pulling in an opposite direction to the ‘for something else’ of commitment. On 
these grounds, I continue to recognize the tension between the artistic and the 
political, but also signal their potential complementarity: something that van 
Delden and Grenier fully reveal during the course of their arguments and the 
depth of situated detail that characterizes their Gunshots at their Fiesta (2012).  
Implications for the novel 
The counter-totalitarian literature provides a particularly rich source for exploring 
the implications of the art/politics dynamic, for in defending social, political and 
intellectual freedoms, it protects the conditions on which the novel, as we have 
come to know it, depends. There is, then, a certain necessity to its literary/political 
enterprise; something that the novel must do if it is to survive. Put another way, if 
the sentiment underlying Victor Cousin’s ‘l’art pour l’art’ is to have any practical 
force, there needs to be an actual political-literary configuration in which authors 
have the freedom to practice their arts and readers the freedom to read and debate 
as they see fit.3 At the same time, the tension underlying Cousin’s aphorism—
whereby the creative and singular properties of art are channelled into a more 
systematic and purposeful form—persists. This is something authors have to 
actively negotiate, with their efforts always raising questions as to how far the 
artistic and the political can successfully speak to each other, or alternately, might 
                                                 
3
 Grenier (2006, p. 13) observes that ‘if a correlation exists between literature and freedom, the 
novel and non‐authoritarian politics, it involves not so much the writer’s political dispositions but 
the conditions of literary production themselves, at the center of which one finds some of the 
fundamental conditions for freedom itself: imagination, conversation, and criticism.’  
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dissolve into a form of literary didacticism in which something essential about 
artistic practice appears to have been distorted or lost.  
The tension at the core of the enterprise is accentuated by the fact that the novel’s 
traditions both invoke, even require, a response to monolithic domination, while 
also circumscribing the terms and conditions on which this response can be made. 
In concluding his 2011 Jerusalem Prize acceptance speech, Ian McEwan said: 
A novel, of course, is not merely a book, a physical object of pages and 
covers, but a particular kind of mental space, a place of exploration, of 
investigation into human nature. … Let me repeat -- the novel as a literary 
form was born out of curiosity about and respect for the individual. Its 
traditions impel it towards pluralism, openness, a sympathetic desire to 
inhabit the minds of others. (McEwan, 2011, np)   
If we set McEwan’s views against Arendt’s (1951/1967, p. 464) description of 
totalitarianism as a system aimed at ‘the destruction of plurality, and the reduction 
of the infinite differentiation of human beings to a single purpose or I’, the novel 
is counter-totalitarian by virtue of its literary form. The irony is that these same 
attributes circumscribe the extent to which authors can assert a countervailing 
ideology and/or use characters as their own political or moral servants. 
Addressing precisely this point, Bullock observes that:  
Just as the novel resists the utopian instinct … so too does it refuse to offer a 
coherent philosophy of its own … for to do so would be merely to replicate 
in inverse form the black and white premises of utopianism, and therefore 
fall victim to an identical didacticism. (Bullock, 2011, p. 94) 
Silone speaks to the difficulties in the ‘Author’s Note’ to the revised version of 
Bread and Wine. Here he explains that he had originally written his novel ‘ex 
abundantia cordis’ immediately following the invasion of Abyssinia and during 
the Moscow trials, when his ‘state of mind’ was more inclined to ‘overemphasis, 
sarcasm and melodrama than calm narration’. He continues: 
Should I now mention the lessons that it seems to me I have learned? The 
first is that a writer with a strong sense of social responsibility is more 
exposed than anyone else to the temptation of overemphasis, of the theatrical 
and romantic, and of a purely external description of things and facts, while 
in every work of literature the only thing that matters is the interior life of 
the individual. Another thing that has grown in me in the course of years is 
an aversion to all forms of propaganda. (Silone 1960/2000, pp. 179-80, my 
emphasis).  
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Silone subsequently revised the text to make it truer to fiction as he saw it. Should 
he have written differently in the first place? Hard to say; his regrets were voiced 
some twenty-five years after he first wrote Bread and Wine, a work that reflected 
the political circumstances of its times and cannot be extracted from them. But my 
underlying thesis is that any such question is itself misplaced; that it is better to 
desist from evaluating texts from the vantage point of either ‘Literature’ or 
‘Critique’ and from the outset to see them as artistic/political composites, with all 
the dense and tangled intersections that this implies. In taking this position, I 
come up against Kundera’s extended case against the politically assertive novel: a 
set of arguments with which I am in silent conversation throughout this thesis.  
Milan Kundera 
Essentially Kundera argues that by asserting a particular truth, the novel 
undermines its fundamental difference with authoritarian discourse. For him, the 
novel is ‘the imaginary paradise of individuals … the territory where no one 
possesses the truth, neither Anna nor Karenin, but where everyone has the right to 
be understood, both Anna and Karenin’ (1988, p. 159). Further:  
The incompatibility between the novel and totalitarianism is deeper than the 
one that separates a dissident from an apparatchik, or a human-rights 
campaigner from a torturer, because it is not only political or moral but 
ontological. By which I mean: the world of one single Truth and the relative 
ambiguous world of the novel are moulded of entirely different substances. 
(Kundera, 1988, p. 26)  
It is on this ‘ontological’ basis that Kundera takes his stand against the explicitly 
political or ‘committed’ novel. Elaborating on this, he describes how during the 
terror in Czechoslovakia, the only thing he ‘deeply avidly wanted, was a lucid, 
unillusioned eye’ (1995, p. 106). He found this in the ‘art of the novel’:  
[This offers] an outlook, a wisdom, a position; a position that would rule out 
any identification with any politics, any religion, any ideology, any moral 
doctrine, any group; a considered, stubborn, furious non-identification, 
conceived not as evasion or passivity, but as resistance, defiance, rebellion. 
(Kundera, 1995, p. 156, original emphasis) 
For Kundera (1995, p. 7) the novel’s refusal to pass moral judgement does not 
represent ‘the immorality of the novel, but its morality’ (original emphasis). On 
this point, he argues that in contrast with the ‘so-called philosophical novel’ 
typified by its subjugation to ‘moral or political ideas’: 
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Authentic novelistic thought is always unsystematic; undisciplined; it is 
similar to Nietzsche’s; it is experimental; it forces rifts in all the idea 
systems that surround us; it explores (particularly through its characters) all 
lines of thought by attempting to follow each one to its end. (Kundera, 1995, 
p. 172) 
Kundera (1995, p. 173) contends that conviction is the enemy of the novel, for it 
represents ‘a thought that has come to a stop, that has congealed’. Hence a 
novelist must ‘systematically desystematize his thought, kick at the barricade that 
he himself has erected around his thought’; Nietzsche, he maintains, is the model 
for philosophy, as his work represents ‘not epistemology, not aesthetic or ethics, 
the phenomenology of mind or the critique of reason etc., but everything human’ 
(p. 173, original emphasis). Elaborating on this matter, Grenier (2006, p. 3) 
suggests that:  
For Kundera, the point is not to separate completely the novel (and 
conceivably art in general) from politics. … In fact, politics is especially 
deserving of being “penetrated” and “unmasked” since it is the realm where 
reductive ideology and propaganda flourish. … The novelist speaks about 
politics, but from a higher position than politics, one that never fails to 
surround politics with its broader and more meaningful cultural context. 
(Grenier, 2006, p. 3)  
What is the particular viewpoint of the novelist according to Kundera? Above all, 
it is an essentially inquiring and hypothetical frame of mind, or, as Grenier (2006, 
p. 5) puts it, the novelist is ‘an “explorer of existence” rather than a prophet or a 
historian’. Precisely because the novelist is not ‘longing for final solutions’, 
Kundera conceives the novel ‘as intrinsically incompatible with authoritarianism, 
especially in its most radical form: totalitarianism’ (Grenier, 2006, p. 5). The 
corresponding notion of the novelist as one who is not political—or is somehow 
outside the political—is core to Kundera’s sense of identity, on which he records 
that he has encountered many ‘odd conversations’: 
‘Are you a communist, Mr Kundera?’ ‘No, I am a novelist.’ ‘Are you a 
dissident?’ No, I am a novelist.’ ‘Are you on the Left or the Right?’ 
‘Neither, I am a novelist.’ (Kundera, 1995, p. 156) 
Kundera strongly objects to the politicized reading of texts, recording how he 
‘deeply, violently, detests those who look for a position—political, philosophical, 
religious, whatever—in a work of art rather than searching in it in an effort to 
know, to understand, to grasp this or that aspect of reality’ (Kundera, 1995, p. 91). 
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This is closely related to his critique of western readings of the literature of 
Eastern Europe, where he declares that: 
If you cannot view the art that comes to you from Prague, Budapest or 
Warsaw in any other way than this wretched political code, you murder it, 
no less brutally than the work of Stalinist dogmatists. And you are quite 
unable to hear its true voice. The importance of this art does not lie in the 
fact that it pillories this or that political regime, but that, on the strength of 
social and human experience of a kind people here in the West cannot 
imagine, it offers new testimony about mankind. (Kundera, 1977, p. 6l; cited 
by Lodge, 1990, p. 159) 4 
When a participant in a panel discussion referred to The Joke as a ‘major 
indictment of Stalinism’, Kundera retorted ‘spare me your Stalinism, please. The 
Joke is a love story’ (cited by Lodge, 1990, p. 159). But Kundera, of course, 
cannot control how his works will be read and interpreted: texts have a life 
independent of their authors, and, as Grenier (2006, p. 3) comments, many of 
Kundera’s novels ‘can be effortlessly interpreted as political novels’. The result, 
‘is an oeuvre in which the tension between the intent of the author and the 
“intention of the text” yields a fruitful and stimulating ambiguity for both social 
scientists and literary critics’ (Grenier, 2006, p. 3).  
Kundera’s critique of the politicized novel leads to his thoroughgoing 
condemnation of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. ‘Orwell’s novel’, he proclaims, 
‘is firmly closed to poetry; did I say novel? It is political thought disguised as a 
novel’ (1995, p. 222). He concedes that Orwell’s thinking ‘is certainly lucid and 
correct’, but nevertheless maintains that ‘Orwell’s situations and characters are as 
a flat as a poster’, unable to throw light on the ‘human situation’ (p. 222). In 
considering whether Nineteen Eighty-Four ‘might at least be justified as a 
popularization of good ideas’, he returns a resounding negative arguing that ‘ideas 
turned into a novel function no longer as ideas but as a novel instead, and in the 
case of 1984, as a bad novel, with all the pernicious influence that a bad novel can 
                                                 
4
 Varlam Shalamov says something strikingly similar of Kolyma Tales: ‘my writing is no more 
about camps than St-Exupéry's is about the sky or Melville's about the sea. My stories are 
basically advice to an individual on how to act in a crowd... [To be] not just further to the left than 
the left, but also more real than reality itself. For blood to be true and nameless.’ 
(http://shalamov.ru/en/) 
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exert’ (p. 223). Quite what this ‘pernicious influence’ represents, and in what 
respects it is exercised by Nineteen Eighty-Four, is left unsaid.5    
In maintaining that ‘experimental thinking conjugates with uncertainty, 
polyphony, and perpetual quest’ and ‘ideologies connect to truth, dogma, and 
final judgment’ (Grenier, 2006, p. 6), Kundera has much in common with 
Bakhtin. The problem is that he makes his case by reducing the political to 
partisan debate, and, as Grenier (2006, p. 14) comments, forgets that politics as 
‘as a dimension of human experience to be reflected upon’ can be subject to 
‘sophisticated and detailed comments and investigation’. Further, he collapses his 
definitional and evaluative criteria, turns his preferences into prescriptions, and 
imposes his own set of rules on a genre that he positions as outside the pernicious 
influence of rule-making. Most problematically, his views are based on a dualistic 
view of art and politics, where the assertions of a didactic politics are placed in 
sharp contrast with the imaginative creativity of art, allowing little or no room for 
their creative interaction, 
At this point, I leave Kundera for the longstanding debate on politically 
committed art, where protagonists variously query whether the political and the 
artistic can intersect in a compelling and lively way, or, alternatively, stand to 
contradict and undermine each other. In elaborating on these issues, I compare the 
‘committed’ positions of Jean-Paul Sartre (1948/2001) and Bertolt Brecht 
(1949/1964) with the ‘distanced’ readings of Theodor Adorno (1970/2004, 
1973/2007) and Jacques Rancière (2010, 2011). While I benefit from each side of 
the debate, I take issue with the abstracted and prescriptive nature of the 
arguments, their distance from the practices of authors and readers, and their 
dislocation from the social and political circumstances in which texts originate 
and take on their significance.  
                                                 
5
 As noted in Chapter One, Orwell’s counter to Kundera can found in his essay ‘Why I Write’ 
where he explains that he writes aesthetically, feeling strongly about prose style and taking 
pleasure in ‘solid objects and scraps of useless information’, but also politically, with his starting 
point ‘always a feeling of partisanship, a sense of injustice’ (1946a/2000pp. 5-6).  
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The art/politics debate 
On behalf of political committed art: Sartre and Brecht 
As a founding member of Les Temps Modernes, Sartre used its initial issue 
(October, 1945) to argue that literature’s failure to engage at a political level was 
tantamount to supporting the status quo. He expanded on this in a series of essays 
published under the title What is Literature? (1948/2001). Making the case that 
the ‘aesthetic imperative’ is simultaneously a ‘moral’ one, he starts with a 
problematic distinction between prose and poetry. The poet ‘sees words inside out 
as if he did not share the human condition’ (p. 6). In contrast, in prose: 
Words are not first of all objects but designations for objects; it is not first of 
all a matter of knowing whether they please or displease in themselves, but 
whether they correctly indicate a certain thing or certain notion. (Sartre, 
1948/2001, p. 6)  
Sartre then argues that the ‘committed’ writer is one who ‘knows that words are 
action’ and who understands that ‘to reveal is to change, and that one can reveal 
only by planning to change’ (p. 14). Taking an extreme view, he contends that 
‘there are only good and bad novels’ and that what distinguishes one from the 
other is not artistic merit but ethical purpose: ‘the bad novel aims to please by 
flattering, whereas the good one is an exigence and an act of faith’ (p. 47). 
Acknowledging that the impact of a text ultimately depends on the act of reading, 
‘without which there are only black marks on paper’ (p. 29), Sartre proposes that: 
To write is thus to both disclose the world and to offer it as a task to the 
generosity of the reader … but as the real world is changed only by action, 
as one can feel oneself in it only by exceeding to in order to change it, the 
novelist’s universe would lack depth if it were not discovered in a movement 
to transcend it. (Sartre, 1948/2001, p. 45) 
For Sartre, the aims of writing and reading should thus be moral rather than 
aesthetic, with this ‘rising above’ the varied pleasures and frustrations that both 
may bring. While his fundamental support for political commitment would make 
him sympathetic to the endeavours of the selected authors, his assertion that the 
act of writing should transcend the universe as currently known cannot respond to 
their more grounded concerns. I wonder, for example, how he would reply to Ivan 
Grigoryevich when he says ‘I used to think freedom was freedom of speech, 
freedom of press, freedom of conscience … but freedom is the same whether you 
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are a locksmith or a steelworker or an artist—freedom is the right to live and work 
as you wish and not as you are ordered to’ (Everything Flows, p. 84). 
Brecht, writing contemporaneously with Sartre, similarly collapses the artistic and 
the political. ‘For art to be unpolitical,’ he insists, ‘means only to ally itself with 
the “ruling” group’ (1949/1964, p. 196). More than Sartre, he attempts to translate 
his political principles into an artistic practice. Commenting on this, Douglas 
Kellner (nd) draws attention to the influence of Karl Korsch, who Brecht referred 
to as ‘my Marxist teacher’. Korsch, who was one of the first intellectuals to be 
thrown out of the Communist Party for deviating from the Party line, stressed the 
historically distinct and specific features of bourgeois society together with the 
development of a method that allowed these to be analysed as distinct social 
formations. Consequently, Brecht’s plays centre on a specific environment or 
period, illustrating how its features shape, assault and destroy its characters (for 
example, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, The Threepenny Opera and Mother 
Courage). His main innovation, the ‘estrangement’ effect (verfremdungseffekt) 
aims to break the illusion of theatre and prevent audiences from self-identifying 
with the characters by disclosing and making obvious its artistic techniques. For 
Brecht: 
The artist’s objective is to appear strange and even surprising to the 
audience. He achieves this by looking strangely at himself and his work … 
the aim of this technique, known as the alienation effect, is to make the 
spectator adopt an attitude of inquiry and criticism to the incident. (Brecht, 
1949/1964, p.136) 
Estrangement is often linked to the Russian formalists’ ostranenie. 
Etymologically, the two notions—Verfremdungseffekt and ostranenie—are 
commonly grounded in the ‘strange’ (‘fremd’ in the German term and ‘stranyi’ in 
the Russian). Further, both involve distancing the viewer/reader from the 
play/text, prolonging Viktor Shklovsky’s ‘process of perception’ (1917/1988, p. 
20). But there the resemblances end, and the differences are significant. For the 
Formalists, defamiliarization is an artistic end in itself, the means by which the 
‘process of perception is slowed’ and we come to apprehend ‘a stone as stony’ 
(Shklovsky, 1917/1988, p. 20). For Brecht, estrangement is first and foremost a 
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political strategy, designed to distance the audience from the play in order that 
they will grasp the structural issues involved and be moved to political action.  
So, and as with Sartre, we see the subordination of art to a designated 
political/ethical purpose. Brecht’s stance is the more puzzling as he was well 
aware of the enforcement of socialist realism in the Soviet Union and had to 
struggle with its implications for playwrights as he did with the more general 
trajectory of political developments under Stalin. In both his and Sartre’s 
formulations, there is little appreciation of the dictatorial logic of the 
aesthetic/political collapse, nor of the highly varied ways in which 
artistic/political combinations may shape our consciousness. Theirs are essentially 
directives for artistic/political practice, not observations on how, and with what 
effects, artworks are created in particular political and social circumstances. It is 
with the purpose-driven nature of their accounts that their contemporary, Adorno, 
takes issue. 
The case against commitment: Adorno and Rancière 
A leading member of the Frankfurt School, Adorno sees modernity, with its 
indefatigable drive to rationalization, standardization and conformity, as the 
ultimate cause of domination and oppression, whether in its state-capitalist, fascist 
or Soviet manifestations (Jay, 1984). Under these conditions, art can best resist by 
not having a purpose: ‘in so far as a social function can be predicated from works 
of art, it is their functionless’ (Adorno 1970/2004, p. 297). Adorno argues that 
contemporary artists, while largely free of the systems of religious and aristocratic 
patronage of earlier epochs, have become subject to a ‘culture industry’ that 
produces standardized cultural goods, leading to mass stupefaction and docility. 
Hence if they are to preserve the distinctiveness of their work, they need to stand 
back from political critique and concentrate on developing the ‘truth content’ 
(‘Wahrheitsgehalt’) of art, a complex notion based on the internal dialectic 
between form and content, where the work illuminates the core of the human 
tragedy as experienced in the here and now, while leaving matters practically 
unchanged: ‘art has truth as the semblance of the illusionless’ (Adorno, 
1970/2004, p. 132).  
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While his theoretical position means he is pessimistic about this happening, 
Adorno sees opportunities in the avant-garde, dissonant and disruptive, arguing 
that these are able to disturb convention and follow their own patterns and 
rhythms. In literature, he favours Kafka and Beckett; in poetry, Celan; in music, 
Schoenberg. Their works, he argues, so thoroughly expose their own internal 
contradictions that they force readers/viewers to contemplate the hidden 
contradictions in society at large; a quality he describes as ‘the artfulness of all 
anti-art’ (1970/2004, p. 39). The point here is obscurity: audiences must be left 
with a profound uncertainty as to the reality of things, they cannot be directed, as 
in Brecht’s case, to the underlying patterns as perceived by the author. 
Adorno reserves his specific criticisms of Sartre and Brecht for an essay entitled 
‘Commitment’ (1973/2007). Here he contends that ‘all that remains’ in Sartre’s 
form of engagement is ‘the abstract authority of a choice enjoined, with no regard 
for the fact that the possibility of choosing depends on what can be chosen’ 
(Adorno, 1973/2007, p. 180). Further, Sartre’s works are ‘bad models of his own 
existentialism, because they display in their respect for truth the whole 
administered world his philosophy ignores: the lesson we learn from them is one 
of unfreedom’ (p. 180). Adorno is kinder to Brecht, seeing him as ‘more 
consistent than Sartre and a greater artist’, and as endeavouring to ‘translate the 
true hideousness of society into theatrical appearance, by dragging it straight out 
of its camouflage’ (pp. 182-3). Nevertheless, he maintains that Brecht’s elevation 
of ‘the didactic play as an artistic principle’ means that the ‘primacy of lesson 
over form … became a formal device itself’ (p. 184). Most critically, his ‘didactic 
poetics’ with their rejection of ‘artistic individuation’ obscure the very political 
truth they seek to demonstrate, for this truth ‘involves innumerable meditations, 
which Brecht disdains’ (p. 184).6 
Adorno’s case against didacticism is convincing. However, his position on the 
‘purposelessness’ of art depends on his critique of capitalism under conditions of 
late modernity, where authors are relatively free to express their views, even if 
                                                 
6
 Instructively, Adorno also criticizes Brecht for his failure to be more openly critical of Stalinism: 
‘for what he justified was not simply, as he long sincerely believed, an incomplete socialism, but a 
coercive domination in which blindly irrational social forces returned to work once again’ (p. 187). 
 43 
this is to assert the right of not having a purpose. Hence he cannot properly 
respond to the circumstances confronting the Russian authors, where the right to 
speak is itself in jeopardy. Further, his marked preference for the obscure neglects 
the variety of ways in which art can provoke and compel, and how these are 
embedded in the historical context in which a work is produced. So, for the 
purposes of this study, we have the ‘foundation’ but not the ‘solution’ to an 
understanding of the density of the art/politics problematic.  
From the early 1960s, the move to poststructuralism challenged the meta-
narratives associated with the respective positions of Sartre and Brecht. This did 
not so much erase the arts/politics debate as recast it in a different key, with 
Rancière being one of the most widely cited (post-Marxist) theorists in the 
contemporary context. Originally a student of Althusser’s and later a critic of his 
pessimistic reductionism, Rancière argues that:  
Political art is an in-between notion that is vacuous as an aesthetic notion 
and also as a political notion. It can be said that an artist is committed as a 
person, and possibly that he is committed by his writings, his paintings, his 
films, which contribute to a certain type of political struggle. An artist can be 
committed, but what does it mean to say that his art is committed? 
Commitment is not a category of art. This does not mean that art is 
apolitical. It means that aesthetics has its own politics, or its own meta-
politics. (Rancière, 2004a, p. 60) 
Rancière shifts the problematic from the notion of freedom, so important to 
Sartre, to equality, with equality construed as our equal claim to be considered 
significant, to count in public. This is not the equality of liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, but as Andy Lavender (2012, p. 310) points out, ‘a free space of 
individuation’ in which ‘communities are defined not so much by their 
togetherness as by their facilitation of difference, the fact that they enable 
individual expression’. Building on this, Rancière redefines the notion of politics 
to mean the arena in which we are able to challenge established perceptions of 
what carries significance and weight in our public life, or, as he terms it, ‘the 
distribution of the perceptible’. In a widely quoted statement, he claims that: 
All political activity is a conflict aimed at what is speech or mere growl; in 
other words, aimed at retracting the perceptible boundaries by means of 
which political capacity is demonstrated. (Rancière, 2011, p. 4)  
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Rancière argues that the hierarchical logics of the academic disciplines and 
bureaucratic institutions establish what is to count as significant in public life. 
Hence the emancipatory potential of an artwork comes to depend on its ability ‘to 
disrupt the relationship between the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable without 
having to use the terms of the message as a vehicle’ (Rancière, 2004, p. 63); or, as 
Tony Fisher (2011, p. 3) puts it, in its ability to ‘remain politically significant 
without assuming a doctrinal standpoint or aspiring to social activism’. 
In a parallel move, Rancière argues for a challenge to the rules governing art 
itself. In The Politics of Aesthetics (2004a), he distinguishes between the ‘ethical’, 
‘representative’ and ‘aesthetic’ regimes of art. These regimes are not so much 
temporal (although they do have distinct cultural and historical associations) as 
distinctive ways of thinking about the relationship between art and society. Each 
of the ethical and representative regimes establish hierarchical standards for 
evaluating art: under the ethical regime these relate to art’s perceived value to 
society; under the representative regime, to art’s capacities to portray/represent 
reality in distinctive and superior ways. The aesthetic regime challenges these 
hierarchies by inserting art into the fabric of society, where it insists on art’s 
‘absolute singularity’ while destroying ‘any pragmatic criterion for isolating this 
singularity’ (Rancière, 2004a, p. 23). In a formulation that resembles Brecht’s, but 
stripped of its political imperatives, Rancière argues that: 
Critical art is an art that aims to produce a new perception of the world, and 
therefore to create a commitment to its transformation. This schema, very 
simple in appearance, is actually the conjunction of three processes: first, the 
production of a sensory form of ‘strangeness’; second, the development of 
an awareness of the reason for that strangeness, and third, a mobilization of 
individuals as a result of that awareness. (Rancière, 2010, p. 142) 
What Rancière offers is a highly abstract formulation, a template, operating at a 
significant distance from the coalface where authors actually put words to paper 
and attempt to make them work. How, I wonder, might he respond to Silone’s 
(1949/2001, p. 113) reflection that for him ‘writing has represented … the painful 
and lonely continuation of a struggle’ and that if he has written books ‘it has been 
to try and understand and to make others understand’. Just what a work like Bread 
and Wine might ‘help us understand’ is open to dispute, but I suggest that 
Rancière does little to help us appreciate what is involved in the production of the 
 45 
text, where we have Silone’s struggle with fascism, the spoiling of his 
revolutionary hopes, and his commitments to the people of the Abruzzi.   
Towards my own position 
What are the implications of these contrasting positions for my own approach to 
the artistic/political relationship? First, I accept each of Adorno and Rancière’s 
cautions concerning any mandatory harnessing of art to politico-ideological 
purposes. Particularly given the consequences of the compulsory enforcement of 
socialist realism, I endorse Adorno’s (1973/2007, p. 184) suggestion that any 
form of mandatory commitment can limit ‘artistic individuation’ and impose a 
single version of truth against its ‘innumerable meditations’. At the same time, I 
question his and Rancière’s systematic preference for the more obviously 
‘strange’ forms of artistic representation. In the case of the novel, this ignores the 
likelihood that the conventional and unconventional are likely to coexist in any 
given case. As Bakhtin insists, the novel is not a pure art form but a pastiche, 
incorporating the multiple discourses of everyday life with which it is constantly 
in dialogue. Hence elements of a political logic will almost invariably coexist with 
its more creative and open-ended modes of literary expression. Rather than wish 
these factors away as artistic hindrances, I argue for the importance of reflecting 
on them in an open and curious fashion.  
I also take issue with the level of abstraction at which Adorno and Rancière pitch 
their arguments, whereby the consequences of individual artworks are ‘read off’ 
certain principles about how the artistic ‘ought’ to operate to achieve certain 
effects. This effectively skips or assumes the responses of readers and/or viewers. 
Depending on how and to whom it is expressed, a political logic may cause 
alienation, frustration, impatience or passive acceptance, or, alternatively, widen 
the discursive scope of a text, offer anchorage points in an otherwise free-floating 
discussion, and/or provide grounds for ongoing contest and controversy. The 
question, then, is not what texts ‘ought’ to do, but how they actually do in fact 
achieve their effects, always taking the variability and unpredictability of the 
‘ordinary’ reader into account.  
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Under rarified constructions such as these, texts are effectively removed from the 
exigencies of their social and political contexts. As Michael Holquist points out, 
‘literary texts, like other kinds of utterance, depend not only on the activity of the 
author but also on the place they hold in the social and historical forces at work 
when the text is written and when it is consumed’ (1990, p. 68). Gabriel Rockhill, 
Rancière’s translator and critic, goes to the point at issue when he says:  
I would like to argue in favour of abandoning unnecessary conceptual 
abstraction and the reification of art and politics in the name of 
understanding them as socio-historical practices that can and have been 
linked in various ways. Art and politics have no fixed natures. They are 
concepts in a struggle that vary according to the social setting and historical 
conjuncture. (Rockhill, 2011, p. 46)  
In relating this to the historical conjuncture of the selected texts, I point out that 
the ideologies associated with fascism and Stalinism were of a particularly 
totalising kind, threatening the social and political freedoms on which literature 
depended. They thus invited an equally strong political response, a kind of 
political counter-stroke: to give the open-ended and plural a clear predominance 
over the critical and assertive might have seemed an unaffordable luxury given the 
urgency of the times. In saying this, I am by no means suggesting that the overtly 
political stance of an Orwell cannot be questioned or evaluated. Neither am I 
proposing that critical assertions do not carry risks and tensions for the literary. 
What I am saying is that in order to understand the specificity of the 
literary/political interplay one must grasp, properly grasp, the circumstance in 
which it arise. There are, of course, multiple ways of challenging monolithic 
domination, realist and fantastic, transparent and oblique, and their 
literary/political potential cannot be understood in an abstract way, but only 
through a detailed immersion in the varied arts of the novel and the political 
circumstances in which these are given particular forms of expression.  
To pause for a moment on this issue of context: here I take careful note of Rita 
Felski’s (2011, p. 577) argument that history is not ‘a kind of box or container in 
which individual texts are encased and held fast’, but rather ‘a profusion of 
whirlpools and rapids, eddies and flows, in which objects, ideas, images, and texts 
from different moments swirl, tumble, and collide in ever-changing combinations 
and constellations’ (p. 578). Further, and drawing on the work of Bruno Latour 
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(2005), Felski argues that if we are to understand the work of texts we need to 
‘slow down at each step’ and ‘forego theoretical shortcuts’ (p. 578). While I do 
not undertake the kind of microscopic work that Felski enjoins, I do attempt to 
‘slow down’ and pay close attention to the workings of the selected texts in all the 
immediacy of their social, political and literary circumstances.  
Hence the brunt of my argument is that prescriptive and/or abstract readings of the 
artistic/political relationship stand to ignore what living, practising authors do in 
the actual circumstances confronting them. To give an analogy: it is like 
theorizing how buildings ought to be constructed while ignoring how they have in 
fact been built in particular periods and circumstances, with particular effects for 
those who inhabit these dwellings. It is, in other words, a restricted reading, 
conducted from ‘on high’. Against this, I reiterate my case for a careful 
consideration of the varied work undertaken by texts in all the particularities of 
their individual circumstances. Such an approach will not lead to any definitive 
set of propositions, but by the same token is more likely to reveal the rich and 
often contradictory ways in which the artistic and the political combine in any 
given set of historical circumstances. 
Finally, I press that the relationship between art and politics will always be 
subject to contestation and dispute. And this is something to be celebrated, not 
ironed out by theoretical critique. It matters whether we prefer a Tolstoy or a 
Dostoevsky; whether or not we think Bakhtin interpreted Dostoevsky correctly; 
and whether we think that the novel has a serious role in the evaluation of political 
and ethical matters in the first instance. Such debates contribute to the novel’s 
capacity to speak to us across time and space in a lively and compelling way. 
They form part of our shared conversations about the nature of literature and help 
form our responses toward a particular work: they are matters that we write about, 
think about and talk about. They belong, in short, to the democratic space, with its 
opportunities for dialogue and debate, on which the novel, as we have come to 
know it, depends.  
It is on this basis that I approach the selected texts, seeing art and politics as 
situated practices rather than objective categories, and as involving particular 
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literary and political tasks dependent on the historical context, with these having 
variable consequences for a text’s capacity to resonate across time and space. In 
the next chapter I explain why Bakhtin offers such a productive, if sometimes 
contradictory, basis for this kind of situated exploration. Before concluding this 
part of the discussion, I wish to offer a brief account of the 1966 trial of the 
Russian authors, Yuri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky. As well as speaking to the 
courage and convictions of the two authors, the event demonstrates the power of 
fiction in protesting the political and the miserable nature of the logic that 
attempts to hold it in check. I therefore want to acknowledge and record it. 
Epilogue: fiction on trial 
Writing under the pen names Nikolai Arzhak and Abram Tertz, Daniel and 
Sinyavsky had managed to get several of their critical pieces published in the 
West. Daniel was sentenced to five years in the labour camps, Sinyavsky to seven. 
Their works were not available in the Soviet Union and had never posed a serious 
threat to the security of the regime. Proving almost totally counterproductive for 
the regime, the proceedings sent ‘a powerful message of self-liberation to the 
nascent democratic movement, a message that far exceeded the impact of the 
authors’ underground works’ (Parthé, 2004, p. xii). The question, then, is why the 
authorities reacted as they did. Political miscalculation? Customary heavy-
handedness? Almost certainly both, but something more fundamental was also at 
stake, something relating to the political voice of fiction. As Marshall Shatz 
(1980, p. 120) observes, by putting Sinyavsky and Daniel in the dock the 
authorities tacitly confirmed the shaping powers of fiction and validated the 
author’s role as social critic.  
Socialist realism, endorsed as the Party’s sole official style in 1934, remained the 
approved literary form. Obliging authors to create ‘positive heroes’ who 
supported developments in the Soviet Union, it presupposed their responsibility 
for the views of the character they created. Reflecting this, and throughout the 
trial, the prosecution applied a ‘dogged literalism’ to the fictional and fantastic, 
attributing to the authors themselves the views of the characters they had created 
(Shatz, 1980, p. 119). In defending their works, Daniel and Sinyavsky countered 
that fictional texts could not be treated in this way, as satire, hyperbole and 
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fantasy were literary devices, and needed to be judged accordingly. At the same 
time, they acknowledged the political content of their works and in this respect 
were at one with the prosecution. As Shatz reflects:  
[While] the authors based their defence primarily on the autonomy of 
literature, the freedom of the artist to choose the literary form that will best 
express the creative process of his imagination … they could not fully reject 
the political role of literature in the name of “pure art” though this was the 
strongest line of defence. In fact, their works were deeply concerned with 
Stalinism and the origins of his despotism. (Shatz, 1980, p. 120) 
Daniel’s indictment centred on his satirical novel This is Moscow Speaking 
(Arzhak/Daniel 1961/1969). The book opens with Moscow radio announcing that 
August 10th, 1960, would be a ‘Public Murder Day’, and that all citizens over the 
age of sixteen could settle old grievances by killing any other citizens, excepting 
security officials, police and members of the armed forces. The hero of the story, 
a war veteran considered killing those responsible for the atrocities of the Stalinist 
era, but his memories of war and slaughter fill him with such revulsion that he 
concludes that he wants to kill no one. Throughout the trial Daniel made his 
political intentions clear: 
In 1960, when I was writing this story, I – and not only I, but any person 
who thought seriously about the situation in our country – was convinced 
that the country was on the eve of a cult of personality. Stalin had not been 
dead all that long. We all remembered what were called ‘violations of 
socialist legality’. … We saw again how one single name appeared on the 
pages of newspapers and on posters, how the most banal and crude statement 
of this person was being held up to us as a revelation, as the quintessence of 
wisdom. (Labedz & Hayward, 1966, p. 61) 
When the prosecution accused him of perpetrating a ‘malicious slander on the 
Ukrainian people’, Daniel countered by asserting that fantasy could not be 
slanderous as it was not credible: ‘I told you once before what slander is. It is 
something that it is credible. And the situation I depict is not credible. And if you 
can’t believe it, it’s not slander, it’s fantasy’ (Labedz and Hayward, 1966, p. 70). 
Nevertheless, he immediately continued, ‘but I want to repeat that everything I 
wrote would be possible if the personality cult were to be restored. If it were to 
return, anything could happen. I feel nothing is impossible if the state is under the 
control of one man’ (Labedz and Hayward, 1966, p. 70). Making his political and 
personal commitments clear, he said his greatest concern in writing This is 
Moscow Speaking was to show that:  
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A human being should remain a human being, no matter in what 
circumstances he may find himself, no matter under what pressure and from 
what quarter. He should remain true to himself, to himself alone, and have 
nothing to do with anything that his conscience rejects that goes against 
human instinct. (Labedz & Hayward, 1966, p. 62) 
In Sinyavsky’s case, the charge centred on two dystopian novels, The Trial Begins 
(1960/1982) and Lyubimov (translated into English as The Makepeace Experiment 
1963/1989). The Trial Begins, is set at the time of the ‘Doctor’s Plot’ (1953) and 
portrays the torrid climate of Stalin’s last years with its ‘atmosphere of arrests and 
suspicion’ (Labedz and Hayward, 1966, p. 103).7 At the core of the book is the 
everyday nature of terror. The narrator opens by saying ‘I hadn’t heard them 
knock. There were two of them in plain clothes standing at the doorway. They had 
modest, thoughtful faces and they looked like twins’ (p. 5). Later, he describes 
how Globov is ‘delighted by the absence of formality’ that characterises his 
meetings with the secret police: 
How deluded was the mercenary Western press whose scribblers portrayed 
these men as sombre villains! In reality, they couldn’t be nicer, they were 
witty, home-loving … many of them liked fishing in their spare time, or 
cooking, or making toys for children. One senior Interrogator, employed on 
cases of the utmost gravity, used his leisure knitting gloves and 
embroidering doilies and cushion covers. (The Trial Begins, 1960/1982, p. 
89) 
In contrast to The Trial Begins, Lyubimov centres on the illusions and dangers of 
utopian politics. In it, Lenny Makepeace, a bicycle mechanic, acquires psychic 
powers through which he convinces the community of Lyubimov that they are 
already living in a free and prosperous town. Lenny himself is an enigma. As the 
narrator notes: 
To this day the discussion continues among the masses as to who Leonard 
Makepeace really was and by what mysterious power he succeeded in 
dominating the city. There are people who believe him to have been an 
envoy of God and others that he was sent by the Devil. Personally I stick 
by the view that there was nothing mysterious or supernatural about his 
origins and that his whole career can perfectly well be explained in 
scientific terms. (The Makepeace Experiment, 1965/1989, p. 39) 
                                                 
7
 The Doctor’s Plot refers to the arrest of nine doctors on the charge of conspiring to murder 
government and Party officials. Six were Jewish. All of the doctors confessed their ‘guilt’; this 
was secured under torture. Stalin died shortly after the arrests and the trial did not take place. The 
seven doctors who survived the investigation were exonerated. 
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Most broadly, the novel parodies Stalin’s isolationism and ideology of progress. 
With the help of an electric signalling system that turns intruders away, 
Makepeace ensures that ‘the city has vanished as if the earth had swallowed it’ (p. 
102). Thus separated from the rest of the world, he dreams of a time in which ‘we 
can begin thinking of expansion on a mass scale’ and where ‘by the living force of 
our example and our influence over progressive minds’ we will ‘gain the 
recognition and sympathy of the world…’ (p. 102). When the prosecutor 
suggested that Lyubimov was defamatory, Sinyavsky responded in terms similar 
to Daniel’s, stressing the ‘illusory’ nature of the novel: 
I invested this backwoods town of Lyubimov with some of my favourite 
qualities of the marvellous and fantastic. The people who walk around the 
town are ghosts, and change their substance. It is pure fantasy. The basic 
idea is one of illusoriness, of invisibility. This is not a real town, it’s a town 
existing only in my imagination. The novel is a lyrical one, not a political 
one. (Labedz & Hayward, 1966, pp. 106-7) 
A lyrical but not a political novel? Surely it would be more accurate to say that the 
novel is political in a lyrical kind of way: such being precisely Sinyavsky’s point 
in his critical essay on socialist realism, where he writes: 
Right now I put my hope into a phantasmagoric art, with hypotheses instead 
of Purpose. … Such an art would correspond best to the spirit of our time. 
May the fantastic imagery of Hoffman and Dostoevski, of Goya, Chagall, 
and Mayakovski … and of many other realists and non-realists teach us how 
to be truthful with the aid of the absurd and the fantastic. (Tertz/Sinyavsky, 
1960/1982, p. 218, my emphasis)  
In so far as they distinguished fiction from politics, Sinyavsky and Daniel were 
pressing the point that authors are artists, not political functionaries. But it was 
precisely the power of fiction to speak with a political voice and to help shape the 
future that was at issue. This was why the two wrote as they did; this was why the 
authorities were so troubled. And it is precisely this—fiction’s shaping powers, 
their ability to represent, record and resist the political—that provides the 
foundations for my inquiry; the basis from which I could not otherwise proceed.  
Further, and as is well-represented in the novels of Sinyavsky and Daniel, we 
have the conjunction of the two forces at the core of my inquiry: the artistic and 
the political. As established, I see these to represent two imperatives: the creative 
and the committed, with the creative pressing towards the open and the original, 
and the committed towards closure and coherence. If the abstractions discussed in 
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this chapter fail to reveal the dynamics of this relationship, it is because they are 
too far-removed from the sites in which texts are laboured over and produced. By 
the same token, they are too distant from the novelist’s tools of trade, the practices 
that make the whole literary/political enterprise possible. To gain insights into 
these practices, I turn to the work of Bakhtin. This is contemporaneous with that 
of many of the authors considered here, illuminates the multiple ways in which 
the artistic and the political can interact in any given set of circumstances, and 






Bakhtin: a perplexing guide  
The dialogic nature of consciousness is the dialogic nature of human life 
itself. The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human 
existence is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To 
live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to 
agree, and so forth. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 293) 
Many of Bakhtin’s most important insights into the novel were developed during 
the 1930s when he was in exile in Kazakhstan. By that time literature was firmly 
under the control of the Party and the principles associated with socialist realism 
strictly enforced. His propositions thus stand as a fundamental refusal of 
contemporary developments as well as an affirmation of his own theoretical and 
ethical commitments. In drawing on his work, I pay particular attention to 
dialogism and polyphony, parody and the carnivalesque, and the time-space 
configurations of chronotope. In each of these respects, Bakhtin illuminates how 
the novel, by virtue of its traditions, can express political ideas in a literary kind of 
way. At the same time, his central contrasts between the monological and 
dialogical, the centripetal and centrifugal qualities of language, and the notions of 
finalizability and unfinalizability invite critical reflection in so far as they obscure 
the multiple and complex ways in which the literary and the political can interact 
in any given text. This is something to which I return throughout the thesis. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide a broad-based introduction to Bakhtin’s work, 
doing as much justice as I can to its theoretical complexity  
At the outset, I note that critics disagree widely over how to best interpret 
Bakhtin’s work, variously emphasizing its phenomenological, political, 
ideological and literary elements.1 Some of the earlier enthusiastic interpretations 
have been followed by critical analyses. Ken Hirschkop (1999, 2001), in 
particular, maintains that Bakhtin not only returned obsessively to the same 
problematic but also borrowed heavily from the work of others. But it can be 
pointed out that Bakhtin developed his notions in the collegiate environment of 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Bernard-Donals 1994, Clark and Holquist 1984, Emerson 1997, Holquist 1990, 
Morson and Emerson 1990) and Todorov 1985 among many others. 
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the Bakhtin Circle, where participants were actively engaged in the exchange of 
ideas, collectively drawing on developments in contemporary German philosophy 
(Brandist 2002). Leaving that aside, the critical issue for my purposes is Bakhtin’s 
contribution to our understanding of the interaction between the artistic and the 
political. In discussing this, I follow a series of steps, starting with Bakhtin’s key 
notion of dialogism and its implications for the novel.  
Dialogism and the language of the novel 
Dialogism signifies that all our different types of expression form part of a 
continuing chain of utterances, with each presupposing, inviting and anticipating 
the other, and in which meanings are relative to the situated position of speaker 
and addressee. For Bakhtin, ‘only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal 
and as yet verbally unqualified world, could have escaped this dialogic inter-
orientation’ in which: 
The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a 
future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself 
in the answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already 
spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet 
been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. 
(Bakhtin, 1935/1981, pp. 279-80) 
As part of this interactive process, the novel is always in dialogue, invariably 
responding to an anticipated audience. In insisting on the importance of this 
anticipatory quality, Bakhtin (1986, p. 94) urges that ‘from the very beginning, 
the speaker expects a response … an active responsive understanding … the entire 
utterance is constructed, as it were, in anticipation of encountering this response’. 
This response is ‘not a linguistic background but one pregnant with responses and 
objections’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 281): 
Any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it is directed 
already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with 
value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist … it is entangled, shot 
through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgements and 
accents. (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 272) 
In explaining how these chains of meaning evolve over time, Bakhtin proposes 
that at any given moment there is an oppositional pull between the centripetal and 
centrifugal characteristics of language, or between a unitary mode (monoglossia) 
and the diverse, polyglot elements of heteroglossia. The centripetal forces 
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represent an attempt to ‘unite and centralize verbal-ideological thought’; to 
develop a ‘universal grammar’ and unify meaning under ‘the one language of 
truth’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 270). They belong to ‘Aristotelian poetics, the 
poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the medieval church, the abstract grammatical 
universalism of Leibniz’ and are present in all our attempts to ensure a ‘maximum 
of understanding in all spheres of ideological life’ (p. 271). In contrast, the 
centrifugal qualities of language always render meaning provisional and 
fragmentary, disturbing and dissolving the unifications and centralizations of 
monoglossia: ‘alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language 
carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and 
unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go 
forward’ (p. 272).  
This does not signify that the language of the novel is wide open. If meaning is be 
established in any given instance, the centripetal and the centrifugal must come 
together: ‘every speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as 
centripetal forces are brought to bear’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 272). As described 
by Holquist (1990, pp. 67-8), it is at this moment of alignment that heteroglossia 
comes ‘as close as possible to conceptualizing a locus where the great centripetal 
and centrifugal forces that shape discussion can meaningfully come together’.  
[This resembles] the situation of a subject surrounded by the myriad of 
responses to which he or she might make at any given point, but any one of 
which must be framed in a specific discourse selected from the teeming 
thousands available. … It is a way of conceiving the world as made up of a 
rolling mass of languages, each of which has its own formal markers. 
(Holquist, 1990, p. 67)  
At the level of genre, the novel gives voice to the evolving and contested nature of 
language. Bakhtin sees it as ‘the most sociological of the genres’, with its 
heteroglossic language being ‘the most immediate and sensitive register of 
changing social attitudes’ (Morson, 1981, p. 668). As a result, concepts such as 
power, ideology, freedom, and responsibility—the stuff of the selected texts—
come laden with qualifications and disputed meanings, entangled with the very 
phenomena they attempt to express. Time and again, Bakhtin presses this point, 
arguing that:  
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At any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from 
top to bottom: it represents the coexistence of socio-ideological 
contradictions between the present and the past, between different epochs of 
the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between 
tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. (Bakhtin, 
1935/1981, p. 291) 
In another observation bearing closely on the selected texts, Bakhtin (1986) 
proposes that the novel is associated with the ‘primary’ speech genres: that is, 
with the patterns of everyday speech before they are institutionalised into the 
‘secondary’ genres governing formal or professional speech. This indicates that 
the novel expresses how meaning is ‘originally’ formed at an experiential level 
before it is abstracted, formalised and removed from the experiences in which it 
was first embedded. The selected novels resound to this, often expressing their 
resistance to ideological theoreticism by speaking to the grounded aspirations of 
people living in the here and now. In Bread and Wine, to take a key example, the 
protagonists’ views, thoughts and beliefs are embedded in the cultural fabric of 
Italian life, with their different socio-ideological languages revealing the contrasts 
between the pragmatism of the mountain dwellers, the obfuscations of 
government bureaucracy, and the authoritative dictates of Party and Comintern.  
Genre-distinguishing moves 
These literary insights are underpinned by Bakhtin’s observations on the 
distinctiveness of the novel at the level of genre. Here I mention two proposals, 
the first of which I find problematic and the second helpful in interpreting the 
artistic/political interplay. In the first, Bakhtin compares the novel with lyric 
poetry. The poet’s language ‘is his language … he makes use of each form, each 
word, each expression according to its power to assign meaning … as a pure and 
direct expression of his own intention’, with this ‘suspended from any mutual 
interaction with alien discourse, an allusion to alien discourse’ (Bakhtin, 
1935/1981, p. 285). In contrast, the language of the novelist, recreates the 
contested and ambiguous ways in which: 
Actual social life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary 
language a multitude of concrete words, a multitude of verbal-ideological 
and social belief systems; within these various systems (identical in the 
abstract) are elements of language filled with various semantic and 
axiological content and each with its own different sound. (Bakhtin, 
1935/1981, p. 288)  
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My difficulty relates to the separation of the novel from the poem. In reality, can 
such a clear distinction be drawn? My counter-suggestion is that the poetic quality 
of words is highly significant in allowing a novel to portray the force of the 
political in an evocative and compelling way. This, as I shall show, is particularly 
important in Platonov’s The Foundation Pit, where Chandler (2009a, p. 172) 
suggests that Platonov uses words ‘more creatively than even the greatest Russian 
poets who were his contemporaries’. Here Platonov’s words illuminate the 
physicality of our existence, with even involuntary bodily movements brought to 
the level of our consciousness: thus, for example, ‘Voshchev felt the cold on his 
eyelids and used them to close his warm eyes’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 3).  
In his second genre-distinguishing move, Bakhtin compares the novel with the 
epic. The epic, he says, is constructed ‘in the zone of an absolute distanced image, 
beyond the sphere of possible contact with the developing, incomplete and 
therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating present’ (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 17). As 
construed by the epic, the past is ‘absolute’; ‘monochronic and valorized … 
closed as a circle, where inside it everything is finished, already over … there are 
no loopholes through which we can glimpse the future’ (pp. 15-16). Hence: 
By its very nature the epic world of the absolute past is inaccessible to 
personal experience and does not permit an individual, personal point of 
view or evaluation. One cannot glimpse it, grope for it, touch it; one cannot 
look at it from any point of view, it is impossible to experience it, analyse it, 
take it apart, penetrate into its core. (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 16) 
In contrast, the novel owes its origins to a period in the late middle-ages when the 
‘creative consciousness of man’ took the ‘present in all its open-endedness as the 
centre for artistic and ideological orientation’ (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 38). At that 
juncture, ‘epic distance was disintegrating’ and artistic representation became 
focused on ‘a contemporary reality that was inconclusive and fluid’ (p. 39. Thus: 
From the very beginning the novel was structured in the zone of direct 
contact with inconclusive present day reality. At its core lay direct personal 
experience and free creative imagination. (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 39) 
A key point to arise from this is that as a ‘high-distance genre’, the epic cannot be 
re-evaluated or re-modelled, whereas the novel ‘has no canon of its own. It is, by 
its very nature, non-canonic. It is plasticity itself. It is a genre that is ever 
questing, ever examining itself and establishing itself to review’ (Bakhtin, 
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1941/1981, p. 39). Holquist (1990, p. 74) underscores the significance of this 
when he observes that ‘epic-ness’ is not confined ‘to a moment in the distant past’ 
but represents ‘an always-still-available possibility’, with the imposition of 
socialist realism representing just such an instance. In this respect, I pay close 
attention to the work of the Russian authors, and most particularly The Master 
and Margarita, where Bulgakov achieves an outright act of literary defiance, not 
just in parodying the expectations of the Writers Union and other official bodies, 
but also, and more so, in writing in a literary form that steadfastly refuses current 
orthodoxies.  
The distinction between the novel and the epic also has significant implications 
for the portrayal of the text’s hero. Bakhtin suggests that the origins of a novelistic 
representation first became evident in the authorial statements accompanying the 
new novels of the eighteenth century. These intimated that a hero ‘should not be 
“heroic” in either the epic or the tragic sense, but must combine in himself 
negative as well as positive features, low as well as lofty, ridiculous as well as 
serious’ (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 10). Further, he should not be ‘portrayed as an 
already completed and unchanging person, but as one who is evolving and 
developing, who learns from life’ (p. 10). Consequently, this person can never be 
fully explained by his or her social situation and/or political predicament. Rather: 
One of the basic internal themes of the novel is precisely the theme of the 
inadequacy of a hero’s fate and situation to the hero himself. … He cannot 
become once and for all a clerk, a landowner, a merchant, a jealous lover, a 
father and so forth. If the hero of the novel actually becomes something of 
the sort … then the surplus of humanness is realised in the main protagonist. 
(Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 10)  
This ‘surplus of humanness’ is, to a greater or lesser extent, reflected across the 
selected texts, where the heroes, almost without exception, combine the ‘low and 
the lofty’, and have the capacity to evolve and develop. Hence, we come to mourn 
their downfall: as, for example, in the cases of D-503 in We, Winston Smith in 
Nineteen Eighteen-Four, and Rubashov in Darkness at Noon. In other more 
nuanced cases, we walk alongside the melancholy of Voshchev in The 
Foundation Pit, the frailties of the Master in The Master and Margarita, and the 
failed aspirations of Pietro Spina in Bread and Wine.  
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The detail of how the novel undertakes its dialogical work is the subject of 
Bakhtin’s essay ‘Discourse in the Novel’ (1935/1981). The ‘purpose of the essay’, 
he says, ‘is to ‘demonstrate that the study of verbal art can and must overcome the 
divorce between an abstract “formal: approach and an equally abstract 
“ideological” one’ (p. 259). Defining the novel as ‘a diversity of social speech 
types … and a diversity of voices, artistically organised’, he argues that the 
‘internal stratification of language, prescient in every language at any given 
moment of its historical existence, is the indispensable prerequisite of the novel as 
a genre’ (p. 263). These languages include: 
Social dialects, characteristic group behaviour, professional jargons, generic 
languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, 
languages of the authorities, languages that serve the socio-political purposes 
of the day. (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, pp. 263) 
Building on this, Bakhtin suggests that the novel filters its languages though 
various ‘stylistic unities’: that is, distinct forms of literary representation located 
on ‘different linguistic levels and subject to different stylistic controls’. He 
identifies five such forms: direct authorial intervention, stylized forms of 
everyday narration or speech (skaz); semi-literary forms such as diaries or letters; 
various ‘literary but extra-artistic’ forms such as ‘moral, philosophical, or 
scientific statements’; and the stylistically individualized speech of the characters 
(Bakhtin, 1935/1981, pp. 261-2). In the selected texts, this diversity works to 
withstand any unitary reading of the literary/political interface. In Cancer Ward, 
for example, Solzhenitsyn varies his style from the more formal to the more 
commonplace, and uses different speech patterns for each of his characters. These 
contrasts offset the novel’s more didactic elements, and open a space in which we, 
as readers, can in engage our own thoughts and speculations.  
In summary so far: Bakhtin offers detailed insights into how the novel undertakes 
its dialogical work, stressing the interlocking ways in which our communications 
are infused by what has already been spoken and what we believe will be spoken 
in the future. While dialogism applies generally, if by no means uniformly, to the 
novel as a literary form, Bakhtin’s earlier notion of polyphony is reserved for only 
a manifestly ‘novelistic’ minority of works. As outlined below, it is here that he 
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introduces some of the most puzzling questions concerning the artistic/political 
relationship.  
Polyphony and unfinalizability  
Like dialogism, polyphony is concerned with the evolving nature of meaning. Its 
focus, however, is less on the nature of language, more on the relationship 
between the author and his or her characters, with these characters seen to have 
their own autonomous consciousness. In his early work, Bakhtin attributed the 
‘invention’ of polyphony to Dostoevsky. Later, he revised this to suggest that the 
Dostoevskian novel was less ‘an unprecedented event’ and more ‘the purest 
expression of what had always been implicit in the genre’ (Clark and Holquist, 
1984, p. 241). In both his earlier and later readings, the critical issue is the 
Dostoevskian ability to create a ‘profound and unresolved conflict with another’s 
word at the level of lived experience … on the level of ethical life … and finally 
on the level of ideology’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 349).  
Bakhtin’s philosophical commitment to polyphony is underpinned by his key 
concept of ‘unfinalizability’. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (1990, p. 36) 
describe the notion as ‘an all-purpose carrier’ of Bakhtin’s view that the world ‘is 
not only a messy place, it is also an open place’. In elaborating on this, they cite 
Bakhtin’s reflection that:  
Nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the 
world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and 
free, everything is still in the future, and will always be in the future. 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 166, cited by Morson and Emerson, 1990, p. 36)  
Just as the world is unknowable so is each and every individual. Here the notion 
of our ‘physical and temporal specificity’ can be seen as ‘a sort of synecdoche of 
our larger irreplaceability’ (Morson and Emerson, 1990, p. 185). This has its 
foundations in Bakhtin’s keen interest in relativity, then emergent in the new 
physics of Planck, Einstein and Bohr. Commenting on this, Holquist (1990, pp. 4-
5) observes that like Einstein, Bakhtin shows that ‘all meaning is relative in the 
sense that it comes about only as a result of the relation between two bodies 
occupying simultaneous but different positions in space’ where bodies range from 
‘the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies and to bodies of ideas in 
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general’ (Holquist, 1990, p. 19, original emphasis). Consequently, when we look 
at each other: 
We are both doing the same thing, but from different places: although we are 
in the same event, that event is different for each of us. Our places are 
different not only because our bodies occupy different positions in exterior, 
physical space, but also because we regard the world from different centres 
in cognitive time/space. (Holquist, 1990, p. 20) 
Taking issue with the certainties then advanced in mechanistic psychology, 
Bakhtin asserts that ‘man is not a final and defined quality upon which firm 
calculations can be made’ but a free being who can ‘violate any regulating norms 
that might be thrust on him’. In diametric contrast:   
Monological discourse denies the existence outside itself of another 
consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with 
equal rights (thou). … Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's 
response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive 
force … it closes down the represented world and represented persons. 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 292-3, original emphases)
 
 
It is the singularity, unknowability and the autonomous consciousness of the other 
that a truly polyphonic author must try to represent. Dostoevsky, Bakhtin claims, 
‘thought not in thought, but in points of view, consciousness, voices … he tried to 
perceive and formulate each thought in such a way that a whole person was 
expressed and began to sound in it … this, in condensed form, is his entire 
worldview from alpha to omega’ (1963/1984, p. 93). He argues further that once 
the hero’s self-consciousness becomes the dominant motif in a work, it ‘breaks 
down the monological unity of the work’ and the hero becomes ‘relatively free 
and independent’ for everything that once positioned him as a ‘once and for all 
completed image of reality' is transformed instead into ‘the material of his self-
consciousness’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 51). Hence: 
Every true reader of Dostoevsky, who perceives his novels not in the 
monologic mode and who is capable of using Dostoevsky’s new authorial 
position, can sense this peculiar active broadening of his consciousness … 
[with this being] primarily in the sense of a special dialogical mode of 
communication with the autonomous consciousness of others, something 
never before experienced, an active dialogic penetration into the 
unfinalizable depths of man. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 68)
 
 
In commenting on the significance of Bakhtin’s approach in this respect, Booth 
(1984, p. xviii) points out that under the western ‘objectivist’ tradition (as 
associated with writers such as Henry James), the author is ‘always imposing 
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upon his characters what they must say, rather than allowing their personalities 
the freedom to say what they will, in their own way’. In contrast, ‘as presented in 
full force by Bakhtin … the novel represents ‘the essential, irreducible, multi-
centeredness, or “polyphony” of human life’.  
It is often asked how far polyphony allows authors to voice their own views and 
values. On this, Morson and Emerson (1990, p. 233) point out that Bakhtin 
repeatedly affirms that a polyphonic author ‘neither lacks the opportunity nor fails 
to express his ideas and values’. He is emphatic on this point, asserting that ‘the 
consciousness of the creator of a polyphonic novel is constantly and everywhere 
in it and is active to the highest degree’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 68). Further:  
The issue is not an absence of but a radical change in the author’s position 
… the author is not required to renounce himself or his own consciousness, 
but he must to an extraordinary extent broaden, deepen and rearrange this 
consciousness … in order to accommodate the autonomous consciousness of 
others. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 68)
 
 
While opening a promising space for exploring how the political/authorial voice 
might operate in a given text, this also invites perplexing questions. How might 
one know whether the ‘radical change’ envisaged by Bakhtin has taken place? 
Who might be the judge? How might the shift, however imperfectly achieved, 
affect how we read and relate to a text? Or, to go to the centre of my interests, 
what sort of provision does this make for the iteration of a political discourse that 
asserts particular values, views and priorities, and attempts to reach determinate 
solutions? These are vital issues, and I reconsider them later in this chapter and 
throughout the thesis. At this juncture, I leave polyphony for the novel’s parodic 
and subversive traditions, which support a more directly political role for the 
novel than the discussion so far might imply. 
The parodic and subversive 
Most broadly, Bakhtin’s view of the parodic is closely linked to his contention 
that ‘the word lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and 
another, alien, context’ (1935/1981, p. 284). In this dialogical sense, the novel is 
necessarily ‘parodic’ in that it involves a multiplicity of voices with each taking 
their meaning from the other. Put another way, all authors are in the process of 
‘writing back to’ or parodying other artistic forms, whether they do so consciously 
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or not, and all will utilise and retract the literary styles of other writers. 
Commenting on this, Bakhtin (1941/1981, p. 5) says that the novel ‘gets on poorly 
with other genres, it exposes the conventionality of their forms and their language; 
it squeezes out some genres and incorporates others into its own peculiar 
structure, re-formulating and re-accentuating them.’ As other genres become 
‘novelized’ they too exhibit the distinctive qualities of the genre: 
They become more free and flexible, their language renews itself by 
incorporating extraliterary heteroglossia and the ‘novelistic’ layers of 
language, they become dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, humour, 
elements of parody and finally—this is the most important thing—a certain 
semantic open-endedness, and living contact with unfinished, still evolving 
contemporary reality. (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 7)
2
 
Consequently, the novel refuses to stabilize around any given form: ‘throughout 
its entire history, there is a consistent parodying or travestying of dominant or 
fashionable novels that attempt to become models for the genre … the ability of 
the novel to criticize itself is a remarkable feature of the genre (Bakhtin, 
1941/1981, p. 6). As Morson (1981, p. 669) puts it, the novel is not so much a 
genre ‘but the anti-genre, no sooner does it start to develop rules than other novels 
parody those rules, just as they parody all other literary and social conventions’. 
In relation to the selected texts, parody at the level of genre is particularly 
important in the cases of The Foundation Pit, which parodies the production 
novel, and Animal Farm, which, in taking the form of a child’s tale, travesties its 
own instructional form. 
The novel is also parodic in a more directly subversive/political way. In his essay 
on the prehistory of novelistic discourse, Bakhtin (1940/1981) proposes that of the 
many heterogeneous factors involved in this development, two were of ‘decisive 
importance’: polyglossia and laughter. Observing that languages ‘throw light on 
one another: one language can, after all, only see itself in the light of another 
language’, Bakhtin (1941/1981, p. 12) argues that as contact with other languages 
became more common and sustained during the classical period, authors had to 
                                                 
22 Bakhtin (1941/1981, p. 7) makes a large claim here, contending that ‘in the process of becoming 
the dominant genre, the novel sparks the renovation of all other genres, it infuses them with its 
spirit of process and inclusiveness. It draws them ineluctably into its orbit precisely because this 
orbit coincides with the basic direction of literature as a whole’.  
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face the singularity of their own language and, by the same token, the polyglossic 
nature of language in general: 
When the period of national languages, coexisting but closed to each other, 
comes to an end … words and language began to have a different feel to 
them; objectively, they ceased to be what they had once seemed to be. 
(Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 12) 
In essence, polyglossia works to ‘free consciousness from the tyranny of its own 
language and its own myth of language’, thus ‘forcing men to experience beneath 
these categories a different and contradictory reality that is otherwise not captured 
within them’ (Bakhtin, 1940/1981, p. 61 and p. 59). Concomitant with this 
development, laughter, originally little more than the art of ‘ridiculing of 
another’s language or another’s discourse’, is elevated to ‘a new artistic and 
ideological level’ (Bakhtin 1940/1981, p. 50). It is laughter that ‘destroys epic 
distance’ for, with its ‘comic familiarization of the image of man’, it ‘brings the 
world closer and familiarizes it in order to investigate it fearlessly and freely’ 
(Bakhtin 1941/1981, p. 25). Time and again Bakhtin emphasizes its ‘fearless’ and 
‘experimental’ qualities:   
Laughter has the remarkable power of making an object come up close … 
where one can ... examine it freely and experiment with it … As it draws an 
object into itself … laughter delivers the object into the fearless hands of 
investigative experiment – both artistic and scientific – and into the hands of 
free experimental fantasy. (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 23)
 
 
These developments are reproduced in the seriocomic traditions of the novel and 
more particularly the practices of the menippea, with these involving a multi-
toned form of narration; a sustained use of the parodic and the humorous; unusual 
or fantastic time/place settings; and a far ranging interest in fundamental 
philosophical issues (Bakhtin, 1963/1984). I return to this in detail in Chapter 
Seven when discussing the fusion of the artistic and the political in We and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, also noting their relevance in Chapter Four when 
discussing the serio-comic cast of The Master and Margarita.   
At a more intricate level of analysis, Bakhtin introduces the notion of ‘double-
voiced discourse’ (or ‘hybrid utterance’), whereby a sentence that ‘grammatically 
and syntactically belongs to a single speaker’ in fact contains within it ‘two 
utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two languages, two semantic and 
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axiological belief systems’, and the author’s voice is ‘refracted’ through the 
interchange (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 284). To illustrate this, he shows how 
Dickens uses an inflated language to ridicule the hypocritical and shallow 
financier Mr Merdle in Little Dorrit:   
Oh what a wonderful man this Merdle, what a great man, what a master 
man, how blessedly and enviably endowed – in one word, what a rich man! 
(Cited by Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 304)  
With this level of detail, Bakhtin is able to show how the novel can be political by 
virtue of its literary form. To further illustrate, I draw on a passage in Bread and 
Wine where Silone sets the literal pragmatisms of the peasants against the 
obfuscations of official ideology. The setting is a community gathering where the 
schoolmistress, acting as an agent of government, recites the broadsheet News 
from Rome in a ‘piercing voice’:   
‘We have a leader for whom all nations on the earth envy us,’ she 
read. ‘Who knows what they would be prepared to pay to have him in their 
country…’ 
 Magascià interrupted. As he disliked generalities, he wanted to know 
exactly how much other nations would be willing to pay to acquire our 
leader.  
‘It’s a manner of speaking’ said the schoolmistress. 
‘There’s no such thing as a manner of speaking in commercial 
transactions’ said Magascià. ‘Are they willing to pay for him or not? If they 
are willing to pay, what are they offering?’ 
The schoolmistress repeated angrily it was just a manner of speaking. 
‘So it isn’t true they want to buy him then?’ said Magascià. ‘And if it 
isn’t true, why do they say it?’ 
Sciatàp also wanted more specific information. Would it be a cash or 
credit transaction? (Bread and Wine, pp. 312-13)  
Notably, the irony of the exchange is directed against the schoolmistress, with the 
‘internal dialogism’ of her utterances speaking to the failure of government to 
reach out to the people on whose labour it depends. Thus Silone anticipates the 
‘answering word’ of his readers, who, in order to respond fully to the irony, need 
to have some understanding of the impoverishment of the peasants, their 
manipulation by the landlords, and the failures of government to respond to the 
exigencies of rural Italy.  
What, then, is the relationship between Bakhtin’s analysis of the novel’s 
subversive/parodic traditions and his insistence on the dialogic and evolving 
nature of meaning? The answer is complex and interesting. On the one hand, the 
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two work symbiotically, with the indeterminacy of the carnivalesque—its 
‘semantic open-endedness, and living contact with unfinished, still evolving 
contemporary reality’—synthesizing perfectly well with ‘the uninterrupted 
processes of decentralization and disunification’ of the dialogical (Bakhtin, 
1941/1981, p. 7, and 1935/1981, pp. 272-3). On the other, the one-sided character 
of the parodic-travestying traditions appear to be at distinct odds with the multi-
voiced nature of the dialogical, producing a distinct twist in the issues as so far 
discussed, whereby the tension arises from within the literary/political practices of 
the novel, rather than between the literary on the one side and the political on the 
other. And this, in its turn, suggests an alternate reading of the notion of tension, 
now construed not in negative terms, but as the energy released by the intersection 
of two equally valid forces.   
Chronotope 
I now reflect on Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope, which, although not so closely 
related to the literary/political interplay as the other qualities considered so far, 
has a significant impact on how the imaginative dimensions of the texts. Not 
always easy to understand, the notion is an amalgam of the Greek words for time, 
‘chronos’ (χρόνος), and space, ‘topos’ (τόπος). As described by Bakhtin 
(1937/1981, p. 250), chronotope constitutes the ‘organizing centre for the 
fundamental narrative events of the novel … the place where the knots of 
narrative are tied and untied … to it belongs the meaning that shapes narrative’.3 
Acknowledging that the term was introduced as part of Einstein's theory of 
relativity, Bakhtin says that its specialized meaning ‘is not important for our 
purposes’; rather: 
We are borrowing it for literary criticism almost as a metaphor (almost, but 
not entirely). What counts for us is the fact that it expresses the 
inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space). … 
In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused 
into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, 
takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged 
and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. (Bakhtin, 
1937/1981, p. 84) 
                                                 
3
 Chronotope appears to bear some resemblance to the Formalists’ distinction between fabula, the 
chronological order of events, and syuzhet, the way they are brought together as a narrative. 
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In describing how chronotope has evolved as a literary practice over time, Bakhtin 
extends Kantian notions of time and space as perceptual categories to consider 
how changing literary representations illustrate a shifting pattern of human 
consciousness. To this end, he traces different treatments of time as they arise 
between various forms of the ancient novel (‘the Greek romance’, ‘the adventure 
novel of everyday life’ and ‘ancient biography and autobiography) and then 
moves to an extended consideration of chronotope in the Rabelaisian and post-
Rabelaisian novel.  
As presented in the ‘Greek romance’—where Bakhtin focuses on Heliodorus’ 
Aethiopica—time does not impact on the character of the heroes: ‘it leaves no 
trace in the life of the heroes or in their personalities’ and ‘does not have even an 
elementary biological or maturational duration’ (1937/1981, p. 90). Hence: 
All adventures in the Greek romance are … characterized by a technical, 
abstract connection between space and time, by the reversibility of moments 
in a temporal sequence, and by their interchangeability in space. (Bakhtin, 
1937/1981, p. 100) 
In contrast, in the ‘adventure novel of everyday life’ it is ‘precisely the course of 
the hero’s life that makes up the plot of the novel’ (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 111). 
Building on this, the autobiographical and biographical texts of the classical 
period constructed the human image ‘to new specifications, that of an individual 
who passes through the course of a whole life’ (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 116). 
From that point on, time is not something external to the individual, but the 
substance of his or her life, something within his or her own capabilities. This is a 
key point for the selected texts. In Darkness at Noon, for example, Rubashov can 
do little or nothing to forestall his execution; he knows from the outset that he has 
only a short measure of chronological time left. But the meaning of that time lies 
within his own construction: how he sees it, what he does with it, how it impacts 
on his reappraisal of all the previous moments that have now come together in a 
particular and final eventuality. 
It is, though, to the Rabelaisian novel that Bakhtin attributes the great widening of 
space-time configurations characteristic of contemporary texts, whereby 
‘everything of value, everything that is valorized positively, must achieve its full 
potential in temporal and spatial terms; it must spread out as far and as wide as 
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possible’ (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 167). I discuss the importance of this in 
subsequent chapters, but briefly illustrate here by comparing Darkness at Noon 
and The Master and Margarita. In Darkness at Noon the time/space configuration 
is limited to the last few days before Rubashov’s execution and the enclosed space 
of his cell; in The Master and Margarita, it stretches back in time to the year of 
Christ’s crucifixion and in space to a universe beyond the earth. These differing 
configurations of space/time are intimately related to the politico-ideological 
stretch of the narrative in each case. In Darkness at Noon this is focused on the 
ideological issues immediately confronting Rubashov and the inexorable fact of 
his impending death; in The Master and Margarita on far-ranging questions of 
artistic integrity, courage, and betrayal, with the Master confronting his own acts 
of cowardice and encouraged to look beyond the narrow restrictions of the Soviet 
literary bureaucracy. 
At every step so far, Bakhtin’s analysis illustrates the complexity of the 
artistic/political relationship. Dialogism signifies the contested nature of meaning; 
polyphony gestures to the unfinalizable and the unknown; parody demonstrates 
the novel’s capacities for subversion and mockery; chronotope illustrates the 
imaginative possibilities of the varying time/space configurations. There is one 
further question that requires consideration before I draw the threads together: the 
problem of ‘truth’.  
On the problem of truth 
At the outset of thesis, I emphasized that the selected authors are actively involved 
in the political and ideological issues of their times, citing Howe’s (1957/2002, p. 
24) proposal that in the political novel ‘writer and reader enter into an uneasy 
compact to expose their ideas to a furious action … and to find some common 
recognition, some supervening human bond over and beyond ideas’. My question, 
then, is whether and how far Bakhtin’s approach to the novel allows for this form 
of ‘common recognition and supervening human bond’.  
As usual the answer to this question can only be problematic. On the one hand, 
Bakhtin’s (1935/1981, p. 273) commitment to the traditions of the carnival—
where there is ‘all languages [are] masks and … no language [can] claim to be an 
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authentic, incontestable face’—precludes any axiomatic assertion of any 
particular truth. Under this construction, each meaning takes its substance from 
another, and each achieves its stability at the moment of the utterance, only to 
dissolve and be remade in conjunction with another set of meanings/utterances. 
Most fundamentally Bakhtin (1986, p. 170) suggests that ‘there is neither a first 
nor a last word and … even past meanings, that is those born in the dialogue of 
past centuries, can never be stable, finalized, ended once and for all (but) will 
always be renewed in the process of subsequent, future development of the 
dialogue’.  
On the other hand, Bakhtin remains intensely interested in truth. He argues at 
length that while a polyphonic/dialogical truth cannot reside in a single axiom, it 
finds its place in the intersection of many simultaneous voices: ‘truth is not born 
nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between 
people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction’ 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 110). Here truth and meaning have an experiential and 
collective basis, requiring a variety of communicating voices, coexisting one with 
another, where:  
At the base of the genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogical notion of 
truth, and the dialogical nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogical 
means of seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which 
pretends to possess a ready-made truth, and it is also counterposed to the 
naïve self-confidence of people who think they possess certain truths. 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 111; original emphasis)  
Significantly, Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 69) also explicitly argues against relativism, 
maintaining that ‘both relativism and dogmatism exclude all argumentation, all 
authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible 
(dogmatism)’. Expanding on this point, Emerson (1997, pp. 220-221) suggests 
that it is precisely because ‘unfinalizability and malleability are inherent in living 
personalities, in everyday events, and in time-space parameters, that the 
achievement … of a whole is so indispensable’. Further: 
If there existed a single unitary standard by which all acts could be judged, it 
would be easy to chart the moral (or immoral) life; when there is no such 
universal standard, every individual consciousness must define for itself 
local constraints; it must pass its own judgement, take a stand when 
blinkered, seek out and defend the truth as he or she sees it. (Emerson, 1997, 
p. 154) 
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For the kind of intercommunicative process favoured by Bakhtin to take place, 
there has to be a prior commitment to an open communicative space. On this 
basis, I suggest that ideological commitment will persist even in a polyphonic 
work. This is evident in Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground (1864), a 
work that Bakhtin cites as a prime example of polyphony. Written in part 
response to Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s What is to be Done? (a novel expressing a 
utilitarian vision of a rational egotism in which social progress is fuelled by an 
indwelling sense of purpose), it expresses his hero’s inchoate rage with the kind 
of formulaic thinking involved in ‘two times two makes four’. While this 
frustration is never brought to any full conclusion, my point is its expression only 
makes sense within the wider framework of the normative issues with which 
Dostoevsky is in discussion. 4   
Emerson captures this fusion of the polyphonic and value-committed in one of her 
many detailed observations on Dostoevsky. Having noted that he endows his 
heroes ‘with so much independence, mobility of perspective, uncertainty of 
motives’ that readers, ‘wishing to know what is going on, by-pass the 
author/narrator and respond directly to the heroes’, she points out that values 
nevertheless permeate his works:  
Dostoevsky, a teacher and a prophet no less than Tolstoy, had a point of 
view on the world and passionate value system that he desired us to take 
seriously. … He wanted us to refuse the Grand Inquisitor’s rationale for a 
paternalistic social system based on ‘miracle, mystery and authority’ and 
embrace instead the free inequality promised by Christ and spelled out in the 
teachings of the Elder Zosima. (Emerson, 2008, p. 136)
 
 
On these grounds, I surmise that the issue for the artistic life of the text is not the 
assertion of particular truths or values, but how these truths are expressed, and, 
more particularly, whether or not such representations work to extend our 
political, philosophical and imaginative horizons. In making this case, I 
acknowledge the importance of the oblique and unfinalizable. But this comes with 
the all-important qualification that the significance of silence and ambiguity needs 
to be located within the wider framework of the values implicitly or explicitly 
                                                 
4 The point can also be applied to the novels of Kundera, where, as Grenier (2006, p. 14) observes, 
‘for all the orchestrated ambivalence and polyphony, the reader is not driven away from the main 
point articulated by the author.’ 
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advocated by the texts. And this, to return to my earlier contention, can only be 
grasped through a dense reading of the varied forms of literary/political 
expression, fantastic and realist, arising in particular historical circumstances.5   
From Bakhtin to the texts: possibilities and puzzles 
Let me now explain how I intend to draw on Bakhtin’s insights when approaching 
the selected texts. As earlier noted, in order to illuminate the dynamics of the 
artistic/political relationship I follow three closely linked lines of inquiry. The 
first considers the nature of the political and philosophical themes circulating in 
the texts; the second explores how the authors draw on, disrupt and/or extend the 
traditions of the novel in expressing their convictions; and the third speculates on 
what might these combinations of the political and the literary might suggest 
about a text’s capacity to resonate across time and space. 
In relation to my first issue, I follow Bakhtin in supposing that the novel is above 
all a form of social dialogue. As Lodge (1990, p. 6) points out, in treating 
language as speech (‘parole’), that is, as a social activity or dialogue, rather than 
as a system of formal relationships (‘langue’), Bakhtin shifts our attention from 
the mechanisms through which meaning is produced within a text to the 
discursive environment through which a text forges its relationship with its 
readers. With this, and against the ‘death of the author’ as variously described by 
Barthes (1967) and Foucault (1969/1988), he endorses the active nature of the 
authorial role. Indeed, for Lodge: 
Bakhtin’s greatest contribution to contemporary criticism may well turn out 
to be his timely reaffirmation of the writer’s creative and communicative 
power … an idea that structuralism (implicitly), and post-structuralism 
(explicitly) have sought to discredit and replace with theories about the 
autonomous productivity of texts and their readers. (Lodge, 1990, p. 6)
 
 
This is not to return to a ‘life and times approach’, for Bakhtin always insists on 
the importance of social and political context, both in the writing and reading of 
works. The text, in other words, is context-dependent, for ‘at any given time, in 
any given place, there will be a set of conditions … that will ensure that a word 
                                                 
5
 For discussion of the importance of how moral criticism is voiced, as opposed to what is said, see 
John Krapp’s (2002) book on pedagogic voice and moral dialogue in the works of Thomas Mann, 
Albert Camus, Joseph Conrad and Fyodor Dostoevsky. 
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uttered in that place at that time will have a different meaning than it would have 
under any other conditions’ (Holquist, 1981b, p. 428). In exploring this 
text/context link, I make use of a number of contemporary and historical sources, 
pay attention to the multiplicity of socio-ideological languages in a text, and 
wherever possible refer to the authors’ own statements about their works and 
beliefs. While I attempt to avoid conflating the ‘real’ with Booth’s ‘implied’ 
author, I hesitate to draw any clear distinction between the two, for as Booth 
reflects:  
However impersonal [the author] may try to be, his readers will inevitably 
construct a picture of the official scribe who writes in this manner—and of 
course that official scribe will never be neutral toward all values. Our 
reaction to his various commitments, secret or overt, will help to determine 
our response to the work. (Booth, 1961, p. 71)
 6 
When it comes to my second question—how the authors draw on, disrupt, and/or 
extend the traditions of the novel in expressing their convictions—I benefit 
greatly from the detail of Bakhtin’s insights, which in their specificity are so 
radically different from the abstractions of the theorists discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, I have also intimated that Bakhtin is a perplexing guide. This is 
so for many reasons: chief among them the fact that his views can point in 
contradictory directions, with the one suggesting a complementary reading of the 
artistic/political relationship and the other an oppositional one. On the 
complementary side, his insights into dialogism, parody, and the imaginative 
possibilities of chronotope show how the political can be expressed in compelling, 
evocative and/or subversive ways. In the oppositional case, his pivotal binary 
distinctions—the monological and dialogical, the centripetal and centrifugal, 
finalizability and unfinalizability—can promote a bifurcated reading of the 
artistic/political relationship. In my discussion of the texts, I take advantage of 
these (apparent) contradictions to illuminate the dense and varied ways in which 
the artistic and the political can combine in any given instance, with marked 
contrasts both within and between the texts.  
                                                 
6
 As defined by Rimmon-Kenan (1983/2002, pp. 87-8) the implied author represents the 
‘governing source of the work as a whole, the source of the norms embodied in the work’  
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More fundamentally, I probe Bakhtin’s juxtapositions between the finalizable and 
unfinalizable, as, for example, exemplified in his frequent contrasts between 
Tolstoy’s ‘narrowing down of heteroglot social consciousness’ as against 
Dostoevsky’s ability to create a ‘profound and unresolved conflict with another’s 
word at the level of lived experience … ethical life … and finally on the level of 
ideology’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 283 and p. 349). As foreshadowed, my 
submission is that the starkness of such contrasts obscures the density of the 
artistic/political relationship, and, more particularly, the formative place of value-
commitment in even the most Dostoevskian of works, where, as Emerson (2008, 
p. 136) reminds us, ‘Dostoevsky a teacher and a prophet no less than Tolstoy, had 
a point of view on the world and passionate value system that he desired us to 
take seriously’. It is, then, the interpenetration of the finalizable and unfinalizable, 
of search and silence, and of ambiguity and commitment, that absorbs me and 
takes up a major part of this thesis. 
As illustrated over the course of this chapter, Bakhtin’s approach to the novel is 
an essentially cerebral one, concerned above all with the making and unmaking of 
meaning. While this can illuminate the cognitive appeal of texts, it does not deal 
so well with the nature of the emotional bonds formed between text and reader. 
As Felski (2011, p. 585) points out, the ‘significance of a text’ is not exhausted 
‘by what it reveals or conceals about the social conditions that surround it’, but 
that ‘it is also a matter of what it makes possible in the viewer or reader—what 
kind of emotions it elicits, what perceptual changes it triggers, what affective 
bonds it calls into being’. In considering how these bonds are formed, I give 
careful thought to the creative force of imagination, the poetic use of language, 
and the texts’ representations of suffering. In adopting this approach, I am 
proposing that the ‘literariness’ of the novel is also invested in artistic qualities 
shared with other forms of creative work, and thus aim to extend rather than 
qualify or contradict Bakhtin’s ideas. 
Finally, I acknowledge that at all times I am involved in act of interpretation. This 
is most evident in the third of my questions, where I speculate on a text’s 
resonating potential. Anticipating deconstruction, Bakhtin suggests that the 
‘represented world of the text’ involves the combination of four components: ‘the 
 74 
reality created in the text; the authors creating the text; the performers of the text; 
and the listeners or readers who recreate and in so doing renew the text’ 
(1937/1981, p. 253). Acknowledging that ‘these real people, the authors and their 
listeners, may be … separated from each other by centuries and by great spatial 
differences’, he nevertheless insists that they ‘participate equally in the creation of 
the represented world of the text’ (p. 253). Hence: 
The event of the life of the text, that is, its true essence, always develops on 
the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects. … This is the 
meeting of two texts—of the ready-made and the reactive text being 
created—and consequently, the meeting of two subjects and two authors. 
(Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 106-7, original emphasis) 
Contra the assertions of theorists such as Stanley Fish (1980), our responses to 
texts are not subject to any kind of objective interpretation, for the process of 
reading, interpretation and reinterpretation is pervasive and indirect, shaping our 
conversations, daydreams and news-watching, and belonging to the provinces of 
bedtime readings, armchair musings, reading groups, waiting rooms and cafes. 
Further, one set of representations influences another. To return to Bakhtin: 
Each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other utterance to 
which it is related by the communality of the sphere of speech 
communication. Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to 
preceding utterances of the given sphere ... Each utterance affirms, 
supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and 
somehow takes them into account. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91, original emphasis)
 
 
Nevertheless, and as we have seen, Bakhtin believes that author, text and reader 
may, in some unspecified way, combine in re-creating the ‘represented world’ of 
the novel, even when separated by centuries of time and great physical 
differences. Further, and as his own reflections on classical texts such as 
Heliodorus’ Aethiopica demonstrate, he assumes that this process is in some way 
subject to systematic reflection: a point fundamental to my project. To interpret 
this, and to put boundaries around an otherwise wide-open situation, I rely on 
Wolfgang Iser’s argument that there is a ‘structure of effects’ within a work that 
‘triggers the re-creative dialectics of the reader’ (p. 30). As he puts it: 
The work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life when realized, 
and furthermore the realization is by no means independent of the individual 
disposition of the reader—though this in turn is acted on by the different 
patterns of the text. (Iser, 1978 pp. 274-5) 
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Drawing on this insight, I surmise that while our responses are particular to us as 
unique individuals, the nature of our responses is also more broadly intelligible. 
Thus, for example, when I propose that Orwell’s use of a nostalgic irony in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four creates a sense of longing for ‘lost times’, I suppose that 
my argument is commonly comprehensible, even if my interpretation is particular 
to me as an individual. Equally, when I say that something about Solzhenitsyn’s 
moralizing approach jars my contemporary ear, I believe that what I propose is 
understandable even if debatable. It is on this basis of a shared, if highly 
differentiated, set of cultural understandings that I approach the texts, attempting 
to make my line of reasoning as transparent as possible.  
Such are the considerations that guide my exploration of the texts over the next 
four chapters. Consistent with my argument that art and politics need to be seen as 
active practices rather than objective categories—where the artistic represents the 
drive for the creative and the open-ended, and the political the urge for coherence 
and commitment—I have grouped the novels in four bands according to their 
political, historical and literary circumstances. Each of these configurations 
confronts authors with a particular set of artistic/political challenges, and these 
form the subject of each chapter. To anticipate my arguments: Platonov and 
Bulgakov face the task of confronting the orthodoxies of their times through the 
art of ‘doing otherwise’; Silone, Koestler and Orwell of counteracting didacticism 
through a skilful use of the novel’s literary traditions; Solzhenitsyn and Grossman 
of creating a ‘creative space’ for our imaginative reinterpretations of past events; 
and We and Nineteen Eighty-Four of ‘speaking truth through the fantastic’. I 
stress that this arrangement is illustrative only, for the challenges are not in fact 
unique to each group, but rather intersect and cut across them. 
Although my analytical frame thus shifts from chapter to chapter, the structure of 
my discussions follows a similar pattern in each case. First, an overview of the 
literary and political circumstances surrounding the texts; second, a consideration 
of how the authors give artistic expression to their political commitments; third, a 
set of concluding reflections on what these literary/political combinations might 
suggest for our readings of the artistic/political relationship. The next chapter 
starts the process by asking how the elusive poetics of The Foundation Pit and 
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The Master and Margarita—works written under decidedly threatening 
circumstances—might unsettle our consciousness and deepen our insights into the 





The novel as literary defiance: Platonov and Bulgakov 
The merging of the hero’s discourse about himself with his ideological 
discourse about the world greatly strengthens the direct signifying power of 
a self-utterance and strengthens its internal resistance to all sorts of external 
finalization … and fixed, stable images. (Bakhtin, Problems of 
Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, 1963/1984, p. 78) 
The Foundation Pit and The Master and Margarita represent profound acts of 
literary defiance, steadfastly refusing the ideological orthodoxies of their times. 
Both texts speak strongly to Bakhtin’s insights into the subversive qualities of the 
novel, and both share much of his philosophical stance on the unfinalizability of 
time, place and person. Composed in the same epoch as Bakhtin was developing 
his theories, the novels are subject to the same range of politico-ideological and 
literary influences. Neither work was published in the lifetimes of their authors. 
The Foundation Pit, which was first completed in 1929/1930, did not appear in 
the Soviet Union until 1987 having first been published in Paris in a bowdlerized 
form in 1969. The Master and Margarita, which was drafted and re-drafted over 
the 1930s, was published in a serialized form in Moscow in the mid-1960s, where 
it attracted a large and fascinated readership (Weeks, 1996). 
In writing when literature was increasingly coming under the direct control of the 
Party, Platonov and Bulgakov face the challenge of opposing monolithic 
orthodoxies without asserting a systematic counter-ideology and/or literary 
formula of their own (Bullock, 2011). In considering how they do this, I explore 
their varied uses of the novel’s traditions in expressing their philosophical 
commitments; attend to the power of their imaginative and emotional calls; and 
ponder the relationship between the finalized and unfinalized qualities of their 
works. This represents a broad-based approach, designed to establish the 
foundations for subsequent analyses of the selected novels and the particular 
literary/political challenges faced by them. In preface, I outline the historical 
context to Platonov and Bulgakov’s novels, concentrating on the status of 
literature, the divisions among writers, and the Party’s far-reaching move to 
harness literature to the purposes of the State.  
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Context: an era of political and literary dissensus 
In her discussion of Russia’s ‘most dangerous texts’, Kathleen Parthé emphasizes 
the literary-centric nature of Russian society, with the written word always 
playing a central role in the nation’s political, ethical and cultural life. Russians, 
she observes (2004, p. 2), came to be known as a people ‘who read broadly and 
deeply, who could memorize vast quantities of poetry, and were able to recognize 
from “half a hint” a politically daring subtext’.1 Above all, art represented a form 
of sustenance and reflection. On this, Parthé cites Dostoevsky’s Underground 
Man’s reflection that ‘aside from literature, there was nowhere else to go’, and 
notes how this belief in the centrality of writing, reading and analysing literature 
represented: 
The cumulative effects of legends of impassioned discussion groups 
(kruzhki) in the nineteenth century, devotion to writers who had dared to 
address the nation’s burning questions both before and after the Revolution, 
and memories of an often costly attachment to literature that endured after 
1917. (Parthé, 2004, pp. 2-3)  
The Russian reading audience was also a deeply divided one, and this, as I shall 
show, has a marked influence on the commitments and writings of Platonov and 
Bulgakov. From early in the nineteenth century, the intelligentsia was a fractured 
group, variously incorporating conservative, nationalist, libertarian, nihilistic and 
revolutionary movements. By the mid-nineteenth century, the term ‘intelligentsia’ 
had narrowed to refer to the ‘classical’ or ‘radical’ intelligenty, characterized by 
their commitments to ‘materialism, atheism, socialism, and revolutionalism’ 
(Morson, 2010, p. 143). In literature, Nikolay Chernyshevsky was the driving 
force behind this group, with other prominent members including the populist 
theorists Pyotr Lavrov and Nikolai Mikhailovsy, the revolutionary anarchist 
Mikhail Bakunin, and, at the outer edge, Sergei Nechaev with his opportunistic 
commitment to violence. Morson also points to a strong literary ‘counter-
tradition’, where authors rejected ‘theoreticism’, insisted on the psychological 
complexity of our being, and suggested that the importance of the present moment 
greatly outweighs the significance of utopian or epic time (Morson, 2010, p. 141-
57).  
                                                 
1
 For discussion of the distinctiveness of the Russian literary tradition see Garrard 1983, Gasperetti 
1997, Emerson 2008 and Lieber 2011, among many others. 
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Controversy over the role of art in serving the revolutionary cause provides the 
immediate background to both The Foundation Pit and The Master Margarita. 
The first concerted move to commit written works to revolutionary purposes saw 
the formation of the Proletkult in 1917 under the leadership of Alexander 
Bogdanov. On the assumption that once workers had achieved economic control a 
proletarian culture would naturally emerge, the Proletkult aimed to hasten the 
process by sponsoring workshops, journals and proletarian publications. 
Originally avant-garde in orientation but soon becoming more narrowly 
educative/ideological, it gave birth to a number of breakaway groups asserting the 
importance of art’s freedom to express itself in the manner it wished. One such 
group was The Smithy (with which Platonov was loosely allied), whose manifesto 
promised writers complete freedom in the choice of literary method and style, 
while at the same time endorsing the vital importance of the future of the 
revolutionary movement.  
In a more clearly autonomous move, another group of experimental writers 
formed the ‘Serapion Brothers’ with the intention of promoting the uniqueness of 
art as a sphere of activity separate from utilitarian politics. Zamyatin was a 
member of this group; so too was Mikhail Zoshchenko, a short story writer and 
satirist, who developed a deadpan style of writing that mocked the abstractions of 
official forms of discourse, and whose development of ‘skaz’ influenced 
Platonov. In their 1921 manifesto, the Serapion Brothers declared:  
We are with the Hermit Serapion. We believe that literary chimeras are a 
special reality, and we will have none of utilitarianism. Art is real, like life 
itself. And, like life itself, it has neither goal nor meaning; it exists because it 
cannot help existing. (Cited by Seifrid, 2009, pp. 65-6)  
Taking a different approach yet again, the Left Front of Art (LEF), formed in 
1922, committed itself to the notion of cultural activity as ‘life-creation’, 
maintaining that art should be devoted to enhancing the productivity of life rather 
than narrow aesthetic aims. As noted by Thomas Seifrid (2009, p. 4), under its 
thesis of ‘productionism’, LEF called on artists ‘to abandon the easel and turn 
their attention to designing products capable of bringing about the utopian 
transformation of the everyday life of the proletariat’. Seifrid also observes that 
Platonov wrote about the notion in his article ‘The factory of literature’ (1926-
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7/1991), and that it is extremely difficult to know how far he was involved in a 
perfectly earnest attempt to apply the idea or parodying its very basis. 
Despite their differences, all these groups asserted the distinctiveness of art as a 
social and cultural activity, and all strove to develop it, thus contributing to the 
experimental environment that formed the background to Platonov and 
Bulgakov’s works. In contrast, the VAPP (the All-Union Association of 
Proletarian Writers), later called RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian 
Writers), aimed to control all forms of literature and fashion them to one form. As 
noted by Andrew Kahn (2011, p. 50), from its origins in the mid-1920s, the RAPP 
‘fought doggedly’ to assert the importance of ‘class origins over all other criteria 
as the basis of Soviet art’. Both Bulgakov and Platonov came under its attack: 
Bulgakov because of his satirical novel The Heart of a Dog, and Platonov because 
of his association with the novelist and critic Boris Pilnyak, who was one of the 
main targets of the RAPP.  
During the greater part of the 1920s, the Proletkult and RAPP did not gain the 
approval of the leading Party members, with the result that experimental art 
continued to flourish through much of the period. In commenting on this period, 
Kahn notes that compared with the later authorities: 
Lenin showed far more enthusiasm for the classics. Trotsky was withering 
about proletariat poetry, and Bukharin was convinced that the creation of 
high-quality Soviet literature depended on writers of genuine talent, 
whatever their class origins. (Kahn, 2011, p. 50) 
But matters are more complicated than this might suggest, for the authorities’ 
views were bifurcated: on the one hand, they endorsed the classics and established 
literary traditions; on the other, they collapsed the aesthetic/political space in the 
name of an over-arching political imperative. Trotsky’s enigmatic Literature and 
the Revolution provides a good example. Produced in 1924 with the aim of 
promoting a revolutionary literature, the work dismisses experimental artists who 
came alongside the revolution but were not yet part of it as its ‘fellow travellers’, 
and maintains that a ‘true’ aesthetic should be ‘above classes’ and express ‘the 
first truly human culture’ (cited by Wilson 1972, p. 244). The single-mindedness 
with which Trotsky pursues his vision means that in the last instance art must 
always, one way or another, be considered an expression of the political, with the 
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logic of this position inadvertently furnishing the grounds on which art is later 
subjugated to the ‘higher purposes’ of Party and State.  
By the end of the 1920s, the experimental period was well over. Anxious to exert 
its controls over art and literature, the Party was no longer willing to tolerate the 
quasi-autonomous nature of the RAPP. Its decisive move came in 1932, when, 
under a resolution entitled ‘On the Reshaping of Literary-Artistic Organizations’, 
it abolished all independent groups, established the Soviet Union of Writers in 
their place and expanded the notion of the ‘production novel’ into the new literary 
genre, socialist realism, which became the sole permitted artistic form. 
Membership of the Union was more or less obligatory for professional writers and 
exclusion meant a virtual ban on publication. The rewards included ‘royalties, 
commissions, access to vacation resorts, forums for discussion of their works, and 
(under certain conditions) foreign travel’ (Emerson, 2008, p. 198). Its activities 
are a major target of The Master and Margarita, where the machinations of the 
Union, its threats and rewards, are reproduced in the shape of the organization 
‘Massolit’ and its club Griboedov’s. 
What of the characteristics of socialist realism? What was it that both Platonov 
and Bulgakov opposed and parodied? In his detailed critique, Evgeny Dobrenko 
(2011, pp. 97-115) describes five features of the genre: first, ‘ideological 
commitment’, which means that art should embody the priorities of the Party; 
second, ‘party mindedness’, whereby every artistic act is also part of the political 
life of the nation; third, ‘popular spirit’, which requires art to draw on the 
traditions and languages of the people; fourth, ‘historicism’, or the principle that 
literature should reflect ‘life in its revolutionary development’; and finally, 
‘typicality’, a notion blending realism with a focus on the positive features 
deemed typical of revolutionary development. In concluding, Dobrenko (2011, p. 
110) suggests that the genre aimed to transform ‘Soviet reality into socialism … 
whatever Soviet reality actually was, socialist realism distilled it into socialism’.  
Emerson, who identifies the same characteristics, nevertheless emphasizes that 
‘socialist realism, like every other party line in Stalinist Russia, was never a fixed 
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formula and was certainly not in the 1930s’ (2008, p. 201). 2  Morson (1979) 
similarly argues against any simple reading of the genre in terms of literary 
deficiency, arguing that this fails to appreciate the Bolsheviks’ attempt to create a 
new type of novel juxtaposed to its ‘bourgeois’ counterpart, where they elevated 
the politico-ideological over the aesthetic, and eschewed critique in favour of 
positive outcomes.  
The literary/political complexities of the period are reflected in the conflicting 
commitments of Maxim Gorky, the first Chair of the Soviet Union of Writers. 
Widely seen as a mediator, and one who had himself been in exile, Gorky stood to 
gain the respect and trust of many contemporary writers. A supporter of the 
Bolsheviks after the party split in 1903, he remained critical of Lenin, never 
formally joined the Party, and always supported an idealist view of human nature, 
while at the same time supporting the new literary norms associated with socialist 
realism. Reflecting Morson’s observation that socialist realism attempted to create 
a new type of novel as against its ‘bourgeois’ counterpart, Gorky claimed that 
‘when the history of culture is written by Marxists we shall see that ‘the 
bourgeoisie’s role in the process of cultural creativity has been grossly 
exaggerated’ (Transcript, First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, 1934, np). 
At the same time, as Chair of the Union, he attempted to temper Party zeal, often 
at considerable cost to himself.  
In summary: the political role of literature was a critical question for the 
intellectuals of post-revolutionary Russia. For those who supported the purposes 
of the revolution, yet also asserted the autonomy of art, the challenge lay in 
developing an alternative style that supported revolutionary aims. For others, who 
were more directly critical of the radical intelligentsia, the task lay in finding a 
literary form that questioned revolutionary ideals. I suggest that Platonov belongs 
to the first group; Bulgakov to the second. As indicated, my discussion is based 
on the premise that they face the task of challenging current orthodoxies without 
advancing a systematic counter-ideology or literary ideology of their own. In 
                                                 
2
 The diversity within the genre is evidenced by the great variability of its novels: compare, for 
example, Fyodor Gladkov’s narrowly focused Cement (which Platonov parodies in Chevengur and 
The Foundation Pit) and Mikhail Sholokhov’s more far-reaching Quiet Flows the Don. 
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considering how they do this, I explore their varied uses of the novel’s literary 
traditions; the power of their imaginative and emotional calls; and the relationship 
between the finalized and unfinalized qualities of their works. I start with the 
strangely haunting case of The Foundation Pit. 
Platonov: The Foundation Pit3 
Platonov’s philosophical views infuse the entirety of The Foundation Pit (see, 
Bullock 2011; Seifrid 2009). Born in 1899, he came of age with the revolution 
and shared its ideals. As mentioned above, he was loosely allied with The Smithy 
during the 1920s, when he submitted articles for LEF’s experimental journal. His 
(always qualified) opposition to the regime was first expressed in his science 
fiction novels, his novel Chevengur (which parodies Gladkov’s Cement) and his 
affiliations with Pilnyak. By force of circumstances, he later repudiated his earlier 
writings, including The Foundation Pit, and attempted to produce a socialist 
realist novel entitled Happy Moscow (1935). As Emerson (2008, p. 192) points 
out, under the conditions he experienced, ‘most people, including artists’, are 
neither ‘collaborators nor martyrs’. Rather: 
They simply survive, balancing the daily benefits of being useful, ‘normal’ 
citizens in their society. This means taking a stand at some points, lying low 
at others, and constantly devising compromises to protect one’s comfort, 
dignity, work and family. (Emerson, 2008, p. 192) 
As indicated, The Foundation Pit draws on Platonov’s experience as a land 
reclamation expert in the 1920s, where he saw the start of the Bolshevik policy of 
grain requisition, the drive to exterminate the kulaks, and the famine in the Volga 
region in the early 1920s. In describing the consequences, the novel details how 
peasants were burning their grains and eating their animals to prevent them from 
falling into the hands of the Party, and how social relationships were destroyed as 
Party officials decided who would survive and who would be classified as kulaks 
                                                 
3 There is a growing corpus of scholarly work on Platonov, and I regret my inability to cover this 
material here. Important contributions include Bullock’s The Feminine in the Prose of Andrey 
Platonov (2005), and his detailed discussion of the ‘politics’ of Platonov’s gaze in Dzhan 
(2014).There is also an extensive coverage of Platonov’s oeuvre in Russian Literature, 2013, 73, 
issues 1-2, pp. 1-340. This incorporates Seifrid’s discussion of Platonov’s work as it relates to 
dissidence (pp. 285-300), and Bullock’s analysis of Platonov and theories of modernism (pp. 301-
22). 
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and ‘liquidated as a class’.4 In recording the harshness of winter and the peasants’ 
response, Platonov describes how: 
Snow fell on the cold ground, meaning to remain there for the winter … only 
around the animals’ sheds did the snow melt and the earth become black, 
since the warm blood of cows and sheep had seeped out beneath the boards. 
… After liquidating all their last breathing livestock, the peasants had begun 
to eat beef and instructed all the members of their households to do the same 
… the flesh of dear and familiar animals had to be hidden away inside one’s 
own body and preserved from socialist ownership. (The Foundation Pit, p. 
102) 
Throughout the novel, Platonov calls the industrializing drive into question, 
evoking Alexander Herzen’s warning that ‘an end that is infinitely remote is not 
an end, but, if you like, a trap; an end must be nearer—it ought it to be, at the very 
least, the labourer’s wage, or pleasure in the work done’ (cited by Morson, 2010, 
p. 157).5 In a more abstract way, he also deals with Bolshevik utopianism, where, 
in a fundamental revision of Marx, Bogdanov had argued that ‘science, art, and 
ideology did not merely reflect the socio-economic structure, but played a crucial 
role in organizing and therefore creating that structure’ (Seifrid, 2009, pp. 38-9).6 
Although Platonov lost his early commitment to these views, he always retained 
his belief that the earth follows its own laws, which we infringe at our peril. In his 
1934 essay, ‘On the first socialist tragedy’, he reflects that:   
Self-destruction in fascism, war between states—these are the losses entailed 
by increased production, these are nature’s revenge for it. … The tragedy of 
man, armed with machine and heart, and with the dialectic of nature, must in 
our country be resolved by way of socialism. But it must be understood that 
this task is an extremely serious one. Ancient life on the ‘surface’ of nature 
was able to obtain what was essential to it from the waste products and 
excretions of elemental forces and substances. But we mess about deep 
inside the world, and in return the world crushes us with an equivalent 
strength. (Platonov, 1934, np)  
                                                 
4
 Under the Sovnarkom decree of 1930, the kulaks were divided into three categories. The first 
were to be sent to forced labour camps or shot; the second were to go to distant provinces; the 
third were allowed to stay where they were, but with a smaller patch of land. As the Red Army and 
the OGPU were unable to carry out the task on their own, youth from the factories, militia and the 
Party were sent out to enforce the establishment of the collective farms.   
5
 Herzen (1912-1870) was a founder of Russian socialism and one of the main proponents of 
agrarian populism.  
6
 Bogdanov elaborated his theory under the title of ‘empiriomonism’, where he aimed to unite all 
forms of knowledge under a universal science he called ‘tectology’. This was the target of Lenin’s 
furious rejoinder in Materialism and Empiriocriticism (Seifrid, 2009, p. 39). 
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Such are the political and philosophical concerns underlying The Foundation Pit. 
So how does Platonov express his views by ‘doing otherwise’? I suggest three key 
moves: a multifaceted use of parody; a fluid form of consciousness; and the 
imaginative use of the time/space configurations of chronotope. 
Parody 
At the level of genre, The Foundation Pit is most evidently a parody of the 
‘production novel’, then the dominant force in Soviet literature. As the forerunner 
of socialist realism, the production novel was devoted to industrialization, with its 
positive heroes establishing factories, building new ventures, overcoming 
hardships, and altogether transforming the city and landscape. The Foundation Pit 
challenges all this, with its core narrative centred on the failure to build an ‘all 
proletarian home’ for the nation’s proletariat, where the labouring diggers ever 
more carve out their own grave. The parody is dense, for it retains the hope for 
revolutionary aspirations while also despairing of them. The book’s two most 
significant characters—Voshchev, a machine factory worker, and Prushevsky, the 
site engineer—are dreamers and doubters, protesting against a mechanical form of 
existence’; at the same time, they never relinquish the hope that machines and 
human effort might transform material and social reality. As Seifrid (2009, p. 111) 
puts it, ‘the most accurate statement to make about The Foundation Pit might be 
that it is at once a parody of the genre of the production novel in mocking its 
world view, and its apotheosis, a work aimed, in a sense, at being the last 
production novel that could ever be written’.7 
The Foundation Pit is also parodic at the detailed level of official discourse, 
where it refracts and satirizes the new forms of Soviet speech by embedding 
words such as ‘organize’, ‘collectivize’, ‘class ‘and ‘proletarian’ into the fabric of 
its text. Illustrating this, Pashkin, the overfed Soviet official, says flirtingly to his 
wife ‘let me organize myself close to you’, and Safronov the ideologue calls for 
‘the leadership of the proletarian future bright world’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 31 
and p. 45). For Olga Meerson (1997), this produces a kind of ‘reverse 
                                                 
7
 Bullock (2005, p. 6) comments on this in a wider context, suggesting that ‘Platonov is a utopian 
writer, concerned both with attempts to establish a really existing, ideal society in the form of 
Soviet communism, and with the discursive practices of utopian thought in general’. 
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estrangement’ where what should be ‘outrageous, fantastic or tragic’ becomes 
mundane and unnoticeable (cited by Seifrid 2009, pp. 169-70). Enlarging on this 
issue, Bullock (2011, p 93) proposes that Platonov’s characters have to struggle to 
communicate within a ‘historically determined, impoverished form of language’, 
citing Joseph Brodsky’s (1987) argument that 
Platonov appears to have deliberately and completely subordinated himself 
to the vocabulary of this utopia, with all its cumbersome neologisms, 
abbreviations, bureaucratese, sloganeering, and the like. (Brodsky, 1987, p. 
288, cited by Bullock, 2011, p. 93) 
Bullock (2005, p. 3) notes that Brodsky’s critical point is that Platonov’s prose is 
‘designed to turn the language of the Soviet state against itself’. I emphasize this 
quality, suggesting that Platonov makes us clearly aware of the impoverished 
form of language with which his characters have to struggle. To give just one 
example: when Voshchev goes to the trade union committee to ‘defend his 
unneeded labor’, he tells the senior official he has been contemplating ‘a plan of 
shared life, general life’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 4). The administrator isn’t 
interested, declaring ‘Happiness will come from materialism, Comrade 
Voshchev’, and it is at this point that Voshchev first experiences ‘doubt in his 
own life and the weakness of a body without truth’ (p. 4).  
Platonov also has his minor characters speak to the contradictions of the 
revolutionary project. The ‘activist’ (who is never known by any other name) can 
be sitting at his desk in the late evenings, ‘probing with painstaking eyes every 
precise step and task’ so as to keep a ‘mental and factual watch over the kulak 
scum’ (p. 72). While he thus busies himself constructing ‘an essential future’ 
without ‘memory of domestic happiness’, the activist will occasionally ‘stop dead 
because of the anguish of life’ and remember that he himself ‘was a bungler and a 
blind overlooker’ (p. 73): With the conflicted mentality of the apparatchik, the 
activist is never at ease:   
 ‘Why don’t I enter the masses, why don’t I lose myself in a shared life led 
by a leader?’ the activist would ask himself at such moments, but he quickly 
remembered himself, since he did not want to be a member of the general 
orphanhood and he felt afraid of the long anguish of waiting for socialism, of 
waiting until every last shepherd came to be in the midst of joy, when he 
knew it was possible to be an assistant to the vanguard this very day and to 





In expressing his fear of belonging to a ‘general orphanhood’, the activist speaks 
to one of the central metaphors of the novel. As we have seen, the rural 
community adjoining the foundation pit resembles a ‘collective-farm orphanhood 
standing in the wind of the roads’ (p. 65). Further, and as I shall describe later, the 
child Nastya, adopted by the diggers, is also an orphan of history. Hence the 
question haunting the novel: what price progress?  
A fluid form of consciousness  
Bullock (2011, p. 82) suggests that Platonov pursues a ‘fluid and shifting form of 
consciousness in which there is hardly a statement, idea or emotion that can be 
confidently attributed to a single source’. This fluid consciousness returns always 
to the disjunction between human aspiration and material actuality. When 
Voshchev is dismissed from his work, he walks through the night to come to the 
central part of town. Arriving, he finds that it belongs to ‘a bright place of 
electricity’, which is ‘separated from nature’, a distant place where ‘only faraway 
water and wind inhabited the darkness and nature, and only birds could sing the 
sorrow of this great substance, since they flew up above and life was easier for 
them’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 9). In the town, a contrasting site of human 
transformation and effort, ‘people were labouring with a will, erecting brick 
partitions, striding with burdens of weight in the timber delirium of scaffolding’ 
(p. 9). Watching the diggers, Voshchev sees how: 
[The workers] are thin as if they had died; the cramped space between each 
man’s skin and his bones was occupied by veins, and it was clear by the 
thickening of those veins how much blood they must let pass during the 
tension of labour. (The Foundation Pit, p.10).   
In conveying his own philosophical desolation, Platonov describes how, on his 
dismissal, Voshchev is left with ‘the general sorrow of life and the melancholy of 
meaninglessness’ (p. 12). It is only when Voshchev joins the diggers that he finds 
himself ready to admit that ‘childhood might, after all, grow up, and that future 
man might find peace in this reliable building, in order to look out from its high 
windows onto a world stretched out and waiting for him’ (p. 13). Thereafter the 
narrative speaks to the loss of that hope. In a pathos-ridden account, we read how 
Voshchev attempts to comfort himself by collecting and storing leaves and other 
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small pieces of nature in order to protect them from the futility of their own 
existence:  
A dead, fallen leaf lay beside Voshchev’s head; the wind had brought it there 
from a distant tree, and now this leaf faced humility in the earth. Voshchev 
picked up the leaf that had withered and put it a secret compartment in his 
bag, where he took care of all kinds of objects of unhappiness and obscurity. 
‘You did not possess the meaning of life,’ supposed Voshchev with all the 
miserliness of compassion. ‘Stay here—and I’ll find out what you lived and 
perished for’. (The Foundation Pit, p. 5)  
The melancholy of Prushevsky, the site engineer, is just as telling. The proletarian 
home is his vision; he wants it to stand in the place of the old town, where people 
still live ‘by fencing themselves off into households’ (p. 19). Impatient, he needs 
it all to happen now, so that ‘the walls of his architecture would not be in vain’ 
and ‘the building would be inhabited by people … who were filled by that surplus 
of warmth called the soul’ (p. 19). Unable to find meaning in the spiritual, 
Prushevsky denies the very possibility of the numinous. On one occasion, he 
walks away from the foundation pit and stops on a hill to look over the land and 
the road beyond. There, as he ‘looked quietly into all of nature’s misty old age’, 
he saw ‘some peaceful white buildings that shone with more light than there was 
in the air around them’ (p. 60). This single limpid moment is destroyed by 
bitterness, for Prushevsky can neither understand nor contain it: 
On an earthly extinct star, it was more comfortable for him to feel sadness; 
an alien and distant happiness awoke shame and alarm in him – what he 
would have liked, without admitting it, was for the whole world, forever 
under construction but never constructed, to be like his own destroyed life. 
(The Foundation Pit, p. 60; my emphasis) 
As Platonov portrays it, the socialist vision dies quietly, almost by stealth, left 
lying on the ground until destroyed by chance: it is something that might have 
been, but has now shrivelled into nothingness. For Voshchev: 
Like it or not there was no truth in the world—or maybe there had been 
once, in some plant or heroic creature, but then a wandering beggar had 
come by and eaten the plant, or trampled this creature there on the ground in 
lowliness, and then the beggar had died in an autumn gully and the wind had 
blown his body clean into nothing. (The Foundation Pit, pp. 102-3) 
Chronotope: no time, no place, high symbolic significance 
Reflecting the fluidity of the novel’s consciousness, the time-place configurations 
of The Foundation Pit combine a temporal sense of ‘no time’ (or ‘outside time’) 
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with a physical sense of ‘no place’. Here the visual imagery or ‘gaze’ of the text is 
highly important, combining with its literary inventiveness: a quality that Bullock 
(2014) attributes to Platonov’s novel Dzhan. With this, the ‘knots’ binding the 
narrative have a dreamlike quality. When Voshchev is dismissed from his work at 
the start of the novel, he walks down an open road that is, as it were, already 
there, and it is by force of destiny that he comes to the centre of the town and 
joins the diggers working on the foundation pit. In this fashion, space and time 
represent quasi-teleological forces to which human subjects must conform and 
within which the apparently fortuitous but nevertheless inevitable events of the 
narrative combine. Here we have something similar to Bakhtin’s (1937/1981, p. 
100) description of the classical chronotope characterized by the ‘reversibility of 
moments in a temporal sequence, and by their interchangeability in space’.  
The crucial meeting between the town’s diggers and the members of the adjoining 
rural community, on which so much else depends, carries this combination of 
happenstance and inevitability. The diggers are going about their work and the 
peasant Yelisey simply walks over the adjoining hill to announce that he has come 
to reclaim a hundred coffins, which, he recounts, his community had earlier 
stockpiled under the foundation pit for their future use. When the coffins are 
found, two are retained, one as a bed for the labourers’ adopted orphan, Nastya, 
and the other for her toys. Yelisey drags the rest back them back over the hill, tied 
together by a long rope. Speaking to the physical dynamics of life, Platonov 
describes how:  
Taking the end of the front rope of the coffins over his shoulders, Yelisey 
leaned forward and, like a barge hauler, began to heave these objects across 
the dry ups and downs of life’s everyday sea. (The Foundation Pit, p. 63)  
Once Yelisey is over the hill, the two parts of the narrative come together, and the 
diggers, who are as oppressed as any of their counterparts in the western 
proletariat, play their part in destroying an already decimated rural community. As 
described by the narrator, it is with enthusiasm that they ‘set against the collective 
farm at full tempo, as a cadre of the cultural revolution’ (p. 106). Enhancing the 
no-place, no-time nature of Platonov’s representations, they are assisted by a 
mythical bear, who has a ‘wearily proletarian face’ and a smoke-singed coat on 
account of his tireless hammering (p. 107). Representing an extreme form of 
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enslavement, the bear is also one of the Party’s most efficient mechanisms of 
death, sniffing out the kulaks and revealing their hiding places. 
In another critical episode, the kulaks are ‘liquidated’ (drowned) following a 
bizarre forgiveness scene in the OrgYard. Sent to their deaths down the river on a 
makeshift raft, they are farewelled by Zhachev the cripple, who has no legs and is 
a symbol of class hatred. As he pushes the raft out, he finds that ‘liquidating the 
kulaks into the distance’ brings him ‘no calm’ for he knows that he too is on 
limited time: ‘socialism, after all, had no need for a stratum of sad freaks, and he 
too would soon be liquidated into the distance’ (p. 115). As the raft disappears 
down the river, he ‘loses the appearance of the class enemy’ (p. 115). The scene 
ends strangely, gaily, almost like a school picnic: 
‘Fa-re we-ll, parasites!’ Zhachev shouted down the river. 
‘Fa-re we-ll!’ responded the kulaks, sailing off down to the sea. (The 
Foundation Pit, p. 115) 
This passage has a mythological quality. Commenting on this, Chandler (2009a, 
p. 163) observes that while the phrase ‘loses the appearance of the class enemy’ 
might simply mean that the kulaks were disappearing from sight, it could also 
mean that the kulaks ‘were ceasing to see Zhachev as the enemy, and he was 
ceasing to see them as enemies’ (original emphasis). Adding weight to this 
interpretation, he points out that in Russian the word ‘farewell’ also means ‘Keep 
forgiving!’, thus suggesting that, in the brief moment of time left to them, 
Zhachev and the kulaks were each able to recognize one another’s humanity. This, 
Chandler suggests, reflects Platonov’s ‘characteristic blend of delicate irony and 
deep tenderness’, a combination that allows him to ‘cherish the individual human 
soul’ while also portraying ‘one of the hells that mankind has created’ (p. 164).  
On the death of Nastya 
The adoption and death of the orphaned child Nastya is one of the most important 
of the novel’s symbolic ‘out of time’ events, representing Platonov’s profound 
despair over the failure of the revolutionary project. Early in the novel, Chiklin, 
the most hardworking of the diggers, goes to visit the Dutch Tile Factory, which 
has now fallen into disuse. There he finds a dying woman stretched out on the 
floor. She is emaciated and her body is covered by fine hair to protect her from 
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the cold. Despite this, Chiklin immediately recognizes her as the one to whom he 
long ago lost his heart, when, one day, she smiled brightly at him on her way to 
work. Lying with her is her daughter, Nastya. The mother instructs her daughter 
never to tell anyone of her bourgeois origins after she has gone, as no one will talk 
to or care for her if she does. After the mother dies, Chiklin takes Nastya in his 
arms and ‘cherishes her till morning, the last pitiful remnant of the woman who 
had perished’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 50). He then takes her back to town, where 
the diggers nourish and protect her as their hope for a peaceful future, which, they 
trust, will persist long after their deaths:  
For a long while, they watched over the sleep of this small being who would 
one day have dominion over their graves and live on a pacified earth that had 
dominion over their bones. (The Foundation Pit, p. 58)  
Close to the end of the book, Nastya becomes ill and dies. We do not know how 
or why she becomes ill, only that she does. As she lies there, Chiklin ‘felt in all 
the places of her body’ and found she was ‘hot and damp and the bones were 
protruding plaintively from within her’ (p. 135 and p. 136). He and Zhachev lean 
against her, ‘so as to cherish her better’, but Nastya’s mind ‘went on sadly 
thinking’ and she calls out for her mother’s bones. When Chiklin finds them for 
her, she ‘kept holding each of them to her body in turn, kissing them, wiping them 
with a little rag, and placing then in order on the earth floor’ (p. 144).  
By morning Nastya has died, and the community is torn apart in grief. The 
mythical bear (the hammer) ‘buried his mouth in the ground and was howling 
sadly into the deep depth of the soil, unable to think through his grief’ (p. 139). 
Zhachev declares that he no longer believes in communism: ‘I’m a freak of 
imperialism – you can see that! But communism is for children, that’s why I loved 
Nastya’ (p. 149). He departs and never returns. Voshchev, who, not knowing that 
Nastya has died, comes bearing her gifts of leaves, ‘stood in bewilderment over 
this stilled child’, asking himself ‘wherein in the world communism was going if 
it didn’t first begin in a child’s feeling and convinced impression’ (p. 148). 
Chiklin, the guardian of the child, is the hardest struck. Because he is ‘unable to 
cry’, he decides to bury Nastya, and everything is suspended in the labour of 
grief: 
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At noon, Chiklin began to dig Nastya a special grave. He dug it for fifteen 
hours on end—in order that it should be deep and that neither a worm nor 
the root of a plant, nor warmth nor cold should be able to penetrate it, and so 
that the child should never be disturbed by the noise of life from the earth’s 
surface. Chiklin gouged out a sepulchral bed in eternal stone and, by way of 
a lid, he prepared a special granite slab so that the vast weight of the grave’s 
dust should not press down on the little girl.  
After he had rested, Chiklin took the little girl in his arms and carried her 
out with care, to lay her in stone and fill in the grave. The time was night, the 
whole collective farm was asleep in the barrack, and only the hammerer, 
sensing movement, awoke, and Chiklin allowed him to reach out and touch 
Nastya farewell. (The Foundation Pit, p. 149) 
 
It is with Nastya’s death and Chiklin’s unrelenting grief that Platonov leaves us, 
with the philosophical questions raised by his text unresolved, and nothing certain 
except for the enormity of loss. Shortly after he had completed The Foundation 
Pit, he wrote:  
Will our socialist republic perish like Nastya or will she grow up into a 
whole human being, into a new historical society? … The author may have 
been mistaken to portray in the form of a little girl’s death the end of a 
socialist generation, but this mistake occurred only as a result of excessive 
alarm on behalf of something beloved, whose loss is tantamount to the 
destruction not only of all the past but also of the future. (The Foundation 
Pit, p. 150) 
Testament to the pressures under which Platonov laboured, these comments have 
a defensive and apologetic note. But nothing can detract from the power of The 
Foundation Pit as a lament, a poetic mourning. Bakhtin (1986, pp. 119-20) 
suggests that an utterance is never ‘just a reflection or an expression of something 
already existing and outside it’; rather, it creates something ‘that never existed 
before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and, moreover, it always has 
some relation to value—the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth’ and 
‘completely transforms’ the grounds from which it originates. This is true both of 
The Foundation Pit as a whole, where it transforms the politico-ideological crisis 
of its origins into a profoundly important literary record, and of its final 
paragraph, which transmutes metaphysical melancholia into a single moment of 
human grief.  
Bulgakov: The Master and Margarita 
If The Foundation Pit is a lament, The Master and Margarita is shot through with 
laughter. Composed over some of the harshest years of Stalin’s long rule, the 
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novel represents an outstanding act of literary defiance, with its imaginative use of 
satire, realism and romance firmly set against the limitations and conventions of 
socialist realism. As a theatre writer and novelist, Bulgakov trails resistance 
behind him, putting his professional life at stake.8 In 1930, when he thought his 
career was finished, he ripped the manuscript The Master and Margarita to shreds 
and made formal application to leave the Soviet Union, with his letter stating 
outright that he ‘would not make any attempt to write a Communist play, being 
quite confident that I could not succeed in writing such a play’ (cited in Curtis, 
1991, p. 104). Surprisingly, Stalin intervened—perhaps he admired Bulgakov’s 
courage—and under his influence Bulgakov re-obtained a position at the Moscow 
Theatre.  
The risks Bulgakov encountered in pushing the work to a conclusion were 
enormous. In her diary, Elena Bulgakova frequently refers to the arrests, trials, 
deaths and executions of those close to them. For example, on 30
th
 October 1935, 
she records that ‘during the day there was a ring at the door. I went out and there 
was Akhmatova with such a dreadful face. … It turned out that both her son and 
husband had been arrested’ (reproduced in Curtis, 1991, p. 214). She also 
recounts that at one of the last private readings Bulgakov gave to their friends, his 
audience sat silent and numb: ‘everything scared them. In the corridor, Pasha 
fearfully tried to tell me that under no circumstances should it be submitted—
terrible consequences might ensue’ (cited in Weeks, 1996, p. 140).  
The Master and Margarita combines three intermeshing stories: the 
literary/political situation in Moscow in the 1930s, where Woland (Satan) visits a 
compulsorily atheistic community; the love affair between the Master and 
Margarita; and Pontius Pilate’s betrayal of Jesus. The last comprises four chapters 
of the book (one narrated by Woland, one dreamed by Ivan Nikolaevich the 
‘Homeless’, and the other two read by Margarita, having been written by the 
Master). Each of the three main stories is associated with a different narrative 
mode: respectively, ‘a humorous and ironic’ style; a ‘rhetorical first-person 
                                                 
8
 Bulgakov’s earlier critical works include his novel, The Heart of a Dog (1925), and his plays, 
The Days of the Turbins (1926), The Crimson Island (1927) and Flight (1928). All were censored 
and withdrawn by the authorities. 
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narration, lyrical in tone and elevated in style’; and a realist ‘neutral, third-person 
narrative’ (Weeks, 1996, p. 26). Because of this, there has been considerable 
discussion over whether the work should be read as a triple, double or single 
novel; arguing against this, Andrew Barrett (1996a) maintains that there can be no 
single interpretation of The Master and Margarita and no one key to unlocking its 
secrets. Bullock (2011) argues further that Bulgakov’s novel comments 
on/parodies its own status as fiction: 
The Master and Margarita contains a novel-within-a novel, whose events, 
themes and characters are subtly paralleled within the novel as a whole ... 
[and where] the narrator … directly addresses readers both real and 
imaginary, inviting them to participate in the literary process and to identity 
with the Master and Margarita and the novel’s other sympathetic characters. 
(Bullock, 2011, p. 95) 
As with The Foundation Pit, broader philosophical issues underpin Bulgakov’s 
novel. In this case, they have their origins in Bulgakov’s quarrel with the 
traditions of Russian positivist rationality, and more particularly, with the 
‘materialism, atheism, socialism, and revolutionalism’ associated with the 
‘radical’ or ‘classical’ intelligentsia of the mid-nineteenth century (Morson, 2010, 
p. 143). As already outlined, the ‘classical’ or ‘radical’ intelligenty drew on a 
materialist metaphysics, a strongly utilitarian philosophy, certainty about their 
role in bringing about change and the defence of ‘revolutionalism on principle’ 
(Morson, 2010, pp. 143-6). Against them stood the strong counter-tradition of the 
literati to which Bulgakov belongs. The distinctiveness of Bulgakov as part of, 
but partly separate from, this counter-tradition lies in his profound sense of the 
‘out of time’ nature of time, an enduring interest in the metaphysical nature of the 
world, and an infusion of the present moment with the ancient and the traditional.  
How, then, does Bulgakov give literary expression to these philosophical 
commitments? I focus on three key moves: satire and irony; the imaginative 
possibilities of chronotope; and the values and actions of the protagonists. 
Satire and irony 
Bakhtin (1937/1981, p. 159) suggests that satire creates its own special worlds, 
which ‘cannot be understood in a direct and unmediated way but must be grasped 
metaphorically’. This is true of the central ‘trick’ of The Master and Margarita, 
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namely Woland’s visit, which as well as acting as a lasting joke against the 
compulsory atheism of Soviet society, challenges literary and religious 
conventions by re-working the Faustian tradition and portraying Woland as more 
an emissary of justice rather than an expression of evil. For Bullock (2011, p. 84) 
Moscow can be seen as ‘a modern day Babylon’ with the arrival of Woland 
revealing that ‘despite their claims to a superior rationalism, its citizens are as 
credulous, sinful and deserving of punishment as their Babylonian counterparts’. 
Whatever the metaphor/s underlying the Master and Margarita, we have an 
iconoclastic distancing from current orthodoxies, something I see as essential to 
Bulgakov’s particular way of ‘doing otherwise’.  
In the opening chapter of the novel, Mikhail Alexandrovich Berlioz, the editor of 
a ‘fat literary journal’ and Ivan Nikolaevich—an aspiring young poet who writes 
under the name of Bezdomny or ‘Homeless’—meet at the Patriarch Ponds, the 
site of the palace of an eighteenth century patriarch of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. The two are discussing Ivan’s anti-religious poem, which Berlioz has 
rejected not because it criticizes Jesus but because it takes him seriously in the 
first instance. Berlioz, a well-read man, is firm with Ivan Nikolaevich, telling him 
that ‘Jesus as a person never existed in the world, and all the stories about him 
were mere fiction, the most ordinary fiction’ (p. 9). It is when his ‘high tenor rang 
out over the deserted walk’, that Woland first makes his appearance. Greeting the 
couple politely, he questions them on the ‘five proofs’ of God’s existence, and 
asks how they respond to Kant’s construction of a sixth final proof of his own. 
When the young poet Ivan angrily asserts there is no need for any supernatural 
power as ‘man governs himself’, Woland dryly observes that ‘to govern one 
needs, after all, to have a precise plan for a certain, at least somewhat decent, 
length of time’, and that this is rendered impossible by the simple fact of human 
mortality (p. 13). The issue of divinity is never resolved; rather the passage 
underlines the foolishness of Berlioz’ axiomatic assertions. 
Barrett (1996b, pp. 113-16) points out that Woland he is ‘by no means Goethe’s 
Mephistopheles’, for he has a better understanding of the ‘divine scheme’, 
‘participates in it with greater readiness’; in seeing truth and dishonesty for what 
they are, he is ‘both scourge and benefactor to the human beings he encounters in 
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Moscow’. It is Woland who rides with the Master and Margarita into infinity, and 
ensures the couple’s ‘forgiveness and eternal refuge’ (The Master and Margarita, 
p. 379). And it is he who speaks some of the most memorable lines of the book. 
To Matthew Levi, who addresses him as ‘spirit of evil and sovereign of shadows’, 
he responds:  
You uttered your words as if you don’t acknowledge shadows, or evil either. 
Kindly consider your question: what would your good do if evil did not 
exist, and what would the earth look like if shadows disappeared from it? 
Shadows are cast by objects and people. Here is the shadow of my sword. 
Trees and living things also have shadows. Do you want to skin the whole 
earth, tearing all the trees and living things off it, because of your fantasy of 
enjoying bare light? You are a fool. (The Master and Margarita, p. 360)  
True to Bulgakov, this scene is also humorous, with Matthew’s manner toward 
Woland exemplified by a kind of collegial hostility—after all they both belong to 
the world of the ‘unreal’—and he merely retorts ‘I won’t argue with you, you old 
sophist’ (p. 360). But it is, indeed, the symbolic significance of shadows that 
forms the key ‘idea’ or thematic ‘hero’ of The Master and Margarita as a work 
that speaks against the closures of rationality and refuses all forms of positivist 
certitude. This challenge to the distinctions between the real and the unreal, the 
actual and the fantastic, recurs throughout the novel, pointing to the fundamental 
flaws of current orthodoxies and, more widely, the limitations of all forms of 
positivist rationality. 
In a more directly political way, Bulgakov draws on the burlesque, grotesque and 
outrageous to describe how Woland and his retinue—Behemoth, Koroviev and 
the more violent Azazello—trick the corrupt, the greedy and the ambitious into 
self-defeating actions, where they compete with each other for possessions, scarce 
housing recourses and the affirmation of the authorities. As noted, laughter 
‘destroys epic distance’ for, with its ‘comic familiarization of the image of man’, 
it ‘brings the world closer and familiarizes it in order to investigate it fearlessly 
and freely’ (Bakhtin 1941/1981, p. 25). In one of The Master and Margarita’s 
major incidents, enacted at ‘Woland’s Magic Show’, the audience fight for the 
bank notes and fancy clothes that flood the stage, only to later find themselves 
naked on Moscow’s public streets holding counterfeit notes. The implication is 
that all such tricks are well deserved. In referring to Nikanor Ivanovich, the 
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grasping chairman of the tenants' association of block 302, Woland says to 
Koroviev, ‘I don’t like this Nikanor Ivanovich, he is a chiseller and a crook. Can 
it be arranged so that he doesn’t come any more?’ (The Master and Margarita, p. 
101).  
In laughing his way through a Moscow beset by housing shortages and 
bureaucratic surveillance, Bulgakov adapts the traditions of menippean satire in 
combining the fantastic and the philosophical, and creating characters that are 
simultaneously real and legendary (see Bakhtin, 1963/1984; Proffer, 1996, pp. 98-
99). As in these traditions, his targets would have been well-known to 
contemporaries, most especially Massolit and Griboedov’s Club: Massolit 
represents the Union of Writers and Griboedov’s the House of Writers, where 
members were rewarded for writing clichéd poems, novels and plays. As the 
narrator observes: 
Any visitor finding himself in Griboedov’s … would realize at once what a 
good life those lucky fellows were having, and black envy would soon start 
gnawing him … [in not owning] a Massolit membership card, brown, 
smelling of costly leather, with a wide gold boarder – a card known to all of 
Moscow. (The Master and Margarita, p. 56) 
As always, there is seriousness behind the irony, reflecting Bulgakov’s hard-won 
knowledge of the inferior works produced by the regime, the creative works that 
might have been produced but never got written, and the artistic aspirations that 
were crushed before they were born. In focusing on the casualties, Bulgakov 
attends to the plight of Ivan the Homeless. A poet manqué, Ivan produces the 
officially approved forms of verse. On first meeting the Master, he admits to 
being a poet, and sees his visitor wince:  
‘What, you mean you dislike my poetry?’ Ivan asked with curiosity. 
‘I dislike it terribly.’ 
‘And what have you read?’ 
‘I’ve never read any of your poetry!’ the visitor exclaimed nervously. 
‘Then how can you say that?’ 
‘Well, what of it?’ the guest replied. ‘As if I haven’t read others. Or else … 
maybe there’s some miracle? Very well, I’m prepared to take it on faith. Is 
your poetry good? You tell me yourself.’ 
‘Monstrous!’ Ivan spoke boldly and frankly. 
‘Don’t write any more!’ the visitor said beseechingly. 
‘I promise and I swear!’ Ivan said solemnly. (The Master and Margarita, 
p. 134)  
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Later, Bulgakov describes how Ivan keeps his promise to the Master. When 
confronted by the mild-faced interrogator who has come to question him about the 
death of Berlioz, Ivan says he will never again write poetry: ‘the poems I used to 
write were bad poems, and now I understand it’ (p. 337). Ivan reaffirms his 
commitment when he sees the Master for the last time before the latter flies off to 
infinity. At this last meeting, the Master asks him to write a sequel to his own 
work, as he himself will ‘be occupied by other things’ (p. 373). This, as I will 
explain later, is the promise that Ivan does not and cannot keep.  
In his comparison of The Foundation Pit and The Master and Margarita, Bullock 
(2011, p. 82) proposes that while Platonov takes us fully into the ‘allure and 
absurdities’ of Soviet utopianism, Bulgakov dismisses the current orthodoxies as 
‘beneath his contempt’ in the expectation that ‘his reader will share and revel in 
his iconoclastic attitude’. At the same time, Bullock underscores that Bulgakov’s 
‘joke’ is a deeply serious one, designed to reveal the deceits beneath the 
orthodoxies, the implausibilities beneath the certitudes, and, above all, the 
importance of safeguarding artistic integrity. Here he comments that:  
Bulgakov conceives of the irrational and the transcendent as a justification 
for and defence of the writer’s vocation, confident that posterity and 
immortality will judge him more fairly than the current age. (Bullock, 2011, 
p. 910) 
In parallel, the Master is able to ‘correctly intuit’ the nature of the events he 
describes, because ‘he has special insight into a world that is beyond the rational, 
materialist philosophy on which Soviet Russia is built’ (Bullock, 2011, p. 91). I 
come then to the Jerusalem story, and with it to Bulgakov’s distinctive use of 
chronotope.  
Time, place and meaning: Moscow and Jerusalem  
Whereas Platonov portrays the force of history through its ‘no place, outside time’ 
use of chronotope, Bulgakov relies on vast shifts in time and space, blurring the 
boundaries between the known and the unknown, the fictional and the real. Here 
we have a vivid illustration of Bakhtin’s (1937/1981, p. 167) proposition that in 
the post-Rabelaisian novel, ‘everything of value, everything that is valorized 
positively, must achieve its full potential in temporal and spatial terms; it must 
spread out as far and as wide as possible’. This represents a powerful form of 
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‘doing otherwise’, with the novel’s ‘spinning out’ of time and space producing a 
sense of reality beyond the immediacy of internecine politics and bureaucratic 
rivalries. 
In shifting between contemporary Moscow and ancient Jerusalem, Bulgakov blurs 
the boundaries between the known and the unknown, the fictional and the real. In 
the case of Moscow, Berlioz’ apartment, subsequently taken over by Woland and 
his retinue, is ‘number 50 of no. 302-bis of Sadovaya Street’ and its layout and 
furnishings are described in detail, modelled on Bulgakov’s own. The same level 
of detail applies to the office of the Director of the Variety Theatre, where the 
furnishings include ‘a bunch of old posters hanging on the wall, a small table with 
a carafe of water on it, four armchairs and, in the corner, a dust-covered scale of 
some model of past review’ (p. 104). In combining this kind of detailed precision 
with the fantastic nature of Woland’s visit, Bulgakov makes the familiar strange, 
for number 50 of no. 302-bis of Sadovaya Street (as it really exists) can now 
never be the same again. Thus he mystifies the customary, suggesting that it is 
only our habits of mind that make it appear predictable and knowable. 
In contrast, Bulgakov demystifies the mythical in the Jerusalem story. In 
introducing Pilate, he is very precise about the time and place, recording that it 
was ‘early in the morning of the fourteenth day of the spring month of Nisan’ and 
that it seemed that ‘a rosy smell exuded from the cypresses and palms in the 
garden, and that the smell of leather trappings and sweat from the convoy was 
mingled with the cursed rosy flax’ (p. 19). There, in the ‘palace of Herod the 
Great’, a centurion’s ‘heavy boots thudded across the mosaic’, after which 
‘complete silence fell in the colonnade, and one could hear pigeons cooing on the 
garden terrace near the balcony and water, singing an intricate, pleasant song in 
the fountain’ (p. 21).  
Having made the biblical story so immediate, Bulgakov resists any literal reading 
of his account. As well as using the alternative Aramaic names for the main 
characters and places—Yeshua for Jesus, Yershalaim for Jerusalem, Kaifa for 
Caiaphas the High Priest, and Kiriath for Judas Iscariot—he changes several key 
aspects of the Bible story. Yeshua has only one disciple and does not enter 
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Jerusalem on a donkey, but by ‘the Susa gate, accompanied only by Matthew 
Levi’ (The Master and Margarita, p. 27). Most significantly there is no supreme 
moment of death and no resurrection beyond it. Terrified and bloody, Yeshua dies 
a mortal death:  
In the very first hour, he (Yeshua) began to have blackouts, and then he fell 
into oblivion, hanging his head in his unwound turban. The flies and 
horseflies therefore covered him completely, so that his face disappeared 
under the black swarming mass. In his groin, and on his belly, and in his 
armpits, fat horseflies sat sucking at his yellow naked body. (The Master and 
Margarita, p. 180) 
How might one read Bulgakov’s account of the Passion with all of its exactness of 
detail and its estrangement in interpretation? For Laura Weeks (1996, p. 42), one 
of the leading authorities on the subject, the narrative works to ‘strip Jesus of all 
the attributes of his role as a Messiah … Bulgakov’s Yeshua sidesteps divinity as 
neatly as he sidesteps the single ray of sunlight that penetrates the colonnade 
during his interrogation’. But I suggest that Bulgakov’s rendering, with all its 
historical precision, also works to make the historical existence of Jesus the more 
real, thus evoking the sense that maybe this is how it all really happened. In short, 
if his description of the events in Moscow renders the ‘real’ fantastic, then his 
reconstruction of the Passion renders the mystical real, thus redrawing the 
boundaries between our fictional and non-fictional worlds, the real and the 
imagined.  
At the same time, the novel invites a search for coherence. Surely, one feels, 
Moscow and Jerusalem, so immediate to our sensibilities, must in some way be 
subject to the same influences? Isn’t there an underlying theme that gives the text 
an internal unity? Pondering this, Vladimir Lakshin (1968/1996) suggests that it is 
the poetics of the sun and moon that govern the indeterminacies of the novel:  
The sun—the customary symbol of life, joy and genuine light—accompanies 
Yeshua along Via Dolorosa as the emanation of hot and searing reality. In 
contrast, the moon is a fantastic world of shadows, enigmas, and 
illusiveness—the kingdom of Woland and his guests, feasting at the spring 
ball in the full moon—but it is also the cooling light of calm and sleep. 
Together, the luminaries of the day and night are the only certain witnesses 
of what happened. No one knows when in Jerusalem and of what took place 
in Moscow. They mark the bonds of time, and the unity of human history. 
(Lakshin 1968/1996, p. 76) 
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This indicates that a symbolic, trans-temporal force might unite the events of the 
novel. This would be quite consistent with Bulgakov’s interest in the 
metaphysical and his refusal of all forms of positivist rationality. But in the third 
and final part of my discussion, I want to propose that something more is 
involved: that Bulgakov’s destabilization of the real and the unreal, the imagined 
and the actual, is underpinned by certain core ethical and philosophical 
commitments, as represented in the actions, views, voices and values of his 
characters.  
On virtue, courage and memory   
As well as being serious about artistic integrity, Bulgakov is serious about love, as 
illustrated in his account of the enduring love affair between Margarita and the 
Master. This part of the novel, which he wrote first, is important to his art of 
‘doing otherwise’, for, against current orthodoxies, it steadfastly insists on the 
traditional and the romantic. Thus, in a wonderfully light passage, the Master tells 
Ivan how their affair started. Out walking one evening, he saw Margarita carrying 
a bunch of yellow flowers, a colour he particularly disliked. On realizing this, she 
threw the flowers in the gutter; he immediately retrieved them and they ‘then 
walked on side by side’. When Ivan begs him to go on with the story, the Master 
says: ‘why you can guess for yourself how it went on. Love leaped at us like a 
murderer in an ally leaping out of nowhere, and struck us both at once’ (p. 140). 
The rest is classic romance: 
She used to come to me every afternoon, but I would begin waiting for her in 
the morning. This waiting expressed itself in moving small objects around 
on the table. Ten minutes before, I would sit down by the little window and 
begin listening for the banging of the decrepit gate. And how curious: before 
my meeting with her, few people came to our yard—more simply, no one 
came—but now it seemed to me that the whole city came flooding there. 
(The Master and Margarita, p. 141)  
If Bulgakov is serious about love, he is also serious about virtue: not virtue in the 
absolute, saintly sense, but virtue in its complex, flawed, human manifestations. 
This is illustrated in the case of Margarita, who shows loyalty and courage in 
agreeing to become a witch in the hope of finding the Master. Flying over the city 
in her transformed state, she uses these same qualities to gleefully wreck the 
apartment of the critic Latunsky, who has savaged her lover’s work. When the 
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small boy on the third floor of the flats is terrified by the noise she makes in 
smashing the critic’s apartment to bits, she stops to comfort him: ‘don’t be afraid, 
little one,’ she says, her criminal voice grown husky from the wind, ‘it’s some 
boys breaking windows’ (The Master and Margarita, p. 240). She is also generous 
and compassionate. When, at the close of the Ball, Woland tells her that she can 
demand ‘one thing only’ for her services, she wills herself to ask that Frieda, one 
of the tormented dead, no longer be offered the handkerchief with which she had 
smothered her two-year old child some centuries ago. But above all, Margarita is 
courageous, and it is this that separates her from Pontius Pilate and the Master, 
both of whom, in their different ways, illustrate the damage that cowardice can 
inflict on personal, spiritual and artistic integrity.   
Let me start with Pilate. As Vladimir Lakshin (1968/1996) points out, he did not 
wish Yeshua to be killed, and even at one point offered him hospitality and a role 
as a court counsellor. But when Yeshua questions Caesar’s right to rule, saying 
that all authority is ‘violence over people’, and that a time ‘would come when 
there will be no authority of the Caesars, nor any other authority’ (The Master and 
Margarita, p. 30), Pilate vacillates and withdraws. He is, in a word, cowed. Timid 
in spite of, or perhaps because of, his power, he fears informers and 
insubordination, is sensitive to ridicule, and shrinks in the face of religious 
fanaticism (Lakshin, 1968/1996). As a result, he bows to Kaifa’s insistence that 
‘the wretched robber Bar-Rabban’ be released over the condemned but innocent 
Yeshua (The Master and Margarita, p. 37), and from that point on the killing of 
Yeshua is a foregone conclusion. After the execution, Pilate condemns himself 
again and again, dreaming that he and Yeshua are walking down a moonlit road. 
When, on one of these walks, Yeshua reflects that ‘cowardice is undoubtedly one 
of the most terrible vices’, Pilate cries out, ‘No, philosopher, I disagree with you, 
it is the most terrible vice!’ (p. 319).  
So, yes, Bulgakov is serious about cowardice, deeply so. At the same time, he is 
compassionate, and spends more time describing Pilate’s torment than the 
emotions of any other character. In one of the most moving scenes of the book, 
the Master and Margarita stand with Woland on the verge of infinity and see 
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Pilate seated on a stone chair with his dog, staring at the moon. He appears to be 
talking, and Woland explains: 
He says one and the same thing, that even the moon gives him no peace, and 
that his is a bad job. That is what he always says when he is not asleep, and 
when he is asleep, he dreams one and the same thing: there is a path of 
moonlight, and he wants to walk down it and talk with the prisoner Yeshua 
Ha-Nozri, because, as he insists he never finished what he was saying that 
time, long ago, on the fourteenth day of the spring month of Nisan. (The 
Master and Margarita, p. 381)
 
 
In a lovely aside on Pilate’s faithful dog, Woland then reflects that ‘if it is true 
that cowardice is the most grievous vice, then the dog at least is not guilty of it. 
Storms were the only thing the brave dog feared. Well, he who loves must share 
the lot of the one he loves’ (p. 381). 
Given Bulgakov’s concern with cowardice, it is significant that he creates a hero 
who doubts the value of his work and lacks the strength to support it. Condemned 
by one of Massolit’s leading critics, the Master burns his novel and admits 
himself to the asylum, and it is only the courage of Margarita that saves him. As 
Pevear (2007, p. xvi) suggests, this establishes ‘a thematic link between Pilate, the 
Master, and the author himself’. Pevear also points out that Bulgakov ‘laboured 
especially over the conclusion of the novel and what reward to give the master’, 
revealing that in an earlier version of this part of the novel Bulgakov had written: 
The house on Sadovaya and the horrible Bosoy will forever vanish from 
your memory, but with them will go Ha-Nozri and the forgiven hegemon. 
These things are not for your spirit. You will not raise yourself higher, you 
will not see Yeshua, you will never leave your refuge. (Pevear, 2007, p. xvi) 
In finally settling his account with his flawed hero, Bulgakov arranges for 
Matthew Levi to ask Woland that the Master ‘be given peace’. Woland agrees, 
saying ‘nothing is hard for me to do, you know that’, but first asks ‘so why don’t 
you take him with you to the light?’ Then comes Matthew’s sorrowful response: 
‘he does not deserve light, he deserves peace’ (The Master and Margarita, p. 
361).  
In both versions of the Master’s reward, Bulgakov proposes that our destiny is 
intimately bound up with our ability to remember and make sense of the past. This 
is also the key to the novel’s epilogue. Here we read that the authorities conduct a 
thorough investigation into the incidents surrounding Woland’s visit; that ‘almost 
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everything was explained’; and that ‘the investigation came to an end as all 
investigations come to an end’ (p. 389). Ivan, now ‘Professor Ivan Nikolaevich 
Ponyrev of the Institute of History and Philosophy’, is ‘aware of everything, he 
knows and understands everything. He knows that as a young man he fell victim 
to criminal hypnotists and was treated and cured. But he also knows that there are 
things that he cannot manage’ (p. 395). Chief among the things that Ivan ‘cannot 
manage’ are the memories that crowd in on him on the nights of the full moon. It 
is then, in his wakeful sleep, that he again sees Yeshua and Pilate walking 
together, and watches the moon ‘begin to rage’ so that it ‘sprays light in all 
directions … (and) … drowns the bed’ (p. 395). These memories are to vanish, 
for: 
The next morning, he wakes up silent but perfectly calm and well. His 
needled memory grows quiet, and until the next full moon no one will 
trouble the professor—neither the noseless killer of Gestas, nor the cruel 
fifth procreator of Judea, the equestrian Pontius Pilate. (The Master and 
Margarita, p. 396) 
Present at the beginning and end of the novel, and appearing in more chapters 
than any of the other characters, Ivan the Homeless pulls the threads of the novel 
together. With only his memory of the Master to sustain him, he acknowledges 
that there are things that he cannot manage and submits to a drug-induced 
tranquillity. What price memory? What price artistic integrity? Such are the 
questions arising from The Master and Margarita, a text that reflects on the act of 
writing through the narrative it tells and the metaphorical, satirical and fantastic 
manner in which it tells it.  
Concluding points: on ‘doing otherwise’ 
This chapter has been based on the proposition that Platonov and Bulgakov face 
the challenge of undermining the certitudes and literary conventions of their times 
without asserting a systematic counter-ideology or literary formula of their own: 
namely, in practising the ‘art of doing otherwise’. Here the artistic is an 
expression of the political, just as the political is an expression of the artistic, thus 
illustrating Booth’s (1984, p. xvi) ‘form/matter pairing’ where ‘neither form nor 
matter can be distinguished in separation from its twin’. In exploring how 
Platonov and Bulgakov achieve this effect, I have considered their varied uses of 
the novel’s traditions in expressing their political and philosophical concerns; the 
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power of their imaginative and emotional calls; and the relationship between the 
finalized and unfinalized qualities of their works. In now reflecting on what this 
might suggest for the complex of factors enabling a work carry across time and 
place, I further reflect on each dimension.  
In the first instance, I underscore the far-reaching and varied nature of Platonov 
and Bulgakov’s literary/political combinations. In The Foundation Pit, Platonov 
confronts the paradox that liberation from human suffering is dependent on matter 
while matter is ultimately obdurate and determinate. To express this in a literary 
way, he uses parody at the levels of genre and official discourse, illuminates the 
elusive nature of his characters’ consciousness, and creates a chronotope that 
represents no-time, no-place and hence all times and all places. In The Master and 
Margarita, Bulgakov illuminates the intellectual, artistic and spiritual closures of 
utilitarian positivism through a combination of satire and irony, radical shifts in 
time and space, and the use of characters that speak to the importance of courage, 
conviction and memory. With these literary moves, distinct to each text, the works 
compel, but differently so. In its profound melancholy, The Foundation Pit 
promotes a sense of the preciousness and vulnerability of our political aspirations; 
in its sweeping movements through time and space, The Master and Margarita, 
reminds us of the vainness of our aspirations, as sun, stars and moon wheel 
around our universe.  
Turning secondly to the texts’ imaginative qualities, I emphasize how the novels 
make a direct call on our consciousness, bypassing analytic deliberation. In The 
Foundation Pit, this effect is achieved through Platonov’s distinctive poetics. 
While ‘the extraordinary weight and density’ of his language often derives from 
its instability, with words ‘hovering between different meanings’ (Chandler 
2009a, p. 172), there are many times when the emotional impact is unequivocal: 
as for example, when ‘Chiklin picked Nastya up in his arms and she opened eyes 
that had gone silent and that had now dried up like fallen leaves’ (p. 140). I re-
emphasize that the impact is experiential as well as linguistic: that is, we come to 
internalize and experience the image as well as ‘think’ it. This quality also applies 
to The Master and Margarita, where the text’s poetics allow for many lines of 
escape and conjecture, creating ‘a mental space, a field of dreams and contention’ 
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(McEwan, 2011, np). There is also something ‘uncanny’ about Bulgakov’s 
imagination, whereby he is able to render the events in Jerusalem as though 
happening in the present, quite literally, ‘bringing them home’ to us as readers. 
Thus he envisages, with such precision how:   
The sun already stood quite high over the hippodrome, [and] that a ray had 
already penetrated the colonnade and was stealing toward Yeshua’s worn 
sandals, and that the man was trying to step out of the sun’s way. (The 
Master and Margarita, p. 25) 
I stress that while these imaginative qualities are not exclusive to the novel as a 
literary form, they are vital to it, and have particular effects when combined with 
its distinctive practices. This is something that we might neglect if, following 
Bakhtin, we emphasize the contrasts between the novel and lyrical poetry. In the 
case of The Foundation Pit, this would obscure just how the text manages to be so 
elusive and so haunting, so able to enter the inner recesses of our consciousness; 
in that of The Master and Margarita, it would be to fail to appreciate how 
Bulgakov’s flights of imagination lead to a feeling of release and renewed mental 
and imaginative energy.  
The emotional call of the texts is vital to their resonance across time and space. In 
this respect, Platonov and Bulgakov do not simply invoke our sympathy for 
particular characters, but also offer glimpses into the scale of human and political 
tragedy. In The Foundation Pit Prushevsky suffers the ‘constriction of his own 
consciousness and an end to any further understanding of life’ (p. 19) while 
Voshchev experiences ‘doubt in his own life and the weakness of a body without 
truth’ (p. 4). In The Master and Margarita, Bulgakov us to contemplate the 
sufferings of the flawed, most particularly the torment of Pontius Pilate with his 
longing for a meeting with Yeshua that will never take place. As Bullock 
comments, in refusing to pass judgement on his characters, Bulgakov evokes a 
reality beyond the academic disciplines: 
[Bulgakov’s] interest in what Morson calls ‘the excluded middle’ – neither 
the righteous nor the damned, but the flawed reality of our humanity (not for 
nothing is the Master a coward who doubts the value and permanence of his 
own novel) stems from his conception of a realm beyond the grasp of human 
politics, history or ideology. (Bullock, 2011, p. 91)  
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What of the relationship between the texts’ finalizable and unfinalizable qualities? 
My first point is that in engaging with utopian discourse, Platonov and Bulgakov 
enter a terrain where political and philosophical binaries dominate the entire 
structure of thought and discourse. Hence, for theirs to be an effective counter 
response, it must avoid the black and white-ness of utopianism, and instead enter 
the world of shadows and ambiguity. Such is surely Woland’s wisdom when he 
says to Matthew ‘do you want to skin the whole earth, tearing all the trees and 
living things off it, because of your fantasy of enjoying bare light? You are a fool’ 
(The Master and Margarita, p. 360). My argument, then, is that the unfinalizable 
qualities of the novels occur in response to and in interaction with the 
finalizability of utopian thought: hence the relationship, as I will argue 
throughout, is best understood as essentially active and dynamic, rather than in 
static and/or binary terms.  
As an extension of this, I submit that the texts’ oblique and/or enigmatic qualities 
exist within, and take their meaning from, the authors’ fundamental values. To 
borrow from Emerson (2008, p. 136), Platonov and Bulgakov can each be said to 
have ‘a point of view on the world and passionate value system they desire us to 
take seriously’. In Platonov’s case this is illustrated in his dedication to a 
socialism in which the new society ‘would be inhabited by people … who were 
filled by that surplus of warmth called the soul’ (p. 19); in Bulgakov’s to a 
fundamental commitment to artistic integrity, personal courage and the freedoms 
of thought and belief. Without these convictions, the works would float loose 
from their political concerns. This suggests that unfinalizability cannot be 
understood simply as an expression of the unknown nature of the world, where all 
is ‘open and free, everything is still in the future, and will always be in the future’ 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 166), but must also entertain the active search for 
meaning or ‘truth’.  
In summary: these two novels demonstrate a close and symbiotic relationship 
between the artistic and the political. In making this case, I have emphasized the 
diversity of their literary/political combinations; illustrated the power of 
imagination and emotion in conveying the human impact of the political; and 
pointed to the interactive relationship between their finalizable and unfinalizable 
 108 
qualities. Building on these foundations, the next chapter turns to the more 
evidently instructional texts of the Western European authors, and explores how, 





The novel as truth-bearer: Silone, Koestler and Orwell 
[In a pedagogical text] truth is impersonal. It is placed in a character’s mouth 
by the author. Characters are not creators of ideas but merely carriers. … In 
such a world, an independent idea cannot be acknowledged on its own 
terms: it is either affirmed (that is absorbed) or repudiated. … Without any 
genuine interaction among characters, dialogue can never be more than 
‘pedagogical’. (Emerson, 1985, pp. 65-6)
 
 
In one of his wartime essays, Orwell (1944/2000, pp. 268-9) mentions a new class 
of ‘roughly political writing’ that had arisen out of the European struggle against 
totalitarianism. Under this genre he includes ‘novels, autobiographies, books of 
“reportage”, sociological treatises and plain pamphlets’ for all share ‘a common 
origin and to a great extent the same emotional atmosphere’. The ‘common 
origin’ include Mussolini’s rise to power, the Spanish Civil War, the Third Reich 
and Stalin’s Russia: in brief, the emergence of the twin faces of totalitarianism, 
fascist and communist. The ‘shared emotional atmosphere’ is bleak, pessimistic 
and urgent. Democracy hangs precariously in the balance, political atrocities are 
perpetrated on a massive scale, and the Left is in disarray as news filters through 
about the Stalinist regime.  
Written before the end of the Second World War, and when the realities of 
Stalin’s regime were still in dispute, Silone’s Bread and Wine, Koestler’s 
Darkness at Noon and Orwell’s Animal Farm entered and helped shape the earlier 
stages of a debate that persisted well into the 1960s.1 Narratives of warning, they 
dwell on the prospects of the revolutionary movement, ponder whether any such 
radical move is doomed, and consider whether the sacrifice of the means for the 
end is an inevitable consequence of the revolutionary drive. More direct and 
instructional than the novels of Platonov and Bulgakov, they are all, in one way or 
another, small ‘truth-bearers’, designed to convince and compel, with their 
political/philosophical drive tending always toward the pedagogical and assertive, 
and away from the ambiguous and oblique. They have truths to tell, and, in the 
                                                 
1
 I leave discussion of Nineteen Eighty-Four until Chapter Seven, where I compare it with 
Zamyatin’s We. However, many of the comments on Orwell’s position raised here also apply to 
my subsequent discussion.  
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main, they do so loudly and clearly: theirs is the territory of ideological 
argumentation.   
Hence the critical question for this chapter is whether it is possible for these three 
novels to create the same kind of generative artistic/political relationship I have 
attributed to Platonov and Bulgakov’s works. At the outset, I stress that political 
conviction is not itself the issue for the artistic life of the text: to the contrary, I 
see it as an integral part of a work’s ability to speak to us across time and space. 
At the same time, I recognize that pedagogical assertion can indeed lead to the 
situation where, in Bakhtin’s terms, a text becomes flat and monological, and its 
characters merely the ‘carriers’ rather than the ‘creators’ of ideas (Emerson, 1985, 
p. 66). The matter is by no means straightforward, for Bakhtin’s also 
acknowledges the persistence of monological elements even in Dostoevsky’s 
works: 
Dostoyevsky the journalist was by no means a stranger to one-sided 
seriousness, to dogmatism, even to eschatology. But these ideas of the 
journalist, once introduced into the novel, become merely one of the 
embodied voices of an unfinalized and open dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, 
p. 166)  
In arguing that the novel can thus exert a mediating influence over its unruly 
elements, Bakhtin does not indicate where the balance might tip over and ‘one-
sided seriousness’ and/or ‘dogmatism’ turn a work into a monological text. 
Neither is it something I attempt to theorize here. I am, however, keenly interested 
in the range of literary factors that might exercise a countervailing influence over 
the didactic elements of Bread and Wine, Darkness at Noon and Animal Farm. In 
considering this, I observe that elsewhere Bakhtin speaks very favourably of 
Dostoevsky as journalist, proposing that: 
His passion for journalism and his love of the newspaper, his deep and subtle 
understanding of the newspaper page as living reflection of the 
contradictions of contemporary society in the cross-section of a single day 
all precisely explained his dialogic vision. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 29)  
So this kind of critical eye—characteristic of the three authors considered here—
evidently has its place in enabling a novel to carry conviction across time and 
place, particularly as far as the more ‘applied’ interests of everyday readers are 
concerned. Hence a vital issue for the art/politics problematic is how far the 
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literary traditions of the novel can counteract the dogmatic qualities of political 
assertion, thus allowing (finalizable) political commitments to achieve a certain 
(unfinalizable) resonance across time and place. Prior to considering how this 
emerges in the texts of Silone, Koestler and Orwell, I outline the historical and 
political background to their concerns, focusing on the ideological crisis facing 
the European Left.  
Context: ideological crisis 
Silone, Koestler and Orwell wrote at a time when many socialist intellectuals, 
including George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, and Beatrice and Sydney Webb, 
remained reluctant to acknowledge the extent of Stalin’s persecutions. In 
explaining this myopia, David Engerman (2001, p. xi) suggests that Stalin’s drive 
to transform the landscape of the country ‘from one dotted with peasant villages 
into a modern terrain of huge mechanized collective farms’ fulfilled the Left’s 
desire ‘for a well-organized economic system under the hands of experts’. 
Similarly, Mazower (1999, p. 127) observes that at a time when capitalism was in 
serious difficulties, Stalin’s Russia ‘formed a striking contrast to the West—an 
image of energy, commitment, collective achievement and modernity—the more 
alluring for being so little understood’, with this perception being reinforced by a 
‘phenomenal will to believe in utopia’.  
As information about Stalin’s terror filtered through to the West during the 1930s, 
so support for the regime became increasingly hard to maintain. This was 
intensified by the dictatorial behaviour of the Third International (Comintern), 
with its insistence on the strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism and its hard line 
approach to social democrats, whom they famously labelled ‘social fascists’. 2 
Some of the difficulties were diffused when the Comintern moved to its ‘popular 
front’ policy (1934-1939), under which the national parties were instructed to 
form broad alliances with all anti-fascist parties with the aim of isolating the 
fascist dictatorships internationally. The old traditions of ‘dictatorship from the 
top’ continued nevertheless, leaving the national communist with little or no 
                                                 
2
 This assisted Hitler’s rise to power, as the German Communist Party’s (KPD) refusal to form an 
alliance with the Social Democrats left the National Socialists as the largest single party in the 
Reichstag with just over a third of the seats. 
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chance of formulating an effective response to Stalinism and/or developing an 
alternative revolutionary program.  
Given these developments, those who were either members of the various 
communist parties, or broadly sympathetic with the aims of the movement, were 
forced to question the status of Marxism as a revolutionary ideal. In particular, 
they had to deal with the issue of whether Marxism-Leninism could truly be seen 
as the opponent of fascism or, whether as some contemporaries came to believe, it 
simply represented a ‘red’ fascism, set against the European ‘black’, with little 
else to distinguish it. With this threatening to leave a theoretical vacuum as far as 
the critique of capitalism was concerned, two main lines of response arose, 
punctuated by numerous intervening positions. The first argued that Stalinism was 
an aberration from the revolutionary ideal and that the principles of Marxism 
could and should remain intact. As leading French intellectuals, Sartre and (for a 
while) Maurice Merleau-Ponty were prominent exponents of this position, 
maintaining that while Stalin’s excesses should be criticised his mission should 
not. The second view, as classically expressed in Popper’s The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957/1986), was that there was something about the nature of 
totalising ideological thinking, whether in the fascist or communist case, which 
predisposed it to authoritarian and destructive outcomes: a notion that threads its 
way meme-like through each of Bread and Wine, Darkness at Noon, and Animal 
Farm.3 
For those members of the Left who had once put their faith in the communist 
movement as a solution to the injustices of capitalism, there was a strongly 
personal as well as political dimension to the ideological crisis. Richard 
Crossman’s The God that Failed (1949/2001) provides a record of the experiences 
of this group by drawing together the testimonies of six ex-communists, with 
                                                 
3
 Originally written as a paper in 1936 and then revised and published in book form in 1957, The 
Poverty of Historicism was dedicated to ‘the memory of all the countless men, women and 
children of all creeds who fell victim to the fascist and communist belief in the inexorable laws of 




Silone and Koestler being contributors alongside Louis Fischer, André Gide, 
Richard Wright and Stephen Spender. I return to Silone and Koestler’s 
contributions later, touching here on Spender’s account, as it illustrates just why 
communism, as a part-political, part-philosophical movement was so important, 
and why its failure was so significant in personal, social, political and spiritual 
terms. 
In reflecting on his motivations for joining, Spender (1949/2001, p. 230) talks 
about his frustrations with the western notion of liberty, as resting on ‘the 
unrestricted freedom of the individual to exploit other individuals’. He also 
describes his early childhood sense of human isolation, remembering how, from 
an early age, he lay in bed and thought about: 
The great loneliness of the human condition where everyone living, without 
the asking, is thrust upon the earth, where he is enclosed upon himself, a 
stranger to the rest of humanity, needing love and facing his own death. 
(Spender, 1949/2001, p. 231)  
As a member of the movement, Spender had a close relationship with his minder, 
a scholarly man called Chalmers, with whom he had long conversations about the 
proletarian novel and unresolved disputes about how to come to terms with 
Stalin’s persecutions. Spender recalls that when he asked Chalmers about the 
trials of Bukharin and Radek, Chalmers ‘hesitated for a moment, looked at some 
object in the middle distance, blinked, and then said: “there are so many of these 
trials that I have given up thinking of them long ago”’ (p. 237). Observing that 
Chalmers had ‘accepted present methods because his hope was in the future, and 
that was that’ (p. 237), Spender reflects that:  
It is obvious that there were elements of mysticism in this faith. Indeed, I 
think this is an attraction of Communism for the intellectual. To believe in 
political action and economic forces that will release energies into the world 
is a release of energy itself. … One can retain one’s faith in the ultimate 
goals of humanity, and at the same time ignore the thousands of people in 
prison camps, the tens of thousands of slave workers. (Spender, 1949/2001, 
p. 238)  
Essentially, Spender’s reasons for breaking with the Party were its untruths and 
ruthlessness. ‘The intellectual communists,’ he says, ‘seemed extremely interested 
in theory, very little in evidence that might conflict with theory … the same 
disregard for scrupulousness in anything but theory applied to behaviour. The 
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ends justified the means’ (p. 255). And it is precisely this dynamic which, in its 
different ways, is portrayed in each of Bread and Wine, Darkness at Noon and 
Animal Farm.  
In brief, Silone, Koestler and Orwell wrote at a time, and helped shape a time, of 
intense ideological debate. As key protagonists in this controversy, they assert 
particular points of view and countermand others, with their novels reflecting 
Grenier’s (2006, p. 13) proposal that a political logic tends towards ‘moralizing 
and action‐oriented impulses’ rather than the ‘free, imaginative and interrogative’. 
As indicated, my question is how the didactic qualities of their texts might be 
counteracted by the literary qualities of the novel, which, as Bakhtin (1963/1984, 
p. 166) suggests, can exert their own mediating force. My considerations follow a 
chronological track, starting with Bread and Wine.  
Silone: Bread and Wine 
The political background to Bread and Wine emerges in Silone’s contribution to 
Crossman’s The God that Failed. Here he describes how, together with Antonio 
Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, he became a co-founder of the Italian Communist 
Party (CPI) in 1921. Although his involvement arose from his deep sense of the 
injustices facing his small village in the Abruzzi, it tore his familiar world apart: 
My own internal world, the ‘Middle-Ages’, which I had inherited and which 
were rooted in my soul, and from which, in the last analysis, I had derived 
my initial aspiration to revolt, were shaken to their foundations, as though by 
an earthquake. Everything was thrown into the melting-pot, everything 
became a problem. Life, death, love, good, evil, truth, all changed their 
meaning or lost it altogether. (Silone, 1949/2001, p. 98)  
For Silone, the Party came to represent ‘family, school, church, barracks’ (p. 98). 
He notes how, in binding each member to the movement, its ‘psychological 
mechanisms were the same as that used in certain religious orders and military 
organizations with almost identical results’ (Silone, 1949/2001, p. 98). His doubts 
grew throughout the 1920s, when ‘the increasing degeneration of the Communist 
International into a tyranny and bureaucracy filled me with repulsion and disgust’ 
(p. 100). His reasons for remaining a member included ‘solidarity with comrades 
who were dead or in prison’, the lack of any other revolutionary alternative, and 
the hope for reform from within (pp. 100-1). As recorded there, a decisive factor 
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in his decision to leave the Party was his visit to Moscow in 1927 to attend a 
meeting of the International Communist Executive. Here, along with Togliatti, 
then the leader of the Italian Communist Party, he refused to vote against Trotsky 
on the basis they had not seen the documents incriminating him. He describes 
returning to Italy disillusioned and bitter, postponing his final break with the Party 
to 1931, when faced with the hard line policy of the Comintern, and its 
instructions that all reformist groups be treated as social fascists. And this exit, 
despite all Silone’s previous frustrations, was marked by grief:  
The truth is this: the day I left the communist party was a very sad one for 
me; it was like a day of deep mourning, the mourning of my lost youth. And 
I come from a district where mourning is worn longer than elsewhere. It is 
not easy to free oneself from an experience as intense as that of the 
underground organisation of the communist party. Something of it remains 
and leaves a mark on the character which lasts all one’s life. (Silone, 
1949/2001, p. 113) 
4
 
Much of Silone’s ideological angst is reproduced in Bread and Wine, the second 
of his Abruzzo Trilogy. The story centres on Pietro Spina, a young communist 
revolutionary, who, at the start of the novel, has returned to his homeland hoping 
to fight injustice and promote equality. As the fascist police are hunting for him, 
his friends disguise him as a priest (Don Paolo Spada), and send him to a small 
village to recover. Once there, he tries and fails to set up a socialist community 
among the disenfranchised peasants. The novel ends with his flight across the 
mountains, his dreams in tatters and those who supported him at risk. For Howe 
(1957/2002, p. 219), Bread and Wine is essentially about despair. He compares it 
with Fontamara, the first of the Abruzzi Trilogy, which, he says, ‘exudes 
revolutionary hope and élan’. In contrast, he believes Bread and Wine, written 
some four years later, to be ‘entirely different in tone; defeat is now final, the 
period of underground struggle at an end, and all that remains are resignation, 
despair, and obeisance before authority’ (p. 220).  
I do not entirely agree, for while the novel ends with Pietro Spina’s failure and 
flight, the revolutionary movement continues and is itself up for question. Hence I 
                                                 
4  I note the controversy over Silone’s political past, following Biocca and Canali’s (2000) 
allegation that he carried on a decade-long correspondence with Arturo Bocchini, head of police in 
Rome. Rather than speculate on the details, I follow Andrew Stille (2001) in reading Bread and 
Wine as a complex rendering of doubt and faith, compromise and betrayal, where, as later noted, 
the chapter dealing with Luigi Murica’s confession has particular significance. 
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see Bread and Wine to combine faith and doubt with a struggle for social justice, 
central features of Silone’s own life. In literary/political terms, this is expressed in 
two main ways: first, through aspirational or sermonic passages, where Silone’s 
authorial voice can be clearly heard and there is a certain pedagogical ‘flattening’ 
of the work; second, through grounding the views, voices and values of the 
protagonists in their immediate physical, political and historical context. My 
argument is that the artistic flattening associated with the aspirational passages is 
counterbalanced by the text’s grounded descriptions.  
Aspirational moments 
In its aspirational passages, Bread and Wine echoes Silone’s philosophical 
commitments as expressed in The God that Failed. Affirming the similarities 
between hero and author, Silone’s first biographer, R. W. B. Lewis says that 
Silone ‘became a socialist because he wanted to be a saint’, while Howe suggests 
that Silone was ‘a Socialist without a Party, a Christian without a Church’ (both 
cited in Pugliese, 2009, p. 9 and p. 5). Very pertinent then is Bakhtin’s 
(1937/1981, p. 130) proposal that in the classic biographical novel, the 
‘autobiographical self-consciousness’ of the hero represents a ‘quest for truth’, 
with the life of the seeker ‘broken down into precise and well-marked epochs or 
steps’: a literary form closely followed in Bread and Wine. 
Spina’s commitments are established in the first chapter of the book, when two of 
his previous fellow-students go to visit their old teacher, Don Benedetto. After 
tea, they reminisce and beg Don Benedetto to tell them who was his favourite 
student. After a short hesitation, the old priest owns that it is Spina. He takes some 
faded yellow pages, and reads approvingly from one of Spina’s early essays:  
But for the fact that it would be very boring to be exhibited on altars after 
one’s death, to be prayed and worshipped to by a lot of unknown people, 
mostly ugly old women, I should like to be a saint. I don’t want to live in 
accordance with circumstances, conventions and material expediency, but I 
want to live and struggle for what seems to be to just and right without 
regard for the circumstances. (Bread and Wine, p. 201) 
The reference to ‘ugly old women’ jars to my contemporary ear, as does the 
vaunting nature of Spina’s aspirations. Their unflinching nature is further 
reflected in Spina’s views on freedom. When Nunzio, one of those who visited 
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Don Benedetto, regrets the professional compromises he makes as a doctor, but 
says he lacks the freedom to do otherwise, Spina retorts:  
Freedom is not something you get as a present. You can live in a dictatorship 
and be free—on one condition: that you fight the dictatorship. The man who 
thinks with his own mind and keeps it uncorrupted is free. The man who 
fights for what he thinks is right is free. But you can live in the most 
democratic country on earth, and if you’re lazy, obtuse or servile within 
yourself, you’re not free. … You can’t beg your freedom from someone. 
You have to seize it – everyone as much as he can. (Bread and Wine, p. 215)  
As well as placing a heavy burden on the individual, this obscures just how 
differently freedom is experienced under a democracy from a dictatorship. There 
are, however, aspirational passages that read more comfortably. In one such, 
Spina tells his friend Bianchina that because the fascist dictatorship is ‘based on 
unanimity’ it is sufficient ‘for one man to say no and the spell is broken’ (p. 397). 
When Bianchina asks if this pertains ‘even in the case of a peaceful man who 
thinks in his own way and does no one any harm’ (p. 398), he responds: 
Certainly. Under every dictatorship, one man, one perfectly ordinary little 
man who goes on thinking with his brain is a threat to public order. Tons of 
printed paper spread the slogans of the regime; thousands of loudspeakers, 
hundreds of thousands of posters … thousands of priests in the pulpits repeat 
these slogans ad nauseam, to the point of collective stupefaction. But it’s 
sufficient for one little man, just one ordinary little man, to say no, and the 
whole of that formidable granite order is imperilled. (Bread and Wine, p. 
398)  
Another memorable ‘truth speaker’ is Don Benedetto, who plays an important 
role in representing the form of Christianity for which Silone yearns. 
‘Christianity’, he declares, ‘is not an administration’ (p. 414). He tells Spina that 
his ‘only consolation’ is that there are ‘unknown members of underground 
groups’ who will carry on the struggle for social justice. He continues: 
I too in my infliction have asked, where then is the Lord and why has He 
abandoned us? The loudspeakers and the bells that announced the beginning 
of the new butchery to the whole country was certainly not the voice of the 
Lord. Nor are the shelling and bombing of Abyssinian villages that are 
reported in the press. But if one poor man alone in a hostile village gets up at 
night and scrawls with a piece of charcoal or paints DOWN WITH THE WAR on 
the walls then the Lord is undoubtedly present. (Bread and Wine, pp. 413-
14) 
To think that it might be sufficient ‘for one little man, just one ordinary little man, 
to say no’ is encouraging, however improbable it may be. The difficulty is that 
such assertions invite applause rather than unsettlement. Bakhtin would suggest 
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that they are more ‘epic’ than ‘novelistic’; Adorno (1973/2007, p. 184) that they 
impose a single version of truth against its ‘innumerable meditations’; Kundera 
(1995, p. 173) that they represent ‘a thought that has come to a stop, that has 
congealed’. So it is important that Silone does not leave such affirmations to stand 
on their own, but also invites our participation in the text through anchoring the 
views, voices and values of his protagonists in their immediate physical, political 
and historical contexts.  
Socio-ideological languages anchored in time and place 
In all of its ideological uncertainties, Bread and Wine remains centred on the 
realities of rural Italy, the struggle to survive, and the failures of both Church and 
Party to respond to these exigencies. In line with these commitments, its 
time/place settings are grounded in recognizable times and places, and it is 
through these specifics that the experiences of embodied human-beings come to 
be known. ‘By many small signs’, Spina learns to tell the cafoni from those who 
live in the valleys: ‘they were poor people whose capacity for suffering and 
resignation had no real limits, and they were used to living in isolation, ignorance, 
mistrust and sterile family feuds’ (Bread and Wine, p. 373).5 When he walks 
down the hill to the village that will be his refuge, he sees the view below in all its 
precise and familiar detail: 
The little land there was between the rocks around the village was split up 
into a number of small fields. The fields were so small and the stone walls 
that separated them so numerous that they looked like the foundations of a 
destroyed town. Immediately beyond the village the gorge closed in to form 
a barrier, and no road led beyond. Two streams of water that came down the 
mountainsides met at the bottom of the valley and formed a rivulet that 
divided the village into two parts connected by a wooden bridge. (Bread and 
Wine, 1937/2000, p. 245)
 
 
In an important literary move, Silone embeds Bakhtin’s (1935/1981, p. 263) 
socio-ideological languages—as exemplified by ‘characteristic group behaviour, 
professional jargons, languages of the authorities, and languages that serve the 
socio-political purposes of the day’—in different physical/geographical settings. 
These take the form of concentric circles with Spina’s mountain village at the 
                                                 
5 ‘Cafoni’ is a colloquial term for the disenfranchised peasants. It is used in the original Italian 
versions of Silone’s works as well as their translations. It does not carry the pejorative 
connotations (boorish, uneducated) later associated with it. 
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centre, followed by Rome as the seat of fascist government, and a large step 
further away, Moscow, from where the directions of the Comintern emanate. As 
the circles widen, so the languages become the more abstracted from the political 
and social realities of the Abruzzi. In the most immediate circle, the mountain 
dwellers, with their lives forged in hardship, have little or no use for Spina’s 
utopian aspirations. Magascià, one of their leaders, tells him:  
Everyone has his own troubles, that’s all that worries us. At most you worry 
about your neighbour’s. You look at your own plot of land; you look through 
the door of your house if the door or window is open; when you eat your 
soup sitting at the front door in the evening you look at your own plate. 
(Bread and Wine, p. 316)
 
 
In one of their most telling exchanges, Spina asks the disenfranchised peasants to 
imagine a country run by people like themselves, where their ‘sons and grandsons 
might be born free’ and where laws might be ‘in favour of all’ (p. 317). In 
response, Sciatàp tells him ‘it’s a dream, a beautiful dream’, akin to ‘abolishing 
stable doors’ (p. 318). With the unbridgeable gap between the two languages—the 
one abstract and oriented to the future, the other concrete and located in the 
present—Spina is left undone. After a while he returns to his lodgings and takes 
out the notebook he has entitled ‘On the Inaccessibility of the Cafoni to Politics’, 
thinks for a while and then writes: ‘perhaps they are right’ (p. 318). The ‘perhaps’ 
is important, for Silone does not foreclose on the possibility of change, providing 
an imaginative space wherein we can actively engage with the text and its 
combinations of hope and doubt.  
Shortly after his conversation with Magascià and Sciatàp, Spina receives a 
package from the Party. Here Silone is more evidently parodic, mocking the 
farcicality of Party propaganda. The envelope contains ‘three voluminous reports’ 
accompanied by a ‘laconic note asking him to give his opinion of the documents 
immediately’ (Bread and Wine, p. 325). With the material concerns of the cafoni 
on his mind, Spina simply skims the titles of the documents with their absurd 
capitalizations. These are: ‘The Leadership Crisis in the Russian Communist Party 
and the Duties of Fraternal Parties’, ‘The Criminal Complicity with Imperialist 
Fascism of Oppositional Elements on the Right and the Left’, and ‘The Solidarity 
of All the Parties of the International with the Majority of the Russian Communist 
 120 
Party’ (Bread and Wine, p. 325). Irritated, Spina puts the documents away without 
reading them.   
Later he is called to Rome to discuss the documents with Battipaglia, the 
interregional secretary. In describing this meeting, Silone transfers his own fateful 
meeting in Moscow to another time and place, with Spina’s encounter with 
Battipaglia coinciding with Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. On leaving the train, 
Spina finds the city unrecognisable with its ‘multi-coloured adornment of orders 
for meetings, garlands, flags, and inscriptions on the walls in whitewash, paint, 
chalk, tar, and coal’ (p. 373). With this, comes a mass hysteria, with the crowd 
‘crying aloud to the leader, the magus, the great leader who held sway over the 
flesh and blood of them all’ with their chanting ‘a kind of exorcistic formula 
mingling with the sacred music of the bells’ (p. 380). Surrounded by chanting 
crowds, Spina and Battipaglia decide to meet in a small church in order to talk in 
peace and privacy. 
Two different discourses again come into play, illustrating how language is ‘shot 
through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgements and accents’ 
(Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 272). Battipaglia gives priority to Party formalities, and 
Spina concentrates on what can legitimately be said given one’s knowledge of a 
particular situation. When Battipaglia presses Spina for an immediate response to 
the documents, saying ‘this, as you know, is more a formality than anything else’, 
Spina retorts, ‘as you know, I have no head for formalities’ and continues: 
If I find it so difficult to understand, if I don’t say my native region but my 
native village, how do you expect me to have an opinion on Russian 
agricultural policy, to disapprove of some views and approve of others? … I 
don’t even know when I will have time to read all that stuff. I don’t even 
know if I am in a position to understand and form a genuine opinion about it. 




                                                 
6
 The account draws closely on Silone’s refusal to sign the documents incriminating Trotsky, as 
described in The God that Failed. Here he recounts how when he refused to sign the denunciation 
of Trotsky on the basis he had not seen the documents incriminating him, the Comintern official 
told him that ‘whatever the minority says or does, whatever document it draws up against the 
majority, I’m for the majority. Documents don’t interest me. We aren’t in an academy here’ 
(Silone, 1949/2001, p. 109).  
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After a while, Spina draws matters to a close by telling Battipaglia that he has 
burned the papers as they don’t interest him. Alluding to the Party’s expulsion of 
Bukharin, he then asserts: 
What it comes down to is that I do not feel able to form opinions on matters 
outside my experience. I cannot stoop to any kind of conformity, to 




Battipaglia is furious. ‘How dare you describe our condemnation of Bukharin and 
other traitors as conformity? Are you mad?’ When Spina points out that 
Battipaglia supported Bukharin as long as he was in the majority, and asks him 
‘how can we hope to destroy Fascist subservience if we abandon the critical 
spirit?’ Battipaglia, ‘trembling with indignation’, tells Spina that his ‘cynicism 
passes all bounds’, and reasserts that Bukharin is a traitor (p. 353). The church 
prevents him from saying more, so he packs his briefcase and leaves without 
saying goodbye. To all intents and purposes Spina is expelled.  
In both instance described so far—the mentalities/languages of the cafoni and the 
Party bureaucracy—Silone positions Spina outside the frame of consciousness of 
those he encounters. This is not so when he visits Uliva, an unemployed violin 
teacher who used to be a member of the same underground cell. Here the text 
shifts, with the discussion representing Silone’s own internal conflict concerning 
the potentials and risks of revolutionary movements. Spina finds his friend in a 
bad state: he is ‘a lean skinny little hunchback and the suit he wears gives him a 
sad, neglected appearance’ (p. 356). In explaining his despair, Uliva says that 
under fascism workers have ‘either been nationalised or brought to heel and even 
hunger has been bureaucratized’ and are unable to contribute actively to any 
revolutionary opposition (p. 358). When Spina tells Uliva he is ‘condemning the 
future’, Uliva retorts that: 
The present black inquisition will be followed by a red inquisition, the 
present censorship by a red censorship. … Just as the present bureaucracy 
identifies itself with all its opponents, so will your future bureaucracy 
identify itself with labour and socialism and persecute everyone who goes on 
thinking with his own brain as a hired agent of the industrialists and 
landlords. (Bread and Wine, p. 358)  
Their argument continues. Uliva asserts that ‘all revolutions, all of them without 
exception, began as liberation movements but ended as tyrannies’ (p. 359). Upset, 
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Spina replies that even if this were true, even if all previous revolutions had gone 
astray, ‘one would have to say, but we shall make one that remains faithful to 
itself’ (p. 359). Uliva becomes angry, calling Spina a ‘ventriloquist’:  
Illusions, illusions! The regenerative ardour that filled us when we were in 
the students’ cell has already become an ideology, a tissue of fixed ideas, a 
spider web. That shows there’s no escape for you either. … Every new idea 
invariably becomes a fixed idea, immobile and out of date. When it becomes 
official state doctrine there’s no more escape. (Bread and Wine, p. 359) 
Uliva emerges as a more relentless and clearer thinker than Spina. Within hours 
his house is blown up and he is killed (the novel never reveals why, but the 
suggestion is that the Party has betrayed him). The issue between the two 
friends—the possibility of hope against the inexorability of totalizing ideology, of 
‘the one revolution that will remain faithful to itself’—is never resolved, leaving 
the text as a compelling reminder of the smashing of utopian aspirations. Hope is 
slim but never extinguished: a notion to which Albert Camus (1951/2000, p. 15) 
refers when he says that ‘if we believe that optimism is silly we also know that 
pessimism about the action of man is cowardly’.  
In grounding Bread and Wine in the political circumstances of his times, Silone 
shows how rotten political conditions can lead to lasting acts of deceit and 
betrayal. The most important example is the confession of a young man, Luigi 
Murica. In this confession, Luigi recounts how, having joined the Party after 
seeing an unprovoked attack on a workman, he became an informer when arrested 
by the fascist police. He recounts that ‘after some formalities’ the police ‘started 
slapping my face and spitting at me, and that went on for an hour’ (Bread and 
Wine, p. 422). When a senior official arrived, everything changed, and Luigi 
found himself half-impressed, half-seduced by the attentive tone of this officer:  
The official who interrogated me railed against his subordinates. … He said 
he could only guess the motives that led me to the revolutionary groups, 
[that] youth was inherently magnanimous and idealistic, and it would be 
disastrous if otherwise. (Bread and Wine, p. 422)
 
 
In his naivety, Luigi recalls being pleased when the senior official praised his first 
report, saying it was well written, and relieved to have an allowance that allowed 
him ‘to have soup at midday as well as in the evenings and go to the movies on 
 123 
Saturday nights’ (p. 423). But then he formed a relationship with a woman who 
trusted in his integrity and his whole situation unravelled:  
An insuperable abyss opened up between my apparent and secret life. 
Sometimes I managed to forget my secret. I worked for the cell with genuine 
enthusiasm. … But I was deceiving myself. When my new comrades 
admired my courage and my activity they reminded me that in reality I was 
betraying them. … But the truth of the matter is this. Fear of being 
discovered was stronger in me than remorse. (Bread and Wine, pp. 423-425) 
Many read this as Silone’s own confession (see footnote 3 above), with Elizabeth 
Leake (2003, p. 137) suggesting that it provides ‘a double self-absolution but 
from the safe setting of a fictional account’. Given all the doubts hanging over 
Silone’s entanglement with the fascist police, my preference is to leave the matter 
exactly where it is: unresolved. There is one passage in The God that Failed that 
might touch on the matter, but its words hide as much as they reveal:  
For me writing has not been, and never could be, except in a few favoured 
moments of grace, a serene aesthetic enjoyment, but rather the painful and 
lonely continuation of a struggle. As for the difficulties and imperfections of 
self-expression with, they arise not so much from lack of observation of the 
rules of good writing, but rather from a conscience, which, while struggling 
to heal certain hidden and perhaps incurable wounds, continues obstinately 
to demand that its integrity be respected. For to be sincere is obviously not 
enough, if one wants to be truthful. (Silone, 1949/2001, pp. 81-2) 
In what ways, I want to ask, does sincerity fall short of truthfulness, in what ways 
does Silone attempt to be truthful over and above the claims of sincerity? He does 
not tell us. Does this matter? I suggest not, for the text’s ambiguity can be said to 
strengthen its ‘internal resistance to all sorts of external finalization … and fixed, 
stable images’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 78). On that note, I leave Bread and Wine 
for Darkness at Noon, a far more ideologically assertive text, briefer, angrier and 
more directly to the point. 
Koestler: Darkness at Noon7 
Centred on the Moscow trials, Darkness at Noon describes the arrest, 
interrogation and execution of Rubashov, an old style but sceptical Bolshevik. As 
                                                 
7 Koestler originally wrote Darkness at Noon in German, translating it into English in 1940 with 
the assistance of Daphne Hardy. In July 2015, a German doctoral student, Matthias Weßel found 
the original German version, (previously believed to have been destroyed). According to 
Scammell (2016, np) the original German version offers a more explicit critique of Stalinism than 
the existing translation, and that, once available, ‘for readers, it will be like seeing a cleaned oil 
painting for the first time after the old and discoloured varnish has been removed’.   
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with Bread and Wine, the political background to the novel can be found in The 
God that Failed. Unlike Silone’s contribution, Koestler’s account is sardonic from 
start to finish. At the outset, he describes how, when he applied for membership at 
the Berlin office in 1931, the woman at the desk gave him ‘what is commonly 
called a searching look but might be more accurately called a fish-eyed stare’ 
(Koestler, 1949/2001, p. 29). Once a member of the Party, he found that: 
It was a world populated by people with first names only, without surname 
or address. … It was a paradoxical atmosphere—a blend of fraternal 
comradeship and mutual distrust. Its motto might well have been: Love your 
comrade but don’t trust him an inch. (Koestler, 1949/2001, p. 30)  
Koestler then describes how, on his visit to the Soviet Union in 1933, he 
experienced a ‘shock with delayed-action effect’ on seeing ‘the ravages of the 
famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukraine: hordes of families in rags begging at the 
railway stations, the women lifting up the compartment window, holding out their 
starving brats … the old men with frost-bitten toes sticking out of torn slippers’ 
(p. 30). He was inured from accepting the reality of what he saw by the long 
process of indoctrination: ‘the necessary lie, the necessary slander; the necessary 
intimidation of the masses to preserve them from short-term errors; the necessary 
liquidation of a whole generation in the interest of the next’ (p. 61). He left the 
Party in 1938 in the wake of the Moscow trials: his was a bitter and disillusioned 
exit, casting a dark light over all his previous commitments. In 1938, he left the 
Party bitter and disillusioned, recounting that: 
As a rule, our memories romanticize the past. But when one has renounced a 
creed or lost a friend, the opposite mechanism sets to work. In the light of 
that latter knowledge, the original experience loses its innocence, becomes 
tainted and rancid in recollection. … The shadow of barbed wire lies across 
the condemned playground of memory. (Koestler, 1949/2001, p. 55) 
Koestler’s anger over the perversion of the revolutionary ideal drives Darkness at 
Noon from beginning to end. This produces a certain relentlessness, a hammering 
of the text. As acknowledged, this stands to flatten the artistic life of the text. 
However, I recollect being absorbed by the book as a teenager, reading it cover-
to-cover in a single sitting, and find I have done so again as an adult, more than 
once over. In considering the literary qualities that might contribute to this 
carrying power, I focus on the time/space settings of chronotope; the subversive 
powers of parody; and the representation of the ‘humanness’ of Rubashov. In 
 125 
parallel with my suggestions about Bread and Wine, I suggest that the 
combination of these elements counteracts the flattening effects of a didactic or 
pedagogical text, where ‘truth is impersonal’ and ‘an independent idea is either 
affirmed … or repudiated’ (Emerson, 1985, pp. 65-6). I also propose that the 
artistic life of Darkness at Noon is preserved through the contrasts between its 
literary/political elements, variously appealing to us imaginatively, cognitively 
and emotionally.  
Chronotope 
Chronotope, we have seen, is ‘the place where the knots of narrative are tied and 
untied’ (Bakhtin 1937/1981, p. 250). In its time/space settings, Darkness at Noon 
is limited to the few days before Rubashov’s death and the tiny enclosure of a 
Moscow cell. The novel starts with Rubashov’s early morning arrest, when two 
members of the secret police batter down his door while he dreams of being 
captured by the Gestapo. It is a familiar scene: the bewildered porter, the watcher 
upstairs, Rubashov stumbling with his dressing gown sleeve. The two officers 
drive Rubashov to prison through desolate streets. On arrival, they throw him into 
Cell 402, which is relatively clean—the straw mattress looked ‘freshly filled’ and 
the can ‘newly disinfected (p. 9). This enclosed space, with its view of the prison 
courtyard, the machine gun tower, and a ‘streak of the Milky Way’ (p. 9), forms 
the spatial/temporal centre of the novel: the spot from which Rubashov 
communicates with the prisoner in the next-door cell by tapping the letters of the 
alphabet on the wall, the fixed spot from which he is taken for his long 
interrogations, and the enclosure where he recalls his life since joining the Party 
as a teenager. 8   
Bakhtin (1937/1981, p. 84) describes how, under the imaginative possibilities of 
chronotope, time ‘thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, 
space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and 
history’. Rubashov can do nothing to forestall his execution; he knows from the 
outset that he has only a short measure of chronological time left. But the meaning 
                                                 
8
 The description of Rubashov’s imprisonment draws on Koestler’s experiences in the Spanish 
Civil war. From his cell in the Málaga jailhouse, he heard men being led out and shot; later, in 
Seville he was placed in solitary confinement in a cell six and a half paces long and led to believe 
that he had been sentenced to death. 
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of that time lies within his power: how he sees it, what he does with it, how it 
impacts on his reappraisal of all the previous moments that have now come 
together in a particular and final eventuality. As he sits and reflects in the 
confinement of the cell, he thinks back over his betrayals and failures, with the 
text taking us from Moscow to Luxembourg, and from the central Soviet Party to 
its subsidiaries in Europe. In a highly symbolic ending, he is shot in the back as he 
stumbles to try and retrieve his pince-nez, which has fallen off, leaving him nearly 
blind. As he walks to his death:  
A dull blow struck him in the back of his head. He long expected it, yet it 
took him unawares. He felt his knees give way and his body whirl round in a 
half-turn. … It got dark, the sea carried him rocking on its nocturnal surface. 
Memories carried him, like streaks of mist on the water. (Darkness at Noon, 
p. 211)  
Parody  
In the passages cited above, Koestler is evocative and expressive, appealing to us 
visually and emotionally. In his parodic representations, he is analytic and critical, 
targeting a mathematical form of thought in which conclusions are drawn from 
pre-given axioms, and where all actions are justified as the means to a pre-given 
end. To portray this, he describes Rubashov’s internal train of thought, where, as 
Bakhtin (1935/1981, p. 284) describes it, there are ‘two utterances, two speech 
manners, two styles, two languages, two semantic and axiological belief systems’. 
In his first diary entry, Rubashov writes about the fate of a leading agriculturalist 
who, along with thirty of his colleagues, was shot for maintaining a view contrary 
to official policy. He reflects that what matters is who is ‘objectively’ right and 
that this is determined by ideological fiat. Mocking the sensitivities of western 
liberals, he proposes that: 
The cricket-moralists of the West are agitated by quite another problem: 
whether B. was subjectively in good faith when he recommended nitrogen. 
For us that is, of course, complete nonsense … [for] the question of 
subjective good faith is of no interest. He who is in the wrong must pay; he 
who is in the right will be absolved. That is the law of historical credit; it 
was our law. (Darkness at Noon, p. 82) 
In another parodic move, Koestler sets Rubashov in dialogue with his senior 
interrogator, Ivanov. The two were ‘twins in their development, they were 
nourished by the same umbilical cord of a common conviction, they had the same 
moral standard, the same philosophy, they thought in the same terms’ (Darkness 
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at Noon, pp. 90-1). Rubashov, facing execution, is partly liberated from his old 
patterns of thought; Ivanov is not. At one point, the two discuss Crime and 
Punishment in the seclusion of Rubashov’s cell as night turns into an early dawn. 
When Rubashov suggests that the moment of truth for Raskolnikov comes when 
he discovers that ‘twice two are not four when mathematical units are human 
beings’, Ivanov retorts: 
If you want to hear my opinion, every copy of the book should be burned. 
Consider for a moment what this humanitarian fog-philosophy would do if 
we were to take it literally; if we were to stick to the precept that the 
individual is sacrosanct, and that we must not treat human lives according to 
the rules of arithmetic. … Your Raskolnikov is, however, a fool and a 
criminal; not because he behaves logically in killing the old woman, but 
because he is doing it in his personal interest. (Darkness at Noon, p. 127)  
Here Koestler portrays not just a particular set of ideas, but also a didactic, 
abstract and clipped manner of speaking, with this illustrating Bakhtin’s 
(1940/1981, p. 75) proposition that parody enables us to ‘feel and recognize’ the 
presence of the parodied language within the parodying style. Above all, Ivanov 
refuses any form of ‘sentimentality’, reminding Rubashov that ‘history is a priori 
amoral; it has no conscience. To want to conduct history according to the maxims 
of a Sunday school means to leave everything unchanged. You know that as well 
as I do’ (p. 127). On taking leave in the early morning, he observes that nature 
inflicts far worse casualties than does the revolutionary movement, informing 
Rubashov that ‘for a man with your past, this sudden revulsion against 
experimenting is rather naïve’: 
Every year several hundred people are killed quite pointlessly by epidemics 
and other natural disasters. And we should shrink from sacrificing a few 
hundred thousand for the most promising experiment in history? … Yes, we 
liquidated the parasitic part of the peasantry and let it die of starvation. It 
was a surgical operation that had to be done once and for all; but in the good 
old days before the Revolution just as many died in any dry year—only 
senselessly and pointlessly. … Why should mankind not have the right to 
experiment on itself? (Darkness at Noon, p. 131) 
Here the force of the text lies in the imperative of an answer, a refutation. In 
pressing his arguments, Koestler hammers home his points, allowing the reader 
little or no escape. So it is significant that he also spends much time on the 
memories and regrets of Rubashov, where his tone shifts from the abstract to the 
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experiential, and from the intellectual to the emotional. These passages are crucial 
in counteracting didacticism, so I describe them in some detail. 
On the humanness of Rubashov 
Much of the literary/emotional power of Darkness at Noon rests on the fact that 
Koestler creates Rubashov as one who is able to change and evolve, and most 
crucially, reflect on the political circumstances that have conspired to create him.9 
At the end of his first diary entry, he observes:  
I have thought and acted as I had to; I destroyed people I was fond of, and 
gave power to those I did not like. History put me where I stood; I have 
exhausted the credit she accorded me: if I was right I have nothing to repent 
of, if wrong I will pay. (Darkness at Noon, p. 82) 
Three memories in particular haunt Rubashov, all of which centre on a 
fundamental betrayal of trust. Notably, it is the personal details invested in these 
accounts that matters: as we come to know the particularities of the betrayed, so 
we come to care more about them. For Ivanov this would be mere sentimentality; 
and such, I believe, is precisely Koestler’s point. 
In the first incident, Rubashov goes to a town in southern Germany to challenge 
Richard, a young communist who has failed to distribute Party material according 
to official instructions. They meet in an art gallery, under a drawing of the Pietà. 
Richard is nineteen and has a seventeen-year old wife who is expecting their baby. 
He stammers when nervous, is committed to the Party, and is honest and naïve. 
On realizing that he is about to be denounced, he implores Rubashov not to ‘throw 
him to the wolves’ (p. 44). Rubashov, who has toothache, ignores his pleas and 
hastens away, knowing that Richard and his cell are to be betrayed to the Gestapo. 
When Richard implores ‘comrade—b-but you couldn’t d-denounce me,’ 
Rubashov responds, ‘I have no more to say to you, Richard’ and hails a taxi (p. 
43). The taxi driver, who has caught the word ‘comrade’, and turns out to be a 
communist, offers to drive Rubashov for free, saying ‘if your young friend ever 
wants anything, my stand is in front of the museum. You can send him my 
                                                 
9
 In this respect, Rubashov resembles Bakhtin’s (1941/1981, p. 10) novelistic hero as one who 
‘should not be portrayed as an already completed and unchanging person but as a person who is 
evolving and developing, who learns from life’. 
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number, sir.’ Rubashov refuses to take the man’s outstretched hand and leaves 
without thanking the driver or saying goodbye (pp. 44-5). 
In the second incident, Rubashov visits a group of communist dockworkers in 
Belgium. Italy has just invaded Ethiopia, and the workers are determined not to 
allow any Italian shipments to pass through their port. Since the Party plans to 
gain financially by supplying the Italians with oil and other resources, Rubashov 
directs the workers to break their ban. When they refuse, he denounces the entire 
cell by name, guaranteeing their arrest by the Belgian authorities. Making matters 
worse, he does so after having gained the trust of Little Loewy, their leader and a 
dedicated communist. Earlier, when they sat together in a pub, Little Loewy had 
told him the story of his life: how he had been born in a South German town, how 
he had learned the guitar and given lectures on Darwin; how he had escaped from 
the Nazis, crossed over to France; and how he had moved between France and 
Belgium, always under threat of arrest. When Rubashov asked him why he was 
telling him all this, Little Loewy responded: 
Because it is instructive. Because it is a typical example. I could tell you 
hundreds of others. For years the best of us have been crushed in that way. 
The Party is becoming more and more fossilized. The Party had gout and 
varicose veins in its every limb. One cannot make a revolution in that way. 
(Darkness at Noon, p. 59) 
After Rubashov’s betrayal, Little Loewy gives up and hangs himself. Trying to 
dismiss his treachery in the darkness of his cell, Rubashov finds that the memories 
flood back: 
He saw himself again in the old Belgian port, escorted by merry Little 
Loewy, who was slightly hunchbacked and smoked a sailor’s pipe. He 
smelled again the smell of the harbour, a mixture of rotting seaweed and 
petrol; he heard the musical clock on the tower of old guildhall, and saw the 
overhanging bays, from the lattices of which the harbour prostitutes hung 
their washing during the day. (Darkness at Noon, p. 53)  
The third memory, which is the most personal and intimate of the three, is the one 
that most torments Rubashov. It concerns Arlova, once his secretary and lover, 
who, sleepy and apolitical, is denounced for no reason. Rubashov not only failed 
to support her, but also signed the deposition condemning her. He had always 
regretted her execution, but in a matter-of-fact way. Everything changes when 
Gletkin (the junior interrogator) arranges for an old comrade of his to be dragged 
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past Rubashov’s cell on his way to execution, shouting out his name and pleading 
for help. At that point, all Rubashov’s convictions are turned upside down and his 
‘past mode of thought seems a lunacy’ (p. 117). The memory drums its way into 
his mind, crowding out any kind of ideological rationalization:  
Up till now Arlova had been a factor in the equation, a small factor 
compared to what was at stake. But the equation no longer stood. The vision 
of Arlova’s legs in their high-heeled shoes trailing along the corridor upset 
the mathematical equilibrium. The unimportant factor had grown to the 
immeasurable, the absolute … the hollow beat of the drumming, filled his 
ears; they smothered the thin voice of reason, covered it as the surf covers 
the gurgling of the drowning. (Darkness at Noon, p. 117) 
The images batter their way into our consciousness, just they do into Rubashov’s, 
where they radically disrupt the certainties of his monologic training. Here the 
parallels between Koestler account and Bakhtin’s description of an internal 
dialogism are striking. In Bakhtin’s analysis: 
The second speaker is present invisibly, his words are not there, but deep 
traces left by these words have a determining effect on the present and 
visible worlds of the first speaker. We sense that this is a conversation, 
although only one person is speaking, and it is a conversation of the most 
intense kind, for each present uttered word responds and reacts with its every 
fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its 
own limits, to the unspoken words of another person. (Bakhtin, 1984, p.197) 
As Rubashov stares out of the window in his cell, he finds that his attempts to 
‘think things through to a logical conclusion’ are interrupted by utterances from a 
second voice. The utterances of this ‘second self’ seem to occur ‘without visible 
cause’; arise ‘just where “thinking to a conclusion” ended’; and are almost always 
accompanied by a ‘sharp attack of toothache’ (p. 91). On reflection, Rubashov 
realizes that the ‘mental sphere’ of these utterances is composed of ‘various and 
disconnected parts’ such as the ‘folded hands of the Pietà, Little Loewy’s cats, the 
tune of the song “come to dust”, or a particular sentence which Arlova has said on 
a particular occasion’ (p. 91). He concludes that: 
Those processes known as ‘monologues’ are really dialogues of a special 
kind; dialogues in which one partner remains silent while the other, against 
all grammatical rules, addresses him as ‘I’ instead of ‘you’ but the silent 
partner just remains silent, shuns observation and refuses to be localised in 
time and space. (Darkness at Noon, p. 90) 
In such ways, Rubashov’s internal thought patterns, foundering on the shore of his 
memories, refuse the monoglossic attempt to ‘unite and centralize verbal-
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ideological thought’ and ‘unify meaning under the one language of truth’ 
(Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 270). On these grounds, it is possible to read Darkness at 
Noon as a literary enactment of the principles that Bakhtin wants to establish 
philosophically. This is the more inviting given that Rubashov’s claim that ‘we 
have learnt history more thoroughly than the others … we differ from all others in 
our logical consistency’, is followed, a moment later, by the admission ‘the fact is, 
I have lost faith in myself. That is why I am lost’ (Darkness at Noon, p. 83 and p. 
84).  
But this is to offer a very particular reading of the work. Howe takes an entirely 
different view, contending that Koestler betrays ‘a wilful insistence on an either/or 
dilemma’, a ‘rigid fascination with absolutes’ and ‘an equally rigid elimination of 
any possible lines of action lying between these absolutes’ (1957/2002, p. 230). In 
his reading, Koestler resembles ‘a stricken Midas yearning for the bread of life, 
yet, with every touch, turning experience into the useless gold of ideology’ (pp. 
230-1). In striking contrast, Orwell (1944/2000, p. 272) maintains that the book 
‘reaches the stature of tragedy’ in its ‘lack of surprise or denunciation, and the 
pity and irony with which the story is told’. Observing that it is ‘a political book, 
founded on history and offering an interpretation of disputed events’, he affirms 
that Koestler is telling us that violent revolution is a corrupting process:  
Really enter into the Revolution and you must end up with either Rubashov 
or Gletkin. It is not merely that ‘power corrupts’: so also do the ways of 
attaining power. Therefore, all efforts to regenerate society by violent means 
lead to the cellars of the OGPU. Lenin leads to Stalin and would have 
become Stalin if he had happened to survive. (Orwell, 1944/2000, p. 272, 
original emphasis) 
Like Howe, I find that Koestler can hammer home his message to the point that 
there is no escape from the logic of the text, just as there is no escape from the 
doctrine it has as its target. But I am with Orwell in my reading of the work. If 
interpreted as a historical explanation of Bolshevism, the book has to fail. If 
alternatively, it is interpreted as a cry of Koestler’s own angst, expressing his 
distress at the social, politico-ideological and human tragedy of a revolution gone 
badly wrong, then, in my reading, the novel convinces and succeeds. In 
mentioning the differences between these interpretations, I underline the always-
contested nature of the artistic/politic interplay with its intersections invariably 
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inviting contrasting views and interpretations: something that is also very relevant 
to Animal Farm. 
Orwell: Animal Farm 
Unlike Silone and Koestler, Orwell was never a member of the Communist Party, 
although earlier sympathetic to it. Hence Animal Farm is less concerned with the 
dynamics of ideology, more in exposing the realities of Stalin’s regime. In his 
preface to the Ukrainian edition of the book, Orwell makes his intentions clear:  
In my opinion nothing has contributed so much to the corruption of the 
original ideal of Socialism as the belief that Russia is a Socialist country. … 
And so for the past ten years I have been convinced that destruction of the 
Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a revival of the Socialist movement. 
(Cited by Dickstein, 2007, p. 139)
 
 
It was the anti-Stalinist thrust of Animal Farm that allowed the book to become a 
favoured text of the Washington establishment, part and parcel of cold war 
ideology. Spender (1972, np) recalls that when he asked Orwell whether he would 
have been ‘as bitter an adversary of the Washington admirers of Animal Farm as 
he was of the Stalinists’, Orwell countered that he ‘had not written the book about 
Stalin in order to provide propaganda for the capitalists’. Even at the most cursory 
reading, the novel’s anti-capitalist message should have been evident. In his 
opening speech, Major declares that: 
No animal in England knows the meaning of happiness or leisure after he is 
a year old. No animal in England is free. The life of an animal is misery and 
slavery; that is the plain truth … Man is the only creature that consumes 
without producing. … Yet he is lord of all animals. He sets them to work, he 
gives back to them the bare minimum that will prevent them from starving, 
and the rest he keeps for himself. (Animal Farm, pp. 6-9) 
The egalitarian impulse is there from the outset. During Major’s speech, four large 
rats sneak out of their boltholes to listen, and narrowly escape being attacked by 
the guard dogs. When Major raises his trotter and asks the assembled animals 
whether or not wild creatures should be considered friends or enemies, ‘it was 
agreed by an overwhelming majority that the rats were comrades’ (Animal Farm, 
p. 11). So while Mr Jones represents the decadence of the old regime, it is 
capitalist greed that the horrified animals confront when, at the end of the book, 
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they peer through the farmhouse window and, looking ‘from pig to man, and man 
to pig again’, find that ‘it was impossible to say which was which’ (p. 120).10  
Orwell (1946a/2000, p. 6) described Animal Farm as ‘the first book in which I 
tried to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole’. Given the 
evidently political nature of Homage to Catalonia and The Road to Wigan Pier, I 
understand him to be emphasizing the purposeful nature of his fusion of the 
political and the artistic: a point central to my interests. To illustrate how he 
achieves this, I focus on parody, chronotope, pathos and unfinalizability.  
Animal Farm as parody 
Bakhtin’s proposal that the novel is parodic at the level of genre has particular 
implications for anti-utopian and/or dystopian works. As Morson (1988, p. 142) 
observes, these texts form part of a wider class of ‘anti-genre’ writing, where an 
‘anti-genre’ establishes a ‘parodic’ relationship between itself and the works and 
traditions of another genre. Animal Farm is strikingly parodic in this respect, with 
the transparency of its allegory travestying the complexity of an extended novel, 
or the analytical details of a formal essay. In effect, Orwell is saying to the 
recalcitrant Left: ‘listen up now, perhaps if I tell it this simply, you will finally 
understand’. There is also a level of self-parody, whereby Orwell mocks the 
didactic nature of his text by making it deliberately childlike, with the animals 
conforming to their customary stereotypes. Basically, he invents a story that is so 
transparently parodic that it mocks its own seriousness, and thus tells us that all 
stories, his own included, will ultimately dissolve and be replaced by others.  
But Orwell’s manner of telling is by no means straightforward. As Guy 
Cunningham (2013, np) observes, Animal Farm’s ‘simple fable-like voice belies a 
great sensitivity to how political leaders—and their intellectual enablers—use 
language to shade and even distort reality’. This would suggest that Orwell is 
something of a ‘trickster’ in literary terms, bringing to mind Bakhtin’s 
(1937/1981, p. 159) observation that jesters ‘create around them their own special 
world, their own chronotope’, whereby ‘their very appearance, everything they do 
and say, cannot be understood in a direct and unmediated way but must be 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed discussion of Animal Farm as a political text, see Rodden, J. (ed) 1994. 
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grasped metaphorically’. The Orwell (1946a/2000, p. 5) who writes ‘every serious 
line of work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, 
against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism as I understand it’ thus lies 
behind the mask of the traditional storyteller in Animal Farm. 
As noted, Bakhtin suggests that parody works through its contrasts, where it sets 
one form, language, and/or atmosphere against another. Illustrating this, Animal 
Farm shifts between humour and menace, and mockery and pathos. These 
contrasts work not so much because the occasions Orwell describes are funny, 
although they sometimes are, but because the moments of absurdity are offset by 
dark or terrifying happenings, their awfulness made worse by the preceding light 
heartedness. Napoleon, eating off his Crown Derby dinner service, is absurd. But 
the reality of his power and the helplessness of the farm animals are brought home 
when the pigs first walk out of the farmhouse on hind legs. Hearing Clover’s 
‘terrified neighing’, the animals stopped dead in their tracks to see that:   
It was a pig walking on hind legs.  
Yes, it was Squealer … and a moment later, out from the farmhouse, came a 
long line of pigs all walking on their hind legs. … And finally … out came 
Napoleon himself … 
He carried a whip in his trotter. 
There was a deadly silence. Amazed, terrified, huddling together, the 
animals watched the long line of pigs march slowly round the yard. (Animal 
Farm, p. 63) 
There are also Animal Farm’s contrasts between the familiar and the unfamiliar, 
the reassuring and the disturbing. On re-reading the book, I was struck by how 
securely the narrative is grounded in the English countryside and its seasons. In 
the bitter winter, when the animals toiled over the windmill, the ‘stormy weather 
was followed by sleet and snow, and then by a hard frost which did not break till 
February’ (p. 64); in spring, the ‘young wheat was thick and green’ and ‘the grass 
and bursting hedges were gilded by the level rays of the sun’ (p. 75). And when 
the animals sang ‘Beasts of England’ the tune was heard everywhere: ‘the 
blackbirds whistled it in the hedges, the pigeons cooed it in the elms, it got into 
the dins of the smithies and the tune of the church bells’ (p. 36). Orwell’s 
evocation of the Englishness of things anchors his dystopia in a long-established 
rural familiarity. Whistling blackbirds and cooing pigeons warn the intellectuals 
of the Left that if they continue to be so careless in their mis-readings of 
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Stalinism, the brutalities described in Animal Farm might well take deep root in 
English soil.  
Chronotope 
Bakhtin’s observations on the fairy tale chronotope have a special interest for 
Animal Farm: 
There appears to be a hyperbolization of time … hours are dragged out, days 
are compressed into moments, it becomes possible to bewitch time itself. 
Time begins to be influenced by dreams; that is, we begin to see the peculiar 
distortion of temporal perspectives characteristic of dreams. (Bakhtin, 
1937/1981, p. 154) 
It is precisely this ‘hyperbolization of time’ that allows Orwell to compress the 
prolonged crisis of Stalinism into the short history of Manor Farm, with the novel 
covering not just the sequence but also the internal logic of events whereby the 
revolutionary process reproduces the very abuses it sets out to confront. Early on, 
the tone of the narrative is highly optimistic, with the third chapter recording that 
‘it was the biggest harvest that the farm had ever seen … [for] all through the 
summer the work of the farm went like clockwork’ (Animal Farm, p. 26). As 
Dickstein (2007) points out, the downfall starts only five or six pages later, when 
Napoleon orders that all the windfall apples are to be collected and sent to the 
harness room for the sole use of the pigs. Critically, the animals accept Squealer’s 
explanation that this is for their own good given that ‘the whole management and 
organization of the farm’ depends on the pigs. On hearing this, the animals ‘have 
no more to say’, and it ‘was agreed without further argument that the milk and 
windfall apples (and also the main crop of apples when they ripened) should be 
reserved for the pigs alone’ (Animal Farm, p. 32) 
From that point on, the novel follows the pattern of the parable, with each 
sequence of events reinforcing what the reader already knows: the pigs are 
conniving, the rest of the animals are naïve, and the revolution will fail. When 
Snowball is chased off the farm by ‘nine enormous dogs wearing brass-studded 
collars’, the animals accept Squealer’s assertion that Snowball is a traitor and 
needs to be exiled. And so it continues, with the pigs trading with the humans, 
moving into the farmhouse, and sleeping in beds. If chronotope represents ‘the 
organizing centre for the fundamental narrative events of the novel … the places 
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where the knots of narrative are tied and untied’ (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 250), 
then the political meaning of Animal Farm can be seen to lie within its pattern and 
sequence of events, which follow a swift optimistic upward drive in the first three 
chapters of the book followed by the long deterioration thereafter. Such, the 
chronotope warns, is the pattern of revolutionary change.  
Political tragedy 
If Animal Farm were simply reinforcing Orwell’s point about the gullibility of the 
animals, it would be a starkly moralist fable indeed. But the book tilts quite 
differently, toward pathos if not tragedy, for it is the animals that trust most who 
suffer most: namely, Clover and Boxer. Shortly after Napoleon’s first slaughter, 
leaving ‘a pile of corpses’ at his feet and the air ‘heavy with the smell of blood’ 
(p. 74), Clover looks down over the familiar countryside, her eyes filled with 
tears, and Orwell records how:  
If she could have spoken her thoughts it would have been to say that this is 
not what they had aimed at when they had set themselves years ago to 
overthrow the human race. These scenes of terror and slaughter were not 
what they had looked forward to that first night when old Major first stirred 
them to rebellion. If she had any picture of the future, it had been of a 
society free from hunger and the whip, all equal and all working to capacity, 
the strong protecting the weak. (Animal Farm, pp. 75-6) 
Clover survives the downfall of the revolution, her hopes dashed. Boxer does not. 
He keeps working, hoping for the best. After he contracts a chest infection, 
Squealer arranges for him to be sent to hospital. The animals panic when they see 
the sign ‘Horse Slaughterer and Glue Boiler’ on the van carrying Boxer away and 
vainly rush towards it:  
As though he had heard the uproar outside, Boxer’s face, with its white 
stripe down his nose, appeared at the small window at the back of the van. 
… A moment later his face disappeared from the window and there was a 
sound of a tremendous drumming of hoofs within the van. He was trying to 
kick his way out. … But in a few minutes the sound of the drumming hoofs 
grew fainter and died away. … Too late someone thought of racing ahead 
and shutting the five-barred gate; but in another moment the van was 
through it and rapidly disappearing down the road. Boxer was never seen 
again. (Animal Farm, p. 59) 
And here we have it: the finality, the no-going back, the too-lateness, and the five-
barred gate that only shuts when hope has left. Boxer, among the most memorable 
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of all the animals, carries the tragedy of the failed revolution away with him to the 
knackers.  
Un/finalizability?  
For Dickstein (2007, p. 140), Animal Farm offers ‘no single tipping point in the 
inexorable shift from the genuine equality that marked the early days after the 
revolution’. But Orwell, as we now know from his recently published letters, 
intended otherwise. In a letter to his friend Dwight Macdonald, he said that he 
meant the moral of Animal Farm to be that ‘revolutions only effect a radical 
improvement when the masses are alert and know how to chuck out their leaders 
as soon as the latter have done their job … the turning-point of the story was 
supposed to be when the pigs kept the milk and apples for themselves’ (Orwell 
1946b, np). Further, in responding to Macdonald’s request that he clarify whether 
Animal Farm applied solely to Russia or made a larger statement about ‘the 
philosophy of revolution’, Orwell (1946b, np) said: ‘Of course I intended it 
primarily as a satire on the Russian revolution. But I did mean it to have a wider 
application in so much that I meant that that kind of revolution (violent 
conspiratorial revolution, led by unconsciously power-hungry people) can only 
lead to a change of masters.’ 
It is on the importance of safeguarding the political process with all the tenacity 
and intelligence available to us that Orwell concentrates, rather than offering any 
blueprint for the future. He provides numerous clues about the attributes of a 
decent system: Clover and Boxer are among the most likeable animals because 
they ‘behave decently’, Benjamin is admirable because he is sceptical and thinks 
for himself, Major speaks with passion and conviction, and so forth. However, he 
goes no further than this, leaving readers free to imagine their own alternatives. I 
note that for Cunningham (2013, np) this is a weakness of the text. Orwell, he 
observes, ‘ultimately doesn’t give the reader much space to think about anything 
beyond that initial “no” message’, and his refusal of tyranny, while important as a 
gateway, is not enough, for ‘the point of a gate is that eventually we need to pass 
through it’. Against this, I press that Orwell was writing at a time when the search 
for utopia was itself up for discussion, and suggest that his silence on the shape of 
the future is part of the politico-ideological point he wishes to make.  
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Finally, I note that Orwell (1939/2000, p. 75) ruminates that Charles Dickens is 
able to produce real art through the ‘fertility of his invention’, ‘turns of phrase and 
concrete details’ and because he is ‘able to go on being funny because he is in 
revolt against authority, and authority is always there to be laughed at’. This use 
of an ironic humour, earnest yet self-deprecating, light yet memorable, pervades 
Animal Farm. A puzzle still remains, however: namely, that Animal Farm 
continues to attract and sustain the interest of readers long after it has outlived its 
political purpose. One explanation might be that for all of Orwell’s (1946a/2000, 
pp. 3-4) intentions to ‘push the world in a certain direction, and alter other 
people’s ideas of the kind of society they should strive for’, the enduring qualities 
of his ‘fairy story’ do not rise or fall on its success as political allegory, but rather 
are invested in the power of a good story, simply told, with its pathos deeply 
invested in an evocative rural nostalgia.  
Concluding points: the power of ‘countervailing effects’ 
At the outset of this chapter, I suggested that each of Bread and Wine, Darkness 
at Noon and Animal Farm are deeply caught up in the business of ideological 
assertion. On this basis, I asked whether it was possible for them to create the 
same kind of generative artistic/political relationship I ascribed to The Foundation 
Pit and The Master and Margarita with their oblique interrogations of utopian 
thought. My analysis has been built around three propositions: first, that political 
commitment is an integral part of a work’s power to carry across time and place; 
second, that pedagogical discourse can flatten the resonating potential of a work; 
third, that the literary traditions of the novel can mediate, even transform, 
didacticism. In relating these notions to the texts, I suggested that Silone’s 
aspirational passages are offset by the socio-ideological languages of his 
protagonists; that the dogmatic nature of Koestler’s ideological assertions is 
counterbalanced by his humanistic portrayal of Rubashov; and that Orwell’s 
combination of parody, chronotope and un/finalizability gives Animal Farm its 
resonance across time and place. 
What I want to do now is combine these reflections with those reached in the 
previous chapter. In that earlier discussion, I highlighted the diversity of Platonov 
and Bulgakov’s literary/political combinations; the power of their imaginative and 
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emotional calls in conveying the human impact of the political; and the complex 
interplay between their finalizable and unfinalizable elements. With a view to 
developing a fuller understanding of the artistic/political relationship, I ask how 
Bread and Wine, Darkness at Noon and Animal Farm—so different in their tone 
from these earlier novels—might add to and/or qualify these suppositions.  
The diversity of the texts’ literary/political combinations is striking, confirming 
Bakhtin’s (1935/1981, p. 261) proposal that the novel ‘is multiform in style and 
variform in speech and voice’. This is demonstrated not just in the major contrasts 
between these three novels and the works of Platonov and Bulgakov, but also in 
the differences between them despite their shared instructional or truth-telling 
form. In Bread and Wine, ideological issues are portrayed through the contrasting 
languages of the protagonists, where Sciatàp’s gentle reflection that Spina’s 
socialist aspirations are a ‘dream, a beautiful dream’ like ‘abolishing stable doors’ 
(p. 318), sits aside Uliva’s assertion that ‘to propagate itself every new idea is 
crystallized into formulas … and invariably becomes a fixed idea, immobile and 
out of date’ (p. 359). In Darkness at Noon, a far more assertive and directly 
instructional text, the ‘truth of the matter’ is presented through its characteristic 
patterns of assertion and counter-assertion, with Ivanov’s declaration that the 
Revolution should be allowed to ‘sacrifice a few hundred thousand for the most 
promising experiment in history’ (p. 131), crying out for direct refutation. And in 
Animal Farm, Orwell achieves a remarkable effect by parodying the instructional 
form from the outset, thus underscoring the partiality of all our political 
narratives. 
The imaginative and emotional qualities of the texts are again important, both in 
their own right and in counteracting didacticism. In contrast to the great spinning 
out of time and space so characteristic of Platonov and Bulgakov’s works, these 
texts illustrate an ‘anchored’ form of imagination grounded in particular times and 
places. In Animal Farm, we have the seasons and fields of England; in Darkness 
at Noon, a cell with a glimpse of the Milky Way; in Bread and Wine, a village 
where ‘the fields were so small and the stone walls that separated them so 
numerous that they looked like the foundations of a destroyed town’ (p. 245). 
Commenting on this in relation to Silone, Camus says ‘look at Silone, he is 
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radically tied to his land but is the most European of all writers … Silone speaks 
for all Europe. If I feel myself tied to him it is because he is incredibly rooted in 
his national and even local tradition’ (cited by Pugliese, 2009, p. 6). The effect is 
different in each case: in the ‘spinning out’ of time and space characteristic of the 
Russian novels, there is an uplift, a sense of reality beyond the immediacy of 
internecine politics and bureaucratic rivalries; in the ‘anchored’ portrayals of the 
Western European texts, a direct call on our political commitment, a move to 
respond to the injustices of the present. 11  
As with the Russian texts, the sufferings of the characters take us well beyond the 
‘logic’ of the dialogical and the logical. In Darkness and Noon, Rubashov’s 
betrayal of the stammering Richard under the Pietà with her ageless, folded hands 
reminds us that politics matter because people matter; in Bread and Wine, we are 
confronted with Uliva’s obstinate courage and brutal death; in Animal Farm, we 
can stand with Clover and look out over the ravaged English fields littered with 
blood, bones, and the small bodies of animals torn to bits. In such ways, the force 
of the political is felt rather than thought, with the texts embedding their truths in 
our consciousness without expressly articulating it. It is in the personal and the 
particular that the impact of these descriptions lies: in, for example, the fact that 
Richard is young and trusting, and that his seventeen-year old wife is expecting 
their baby. This matters to us: in some indefinable way it makes Rubashov’s 
actions worse. The point may seem obvious enough, but I submit that it is 
obscured in the respective critiques of Kundera, Adorno and Rancière, with their 
systematic preferences for the strange and/or oblique.  
I come last and in most detail to the intersections between finalizability and 
unfinalizability. My first point is that just as the unfinalizable elements of 
Platonov and Bulgakov’s works are embedded in a set of relatively finalizable 
values and commitments, so the assertive/finalizable features of the Western 
                                                 
11  This pull of the local and its capacity to extend our imagination outward is reflected in 
Bakhtin’s (1937/1981, p. 225) suggestion that in the rural idyll: ‘the unity of the life of generations 
… is in most instances primarily defined by the unity of place. … [This] brings together and even 
fuses the cradle and the grave (the same little corner, the same earth), and brings together … 
childhood and old age (the same grove, stream, the same lime trees, the same house’.  
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European texts are accompanied by considerable silences or ‘gaps’. In Bread and 
Wine, the fate of the revolutionary movement is never settled; in Darkness at 
Noon, Rubashov is shot in the back to no purpose and there is no sense of 
resolution; in Animal Farm, the pigs end up sleeping in humans’ beds and Orwell 
refuses to offer a blueprint for the future. It is in and through these silences—a 
highly important example of countervailing literary effects—that we are prompted 
to ask further questions and search for new insights. 
My reading of the texts also suggests that the distinction between finalizability 
and unfinalizability, so important to the artistic/political binary, may be too blunt 
an instrument to account for the nature of our responses to a work. If we take 
Howe’s (1957/2002, p. 17) definition of a political novel as one where ‘political 
ideas play a dominant role or in which the political milieu is the dominant 
setting’, Darkness at Noon and Animal Farm are more directly and evidently 
‘political’ than Bread and Wine. So it might appear that they are the more 
vulnerable to the risks of pedagogy. On my reading this is not so. This is partly 
because the narrative of Bread and Wine does not particularly appeal (the 
characters seem contrived, and the tone of the text dated); partly because in all 
three cases the political content holds my attention as a focal point; and partly 
because the pedagogical risks associated with a political content are, in each case, 
counterbalanced by the literary traditions of the novel.  
Let me briefly recapitulate on this critical matter. In the case of Darkness at Noon, 
there are times when I withdraw from the text because of its relentless 
hammering, experiencing a feeling of being ‘worn out’ by its insistences. 
Nevertheless, the work continues to haunt me, largely because of the sense of 
personal, social and political suffering embedded in it. In reading Animal Farm, I 
find that the moral of the fable blends in such a simple and unpretentious way 
with an old-style story, coherently told by an accomplished writer, that the text 
takes an imaginative hold not so much despite as through its political directness. 
Finally, and this time in line with Bakhtin’s suppositions, I believe that the most 
compelling passages of Bread and Wine emerge in its more complex moments, 
when the fine balance between doubt and hope emerges through the contending 
voices of the protagonists.  
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In summary, I reiterate the diversity of the texts’ literary/political combinations; 
the importance of imagination in extending our political horizons; the significance 
of emotion in portraying the human impact of the political; and the intricate 
connections between the finalizable and unfinalizable. Against many of the 
prescriptive readings of the arts/politics relationship discussed in Chapter Two, 
these considerations withstand any single rendering of the artistic/political 
relationship, and point instead to the multiplicity of ways in which the novel’s 
artistic/political configurations might resonate across time and space. Building on 
these foundations, I turn to the novels of Solzhenitsyn and Grossman as examples 
of works that take systematic stock of Russia’s past, present and future, and in so 





The novel as historical record: Solzhenitsyn and Grossman 
In recent times our Soviet literature has been persistently labouring over new 
forms for the socio-ideological novel. This is perhaps the most pressing and 
important genre on today’s literary scene. The socio-ideological novel—
ultimately the socially tendentious novel—is a completely legitimate artistic 
form. Not to recognize its purely artistic legitimacy is a naïve prejudice of 
superficial aestheticism, which we should have long ago outgrown. (Bakhtin, 
1930/1989, p. 256) 
Bakhtin offered this surprising acknowledgement of the ‘socio-ideological genre’ 
in his preface to Tolstoy’s last novel, Resurrection. He was writing in 1930, 
around the same time that he was developing the theoretical notions discussed in 
this thesis. True to those evolving ideas, he immediately qualified his 
endorsement:  
But actually this is one of the most difficult and risk-laden forms of the 
novel. … To organize the entire artistic material from top to bottom on the 
basis of a well-defined socio-ideological thesis, without stifling it or drying 
the living concrete life within it, is a very difficult task. (Bakhtin, 1930/1989, 
p. 256) 
Although Solzhenitsyn’s In the First Circle and Cancer Ward, and Grossman’s 
Everything Flows are more fluid and complex than Bakhtin’s designation of the 
socio-ideological novel would suggest—and surely there are few, if any, texts in 
which ‘every word, every epithet, every comparison’ is devoted to a single, 
central thesis—they yet remain vulnerable to the ‘stifling’ or ‘drying’ effects 
Bakhtin associates with the socio-ideological genre. As discussed in the last 
chapter, the stifling effect of pedagogy also applies to the ‘truth-telling’ novels of 
Silone, Koestler and Orwell. However, I propose that the challenges facing 
Solzhenitsyn and Grossman are the greater, for in reconstructing the past and 
evaluating the role of their characters as active players within that past, they lean 
always toward the historical ‘real’ and a morally evaluative stance. If Silone, 
Koestler and Orwell’s novels represent a polemical/assertive form of political 
logic, Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s works represent its ‘stock-taking’ character, 
something that does not lend itself easily to satire, irony and/or story-telling, all of 
which are important countervailing features in the Western European texts.  
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Solzhenitsyn and Grossman novels are evidently far-removed from the oblique, 
philosophically-oriented renderings of either of The Foundation Pit or The Master 
and Margarita. Hence the critical question for this chapter is whether and how far 
they might leave room for our own imaginative re-interpretations as readers while 
also holding history to account; put another way, how they might combine the 
open and creative nature of the artistic with the systematizing qualities of the 
political. Before exploring this, I turn to the literary and political contexts in 
which their novels emerged and gained their significance.  
Context: protesting the past and present 
As contributors to the dissenting literature of the period, Solzhenitsyn and 
Grossman’s novels fall under what Parthé (2004) describes as the ‘paraliterary’ 
space; that is, the space where literature and criticism coincide and become 
subject to the political scrutiny of the authorities. Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’, 
delivered to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, set the parameters for 
legitimate dissent. On the one hand, the speech condemned Stalin’s abuses; on the 
other, it remained resolutely silent on the ideological, legal and institutional 
character of the regime. As Shatz (1980, p. 100) comments, the denunciation 
‘remained strictly on the level of moral criticism: the Soviet political, economic 
and social system was fundamentally sound, only the defective character of some 
of the people who had been running it was at fault’. The speech also made it clear 
that even if the arbitrary arrests, persecutions and executions were over, the 
Party’s monopoly of political power would continue. Hence: ‘the one-party state 
would be preserved, alternative ideologies would be suppressed and state 
economic ownership would be preserved … the future of the USSR lay in a return 
to the past’ (Service, 2009, p. 339).1 
Three years prior to the speech, the critical journal Novy Mir published Vladimir 
Pomerantsev’s article, ‘On sincerity in literature’ (1953). Taking a bold step, 
Pomerantsev called for a new form of sincerity in authors, observing that ‘to say 
of a writer that his books are characterized by patriotic feeling, love for the 
people, and faith for the future, is to say nothing’ (cited by Shatz, 1980, p. 101). In 
                                                 
1 For discussion of the role of dissident literature over this period, see Boobbyer 2005, and Booker 
and Juraga 1995. 
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a second important dissenting move, also in 1953, Ilya Ehrenburg’s short novel 
The Thaw (the title of which subsequently gave its name to Khrushchev’s uneven 
periods of liberalization) was published and circulated. The novel describes how 
the wife of a despotic factory-owning husband left him during the spring thaw; in 
its ‘daring subplot’ it compares a penurious artist, Saburov, who is unable to 
exhibit but maintains his professional and personal integrity, with a successful 
careerist, Pukhov, who produces orthodox and sterile artistic works (Shatz, 1980, 
p. 104). In this early post-Stalinist stage, the authorities gave cautious but 
grudging acknowledgement to the existence of both pieces. 2    
As the cold war set in, so the space for legitimate protest narrowed. This is 
reflected in the official reception of Vladimir Dudinstev’s Not by Bread Alone 
(1958). The book describes how a dedicated inventor was systematically defeated 
on all sides by a short-sighted, selfish and opportunistic bureaucracy. Bureaucratic 
red tape was traditionally a legitimate literary target, and it was not until the novel 
was published and endorsed in the West, that Dudinstev was ‘shunned, banned 
and harried into poverty’ (Stonor Saunders, 1994, p. 8). In the final and most 
significant event of the 1950s, described by Shatz as ‘the greatest literary 
sensation of the Khrushchev years’ (1980, p. 106). Pasternak was offered a Nobel 
Prize for his Dr Zhivago in 1958. Given the novel’s suggestion that the 
Revolution had sacrificed individual freedoms for economic transformation, the 
Soviet authorities reacted furiously to its celebration in the West. Ostracized, 
isolated and vilified as a traitor in the Soviet Union, Pasternak was brought close 
to suicide and refused the award.3  
In 1961, Khrushchev reaffirmed his earlier commitments to liberalization in his 
address to the Twenty-Second Party Congress. With his explicit approval, Pravda 
                                                 
2
 The official response to Pomerantsev’s article is nicely illustrated in Cancer Ward. Here Dyoma, 
a student, asks Aviette, the daughter of Rusanov, a senior police officer, for her opinion on the 
work. She replies ‘the man who wrote that article turned everything the wrong way round. Either 
that or he didn’t think his argument through properly. Sincerity can’t be the chief criterion for 
judging a book. If an author expressed incorrect ideas or alien attitudes, the fact that he is sincere 
about them merely increases the harm the work does’ (Cancer Ward, p. 310). 
3
 For a caustic and absorbing account of Isaiah Berlin’s role in bringing the manuscript of Doctor 
Zhivago to the West, the actions of the publishing industry, the possible role of the CIA, and the 
devastating consequences for Pasternak, see Stonor Saunders 2014. 
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published Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s ‘Heirs of Stalin’, a poem suggesting that 
Stalin/ism continued to stalk the upper echelons of the Party. Evoking 
mausoleums and the slumbering dead, it read: 
He was scheming. Had merely dozed off. 
And I, appealing to our government, petition them 
to double, and treble, the sentries guarding this slab,  
and stop Stalin from ever rising again 
and, with Stalin, the past … 
No wonder Stalin’s heirs seem to suffer 
these days from heart trouble. They, the former henchmen,  
hate this era of emptied prison camps 
and auditoriums full of people listening to poets. (Yevtushenko, 1961) 
When Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, a period of ‘re-Stalinisation’ settled 
in. Given that the old instruments of espionage and surveillance remained 
substantially intact, Brezhnev was able to clamp down on the nascent cultural and 
intellectual freedoms with relative ease. One event followed another. 
Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which has been released 
in book form and circulated in schools in 1962, was quietly withdrawn. The poet 
Joseph Brodsky was brought to trial on the astonishing charge of ‘parasitism’;4 
Daniel and Sinyavsky were sentenced to the labour camps for ‘publishing anti-
Soviet propaganda abroad’ in 1966; the editor of Novy Mir, Alexander 
Tvardovsky, was forced to resign in 1977. Until Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost 
some two and a half decades later, dissident works were refused publication, 
confiscated and banned, surviving through the underground process called 
‘samizdat’, whereby banned manuscripts were passed from hand to hand usually 
in carbon copy form. 
The publication histories of Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s novels tell their own 
stories. Solzhenitsyn first worked on In the First Circle between 1955 and 1958, 
and then, hoping for publication, submitted a ‘lightened’ version to the Union in 
1964, with its more contentious passages omitted and the text reduced from 
ninety-six to eighty-seven chapters. Even in this abbreviated form, it was refused 
publication, and a year later the KGB seized a copy and circulated it among 
                                                 
4
 Brodsky, whose works were not particularly political, was tried on the charge that he had not 
earned his upkeep in terms of output. His plea that he had worked diligently to perfect his talents 
as a poet was not successful, and he was sentenced to five years’ forced labour in a distant locality 
(Shatz 1980).  
 147 
officials. It was published in its shortened form in the West in 1968, and in its full 
form in the Russian language in the United States in 1978. In this ‘restored’ 
version (1978) Solzhenitsyn writes:  
Such is the fate of Russian books today: they bob to the surface, if they ever do, 
plucked to the skin. … So also with this novel of mine. In order to give it even a 
feeble life, I myself shortened and distorted it … but here it is now, the authentic 
one. By the by, while restoring the novel, there were parts that I refined: after all, I 
was forty then but am fifty now. (In the First Circle, front pages) 
Cancer Ward was similarly refused publication rights when Solzhenitsyn 
submitted it in 1967, and the Union formally banned the book the following year. 
It too made its way to the West, to be later published in the Soviet Union. 
Grossman’s experiences were similar. In 1960, his earlier epic novel, Life and 
Fate, was formally ‘arrested’ by the KGB, who also confiscated his typewriter 
and its ribbons, asserting that Grossman’s writing was no longer in the public 
interest. Grossman then worked privately on Everything Flows until his death in 
1964, circulating drafts to close friends. The authorities, he lamented, ‘have 
strangled me into a corner’ (Chandler, 2011, p. xxix). 
Other important dissenting works of the period include Anatoly Rybakov’s 
Children of the Arbat (1966/1988), which describes the experiences of a young 
member of the komsomol exiled as a result of party intrigues; Sasha Sokolov’s A 
School for Fools (1969/2015), which develops a new style ‘proeziia’ (‘between 
prose and poetry’) to enter the inner mental landscape of a schizophrenic 
adolescent; and Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales (1966/1994), which, in 
Shalamov’s words, is characterized by ‘a “new prose”, which is not the prose of 
the document but of the ordeal born out of it’ (cited by Toker, 1997, p. 554). 
Children of the Arbat was suppressed until perestroika, where it was published as 
a series of essays; School for Fools made its way to the United States, where it 
was first published in the mid 1970s; Kolyma Tales was taken to the United States 
in 1966 and individual stories were published there between 1970 and 1976. 
Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s novels do not have the stylistic adventurousness of 
either of Sokolov or Shalamov’s works. They are, however, distinctive in their 
systematic reconstruction of the past and their evaluation of characters as active 
players in that past. It is this evaluative stance that leaves them vulnerable to 
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Bakhtin’s (1930/1989, p. 256) warnings on the ‘stifling’ or ‘drying’ of effects of 
the socio-ideological novel, and it is the dimensions of this problem that 
preoccupy me here. In preface, I note that the nature of Solzhenitsyn and 
Grossman’s responses to this challenge is substantially influenced by their prior 
literary orientations. Solzhenitsyn’s is a thoroughly Tolstoyian perspective, being 
based on the conviction that art has a supervening moral purpose perspective. Just 
as Tolstoy asserts that the distinguishing feature of ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ art is its 
capacity to ‘call up in a man that feeling, utterly distinct from all other feelings, of 
joy, of spiritual union with another and with others’ (1898/1996, p. 120), so 
Solzhenitsyn declares that:  
I have understood and experienced this truth in my life: that world literature 
as a unifying force is no longer an abstract sum of influences or a 
generalisation constructed by literary experts but a common body and 
common soul, a living unity of heart in which the growing spiritual unity of 




In contrast, Grossman’s orientation—possibly following his training as a war 
journalist—is analytical, investigative and critical, evincing a desire to put things 
on the historical record and give a name to what has gone before. In Everything 
Flows this produces an unusual combination of analytic/critical comment and 
creative/imaginative description, with priority given to the social and political 
conditions framing human action. In brief, we have a distinction between a more 
normative and a more sociological approach, each of which produces its own 
particular way of responding to the challenges facing the socio-ideological novel. 
As established at the outset of this discussion, in taking stock of the past, 
Solzhenitsyn and Grossman face the challenge of revealing the finalizable 
elements of historical developments while at the same time offering a place where 
we can interpret and/or come to terms with the force of the events described. I 
suggest that this depends on a ‘creative space’ or ‘imaginative gap’ where the 
truths a text asserts, the historical developments it portrays, and the views and 
values of its characters all have degree of freedom one from another, even while 
closely woven into the normative fabric of the text. Put another way, history needs 
to be allowed to ‘speak for itself’, in just the same way that novelistic characters 
need to have some autonomy from the author that creates them. I stress that this is 
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not a plea for unfinalizability, but rather for the intersection between the two, 
whereby the finalizable nature of historical events combines with the space for 
imaginative re-presentation.  
In using this line of argument as the analytical frame for my discussion, I make 
considerably less use of the detail of Bakhtin’s insights than I do in any of my 
other chapters on the texts. His warnings about the risks of the sociological novel 
are, however, always at the centre of my considerations. The discussion falls into 
two main parts: relating the authors’ re-creation of the past and their 
representation of characters as historical actors.  
Re-creating the past 
In her discussion of the Gulag literature, Leonie Toker (2000, p. 188) proposes 
that works that attempt to say something ‘true’ about the past represent a 
‘veridical’ form of prose where characters and events do not generally refer to 
‘real events and actual people’ but are ‘yet felt to be typical, to represent a 
paradigm, a replicating model of human attitudes and fates’ (original emphasis). 
Such texts, she says, engage the reader in a ‘metafictional pact’ whereby they 
‘promote attention to the links between the texts and the reality they point at, as 
well as the nature, extent and purpose of the fictionalisation’ (p. 188). This invites 
consideration of just how Solzhenitsyn and Grossman draw on the powers of 
fiction to create their ‘metafictional pacts’, and how far the ‘nature, extent and 
purposes’ of their fictionalisations allow historical events to ‘speak for 
themselves’, or alternatively, subordinates them to the authors’ moral and/or 
political concerns. I consider each of the three novels in turn. 
In the First Circle 
In the First Circle is based on Solzhenitsyn’s three years (1946-9) as a political 
prisoner in a security prison just outside Moscow. Its setting is the Marfino 
Institute for Scientific Research, a security prison staffed by scientists and 
engineers taken out of the labour camps to do technical work for the regime. Its 
title, with its Dantean allusion, reflects the fact that even though the prisoners 
(zeks) are isolated from the outside world and cut off from their families, their 
conditions are appreciably better than those in the inner reaches of the Gulag. 
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Hence they face the dilemma of whether they should comply with the authorities, 
in which case they will assist in the imprisonment of others, or refuse, knowing 
that this means they will be sent back to the labour camps where they may well 
die. At the end of the book, when the autobiographical Gleb Nerzhin awaits 
transportation to the forced labour camps for refusing to comply, he sounds 
almost euphoric in his declaration: ‘No, Ilya Terentich, [Marfino] isn’t hell! … 
Hell is where we’re going! The special prison is the highest, the best, the first 
circle of hell. It’s practically paradise!’ (In the First Circle, p. 740). 
Toker (2000, p. 124) observes that In the First Circle contains ‘more referential 
material than do many of the cautious contemporary memoirs, which suspended 
references to time, place, and police in order to withhold the information from the 
secret police’. But what is the purpose of this material and what kind of 
‘metafictional pact’ does it seek to serve? In many instances, it is moral, with the 
historical detail illustrating not so much the circumstances of the times as the 
status of the characters in responding to those circumstances, as illustrated in 
Nerzhin’s declaration cited above. Further, in compressing the force of the plot 
into a finite space and time—a four-day period over Christmas 1949—while at the 
same time expanding on the motivations, deliberations and actions of the 
characters, Solzhenitsyn underscores the significance of each and every one of our 
actions.  
Let me illustrate the force of Solzhenitsyn’s moral discourse with reference to the 
predicament of Gleb Nerzhin’s wife, Nadya. On becoming a university student, 
Nadya finds that there are ‘practically no research topics without a research 
classification’ and that ‘the whole of science was being labelled as top secret from 
top to bottom’ (p. 272). Her situation is untenable: if she owns that her husband 
has been convicted under Article 58, the authorities will not let her present her 
thesis, ‘let alone work at the university’, and if she lies and says he has been 
‘reported missing on active service’, they will trace his details and she will be 
prosecuted for false information (pp. 272-273). All this is vital information, and I 
search for more insights: how the university operates; the kinds of procedures to 
which Nadya is actually or potentially subject; and the ways in which scientific 
research is bent to the purposes of the regime. But Solzhenitsyn notably fails to 
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provide such details, instead underlining the enormity of Nerzhin’s sacrifice in 
agreeing to Nadya’s request for a divorce. The climax of the chapter, the force of 
the telling, comes when Nerzhin kisses Nadya farewell, knowing he had ‘no hope 
of being in Moscow in a year’s time to kiss her again’ (p. 277). 
I submit that in its moral foundations, the chronotope of In the First Circle has 
more in common with the heroic cast of Bakhtin’s (1937/1981) classic 
biographical novel than the great widening of time and space of the post-
Rabelaisian novel. There are, however, many occasions where Solzhenitsyn does 
allow the historical detail to speak for itself, thus creating the ‘space’ for our own 
imaginative reinterpretations. In detailing Marfino’s characteristics as a ‘first 
circle of hell’, for example, he records the prisoners’ separation from family and 
friends, their subjection to repeated roll calls and body searches, and their control 
by prison authorities who are ‘paid to suspect that the convict’s most innocent act 
is a treacherous ruse’ (p. 172). Reproducing an actual historical event, he 
describes how when the prisoners are occasionally allowed to see their families, 
they are driven to a separate prison in a large orange and blue van labelled ‘meat’ 
to ensure that the public will not realize that Marfino, which was once a seminary, 
has been turned into a security prison. He also details the physical characteristics 
of Marfino, capturing the ordinariness and thus the potential everywhereness of 
the mechanisms of surveillance:  
The Acoustics Laboratory occupied a lofty, spacious room. … Big bulbs in 
frosted fixtures shed a pleasant diffused white light. There was a soundproof 
acoustic chamber with sides short of the ceiling, at the far corner of the 
room. It looked unfinished: its exterior was upholstered with ordinary 
sacking stuffed with straw. … Near the booth, rows of copper sockets 




In a parallel but distinct literary move, Solzhenitsyn uses a combination of 
symbolism and parody to represent Stalin as a dying dictator. The occasion is the 
evening of Stalin’s seventieth birthday, and from the outset, Solzhenitsyn 
emphasizes the ordinariness of the great dictator: ‘he was only a little yellow-
eyed old man with gingery … thinning … hair, with deep pockmarks in a grey 
face and a sagging dewlap… with uneven blackened teeth’ (Cancer Ward, p. 98). 
This is an isolated and lonely Stalin: ‘there was no one he now remembered as a 
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friend … he had and could have no friend’ (p. 102). Most of all, this is a 
delusional Stalin, a captive of personal isolation and ideological fallacies: 
Stalin felt so lonely because he had no one to try his thoughts on, no one to 
measure himself against. Still half the universe was there in his breast, all 
order and clarity. Only the other half, called objective reality, was lost in the 
swirling mist that covered the world. (In The First Circle, p. 153) 
It is impossible to say how far this does justice to Stalin’s last years: certainly it 
does not match the energy, ruthlessness and obdurate determination of the dictator 
who transformed the Russian economy and was responsible for millions of deaths. 
What it does do is underscore Solzhenitsyn’s thesis that wrongdoing will bring 
about its own form of mortal retribution. In so far as this overrides the actual, 
historical Stalin, it can be said to subordinate the reality of history to 
Solzhenitsyn’s moral concerns. Against this, I argue that we have an imaginative 
reconstruction that invites us to look at the category ‘dictator’ in a very different 
way, reflecting Bakhtin’s (1941/1981, p. 10) point that a ‘basic internal theme of 
the novel’ is precisely the ‘inadequacy of fate or situation’ in describing the 
totality of a human actor.  
In summary: In the First Circle offers three distinct accounts of the historical: 
moral, empirical and symbolic/parodic. My argument is that the moral forecloses 
on the creative space by subordinating history to Solzhenitsyn’s socio-ideological 
thesis; that the empirical leaves history to ‘speak for itself’ and expands our 
political imaginaries; and that the symbolic/parodic invites us to revise our 
preconceptions. Keeping these distinctions in mind, I turn to Cancer Ward where 
the text’s metaphorical basis withstands any single line of interpretation from the 
outset. 
Cancer Ward 5  
For Patricia Blake (1968, np), Cancer Ward ‘irresistibly conveys an image of the 
immediate post-Stalin period when both victims and executioners were confined, 
all equally mutilated, in the cancer ward of the nation’. However, at a meeting 
with the Writers Union, Solzhenitsyn insisted that ‘the book is about cancer, 
cancer as such … as it is experienced every day by the sick’ (cited by Blake 1968, 
                                                 
5
  Cancer Ward draws on Solzhenitsyn’s experience as a patient in a hospital in Tashkent when on 
temporary release from exile ‘in perpetuity’ at Kok-Terek in Kazakhstan. 
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np). While this can be interpreted as his attempt to defend his novel against the 
authorities, it is indeed true that Cancer Ward is specific about the different forms 
of the disease, its various treatments, and the hopes and fears of patients. When, 
for example, Kostoglotov has his tumour examined by the doctors, he ‘can feel at 
once how this toad inside him … had dug itself deep inside him and was pressing 
against his stomach’ (Cancer Ward, p. 62).   
On this basis, I suggest that the cancer metaphor has a two-fold significance. First, 
the historical and political, with its notions of malignancy and contamination, as 
reflected in Kostoglotov’s query: ‘a man dies from a tumour, so how can a 
country survive with growths like labour camps and exiles?’ (Cancer Ward, p. 
56). Second, the moral and spiritual, where patients are compelled to take stock of 
their lives and deliberate the meaning of life and death. As an example of this 
second theme, we have Yefrem Podduyev, a former labour camp overseer, who 
has no idea how to face death, for ‘the whole of his life had prepared him for 
living not for dying’ (p. 108). Accordingly: 
Day after day, he marched up and down the old floors, rattling the floor-
boards, without getting it any clearer in his mind how to meet death. He 
couldn’t work it out and there was no one to tell him. (Cancer Ward, p. 111) 
It is on this twin basis that I consider Cancer Ward’s recreation of historical 
events, suggesting that its metaphorical base allows it to withstand ‘all sorts of 
external finalization … and fixed, stable images’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 78). The 
novel is set in the mid 1950s, when Stalin’s machinery of surveillance was still 
intact and memories of the regime still fresh. As well as the hero, Kostoglotov, 
who is an exile and ex-prisoner, the rest of the characters include the medical and 
nursing staff, a member of the secret police, a contractor, a camp guard, a 
geologist, a Bolshevik scholar and two students. In drawing on the experiences 
and exchanges of these characters, Solzhenitsyn shows just how differently 
Stalin’s regime impacted on its subjects and how variously it was understood. 
When, for example, Zoya the nurse asks Kostoglotov what ‘exile in perpetuity’ 
means, it is clear that she knows nothing about the ‘Penal Code, all those 
paragraphs, clauses and their extended interpretations’ (p. 180). And she still does 
not comprehend, cannot comprehend, when Kostoglotov tells her:  
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If it were a life sentence, well, I suppose, my coffin would be brought back 
to Russia, but since it’s “perpetual”, it means that even that won’t be allowed 
back. I won’t be allowed back even after the sun goes out. (Cancer Ward, p. 
181)  
Similarly, Ludmila Dontsova, a doctor in the ward, cannot understand why 
Kostoglotov was not offered a diagnosis when he was in the camps. In trying to 
explain this to her, Kostoglotov says ‘there were such stormy goings-on where we 
were, Ludmila Afanasyevna, that I give you my word of honour … I’d have been 
ashamed to ask about a little thing like my biopsy. Heads were rolling. And I 
didn’t even understand what a biopsy was for’ (p. 81). When she protests, saying 
‘of course you didn’t understand. But these doctors must have understood. These 
things can’t be played with’ (p. 81), Kostoglotov ceases his explanations and 
reflects: 
Wasn’t that typical of life? Here, sitting in front of him, was his compatriot, 
his contemporary and well-wisher. They were both talking in their own 
language, common to them both, and still he couldn’t explain the simplest 
thing to her. It seemed one had to start too far back, or else end the 
explanation too soon. (Cancer Ward, p. 81) 
In another telling instance, the characters respond very differently to the Party’s 
decision not to commemorate the second anniversary of Stalin’s death (March 
5th, 1955). Vadim, a student loyal to the regime, is shocked, for he and his brother 
had grown up with Stalin’s portrait in their nursery, and ‘always saw over them 
those thick eyebrows, that thick moustache, that firm steadfast face’ (p. 335). In 
contrast, Kostoglotov ‘found it impossible to comprehend ... that on this day two 
years ago old men had shed tears, young girls had wept and the whole world 
seemed orphaned’ (p. 339):  
He found this preposterous to imagine because he remembered what the day 
had been like for them. … Barrack blocks were not unlocked and the 
prisoners were kept shut up … (but) the news spread and spread. … People 
were moving along the bunks saying, ‘Hey kids it looks as though the old 
Cannibal has kicked the bucket’. … And they all started to grin, they were 
all but openly crowing in triumph, those coarse, sharp-boned, swarthy 
prisoners’ mugs. (Cancer Ward, pp. 339-40)
 
 
In their dialogic way, these passages show how ‘the word lives, as it were, on the 
boundary between its own context and another, alien, context’ (Bakhtin, 
1935/1981, p. 284). Solzhenitsyn, though, never retreats from the actuality of 
Stalin’s terror. In portraying this, he uses a combination of symbolism and parody 
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to create Pavel Rusanov, a senior police officer, as both mortal human being and 
executor of terror. Rusanov’s disease ‘unforseen and unprepared for’ had come 
upon him ‘like a gale in the space of two weeks’, and ‘dragged him in like a fish 
on a hook and flung him on this iron bed’ (Cancer Ward, p. 9 and p. 7). 
Notwithstanding his fears and frustrations, Rusanov is still able to gloat that:  
Each person is permanently connected to central records administration by 
hundreds of little threads … and …if all these threads … millions in all … 
were suddenly to become visible, the whole sky would look like a spider’s 
web, and if they materialized as elastic bands, buses, trams and even people 
would all lose the ability to move, and the wind would be unable to carry 
torn up newspapers or autumn leaves along the streets of the city. (Cancer 
Ward, p. 208)  
Later, Solzhenitsyn portrays the ‘actuality’ but ‘impossibility’ of Stalin’s terror by 
making use of the surrealism of the dream, which, as Bakhtin observes in 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1963/1984), allows the novel to move ‘outside 
time’ while also dealing precisely with events as enclosed ‘in time’. In this dream, 
Rusanov finds himself ‘crawling along a concrete tube with uncovered steel bars 
jutting out from its sides’ (p. 229). After a long time, he emerges onto a 
construction site. The workmen have departed, but a girl is sitting there, her 
‘straw-like hair hanging loosely without comb or pin’ and her eyes ‘all water’ (p. 
230). Subsequently, he finds himself in a mineshaft, which, to his surprise, has a 
phone sticking out of the wall. He lifts the receiver to ask the operator to be taken 
to hospital. Instead of a dialling tone a ‘vigorous business like’ voice summons 
him to the Supreme Court (pp. 232-6). Fearing for his life, Rusanov goes to Court 
and the dream ends.  
In its surreal form, this dream narrative extends our insights into what it might be 
like to exist under a reign of perpetual terror. In its telling, it captures something 
of Platonov’s description of the liquidated Kulaks floating down the river in a raft, 
depicting a world that should never be, was unbelievable in all respects, and yet 
had come to be. The ‘unbelievable’ nature of Stalin’s wreckage is also captured in 
the conclusion to the novel. On his release from hospital, Kostoglotov decides to 
visit the zoo. Here he stands for a long time by the monkey’s cage, baffled by a 
notice pinned to its door, which explains that an ‘evil man’ blinded the monkey by 
throwing tobacco into its eyes. Kostoglotov is struck dumb: ‘Why? Thrown into 
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its eyes just like that? Why? It’s senseless!’ (p. 542). It is partly the simplicity of 
the notice, which staggers and enrages him: ‘this unknown man … was not 
described as “anti-humanist” or an “agent of American imperialism”. He was 
simply evil.’ He is unable to find an explanation. The next day he is travelling 
back to exile and the book ends as follows:  
The train went on and Kostoglotov’s boots dangled over the corridor like a 
dead man’s. An evil man threw tobacco into the Macaque-Rhesus’s eyes. 
Just like that. (Cancer Ward, p. 570) 
This is a haunting conclusion, combining the coherence of the narrative, whereby 
Kostoglotov seeks certain truths, and the silence of the space, where he can find 
no answers. It is strikingly different from Nerzhin’s triumphal return to the forced 
labour camps at the end of In the First Circle. So here and elsewhere, I suggest 
that Cancer Ward has the greater potential to sustain and widen the creative space. 
In evoking frailty, disease and death, it evokes compassion; in its empirical detail, 
it shows just how differently Stalin’s regime was experienced by subjects; in its 
symbolism it creates a bizarre but terrifying picture of the actuality of terror; in its 
metaphors it withstands any single reading.  
Everything Flows 
I now turn to Everything Flows, the text most centrally concerned with recording 
historical suffering in and for itself. Chandler suggests that Grossman wrote for 
the dead, so that those who ‘lie in the earth’ would have voice and be remembered 
(2011, p, xxiii). This is reflected in Grossman’s report on the massacre of the 
Ukrainian Jews in Kazary, where he writes that ‘silence and calm hover over the 
dead bodies buried under the collapsed fireplaces now overgrown with weeds … 
this quiet is much more frightening than tears and curses’ (Grossman, 1945/2005, 
pp. 252-3). He then tries to make good the loss, to provide a memorial for the 
dead, by ‘calling out’ the names of those who now lie under the collapsed 
fireplaces:  
Craftsmen and professional people; tailors, shoemakers, tinsmiths, jewellers, 
house painters, ironmongers, bookbinders, workers, freight handlers, millers, 
bakers and cooks … violinists and pianists … two-year-olds and three-year-
olds … eighty-year-old men and women with cataracts on hazy eyes, with 
cold and transparent fingers and hair that rustled quietly like white paper. 
(Grossman, 1945/2005, p. 253)  
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Grossman’s endeavour to counteract the ‘silence and calm’ of public memory 
takes up a major part of Everything Flows. Such, in essence, is the nature of his 
‘metafictional pact’: to remember and to remember as clearly as possible. As one 
means of doing this, he creates individuals that live for a short time on the pages 
of his book and then vanish from then as swiftly as they did in real life. In one of 
the most shocking examples, he describes how Masha Lyubimov, a young 
woman, is imprisoned for refusing to denounce her husband. When she is in 
prison, a senior guard knocks out two of her front teeth, and then, twice a week, 
forces her down a narrow corridor to a room where there are boards covered with 
sheepskins. There he rapes her. At one point, he gives her five candies. Wanting 
to send them to her daughter who has been placed in an orphanage, Masha does 
not eat them, but hides them in her small straw mattress (p. 114). Having for a 
long time held onto the hope that she will one day return to her family, Masha 
only ‘returns to freedom’ when she dies and the medical orderlies ‘place her in a 
box that the timber inspectors had rejected for any other use’ (p. 114).  
One of the most remarkable features of Grossman’s work is how it engages with 
historical facts through the poetry of its language. I highlight this because 
‘facts’—in all of their finalizability—are not usually combined with poetics, but 
this is exactly what happens here, where Grossman’s ‘horrified imagination’ 
brings home the full and shocking force of events.6 He reports, for example, how 
in the prisoner transport system of the 1930s, ‘steel combs were installed 
underneath the tail wagon of each train’ so that if a prisoner ‘managed to 
dismantle the floorboards and throw himself prone beneath the rails, this comb 
would seize him, yank him up, and hurl him beneath the wheels’ (p. 95). In the 
same detailed fashion, he records the stifled atmosphere of the prison cells, where: 
The cell windows were covered by thick wooden panels, and light from 
outside penetrated by only a narrow slit. … The electric lights burned 
twenty-four hours a day with merciless brightness; it was as if all that 
terrible, stifling heat came from them, from their white incandescence. 
Ventilators hummed day and night, but the torrid air from the June asphalt 
brought no relief. At night the air you breathed seemed like layers of hot felt 
stuffed inside your lungs and head. (Everything Flows, p. 149) 
                                                 
6
As earlier noted, the notion of a ‘horrified imagination’ belongs to Ricoeur (2004, p. 559), who 
observes that ‘horror’ is not itself a historical category, and it is the power of a literary imagination 
that ‘gives eyes to the horrified narrator’, and, I would add, to the ears of the horrified reader. 
 158 
The most extended example of Grossman’s poetic/factual combination is his 
account of the Ukraine famine. Here he creates a narrator with direct experience 
of events: Anna Sergeyevna, who thirty years earlier had been a member of one of 
Stalin’s youth brigades. In her early conversations with Ivan Grigoryevich, Anna 
describes her role as a brigade leader on the collective farms, simply commenting 
that ‘the work became more than my soul could bear’ for ‘if someone steels a 
fistful of grain—of the grain, like it or not, they have sown themselves—they get 
seven years …’ (p. 83). Later, when they become lovers, she gives him a full 
account of events, starting with the fact that the arrest and extermination of the 
Kulaks was triggered by an essentially administrative decision in which:  
The provincial committee would draw up a plan … and send it to the district 
Party committee. The district committees would then decide on the number 
of kulaks to be arrested in each village—and the village soviets would then 
each draw up a list of names. It was on the basis of these lists that the people 
were arrested. And who drew up the lists? A group of three—a troika. A 
group of ordinary muddle-headed people determined who would live and 
who would die. (Everything Flows, p. 117)  
Over its several pages, Anna’s narrative is packed with historical detail: in 
Toker’s (2000) terms, actual, referential, empirical detail. She records how all the 
social amenities in the district centre, ‘the cinema, theatre, the clubs, and the 
schools’, were turned into prisons to accommodate the forced exodus of Kulaks. 
During the journey, many people were ‘put down in the middle of nowhere … left 
to fend for themselves in the middle of the snow’ with the result that ‘the weak 
froze to death’ (p. 122). The famine ‘never slept’, and as the hunger set in, ‘there 
was nothing that the people didn’t eat. They caught mice; they caught rats, 
jackdaws, sparrows, and ants; they dug up earthworms. They ground up bones to 
make flour’ (p. 128 and p. 131). And then Anna remembers the children: 
As for the children—did you see the photographs of the children from the 
German camp? They looked just the same: heads heavy as cannon balls; thin 
little necks like necks of storks; and on their arms and legs you could see 
every bone. Every single little bone moving under their skin and the joints 
between them. … By the spring they no longer had any faces at all. Some 
had the heads of birds with a little beak. (Everything Flows, pp. 130-1) 
At the end, when the famine took over, ‘from the village, came a howl; it had seen 
its own death. The whole village was howling, without mind, without heart. It was 
noise like leaves in the wind, or creaking straw’ (p. 132). Finally, the ‘whole 
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village died’, and the ‘flat topped carts’, one after the other, carted the corpses 
away (p. 135).  
Both as war reporter and author of fiction, Grossman knew what was involved in 
reproducing ‘what really happened’ (Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 11). Chandler (2009b, p. 
xi) observes that ‘the burden of history’ carried by Everything Flows is so great 
that ‘most novels would sink under its weight’. I have suggested that the reason 
that the novel does not do sink, but rather resonates across time and space, owes 
itself to Grossman’s particular blend of factual detail and poetic imagination, 
whereby he grounds us in the actuality of historical events while also widening 
and deepening our political imaginaries. 
Characters as historical actors 
I now come to this chapter’s second major theme: Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s 
representations of their characters as historically active and potentially culpable 
actors. As earlier established, a dialogical/polyphonic text must create a ‘plurality 
of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of 
unmerged voices’, where its characters are ‘not only objects of authorial discourse 
but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse’ (Bakhtin, 1933/1984, 
pp. 6-7). But this cannot be left to stand where it is, for I have also argued that the 
use of ‘flat’ characters, as vividly represented in Solzhenitsyn’s depiction of Pavel 
Rusanov, can be ‘artistic’ in the making of a strong political point. Hence I 
distinguish between those instances where there is an explicit use of the novel’s 
parodic traditions and those in which a character is purportedly portrayed in their 
own right. If it turns out that such an ‘individualized’ person is in fact a surrogate 
for the author’s political or moral point, a threat to the integrity of the novel 
exists, for the individuality of characters, so central to it, has been bent to a 
different purpose. It is on this basis that I consider the texts, turning first to 
Solzhenitsyn’s depictions, where my reservations are greatest.  
Solzhenitsyn’s representations 
In an interview conducted in 1967, Solzhenitsyn was asked which genre he found 
most interesting and tried to emulate. To this, he replied ‘a polyphonic novel 
strictly defined in time and place’ (cited by Krasnov, 1980, p. 2). He continued:  
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How do I understand polyphony? Each person becomes the main hero as 
soon as the action reverts to him. Then the author feels responsible for as 
many as thirty-five heroes. He does not accord preferential treatment to 
anyone. He must understand every character and motivate his actions. I 
employed this method in writing two books and I intend to employ it in the 
writing of another one. (Cited by Krasnov, 1980, pp. 2-3)
 
 
In commenting on this interview, Vladislsav Krasnov (1980) points out that 
although Solzhenitsyn never mentions Bakhtin, he would have been aware of his 
work as it was under substantial discussion in the Soviet Union at the time of the 
interview. Krasnov also maintains that the issue is not whether Solzhenitsyn 
understood Bakhtin, but how far he managed to incorporate the 
polyphonic/dialogical into his works, on which he comments favourably. Against 
this, I press that it is indeed important to ask how far Solzhenitsyn allows his 
characters to speak to their own truths or, alternatively, subjects them to a 
‘monological design’ where the hero’s ‘self-consciousness’ is inserted into ‘a 
fixed authorial vision … with its finalizing definitions’ (Bakhtin’s 1963/1984, p. 
52). To discuss this, I compare Solzhenitsyn’s depictions of Innokenty Volodin 
(In the First Circle), Lev Rubin (In the First Circle) and Aleksei Shulubin 
(Cancer Ward).  
Innokenty Volodin’s portrait is essentially a moral parable on the imperative of 
personal conscience and the cleansing nature of suffering. At the beginning of the 
novel, Innokenty, previously a pleasure-loving diplomat, makes a conscience call 
to the American Embassy to warn them that information about the atomic bomb is 
about to fall into Soviet hands. The call is traced to him, and he is arrested, 
interrogated and imprisoned. When Innokenty makes his decision to call the 
embassy, Solzhenitsyn interjects to observe:  
The capacity for heroic deeds … depends on will power … the heroic acts 
that cost the greatest effort are those that are performed spontaneously by 
sheer will power’ (In The First Circle, p. 620).  
The forces leading to Innokenty’s transformation from epicurean diplomat to man 
of principle are first signalled in a countryside walk he takes with his sister-in-
law, Klara. When the couple reach the top of a hill, Innokenty surveys the view 
and says that this what he needs, for in his personal life he lacks ‘a clear view all 
round, and a chance to breathe freely’ (p. 303). Later, in his mother’s library, he 
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searches for a book on Epicurus, and unexpectedly finds her diaries. One entry 
leaps out at him: 
What is the most precious thing in the world? I see now that it is the 
knowledge that you have no part in injustice. Injustice is stronger than you, 




Innokenty, we are told, ‘sat there for days on end, on the little stool by the wide-
open cabinets, breathing their air and intoxicated with it’ (p. 439). And so the 
parable unfolds: 
In his carefree youth, before his crisis, Innokenty had seen nothing 
reprehensible about backdoor business; he had thought it fun and made light 
of it. Now it was distasteful, repellent. The great truth for Innokenty used to 
be that there was only one life. Now with the new feeling that had ripened in 
him, he became aware of another law: that we are only given one conscience 
too. (In The First Circle, p. 441)
 
 
Innokenty’s transformation is complete only at the point of his incarceration. 
After his interrogation, he knows the truth of the matter: he will be confined in a 
windowless box in Lubyanka’s inner prison until he either dies or is executed. But 
Solzhenitsyn does not leave us with his anguish, or that of those of the thousands 
of Lubyanka’s other inmates, but with his rejection of his old enthusiasm for 
Epicurean philosophy. As the prison closes in on his hero, Solzhenitsyn declares: 
How wise it all seems when you read these philosophers as a free man! But, 
for Innokenty, good and evil were now distinct entities, visibly separated by 
that light grey door, those olive green walls and the first night in prison. His 
struggle and his suffering had raised him to a new height from which the 
great materialist’s wisdom seemed like the prattle of a child or perhaps a 
savage’s rule of thumb. (In the First Circle, p. 711)
  
The parable-type qualities of Innokenty’s portrait also apply to Solzhenitsyn’s 
depiction of Lev Rubin, but in a less pronounced way. Rubin is a prisoner and 
committed communist, who agrees to co-operate with the authorities in 
developing the technologies that trap Volodin and later bitterly regret it. While his 
is not an unsympathetic portrait—it draws on Solzhenitsyn’s friend Lev 
Kopelev—it systematically points to the flaws of a materialist ideology. In the 
following exchange where Rubin and Nerzhin, positioned as friendly antagonists, 
                                                 
7 Compare Solzhenitsyn’s declaration in his Letter to Three Students: ‘There is nothing relative 
about conscience. Indeed, justice is conscience, not a personal conscience but conscience of the 
whole of humanity’ (cited by Shin, 1985, p. 344).  
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debate the nature of social justice in the prison yard, the truth flows clearly in 
Nerzhin’s direction:  
Nerzhin freed himself and stood up from his niche. ‘Justice is never 
relative …’ 
‘It’s a class concept, of course it is;’ said Rubin, brandishing an open 
hand over Nerzhin’s head.  
‘Justice is the cornerstone … the foundation of the universe!’ Nerzhin too 
waved an arm. ‘We were born with a sense of justice in our souls; we can’t 
and don’t want to live without it!’  
‘You’ve got nowhere to hide!’ Rubin said threateningly, ‘You will have 
to decide one day what side of the barricades you are on!’ 
Nerzhin answered just as threateningly. ‘That’s another word you blasted 
fanatics have done to death! You have put up barricades all over the world! 
That’s the horror of it. (In The First Circle, p. 340) 
It is but a short step from this for Solzhenitsyn to infer that it is the nature of 
Rubin’s ideals that leads him to co-operate with the authorities. Because Rubin 
had ‘lost all chance of private happiness long ago’ he ‘made mankind his family’ 
(p. 244). Wanting to do good for his cause, he persuades himself that the end 
justifies the means, and when asked to work on the phonoscopy ‘looked forward 
to his research with a true scientist’s excitement’ (p. 247). As Rubin explains to 
Nerzhin:  
You see old fellow, it’s a new science, the science of phonoscopy, with its 
own methods and horizons. … How great it will be if we both put our 
shoulders to the wheel! To be founders of a completely new science—that’s 
something to be proud of! (In The First Circle, p. 337)  
In a yet more problematic step, Solzhenitsyn has Rubin suffer for his 
commitments. When Dmitri Sologdin, a passionate and doctrinaire Christian, 
accuses Rubin of sacrificing the means for a misguided end, Rubin finds himself 
unable to sleep, for ‘memories that he had no wish at all to awaken drifted though 
his mind’ (p. 531). These memories include his participation in the 
collectivization of a rural village where he was under instruction to blow up pits 
where the grain was hidden, stop peasants grinding corn and baking bread, and 
prevent them drawing water from the well (p. 531). Rubin is tormented: ‘now that 
he knew how horrible it had been, knew that he could never do it again, how 
could he cleanse himself of it?’ (p. 532). But Solzhenitsyn forecloses on his 
misery, ending the chapter by asserting ‘what excruciating torment a sleepless 
night can be for a soul grieving over past mistakes!’ (p. 532).  
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Rubin’s regrets, convictions and friendliness make him a recognizable and 
compelling being, who enjoys a good measure of Bakhtin’s (1941/1981, p. 10) 
suggestion that a novelistic character must ‘combine in himself negative as well 
as positive features, low as well as lofty, ridiculous as well as serious’, and be one 
‘who is evolving and developing, who learns from life’. Nevertheless, as a 
novelistic character Rubin falls seriously short, and must so fall short given his 
subordination to Solzhenitsyn’s authorial vision. The description of his 
involvement in the brutalities of collectivization is rhetorical rather than detailed, 
and his sense of remorse is undercut by Solzhenitsyn’s authorial interjections. 
Consequently, we stand to learn little about belief, suffering, remorse and 
resistance.  
Solzhenitsyn’s portrait of Aleksei Shulubin (Cancer Ward) is strikingly different, 
for it invites our sympathetic engagement rather than moral judgement. Shulubin 
is a librarian and Bolshevik scholar who has compromised his scholarly ideals and 
now deeply regrets it. Towards the end of the novel, he and Kostoglotov enter into 
a long discussion on their political beliefs. In contrast with the Rubin/Nerzhin 
exchange, this dialogue emerges as an interactive search for meaning, and 
Shulubin’s views—which may represent the evolution of Solzhenitsyn’s own—
are treated with respect. 8 At one point, Shulubin makes the case for ‘an ethical 
socialism’, describing it as one in which ‘all relationships, fundamental principles 
and laws flow directly from ethics, and from ethics alone’ (p. 474, original 
emphasis). When Kostoglotov says, ‘I want happiness, you’d better leave me with 
happiness. Just give me happiness in the few years before I die’ (p. 476), Shulubin 
‘strains his strength to the utmost’ to declare:  
Happiness is a mirage. I was happy bringing up my children, but they spat 
on my soul. To preserve this happiness, I took books that were full of truth 
and burned them in the stove. … Ideas of what happiness is have changed 
too much through the ages. No one should have the effrontery to try and plan 
it out in advance. When we have enough loaves of white bread to crush them 
under our heels, when we have enough milk to choke us, we still won’t be 
happy. (Cancer Ward, p. 476) 
                                                 
8
 It was during his time in the camps that Solzhenitsyn abandoned his earlier commitment to 
communism and searched instead for a philosophical form of Christianity based on practice rather 
than abstract or universalising principles. This is described in some detail in the fourth part of The 
Gulag Archipelago, ‘The Soul and Barbed Wire’. 
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Towards the end of their exchange, Kostoglotov owns to being envious of 
Shulubin’s freedom and depressed about his own return to exile. Shulubin 
counters: ‘you haven’t had to do much lying, do you understand? At least you 
haven’t had to stoop so low, you should appreciate that! You people were 
arrested, but we were herded into meetings to “expose” you. They executed 
people like you, but they made us stand up and applaud the verdicts as they were 
announced’ (p. 464):  
When we applauded we had to hold up our big strong hands high in the air 
so that those on the platform would notice. Because who doesn’t want to 
live? Who would come out in your defence? Whoever objected? (Cancer 
Ward, p. 464)  
Kostoglotov tries to comfort Shulubin: ‘Aleksei Filippovich, it all depends on the 
number you happen to draw. If the position had been reversed, it would have been 
just the opposite: you would have been the martyrs, we the time-servers’ (p. 465). 
At first, Shulubin shakes his head, unconvinced. Later, when Kostoglotov asks 
‘tell me, did you think of these things during the twenty-five years, while you 
were bowing low, and renouncing your beliefs?’, he responds: 
‘Yes, I did. I renounced everything, and I went on thinking. I shoved the old 
books into the stove and I turned things over in my mind. Why not? Haven’t 
I earned the right to a few thoughts—through my suffering and through my 
betrayal?’ (Cancer Ward, p. 477) 
Because it is Shulubin, whose views we are encouraged to respect, that betrays his 
own ideals, the text avoids the moral bifurcation that so diminishes the portrait of 
Lev Rubin. The difference is important, for the same moral thesis—the failure of 
materialism—applies in each case. This reinforces a point that has been implicit in 
my discussion throughout: namely, that what is at issue for the artistic life of the 
text is not so much the presence or absence of a moral thesis, nor even perhaps the 
content of this thesis, but how the issue is voiced and whether or not its expression 
widens our political horizons. Keeping this in mind, I turn to Grossman.  
Grossman 
Everything Flows is a multi-layered text, with Grossman’s discussions of 
culpability taking three principal forms: ‘interpretative’, ‘representational’ and 
‘analytical’. These contrasts, imbued as they are with historical detail, follow 
Bakhtin’s (1935/1981, p. 288) description of the novel as ‘a multitude of concrete 
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words, a multitude of verbal-ideological and social belief systems’. Further, in 
their blending of different sources—historical, imaginative and philosophical—
they reflect the novel’s willingness to borrow from other sources: as Bakhtin 
(1941/1981, p. 33) reflects, ‘the boundaries between fiction and nonfiction, 
literature and nonliterature are not made up in heaven’.  
In his interpretative approach, Grossman explores how ‘a group of ordinary 
muddle-headed people’ could come to ‘determine who would live and who would 
die’ (Everything Flows, p. 117). Here he is exploratory in the first and last 
instance, complementing traditional historical accounts with literary insights into 
human culpability. Anna Sergeyevna tells us how she ‘came under a spell’, 
learning to believe that ‘kulaks were evil, unclean’, and that ‘those who were 
being disposed of were like cattle or swine’ for they were ‘vile in themselves, and 
they had no souls, and they stank’ (p. 118). The point is, Grossman does not 
retreat from the consequences of people’s involvement in the persecution of 
others; he simply makes the situation comprehensible. Thirty years on, Anna feels 
like she is ‘losing her mind’: 
Did Stalin really turn his back on all these people? Did he really carry out 
such a massacre? Stalin had food, Stalin had bread. It seems that he chose to 
kill all these people, to starve them deliberately. … ‘No’, I say to myself, 
‘how could he?’ But then I say to myself, ‘It happened, it happened’. And 
then immediately: ‘No, it couldn’t have’. (Everything Flows, p. 131)
 
 
In his parallel fictional/representational accounts, Grossman creates characters 
that illuminate the small but significant acts of deceit and betrayal that can arise 
under conditions of terror and help to perpetuate them. In this case, he is closely 
concerned with a person’s sense of self, illustrating Bakhtin’s observation that: 
The hero interests Dostoyevsky as a particular point of view on the world 
and on oneself, as the position enabling a person to interpret and evaluate his 
own self and his surrounding reality. What is important to Dostoyevsky is 
not how the world appears to his hero, but how the hero appears to himself. 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 47) 
This is best exemplified in the case of Nikolay Andreyevich, cousin to Ivan 
Grigoryevich and a moderately successful scientist. There were things about his 
career of which Nikolay had once felt proud: he had never denounced anyone, had 
refused to provide compromising information about an arrested colleague, and 
had ‘even shaken the hand of the wife of an exiled colleague and asked after the 
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health of her children’ (Everything Flows, p. 29). But Nikolay also has to come 
terms with his willingness to sign the letter denouncing the Jewish doctors who 
had ‘confessed’ to their plot to poison Stalin. When the Party later admitted that 
the doctors had been tortured, Nikolay experienced: 
A turbid aching feeling that he had never known before … a new, strange, 
and very particular sense of guilt—guilt with regard to his own moral 
weakness, to his speech at the meeting, to his having signed the collective 
letter denouncing the monster doctors, and to his willingness to consent to an 
obvious lie. (Everything Flows, pp. 27-8)
 
 
In a human-centred account, Grossman describes Nikolay’s mixed feelings on 
Ivan’s return: Ivan who has spent three decades in the camps and never 
denounced anyone. Initially Nikolay hopes that he will confess everything and 
Ivan will understand and absolve him. In this imagining, he will say to his cousin, 
‘Vanya, Vanechka, I envy you because you did not have to sign vile letters in 
your terrible camp. You never voted for the execution of innocent men, and you 
never made vile speeches’ (pp. 38-9). But in the event Nikolay’s need to see 
himself as a good person, indeed, the better person, takes over:  
[Nikolay] felt now that Ivan had come to him in order to strike a line through 
the whole of his life. Any moment now—and Ivan would humiliate him; he 
would talk down to him, he would treat him with condescension and 
arrogance. And he desperately wanted … explain to him that everything had 
changed and come anew, that all the old values had been deleted, that Ivan 
himself had been vanquished and broken. (Everything Flows, p. 39) 
In another portrait of subterfuge and deceit, Grossman creates Vitaly Pinegin, the 
man responsible for Ivan Grigoryevich’s arrest in the first place. This is a flatter 
portrayal than that of Nikolay Andreyevich, in which Grossman draws on the 
novel’s parodic traditions. When Pinegin, now an elderly man in a padded jacket, 
well-accepted as part of the establishment, unexpectedly meets Ivan on the streets, 
he is overcome with anxiety that he will be exposed. Ivan, he thinks, will turn on 
him and say ‘you know more than enough already. Yes, you had more than 
enough to say about me when there were people wanting to know’ (p. 57). Shaken 
by the encounter with the one he has betrayed, Pinegin rushes to the comfort of 
his club’s famous restaurant. Once there, he starts to feel better, cheered by the 
sight of the ‘ash-pink salmon surrounded by small lemon suns’ (p. 74).  
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As well as these representational renderings, Grossman uses an analytical 
approach to examine issues of culpability, guilt and judgement. This is best 
illustrated in a stand-alone chapter which opens by asking ‘Who is guilty?’ and 
‘Who will be held responsible?’ Cautioning that this ‘needs thought, we must not 
answer too quickly’ (p. 58), Grossman sets up a trial, with four defendants, all 
named Judas, placed in the dock. Using a dramatic format, he requires us to think 
and think again. In the case of the second Judas, the prosecution records that the 
man had ‘conducted heart-to-heart conversations with his friends and then handed 
in written reports to the authorities’ (p. 59). When all seems lost, the narrator 
interjects and casts a different light on matters: 
But let us not hurry. Let us think before we pass judgement. Ever since 
childhood he had been frightened out of his mind. … He had lived in terror; 
terror had inhabited his mind. At school he had trembled before the 
Secretary of the Party cell… At this point one begins to understand. This 
man had been hypnotised, enchanted by the might of the new world. He was 
like a little bird, unable to look away, captivated by the dazzling gaze of 
something new, brilliant and all-embracing. (Everything Flows, p. 60) 
At the end of the chapter, and in his strongest move, Grossman has the accused 
respond to the prosecution en bloc, raising the question of collective guilt. Now 
guilt and innocence become blurred, together with the question of who can judge 
whom and on what grounds. This is no longer the voice of a single narrator, or an 
individual judge, but that of the collective accused, speaking to all of us who sit in 
judgement:  
And please also answer one other thing. Why have you waited till now to 
ask these questions? … Like us, you participated in the Stalin era. Why must 
we, who were participants, be judged by you who were also participants? 
Why must you determine our guilt? Do you not see here the difficulty lies? 
Maybe we really are guilty, but there is no judge who has the moral right to 
discuss the question of guilt. (Everything Flows, p. 68) 
So how might we read Everything Flows with its distinct shifts in narrative style? 
As a novel? As a political exegesis? Or, as I would urge, an essentially hybrid 
text? In suggesting this, I cite Morson’s (1981, p. 669) point that if, as Bakhtin 
suggests, the essence of the novel is to violate rules, then authors may also choose 
to break the novel’s own rules. Whether or not Grossman does this on purpose is 
hard to say, given that Everything Flows was incomplete at the time of his death. 
Nevertheless, a measure of literary experimentation may well come into play, 
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with the latitude offered by the conventions of the novel allowing him to combine 
the skills he developed as a journalist with his creative talents as a novelist. And 
this could be a distinct advantage, for, to return to an earlier theme, it strengthens 
a text’s ‘internal resistance to all sorts external finalization … and helps it triumph 
over all sorts of fixed, stable images’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 78).  
Concluding points: the significance of the ‘creative space’ 
I began this chapter with Bakhtin’s warning that a socio-ideological thesis can 
‘stifle’ or ‘dry’ the inner artistic life of the text. In considering this, I have 
emphasized that Solzhenitsyn and Grossman do not face the situation where ‘the 
world is open and free, everything is still in the future, and will always be in the 
future’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 166), but instead have to consider the burden of 
past and its implications for the present and future of their nation. The issue, then, 
is how their texts, burdened with such truths, might expand and deepen our 
understanding of the developments they describe. I have suggested that this 
depends on a ‘creative space’ where the different dimensions of the works—
themes, characters and historical events—have a degree of separation one from 
the other, thus prompting us to ask further questions and/or enabling us to see 
matters in different ways. With this reinforcing my earlier arguments concerning 
the interplay between the finalizable and unfinalizable, I build on the conclusions 
of the previous chapters to consider the factors that might contribute to a text’s 
capacity to resonate across time and space. 
In the first instance, I reiterate the importance of literary diversity. In relation to 
Solzhenitsyn’s two texts, I have suggested that Cancer Ward is better able to 
extend our political imaginaries than is In the First Circle, as its approach is more 
oblique, its truths more metaphorical and enigmatic, and its characters presented 
in a more detailed and sympathetic light. The variability within each text is 
important too: in the case of In the First Circle, the parodic and empirically-based 
descriptions offset the morally-charged discourse; in Cancer Ward, the text’s 
combination of the historical/political and moral/spiritual invites different lines of 
interpretation and response. Similarly, in Everything Flows, Grossman’s shifts 
across the interpretive, representational and analytical means that there is a 
considerable degree of freedom in the text, allowing the narrative to breathe and 
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expand in a novelistic kind of way. Variations such as these reinforce the all-
important point that novel’s diversity withstands any one-dimensional reading of 
the artistic/political relationship.  
Second, I emphasize the vital ingredient of imagination. The previous two 
chapters contrasted the ‘expansive’ and ‘anchored’ imaginations of the early 
Russian authors and Western European writers. Solzhenitsyn and Grossman’s 
works demonstrate something else yet again: what might best be called a 
‘historical’ imagination. On this, I have noted how the pointed use of everyday, 
apparently ordinary, detail can illuminate the devastations of history: thus, for 
example, Solzhenitsyn describes the minutiae of laboratories where ‘rows of 
copper sockets gleamed in the black lacquered panel of the central switchboard’ 
(The First Circle, p. 19) and Grossman records how the ‘steel combs’ of trains 
would seize any escaping prisoner and ‘yank him up, and hurl him beneath the 
wheels’ (Everything Flows, p. 95). I have also pointed to the poetic force of 
Grossman’s ‘horrified imagination’ where he describes how starved children’s 
heads came to resemble ‘birds with a little beak’, and how, at end of the famine, 
‘the whole village was howling, without mind, without heart’ and that it sounded 
like ‘noise like leaves in the wind, or creaking straw’ (p. 130 and p. 132). In such 
ways, the texts allow no escape from the historical reality of events, but also 
create the space wherein we are able to apprehend horror in our own particular 
ways.  
Third, there is the emotional call of the texts. Here I have argued that the 
‘heaviness’ of a socio-ideological thesis, and the risk that it will stifle the artistic 
life of a text, can be offset by a sympathetic entry into the consciousness of 
another. As in the previous texts, the sufferings of the characters extend and 
deepen our insights. We feel for Aleksei Shulubin, who, along with his 
colleagues, held ‘big strong hands high in the air so that those on the platform 
would notice’ (Cancer Ward, p. 464); for Yefrem Podduyev as ‘day after day, he 
marched up and down the old floors, rattling the floor-boards, without getting it 
any clearer in his mind how to meet death’ (Cancer Ward, p. 111); and for the 
foolish Nikolay Andreyevich, who desperately wants his cousin’s friendship but 
ends up patronising him and severing the relationship. This form of sympathetic 
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invocation is distinctive to the literary powers of the novel, for, as Nussbaum 
(1990, p. 3) points out, our understandings of human frailty ‘cannot be fully and 
adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophical prose, a style 
remarkably flat and lacking in wonder—but only in a language and in forms 
themselves more complex, more allusive, more attentive to the particular’. 
Over the past three chapters, I have distinguished between the selected novels on 
the basis of the artistic/political tasks confronting them, suggesting that for 
Platonov and Bulgakov this involves countering monolithic ideology in a way that 
is fundamental yet oblique; that for Silone, Koestler and Orwell, it hinges on 
producing a literary form of ideological interrogation; and that for Solzhenitsyn 
and Grossman, it depends on a creative space that speaks to the obduracy of 
historical facts while also engaging our own imaginative responses. In actuality, 
and as will be evident from my discussions, these tasks cut across all the texts. 
Further, I point to the same complex of literary/political qualities in each case: 
most particularly, the complex interplay between the finalizable and unfinalizable; 
the resonating calls of imagination; and the power of emotion in conveying the 
human force of the political. This suggests that the socio-ideological novel is not a 
separate genre (as Bakhtin’s comments might suggest), but rather a set of political 
and literary representations, which, as illustrated here, may shift within as well as 
between different works. Building on these propositions, my next and final 
chapter on the texts asks how Zamyatin’s We and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
might be able to preserve their artistic life while at the same time offering a 
political counterstroke to the forces threatening to destroy the freedoms on which 




The novel as counterstroke: We and Nineteen Eighty-Four 
True literature can only exist when it is created, not by diligent and reliable 
officials, but by madmen, hermits, heretics, dreamers, rebels and sceptics. 
(Zamyatin, 1921/1970, p. 57)  
The imaginative writer … cannot misrepresent the scenery of his own mind 
… [and] if he is forced to do so, the only result is that his creative faculties 
dry up. (Orwell, 1946c/2000, p. 334)
 
 
At core, my thesis argues for the generative potential of the artistic/political 
relationship. I now put this notion to a further test by considering whether it is 
possible for a novel to make a directly political case and yet preserve its status as 
an artistic work. In surmising that this is indeed possible, I draw on Bakhtin’s 
analysis of the traditions of the menippea, for these indicate that there are 
novelistic features that promote the kind of artistic/political unity I have in mind. I 
have chosen We and Nineteen Eighty-Four as my test cases for this proposition as 
they are transparently political works, drawing on, and helping to create, the 
traditions and practices of the dystopian imaginary. Furthermore, Zamyatin and 
Orwell have truths to tell and do so loudly and clearly, with these truths centred 
on the integrity of thought, language and literature at a time they seen to be under 
sustained and serious threat. Hence in the very act of affirming social, political 
and intellectual freedoms, they guard the conditions on which art and literature 
have come to depend.  
In proposing that it is possible for an overtly political novel to be profoundly 
artistic, I problematize the ‘anti-political’ position represented by Kundera. As we 
have seen, he roundly criticizes Nineteen Eighty-Four on the basis of its explicitly 
political form, declaring that it is ‘firmly closed to poetry; did I say novel? It is 
political thought disguised as a novel!’ (1996, p. 222). Here and elsewhere, 
Kundera implies that a political logic is itself inimical to the artistic life of the 
text: a view I wish to challenge. My suggestion is that Kundera makes the 
fundamental mistake of equating political content with artistic form, thus failing 
to see the interactive relationship between the two, and, more specifically, how an 
assertive political logic can draw on, and be expressed through, artistic traditions 
with which he himself is in sympathy. Such is the subject of this chapter. I preface 
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my analysis with some general observations on Zamyatin and Orwell’s novels, 
concentrating on their contexts, similarities and differences.  
On the novels and their authors1    
Completed in 1921, We was the first fictional work to be banned under Lenin’s 
new censorship laws. After being proscribed in the Soviet Union, it was first 
published in English in New York in 1924, and then in a series of other languages, 
including French and Czech, in the West. In 1927, the original Russian text was 
sent to Marc Slonim, the editor of a publishing house based in Prague and, 
following that, copies made their way back to the Soviet Union, where they were 
passed from hand to hand (Brown, 1993). Blacklisted from publishing, Zamyatin 
realized his career as a writer in Russia was finished, and in 1930 he wrote to 
Stalin requesting permission to emigrate, explaining that his reason was ‘my 
hopeless position here, the death sentence that has been pronounced upon me as a 
writer here at home’ (Zamyatin, 1921/1970, p. xii). Stalin, possibly influenced by 
Gorky, agreed, and in 1931 Zamyatin ‘quit his homeland forever’ to live an 
isolated existence in Paris until his death in 1937 (Brown, 1993, p. xxv). 
During his years in Paris, Zamyatin wrote what Clarence Brown (1993, p. xxv) 
describes as a ‘parodic self-interview’. In this interview, Zamyatin describes a 
Persian fable about a rooster who had its head chopped off because it crowed an 
hour earlier than the others. Observing that the ‘uppermost problem was still that 
of the individual personality versus the collective’, Zamyatin concluded that: 
We turned out to be a Persian rooster. It was still too early to raise this 
problem in such a form. So, after the novel was published (in various 
language translations) the Soviet critics hacked it about the head rather 
severely. But I must be solidly built, for my head, as you see, is still on my 
shoulders. (Cited by Brown, 1993, pp. xxv-xxvi) 
Even though We caused such profound disquiet in the Party hierarchy, it cannot 
be read simply as an anti-Soviet text. In his introduction to the novel, Brown 
(1993) points out that many of its themes echo those of Zamyatin’s earlier novel, 
The Islanders, a parody of the English, where the Vicar of Dooley lives a 
regimented life similar to the formulaic existence of the characters of OneState, 
                                                 
1
 As noted, there is a large volume of literature on Orwell’s work, with the more recent 
contributions including Bowker 2003; Hitchens 2002, 2007; Lucas 2003; Marks 2015; Rodden and 
Cushman (eds) 2004; Rodden (ed) 2007a, and Rodden 2003, 2007b, 2010. 
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likewise setting aside prescribed times for sex and designing a mathematically 
perfect plan for human salvation. We also deals with automation and scientific 
management, both of which were enthusiastically endorsed by Lenin and his close 
followers, and, in a broader way, with the problems of scientific utopianism, as 
reflected in Zamyatin’s longstanding critique of the views of H.G. Wells. 
Commenting on these qualities, Brown observes that: 
Zamyatin’s nightmare is a nightmare of the early twenties and it is more 
specifically the nightmare of a Russian who has spent time in the industrial 
north of England, and read H. G. Wells, never forgetting his native 
Dostoevsky nor what he could see out of the window. (Brown, 1993, p. xvii)
 
 
Orwell, who reviewed We in Tribune (January 1946), the democratic socialist 
weekly magazine, similarly contends that Zamyatin ‘did not intend the Soviet 
regime to be the special target of his satire’ for, ‘writing at about the time of 
Lenin's death, he cannot have had the Stalin dictatorship in mind’. Zamyatin’s 
focus, he says, was ‘not any particular country’ but ‘a study of the Machine, the 
genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again’ 
(Orwell, January 1946, np). As part of this review, Orwell suggested that Huxley 
owed an unacknowledged debt to We, for he too dealt with a mechanised, 
rationalised society, set in an imaginary future: 
Both books deal with the rebellion of the primitive human spirit against a 
rationalised, mechanised, painless world, and both stories are supposed to 
take place about six hundred years hence … it is roughly speaking the same 
kind of society that is being described, though Huxley's book shows less 
political awareness and is more influenced by recent biological and 
psychological theories. (Orwell, Tribune, January 1946, np)  
Orwell admitted his own debt to We, telling his publisher that he was considering 
‘taking it as the model for his next novel’ (Bowker, 2003, p. 340). For Brown 
(1993, pp. xv-xvi), ‘We appears to have been the crucial literary experience for 
George Orwell as author of Nineteen Eighty-Four and for certain others bent on 
creating their own dystopias’ (original emphasis), 2  However, and as I will 
illustrate, there are critical differences between the novels, not least the fact that 
the themes of Nineteen Eighty-Four are a deal more multilayered than those of 
                                                 
2 For discussion of We and/or Nineteen Eighty-Four as dystopian texts, see Booker 1994a and 
1994b, Brown 1976, Gottlieb 2001, and Marks 2015 among many others. Against this, Dickstein 
(2004, p. 103) suggests that the dystopian tradition is at best ‘an interesting minor undercurrent’ in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
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We. In his commentary on the work, Bernard Crick (2007, p. 148) draws attention 
to seven such strands: the division of the world at Tehran following the end of the 
Second World War; the ‘dumbing down’ of the mass media; the power hungry 
nature of totalitarianism; the betrayal of intellectuals who fail to challenge 
ideological orthodoxy; the ‘debauching’ of language; the destruction of history 
and objective truth; and the adaption of James Burnham’s thesis of convergence, 
whereby capitalism and communism would coincide under the drive to manage 
and control their economies and populations.  
Over and above their similarities and differences, Zamyatin and Orwell are united 
in their defence of the freedoms of thought, language and literature. Zamyatin, 
who always defended the original ideals of the Revolution, actively opposed the 
dogmatic rationalism of his day. As a leading member of the Serapion Brothers in 
the 1920s, he pleaded openly for the freedoms of literature. In his essay entitled ‘I 
am Afraid’ (1921/1970), he reflects that: 
Proletkult art is at present a step backward to the 1860s … if this sickness is 
incurable, I am afraid that the only future possible to Russian literature is its 
past … [for] there can be no genuine literature until we cure ourselves of this 
new brand of Catholicism, which is as fearful as the old of every heretical 
word. (Zamyatin, 1921/1970, p. 60)  
As with his contemporary Bulgakov, Zamyatin’s concerns are metaphysical and 
philosophical rather than immediately political. In an essay entitled ‘On literature, 
revolution, entropy and other matters’ (1923/1970) he formulates the pivotal 
contrasts between energy and entropy, freedom and unfreedom on which so much 
of We depends. In combining these views with his defence of a literature based on 
imagination, dissidence and romanticism, he writes that: 
Where the flaming, seething sphere (in science, religion, social life, art) 
cools, the fiery magma becomes coated with dogma—a rigid, ossified, 
motionless crust. Dogmatisation in science, religion, social life, or art is the 
entropy of thought. What has become dogma no longer burns: it only gives 
off warmth—it is tepid, it is cool. … Harmful literature is more useful than 
useful literature, for it is antientropic, it is a means of combating 
calcification, sclerosis, crust, moss, quiescence. (Zamyatin, 1923/1970, p. 
109) 
Twenty years later, and a continent apart, Orwell’s concerns are surprisingly 
similar. In his essay ‘The prevention of literature’, he declares that the 
‘imaginative writer is unfree when he has to falsify his subjective feelings … it 
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follows that the atmosphere of totalitarianism is deadly to any kind of prose 
writer’ (1946c/2000, p. 334). Complaining that ‘political writing in our time 
consists almost entirely of prefabricated pieces like a child’s Meccano set’, he 
ruminates that: 
It would probably not be beyond human ingenuity to write books by 
machinery. But a sort of mechanizing process can already be seen to be at 
work in the film and radio, in publicity and propaganda, and in the lower 
reaches of journalism. The Disney films, for instance, are produced by what 
is essentially a factory process … so also with the innumerable books and 




In short, Orwell and Zamyatin are most evidently partisans, unequivocally on the 
side of freedoms in thought, language and literature. My question, then, is how—
in all of their assertiveness—they might yet draw on the literary practices of the 
novel in asserting their case in a distinctly artistic way. My argument is that their 
ability to do so owes itself to the traditions of the menippea as described below. 
Bakhtin on the menippea  
Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 11) traces the origins of the menippea to Socratic 
dialogue, where ‘the dialogical means of seeking truth is counterposed to official 
monologism, which pretends to possess a ready-made truth’ (original emphasis). 
However, while Socratic dialogue became confined to particular schools of 
philosophical thought, the menippea circulated through different periods of belief 
and religion, penetrated the rituals of carnival, and remains influential to the 
present:  
Menippean satire exercised a very great influence on old Christian … and 
Byzantine literature. In diverse variants and under diverse generic labels it 
also continued its development into the post-classical epochs: into the 
Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Reformation, and modern times. … This 
carnivalized genre, extraordinarily flexible and as changeable as Proteus, 
capable of penetrating other genres, has had an enormous and as yet 
insufficiently appreciated importance for the development of European 
Literatures. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 112) 
I acknowledge that Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 121) notes that ‘the ancient menippea 
is … primitive and pale’ in comparison with Dostoevsky for it ‘does not yet know 
polyphony’. Hence I am not suggesting that either We or Nineteen Eighty-Four 
are in any way polyphonic—a characteristic that Bakhtin reserves for a minority 
of works in any event—simply that they put their political case in a distinctly 
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literary way through their use of the menippean traditions, and more particularly 
through their combinations of the fantastic and the political.  
In a critical observation, Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 114) insists that the fantastic does 
not represent ‘the positive embodiment of a truth, but as a mode of searching after 
truth, provoking it, and most important, testing it’. Almost immediately, he 
reiterates his argument: ‘it is essential to emphasize once again that the issue is 
precisely the testing of an idea, of a truth, and not the testing of a particular human 
character, whether an individual or a social type’ (p. 114). His point, as I 
understand it, is that the fantastic leads to the evocation rather than the declaration 
of a truth, and that its focus is always on this search rather than the qualities of a 
character. Hence it is not D-503 or Winston that are under evaluation, but rather 
the ideas evoked in each novel. It on this basis that I proceed, focusing on the 
following four elements of the menippea: the adoption of an unusual point of 
view; a sustained use of the parodic and the humorous; a far ranging interest in 
fundamental philosophical issues; and the notion of the quest, involving the hero’s 
search, return, and, in some instances, downfall.   
An unusual point of view  
Working within the dystopian tradition, We and Nineteen Eighty-Four can be said 
to adopt an ‘unusual point of view’, which allows them to project the tendencies 
of the present into a shocking future. This prophetic viewpoint is characteristic of 
the menippea, which Bakhtin describes as exemplified by a ‘special type of 
experimental fantasy … [involving] … observation from some unusual point of 
view, from on high for example, which results in a radical change in the observed 
phenomena of life’ (p. 116). Bakhtin also observes that this ‘bold and 
unrestrained’ development of the ‘fantastic’ is: 
[A quality] that is internally motivated … justified by and devoted to a 
purely ideational and philosophical end: the creation of extraordinary 
situations for the provoking and testing of a philosophical idea, a discourse, 
a truth, embodied in the image of a wise man. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 114)
 
 
In We, Zamyatin’s ‘unusual point of view’ centres on the relationships between 
the individual and the collective, freedom and unfreedom, and energy and 
entropy. The novel is set in the twenty-sixth century AD in the (almost) totally 
controlled OneState, a glass city where the citizens wear identical uniforms and 
 177 
are known only by numbers. In this transparent place, subjects are scrutinized at 
every moment, and human emotions are subordinated to a rigid and mechanically 
controlled structure. The Guardians monitor the citizens; above them stands the 
Benefactor, who is unanimously re-elected each year by all the citizens. The 
narrator is D-503, a gifted engineer, who has been placed in charge of the building 
of INTEGRAL, a space ship designed to destroy the territory beyond the Green 
Wall. There is a measure of hope when D-503 falls in love with a sharp-eyed 
woman called 1-330, the leader of the Mephi, a resistance movement that plans to 
destroy the Green Wall and unite OneState with the natural world. However, by 
the end of the novel the resistance movement has collapsed, D-503 has agreed to 
have his imagination excised, and total control is about to be reasserted.  
In setting One-State in the twenty-sixth century AD, Zamyatin positions it 
‘outside time’, a glass city of an imaginary future. It is this that gives the text its 
‘unusual point of view’, ‘as it were from on high’, allowing it to throw its ideas 
and truths into sharp relief. With his focus on the relationship between the 
individual and the collective, Zamyatin keeps returning to the notion of 
‘unfreedom’. Recreation is restricted to an hour’s march each day to be taken to 
the tune of the national anthem, with every thought and every step of the citizens 
trained to coincide: ‘we were walking the same as always,’ D-503 recounts, ‘a 
thousand heads with two fused, integrated legs, with two integrated arms, 
swinging wide’ (We, p. 121, my emphasis). Another time, when D-503 watches 
INTEGRAL take shape ‘under the beat of some unheard music’, he marvels at the 
‘whole beauty of this grandiose mechanical ballet’ and asks himself, ‘why 
beautiful? Why is this dance beautiful?’ (p. 6). Answering his own question, he 
says ‘because it is nonfree movement, because all the fundamental significance of 
the dance lies precisely in its subjection, its ideal nonfreedom’ (p. 6, original 
emphasis).   
In its invocation of a wide range of imaginative and philosophical possibilities, 
We exemplifies the menippea’s ‘extraordinary philosophical universalism and 
capacity to contemplate the world on the broadest possible scale’ (Bakhtin, 
1963/1984, p. 115). The same holds true of Nineteen Eighty-Four. From its 
opening lines—‘it was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking 
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thirteen’—it creates an unsettling combination of familiarity and unfamiliarity, 
reality and unreality, possibility and impossibility. Unlike We, it is situated in the 
‘nearly now’ in an ‘almost recognizable’ place. Its physical setting, it is ‘this 
place’ but ‘not quite this place’, with the newly created Ministries of Truth, Peace, 
Plenty and Love towering over the shattered buildings, slums and poverty of a 
post-war London. As Winston looks out over the city, he asks himself: 
Were there always these vistas of rotting nineteenth-century houses, their 
sides shored up with baulks of timber, their windows patched with cardboard 
and their roofs with corrugated iron, their crazy gardens sagging in all 
directions? And the bombed sites where the plaster dust swirled in the air 
and the willowherb straggled over the heaps of rubble; and the places where 
the bombs had cleared a larger patch and there had sprung up sordid colonies 
of wooden dwellings like chicken houses? (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 5) 
He searches his memory and cannot find an answer, for ‘nothing remained of his 
childhood except a series of brightly-lit tableaux, occurring against no background 
and mostly unintelligible’ (p. 5). So there is nothing to tell him that the Ministry 
of Truth, ‘an enormous pyramidal structure of glittering white concrete, soaring 
up terrace after terrace, three hundred metres into the air’ (p. 5), has only recently 
dominated the skyline. Later, when Winston goes to Mr Charrington’s antique 
shop on the other side of the city where the Proles live, he sees a picture of an 
oval building, the Church of St Clements. He recognizes the street, but the Church 
is no longer there, for it has since been bombed and the Palace of Justice now 
stands in its place. When ‘Mr Charrington’ (in fact, a member of the Thought 
Police) recalls the rhyme, ‘Oranges and lemons’, say the bells of St 
Clement’s/‘You owe me three farthings,’ say the bells of St Martin’s’, Winston 
finds he cannot get the words out his head. ‘It is curious,’ he reflects, ‘that when 
you say those lines to yourself, [you have] the illusion of a lost London that still 
existed somewhere or other, disguised and forgotten’ (p. 103). 
Here and elsewhere, much of the poignancy of Nineteen Eighty-Four depends on 
its evocation of memories that have almost vanished and whose loss now seems 
inevitable. When Winston visits the old parts of city, he watches children playing 
on the streets and broad-shouldered women hanging out the washing; when he 
dreams, he remembers his mother struggling to cope with post-war conditions; 
when he is happiest, it is with Julia in a woodland where the bluebells bloom. In 
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thinking about these lost traditions, he reflects that ‘what mattered were individual 
relationships, and the completely helpless gesture, an embrace, a tear, a word 
spoken to a dying man, could have value in themselves’ (p. 269). If Zamyatin’s 
dystopia evokes a truncated civilization stripped of diversity and imagination, 
Orwell’s depends in large part on images of irreversible loss. 3  
Humour and irony  
In contrast to this melancholic drift, let me turn to the humorous and ironic 
qualities of the menippea. Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 109) describes the genre as 
rejecting the stylistic unity of ‘the epic, the tragedy, high rhetoric, and the lyric’ 
and adopting instead a ‘multi-toned narration, a mixing of high and low, serious 
and comic’ involving ‘a mixing of poetic and prosaic speech, living dialects and 
jargons’. In an observation equally relevant to We and Nineteen Eighty-Four, he 
stresses that the menippea has a ‘deep bond with carnivalistic folklore’, where 
despite its ‘strong rhetorical element’ there is a ‘weakening of its one-sided 
rhetorical seriousness, its rationality, its singularity, its dogmatism’ (p. 109).  
Commenting on the humorous irony that pervades We, Brown (1993, p. xvi) 
suggests that it is ‘perhaps better not be too solemn about Zamyatin’s wonderfully 
appealing novel’. The book’s description of sexual regulation is among its most 
light-hearted sections. Here we read that the Guardians make a concession to 
primal human impulses through a prescribed ‘sex hour’, where the assignations 
are organized by pink tickets and citizens can draw the curtains of their 
apartments for a short time. Matters are determined algebraically, with the ‘Sexual 
Bureau Labs’ determining the ‘exact content’ of a person’s hormonal impulses 
and his or her ‘correct Table of Sex Days’ (We, p. 22). The humour is deepened 
by the text’s wordplay. D-503’s assigned sexual partner is O-90, where the shape 
of her numbers matches her body: ‘Dear O!’ proclaims D-503, ‘it always strikes 
me that she looks like her name: about ten centimetres shorter than the Maternal 
                                                 
3
 Crick (2007) and Dickstein (2004) both comment on the significance of trust, tradition and 
memory in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Crick observes that Orwell believed that ‘a good and decent life 
already existed in tradition’ (2007, p. 153); Dickstein describes Orwell’s evocative use of lyrics, 
and the symbolic importance of the smashing of the crystal paperweight. 
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Norm, and therefore sort of rounded all over, and the pink O of her mouth, open 
to every word I say!’ (p. 6). 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, a sense of carnival similarly offsets any ‘one-sided 
rhetorical seriousness’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 109). In illustration, I cite its final 
paragraph, which describes how Winston finally succumbs to Big Brother: 
He gazed at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what 
kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless, 
misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two 
gin scented tears trickled down his nose. But it was all right, everything was 
all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He 
loved Big Brother.  
THE END 
In commenting on this passage, Crick (2000, p. xiii) maintains that it is either 
‘grotesquely and incompetently overwritten’ or ‘broad satire all the way’. Arguing 
in favour of the latter—and against those who read it as indicative of a ‘terrible 
black pessimism’, which is then referred back to the novel as a whole—he 
underscores its essentially comic elements. He points to its parody of popular, 
romantic novels (‘O cruel’ … ‘O stubborn’) and of British soap box, street corner 
evangelists (‘He had won the victory over himself’) (p. xiii). Even the capitalized 
THE END, he contends, ‘is another bit of Galeghumor’ for it appears nowhere else 
in Orwell’s works, but resembles ‘popular novelettes at the end of Hollywood B 
movies’ (p. xiii). The thing is, Crick wants us to choose between a darkly 
pessimistic and a comic or satirical account. But surely the point is that Nineteen 
Eighty-Four is both, and both simultaneously. It is, one might say, seriously 
comic that we should treat the integrity of language, on which our ability to 
understand and communicate depends, so carelessly. 
Humour and irony allow the two novels to breathe, celebrate ambiguity, and 
become subject to multiple interpretations, with this creating the dialogic space so 
important for the ‘living concrete life’ of the text. As earlier cited, Bakhtin 
(1940/1981 p. 61 and p. 59) describes how the novel’s parodic traditions ‘free 
consciousness from the tyranny of its own language and its own myth of 
language’, thus ‘forcing men to experience beneath these categories a different 
and contradictory reality that is otherwise not captured within them’. At the same 
time, serious issues are brought to the fore and minutely examined, for laughter is 
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able to ‘deliver an object into the fearless hands of investigative experiment—
both artistic and scientific—and into the hands of free experimental fantasy’ 
(Bakhtin 1941/1981, p. 23). I come then to the serious side of the menippea. 
Contemporary yet ultimate questions 
Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 108) proposes that the ‘starting point’ for the menippea is 
‘the living present, often the very day’, where it represents ‘the “journalistic” 
genre of antiquity, accurately echoing the ideological issues of the times’. With 
this, the genre focuses on ‘ultimate questions’, which it poses a particularly 
‘naked’ way: 
Under menippean conditions the very nature and process of posing 
philosophical problems, as compared with Socratic dialogue, had to change 
abruptly: all problems that were in the least ‘academic’ (gnoseological and 
aesthetic) fell by the wayside, complex and extensive modes of 
argumentation also fell away, and there remained essentially only naked 
‘ultimate questions’ with an ethical and practical bias. (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, 
p. 115)  
In We this ‘ethical and practical bias’ is exemplified in its contemporary focus on 
mechanization, automation and scientific management underpinned by the 
‘ultimate’ questions of entropy and energy, freedom and unfreedom. In line with 
the menippea’s multi-layered inclusions of ‘moral confessions’ and ‘political 
manifestos’ (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 33), these matters are illuminated through the 
Records of D-503, which, as the diary of a highly educated man, are full of 
contemporary and classical allusions. In the following entry, for example, a 
reference to the ‘Table of Hours’ (where each hour of the day is ruled by a planet) 
combines with an allusion to Frederick Taylor and his principles of scientific 
management:  
The Table of Hours … turns each one of us right there in broad daylight into 
a six-wheeled epic hero. Every morning, with six-wheeled precision, at the 
very same hour and the very same minute, we get up millions of us, as 
though we were one. … And at one and the same second we leave for a 
stroll and go to the auditorium, to the hall for the Taylor exercises, and then 
go to bed. (We, p. 13) 
Elsewhere, the Records allude to the eighteenth-century mathematician, Brook 
Taylor (1685-1731), known for his ‘Taylor Theorem’ and ‘calculus of finite 
differences’. Here Zamyatin describes how mathematical precision becomes a 
force for prediction and control: 
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No doubt about it, that Taylor was the genius of antiquity. True, it never 
occurred to him to extend his method over the whole of life, over every step 
you take right around the clock. He wasn’t able to integrate into his system 
the whole spread from hour 1.00 to 24.00. But still how could they write 
whole libraries about someone like Kant and hardly even notice Taylor—the 
prophet who could see ten centuries ahead? (We, p. 34) 
As well as relying on D-503’s records to reveal the truths of his text, Zamyatin 
invokes the views of his two major protagonists: I-033 and the Benefactor. 
Because I-033 stands for courage, determination and honesty, we come to care 
about the views she so bravely asserts. In a core philosophical passage of the 
novel, she and D-503 enter into a discussion on the nature and finality of 
revolutions. At the start of this exchange, D-503 follows Party orthodoxy in 
telling I-033 that ‘our revolution was the final one. And there can’t be any further 
revolutions of any kind. Everyone knows that’ (p. 168). 1-330, her eyes ‘a sharp 
mocking triangle’, then challenges him: 
 ‘My dear, you are a mathematician. You’re even more, you’re a 
philosopher of mathematics. So do this for me. Tell me the final number.’ 
‘The what? I don’t understand. What final number?’ 
‘You know—the last one, the top, the absolute biggest.’  
‘But, I-330, that’s stupid. Since numbers are infinite, how can there be a 
final one?’ 
‘There is no final one. The number of revolutions is infinite. There is no 
final one. The number of revolutions is infinite. The last one—that’s for 
children. Infinity frightens children, and it's essential that children get a good 
night’s sleep.’ (We, p. 168)
 4
 
Hearing this, D-503 is distraught. He pleads that children will always keep asking; 
that all the citizens of OneState are happy; that their ancestors fought long and 
hard in the 200-Years War; and that theirs has to be the final revolution. 
Unperturbed, his lover remarks that ‘bold philosophers will always be children’, 
and continues:  
They [our ancestors] made only one mistake … they got the notion that they 
were the final number—something that doesn’t exist in nature. Their mistake 
was the mistake of Galileo. He was right about the earth moving round the 
sun, but he didn’t know that the entire solar system revolves around yet 
another center; he didn’t know that the real orbit of the earth, as opposed to 
the relative orbit, is by no means the same circle. (We, p. 169)
 
 
                                                 
4
 Compare I-330’s views with Zamyatin’s own: ‘Revolution is everywhere, in everything. It is 
infinite. There is no final revolution, no final number. The social revolution is only one of an 
infinite number of numbers: the law of revolution is not a social law, but an immeasurably greater 
one. It is a cosmic, universal law—like the laws of the conservation of energy and of the 
dissipation of energy (entropy)’ (Zamyatin, 1923/1970, p. 112).  
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Then, throwing her own position into doubt, I-330 says ‘it’s even probable that we 
will forget this, when we get old, the way everything inevitably gets old. By that 
time, we too will inevitably go down, just as leaves fall from trees in the autumn’ 
(p. 169). She departs, and D-503 invites us to imagine what it might be like if 
‘they blindfolded you, forced you to walk by feeling your way along, stumbling 
and knowing that right there, inches away, was the edge’ (p. 169). Zamyatin 
offers his hero no relief, but leaves him, stumbling along, on the brink of an 
existential precipice. The reader too is left hanging in the balance, wishing to 
comfort D-503 and relieve him of his angst, while at the same time knowing that 
his only resolution is to live with the uncertainty I-330 so bravely asserts. The 
force of the text is thus experienced emotionally as well as intellectually, with our 
affection for Zamyatin’s truncated hero—who speaks so directly to us, and whose 
angst cannot be resolved—persisting in a kind of unresolved distress. 
In invoking the views of his other key protagonist, the Benefactor, Zamyatin joins 
the long-standing critique of the intelligentsia’s ‘materialism, atheism, socialism, 
and revolutionalism’ (Morson, 2010, p. 143). In a critical episode toward the end 
of the book, D-503 is summoned before the Benefactor to explain his attempt to 
thwart the launch of INTEGRAL. In his sometimes funny and always pathos-
ridden account, D-503 recalls that the only reason the Benefactor’s voice ‘didn’t 
roar like thunder’ was that it ‘reached me from such a height’ (p. 206). Invoking 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, the Benefactor declares (or roars):  
A true algebraic love of mankind will inevitably be inhuman, and the 
inevitable sign of its truth is its cruelty. Just as the inevitable sign of fire is 
that it burns. Can you show me a fire that does not burn? Well? Prove it! Put 
up an argument! (We, p. 206) 
And when D-503 cannot find a reason, is cowed into silence, the Benefactor 
assumes the voice of the authoritarian parent, pronouncing that:   
If this means you agree with me, then let’s talk like grownups after the 
children have gone to bed, holding nothing back. I ask this question. What is 
it that people beg for, dream about, torment themselves for, from the time 
they leave their swaddling clothes? They want someone to tell them, once 
and for all, what happiness is—and then to bind them to that happiness with 
a chain. (We, p. 207) 
The satire is all-important, for in assuming and ironizing the voice of the Grand 
Inquisitor, Zamyatin puts us on notice that we are indeed being ‘educated’, while 
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at the same time leaving a ‘free zone’ for our own interpretations, objections and 
responses, thus exemplifying the complementary relationship between the artistic 
and directly political. 
How does this combination of contemporary yet ultimate issues play out in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four? As noted, this is a denser and more multi-layered novel 
than We, with its concerns extending well beyond the ‘Big Brother’ theme that 
has so effectively lodged itself in our political imaginaries. In the following 
comments, I draw attention to Orwell’s deep concerns with the threats to language 
and literature; the possible destruction of history and objective truth; and his 
adaption of James Burnham’s thesis of convergence. Like Zamyatin, Orwell uses 
a variety of literary means to convey his ideas, including the views and voices of 
his protagonists, written documents and parodic representation. 
I start with the protagonists, and more particularly, the clever, likeable Syme, a 
major source of information on the formative bonds between language and 
thought. He informs Winston that the aim is to ‘narrow the range of thought’ 
ensuring that ‘every year there will be ‘fewer and fewer words’ with ‘the range of 
consciousness always a little smaller’ (p. 55). This will make ‘thoughtcrime 
literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it’; 
further, in time, ‘there will be no thought as we understand it now’ for ‘orthodoxy 
means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness’ (p. 56). 
Then, ‘with a sort of mystical satisfaction,’ he says: 
Has it ever occurred to you, Winston, that by the year 2050, at the very 
latest, not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a 
conversation as we are having now? (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 55) 
Orwell also uses poetic imagery to reinforce the fundamental nature of his 
language/thought connection. My favourite example is his portrayal of a ‘lesser 
official from the Fiction Department’, who is addressing the outer party in the 
language of ‘pure orthodoxy, pure Ingsoc’ (p. 57). Because this man had his head 
‘thrown back a little’, his spectacles caught the light and presented ‘two blank 
disks instead of eyes’. As Winston watched the ‘eyeless face with the jaw moving 
rapidly up and down’, he had ‘the curious feeling that this was not a real human 
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being but a dummy. It was not the man’s brain that was speaking, it was his 
larynx’ (p. 57).  
In making the density of his arguments accessible to readers, Orwell makes use of 
what Bakhtin (1963/1984, p. 118) calls ‘inserted genres’ (that is, written and other 
documents), which are ‘always presented at various distances from the ultimate 
authorial position—that is, with varying degrees of parodying and objectification’. 
One such is the Appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four where Orwell deals with the 
debauching of language. Here he sets out the principles of Newspeak, offering a 
full description of the etymology of meaning-less words, including ‘joycamp’ 
(labour camp); ‘undark’ (light); ‘sexcrime’ (all sexual misdeeds whatsoever); and 
‘unperson’ (dead; non-existent; never existed). In a wonderfully ironic conclusion, 
he postpones the full and final adoption of Newspeak to as ‘late a date as 2050’, 
as there was so much work to be done to bring ‘Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, 
Byron, and Dickens’ into line with the philosophy of Ingsoc, and because ‘large 
qualities of merely utilitarian literature’ also had to be adapted’ (Nineteen Eighty-
Four, pp. 325-6).  
The other critical ‘inserted genre’ is the banned thesis of Emmanuel Goldstein, 
where Orwell parodies the doctrinaire character of official orthodoxy while also 
setting out his own arguments in a readable fashion. This document, which 
constitutes a substantial part of the book, works like an instruction manual, or 
‘info dump’, covering the nature of totalizing power, the destruction of language, 
the failure of the intellectuals, and the reconstruction of Burnham’s theory of 
convergence.5 Here we have the clearest evidence that Orwell is dealing with a 
post-totalitarian society and not just the Stalinist epoch, for the Goldstein thesis 
explains that the current developments in political thought had been 
‘foreshadowed by the various systems, generally called totalitarian, which have 
emerged earlier in the century’, but only emerged as ‘fully worked-out political 
                                                 
5
 Orwell was critical of the Burnham thesis, writing two lengthy reviews on it. Crick comments 
that Orwell never fully resolved whether he was ‘satirising Burnham’s view of the primacy of pure 
power as an impossibility … or whether he thinks that it is all too possible that party leaders and 
civil servants who begin as civilized men simply end up as a regime of office-holders, brutally 
interested in nothing but power for the sake of power’ (Crick, 2007, p. 136). 
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theories’ after ‘a decade of national wars, civil wars, revolutions and counter-
revolutions in all parts of the world’ (Nineteen Eighty Four, p. 213).  
In explaining the destruction of history and objective truth, the Goldstein thesis 
offers a series of closely reasoned propositions. Ingsoc, it explains, has come to 
rest on the ‘mutability of the past’, whereby ‘past events have no objective 
existence and survive only in written records and human memories’ (p. 222). 
Doublethink, on which Ingsoc depends, involves ‘the power of holding two 
contradictory ideas in one’s mind and accepting both of them’, and the ability to 
lie, knowing that one lies, while also believing in those lies. Here we have 
Orwell’s deep concern with the destruction of history as objective record. As 
Goldstein elaborates:  
To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact 
that has become inconvenient, and then when it becomes necessary, to draw 
back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed, to deny the existence of 
objective reality and all the while take account of the reality which one 
denies—all this is indispensably necessary. (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 223)
 
 
In a move resembling Zamyatin’s parodic use of the Benefactor, Orwell creates 
O’Brien. It is from O’Brien that we learn that ‘the Party seeks power entirely for 
its own sake’, that it is not interested in ‘wealth or luxury or long life or 
happiness, but power, pure power’, and that ‘the more the Party is powerful, the 
less it will be tolerant; the weaker the opposition, the tighter the despotism’ (p. 
275 and p. 281). These assertions are reasonably measured. But at other times, 
O’Brien really lets fly, declaring that power is all about inflicting pain and 
humiliation … tearing human minds to pieces and then putting them together in 
new shapes of your own choosing’ (p. 279). In the future: 
There will be no art, no literature, no science. … There will be no distinction 
between beauty and ugliness. … There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of 
the process of life. But always, do not forget this Winston – always there 
will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing and constantly 
growing subtler. (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 280) 
O’Brien gives voice to some of the novel’s most widely quoted lines, but in what 
ways does he ‘test’ the ‘truths’ that Orwell is so keen to expose? For some critics 
he is superfluous, adding nothing to what has already been revealed in the 
Goldstein thesis. Dickstein (2004, p. 103), for example, queries whether ‘we 
really need the diabolical O’Brien to tell us yet again about doublethink … 
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doctoring reality, abolishing memory, and consigning opponents to oblivion’. 
Qualifying this, I suggest that in the traditions of the menippea, O’Brien is both 
real and legendary, and essentially represents a warning about the future. Here I 
refer to a note Orwell wrote for his publishers: 
It has been suggested by some reviewers … that it is the author’s view that 
this, or something like this, is what will happen in the next forty years in the 
Western World. This is not correct. I think that, allowing for the book being 
a parody, something like Nineteen Eighty-Four could happen. This is the 
direction in which the world is going at the present time, and the trend lies 
deep in the political, social and economic foundations of the contemporary 
world situation. (Cited by Crick, 2007, p. 154, original emphasis)
 6
   
Reinforcing this notion of O’Brien as a historical warning, Richard Rorty 
proposes that O’Brien is not designed to convince us as in a polemical or historic 
sense, but to signify an empirical possibility:   
Orwell did not invent O’Brien to serve as a dialectic foil, as a modern 
counterpart to Thrasymachus. He invented him to warn us against him, as 
one might warn against a typhoon or rogue elephant. … He does not view 
him as crazy, misguided, seduced by a mistaken theory, or blind to the moral 
facts. He simply views him as dangerous and possible. (Rorty, 1989, p. 176, 
original emphasis) 
As Rorty stresses, Winston’s trust in O’Brien is essential to his construction as 
‘dangerous and possible’ and thus to our own gullibility in the face of political 
threats. This confidence is inspired by O’Brien’s appearance. Winston describes 
him as ‘a large, burly man with a thick neck and a coarse, humorous, brutal face’, 
and ‘a certain charm of manner … (and) … a trick of re-settling his spectacles on 
his face which was curiously disarming—in some indefinable way, curiously 
civilised’ (p. 12). When the two finally meet up in the Ministry of Love, Winston 
leaps to his feet, still believing O’Brien to be his ally: 
‘They’ve got you too!’ he cried. 
‘They got me a long time ago,’ said O’Brien with a mild almost regretful 
irony. (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 52) 
We never know who ‘they’ are, or whether O’Brien went over to ‘them’ willingly, 
or was pushed. All we do know is that he is now credible and dangerous, a 
                                                 
6 In his comparison of the epic and the novel, Bakhtin (1941/1981, p. 31) proposes that ‘prophecy 
is characteristic for the epic, prediction for the novel. Epic prophecy is realized wholly within the 
limits of an absolute past … it does not touch the reader and his real time … the novel has a new 
and quite specific problematicalness: characteristic for it is an eternal re-thinking and re-
evaluating. That center of activity that ponders and justifies the past is transferred to the future’.  
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product of the new ruling class so fully described in the Goldstein thesis. That 
there are real contradictions in O’Brien’s appearance has to be significant, for the 
image of the O’Brien who re-settles his spectacles in a ‘curiously civilised’ way 
and who speaks with a ‘mild almost regretful irony’, never quite gels with the one 
who predicts a future where there will be ‘no art, no literature, no science … no 
distinction between beauty and ugliness’, a time that will resemble ‘a boot 
stamping on the human face—for ever’ (p. 280). This combination of the ordinary 
and the horrific is surely Orwell’s point, for it lies at the core of the mid-twentieth 
century disaster whereby ideologues and henchman alike colluded in horrific acts.  
Critically, O’Brien is also the instrument of Winston’s downfall. So let me turn to 
my final theme: the failure of the resistance movement and the downfalls of D-
503 and Winston Smith. This is not so directly attributable to the traditions of the 
menippea as the matters considered so far, except in so far as the menippea deals 
with the notion of the quest and the potential transformation of the hero. I return 
to these matters in the course of the discussion, first setting them within a broader 
context. 
Resistance and capitulation  
As well as the forces of order and control, schism and resistance are vital to We, 
for if OneState were totally impermeable, there would be nothing left to ponder 
and no countervailing truth to offer. Equally, if D-503 were totally impervious to 
change, there would be nothing to hope for and no loss to mourn. Throughout his 
records, we detect the fissure in his consciousness, the hope for his redemption. 
After he falls in love with 1-330, he starts to dream and this worries him, for he 
knows that ‘dreams point to a serious mental illness’ and ‘up to now, my brain has 
checked out chronometrically perfect, a mechanism without a speck of dust to dull 
its shine’ (p. 33). Using an intimate, conversational style, he owns that: 
What I feel there in my brain is just like … some kind of foreign body … 
like having a very thin little eyelash in your eye. You feel generally okay, 
but that eye with the lash in it—you can’t get if off your mind for a second. 
(We, p. 33).  
In making the transformation of his hero possible, Zamyatin adapts the threshold 
experience of the menippea, where ‘the hero goes and returns from either a 
heavenly place, or, more often the ‘nether world’, and is thereby moved ‘beyond 
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the bounds of his fate and his character’ (Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 115). D-503’s 
first assignation with 1-330 takes place at the Ancient House, a relic of the past, 
left standing beside the Green Wall: ‘a strange, rickety, godforsaken structure clad 
all about in a glass shell’ (We, p. 26). D-503 is fearful and suspicious, but when he 
accompanies I-330 down the old tunnels to glimpse the ancient world beyond the 
Green Wall, he looks around with wonder and sees that: 
The sun, it wasn’t our sun, evenly distributed over the mirrored surface of 
our sidewalks. The sun was all sharp fragments, alive somehow, leaping 
spots, that blinded the eyes and made the head spin. And the trees were like 
candles sticking right up into the sky, or like spiders squatting on the ground 
with crooked legs, or like silent green fountains. (We, p. 148)  
Having opened up the possibility for the transformation of his hero, Zamyatin 
closes it down. In the menippea, the ‘threshold experience’ is associated with 
‘unusual, abnormal, moral and psychic states … split personality, unrestrained 
daydreaming, unusual dreams, passions bordering on madness and so forth’ 
(Bakhtin, 1963/1984, p. 116). In adapting this, Zamyatin portrays both the hope of 
the threshold and the tragedy of its closure. On the side of hope, D-503 comes to 
see the world totally anew:   
Somehow this never entered my head before, but this is how it really is: we 
on this earth are walking above a crimson sea of fire, hidden down there in 
the bowels of the earth. (We, p. 56) 
On the side of closure, D-503 comes to feel that there are two persons within him, 
each radically at war one with the other, creating an unbearable tension:  
One was the old me, D-503, Number D-503, and the other … the other used 
to just stick his hairy paws out of his shell, but now all of him came out, the 
shell burst open, and the pieces were just about to fly in all directions … and 
then what? (We, p. 56) 
This internal splitting would be hard for even the toughest hero, and D-503 is not 
tough. He might have weathered the storm, held the pieces together, were it not 
for his anguish over I-033. Here Zamyatin introduces a truly pathetic moment, 
getting the Benefactor to jeer at D-503, telling him that I-330 has seduced him for 
her own ends; he’d been taken for a ride and hadn’t had the sense to realize it. D-
503, who has learned to love 1-330, and to believe that she too loves him, is torn 
apart. From that point on, his emotional and imaginative extinction is a foregone 
conclusion. As he struggles to resurrect his old sense of self, the Guardians 
announce that they have discovered how to excise imagination from the human 
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brain. It is, they say, a disease, responsible for all the unrest and suffering. Unable 
to live with his anguish, D-503 decides to confess his collusion in the resistance 
movement and undergo the operation. In recounting his decision, he says: 
All this was like the final grain of salt added to a saturated solution. The 
crystals, bristling with needles, begin to appear, harden and set. It is clear to 
me that everything has been decided. Tomorrow morning, I would do it. It 
was the same thing as killing myself—but maybe that’s the only way for me 
to be resurrected. Because you can’t resurrect something unless it’s been 
killed. (We, p. 218, original emphasis) 
After the operation, D-503 is perfectly calm, recording that there is now ‘no 
delirium, no ridiculous metaphors, no feelings. Just the facts’. He is ‘completely, 
absolutely well … [and] … can’t help smiling’, for they have ‘extracted a kind of 
splinter from my head, and now my head is empty and easy’ (p. 224). And so he 
watches with equanimity while I-330 (‘that woman’) is tortured under the Gas 
Bell. In a short concluding note, he records that ‘at this very moment’ the 
authorities are safeguarding the city by building ‘a temporary wall of high-voltage 
waves on Fortieth Avenue, which runs across town’, and ends by saying ‘I hope 
we’ll win. More—I’m certain we’ll win. Because reason has to win in the end’ (p. 
225). But I-330 has already told him that no such certainty is possible and that 
resistance can disturb the rationalities of any ‘final revolution’.  
So the book’s nadir, its single most tragic moment, remains with D-503’s loss of 
imagination—lose it, Zamyatin intimates, and we lose all that is human within us. 
Retain it, and we have the capacity to envisage a world radically other than our 
own. To make such a point directly would be to kill it, a literary/political 
oxymoron. So Zamyatin instead relies on metaphor, leaving us with the shocking 
image of how the ‘now completely well’ D-503 is able to watch the torture and 
death of his courageous lover.  
I turn finally to the nadir of Nineteen Eighty-Four, its single most tragic 
moment—namely, Winston’s betrayal of Julia. The emotional/political impact of 
this is the more devastating because Winston is potentially a critic from the outset. 
Amazingly, he scrawls ‘DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER’ in big schoolboy 
capitals in his diary and contrives to leave the page open on his office desk; 
bravely he scribbles that ‘freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two is four 
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… if that is granted, all else follows’ (p. 84). But all of this is to be crushed, and 
with it that which is most human in Winston. Early in the interrogation, O’Brien 
puts him on notice by saying:  
Do not imagine that you will save yourself, Winston, however completely 
you surrender to us. … We shall crush you down to the point from which 
there is no coming back. Never again will you be capable of ordinary human 
feelings. Everything will be dead inside you. Never again will you be 
capable of love, of friendship, or joy of living, or laughter, or curiosity, or 
courage, or integrity. You will be hollow. (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 269) 
So it was foolish of Winston to say to O’Brien, ‘I have not betrayed Julia’ (p. 
286). O’Brien ‘looks at him thoughtfully’ and says ‘no, that is perfectly true. You 
have not betrayed Julia’ (p. 286). Soon after his loyal assertion, Winston is 
subjected to the threat of torture through rats. As the creatures advance on his 
mouth, he hears himself shouting frantically, over and over: ‘Do it to Julia! Do it 
to Julia! I don’t care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. 
Not me! Julia! Not me!’ (p. 300). Rorty (1989, p. 170) points out that once 
Winston had wished this, willed his torment to be transferred to Julia, he 
experienced the ‘point of no return’ when a person is forced to realize that:  
The story that I have been telling about myself—my picture of myself as 
honest, or loyal or devout—no longer makes sense. I no longer have a self to 
make sense of. There is no world in which I can picture myself as living, 
because there is no vocabulary in which I can tell a coherent story about 
myself. (Rorty, 1989, p. 179) 
Winston’s betrayal of Julia is an empirical fact: it has happened and nothing can 
undo it, and Winston can no longer think of himself as he used to do. Just as D-
503 loses the quality that allows him to perceive the world differently, so Winston 
suffers the extinction of that which is most human within him. 
Concluding points: ‘speaking truth through the fantastic’ 
In this chapter, I have put my thesis to a ‘final test’ by considering whether it is 
possible for a novel to make a directly political case and yet preserve its status as 
an artistic work. As indicated, in arguing in the affirmative, I problematize 
Kundera’s contention that a political logic is itself inimical to the artistic life of 
the text, suggesting that he makes the mistake of equating political content with 
artistic form, thus failing to see the interactive relationship between the two—and, 
more specifically, how an assertive political logic can draw on, and be expressed 
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through, artistic traditions with which he himself is in sympathy: namely the 
fantastic, the curious, the exploratory, and the comic.  
Returning now to my defence of the explicitly political novel, I propose that 
political assertion, even in its most transparent and ‘roman à thèse’ form, can still 
inspire deep reflection across time and space, provided, and always provided, it 
has the spaciousness of a poetic imagination and the emotional resonance of a 
human telling. In each of the novels considered here, it is this 
imaginative/emotional combination, underpinned by the fantastic, that creates the 
close and compelling fusion of literary form and political content. Zamyatin’s 
affirmation of the infinitude and unknowability of our existence is symbolically 
reproduced in the creation of an imaginary glass city; Orwell’s intimations of the 
imminent threats to thought, language and literature are replicated in a 
constellation of images that are at one and the same time real and unreal, 
comprehensible and non-comprehensible. In each instance, there is an 
onomatopoeic type relationship between political idea and artistic expression, 
allowing the works to appeal to us intellectually, emotionally and imaginatively. 
With this, I stress the works’ capacity to speak to the present. Zamyatin’s binaries 
have a timeless quality, reproducing the basic Self/Other split and allowing the 
novel to speak across time and place. As Bullock (2011, p. 85) observes, 
‘OneState is sealed off from the imperfect, unreconstructed world by a glass wall 
that serves to defend utopia from infection, destruction and alternative ways of 
being’. Hence Zamyatin does more than create an illusory city hanging in space, 
for when he surrounds OneState with the Green Wall, protecting it against the 
forces of Hunger and Love, he represents the world as we know it today, where 
rich nations barricade themselves from poor ones, border patrols safeguard 
national boundaries, and naval ships send refugees back to sea to die. Similarly, 
Orwell does more than create the imagined world of Big Brother, for he shows 
how the subversion of language can ‘narrow the range of thought’ so that 
eventually ‘there will be no thought as we understand it now’ for ‘orthodoxy 
means not thinking—not needing to think’ (p. 56) and how: 
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Being in a minority, even a minority of one, did not make you mad … there 
was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth even against 
the whole world you were not mad. (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 226)  
In relating these arguments to those of the previous chapters, I reaffirm the central 
importance of the texts’ poetic imagery. Booker (1994b, p. 19) makes the 
important point that in dystopian fiction, the use of ‘spatially or temporally distant 
settings’ can provide ‘fresh perspectives on problematic social and political 
practices that might otherwise be taken for granted or considered natural and 
inevitable’. But this strategy could deteriorate into didacticism if simply deployed 
as an instructional device. Hence I insist on the poetic qualities of Zamyatin and 
Orwell’s representations, with these creating a greatly enlarged sense of space, 
time, meaning and relationships: something that is also true of The Foundation Pit 
and The Master and Margarita. In commenting on this imaginative force in 
relation to We, Brown suggests that: 
Zamyatin’s great merit … is not to have made the highly questionable if 
only metaphorical leap across the boundary from physical science to human 
social organization. His merit was and remains to have turned the idea into 
an enduring fable that immediately caught the imagination of the world and 
gave rise to others, like 1984. (Brown, 1993, p. xxiii) 
As in all the previous novels, the texts’ deeper resonating notes owe themselves to 
their emotional calls, with the downfall of their heroes speaking to the loss of all 
that is most important in our social and political relationships. Here we have a 
deep sense of pathos for the passing of something vitally important to our human-
ness. This is particularly striking in Nineteen Eighty-Four with its evocation of the 
erosion of the social traditions that bind and hold. One of the most compelling 
tributes to the work in this respect comes from Dickstein who comments that: 
By investing his own feelings in Winston’s fate, and by making his England 
one that his readers would recognize, Orwell rescues Nineteen Eighty-Four 
from the merely speculative horizon of most futuristic writing; he lends an 
emotional unity, an authentic immediacy, to an otherwise eclectic and 
sometimes contradictory piece of work. (Dickstein, 2004, p. 109) 
Let me turn last to the finalizable/unfinalizable conjuncture. When earlier 
discussing the novels of Platonov and Bulgakov, I suggested that they deal in 
shadows and ambiguity, being actively engaged with the dualistic elements of 
utopian thought. In We and Nineteen Eighty-Four a different but parallel dynamic 
operates, whereby the texts aim to parody, fantasize and/or render absurd the 
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binaries of utopian thought, while, at the same time, rendering their own didactic 
assertions subject to ambiguity and doubt through the force of the fantastic. With 
this, they utilize an artistic form that both complements and mediates their 
political content, and, equally, are committed to a political content that 
complements and mediates their artistic form. In such ways, they traverse and 
contradict many of the traditional boundaries associated with the artistic and the 
political, and prompt further questions about the relationship between the two. In 
my concluding chapter, I look across the texts as a whole and further consider our 







Reflections from the base camp 
It is much easier to study the given in what is created (for example, 
language, ready-made and general elements of world view, reflected 
phenomena of reality, and so forth) than to study what is created. (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 120; original emphasis) 
What we call the beginning is often the end/And to make an end is to make a 
beginning/The end is where we start from. (T. S. Eliot, ‘Little Gidding’, The 
Four Quartets, 1943)   
Over the course of this study, I have attempted to understand the multifaceted 
nature of the artistic/political relationship, both as it arises in the selected texts 
and a more general level of conceptualization as it pertains to the traditions and 
practices of the novel. My observations point to a common but highly 
differentiated enterprise, with the selected novels illustrating the contrasting and 
at times contradictory ways in which the artistic and the political can combine in 
any given instance. That there is a fundamental tension between the artistic and 
the political as contrasting epistemologies (van Delden and Grenier, 2012), I have 
accepted; that this can emerge in unexpected ways, with generative as well as 
limiting effects, is what I have tried to illustrate. As I see it, the risks to the artistic 
life of the text arise not from the assertiveness of a political critique, but rather 
from a moralizing discourse where the reader is to be ‘educated’ rather than 
‘argued with’ or even ‘shouted at’; from the conflation between author and hero, 
where we are encouraged to admire or affirm rather than question or speculate; 
and from a lack of transparency, where a purportedly realistic character is in fact a 
mouthpiece for an author’s moral and/or political convictions.  
In all these considerations, my emphasis has been on the density of the texts’ 
literary/political combinations and their resistance to any single line of 
theorization. In this final chapter, I retain this accent, now focusing on the 
qualities contributing to the resonating potential of the novels. As Felski (2011, p. 
580 and p. 583) points out, ‘texts are objects that do a lot of traveling; moving 
across time, they run into new semantic networks, new ways of imputing 




help shape outcomes and influence actions’. It is on the nature of this carrying 
power that I reflect here: what contributes to it, and how we might better 
understand these contributory factors.  
At each point of the analysis, I reflect on what my conclusions might suggest for 
our interpretations of the artistic/political relationship. As earlier argued, this is a 
critical matter, for our readings influence how we approach texts, the kinds of 
questions we ask, and the nature of the conclusions we reach. When, to return to a 
much rehearsed example, Kundera takes issue with Nineteen Eighty-Four, he 
reads the work through a particular lens, where to be ‘true’ to itself the novel must 
rule out ‘any identification with any politics, any religion, any ideology, any 
moral doctrine, any group’ (Kundera, 1995, p. 156). In repeating this example, I 
acknowledge that we necessarily interpret the artistic/political relationship 
through our own particular templates, for the artistic and the political are 
subjective phenomena rather than objective categories. Hence in making my case 
for a grounded understanding, I simply contend that such an approach is better 
able to reveal the evolving and often contradictory nature of the artistic and the 
political relationship than is one based on abstracted theorization. By the same 
token, I recognize that my preferred perspective will not promote definitive 
propositions, but rather invite new lines of speculation and inquiry.  
My discussion is built around the three main themes that have consistently 
surfaced in my analyses of the texts: first, the dense intersections between 
finalizability and unfinalizability, where I query a central element of the 
artistic/political binary; second, the carrying power of imagination, where I reflect 
on the imagery of the texts and its experiential potential; third, the impact of the 
texts’ emotional calls, where I look closely at the poetics of the texts, and suggest 
that they take us well beyond the cognitive emphasis of the 
dialogical/monological binary. These reflections do not lead to any neat or 
systematic tying up of ends, but rather to a series of speculations and suggestions 
about how we—the ordinary readers—might conceptualize the artistic/political 




Finalizability and unfinalizability 
In dualistic readings of the artistic/political relationship, finalizability and 
unfinalizability are positioned in fundamentally oppositional terms, with the one 
achieving its ends at the cost of the other. This is reflected in Kundera’s critique 
of the politicized novel, which, as noted by Grenier (2006, p. 6), relies on an 
axiomatic distinction between ‘uncertainty, polyphony, and perpetual quest’, on 
the one hand, and ‘truth, dogma, and final judgment’, on the other. It is also 
deeply embedded in Bakhtin’s view, which, as noted by Clark and Holquist 
(1984, p. 291), positions the history of the novel as ‘a long contest between two 
stylistic lines of development’ according to ‘which side they take in the struggle 
in language between centripetal and centrifugal forces’. On the one side, Bakhtin 
places Tolstoy, classicism, the sonnet and poetry; on the other, Dostoevsky, 
romanticism, the novel and prose (Clark and Holquist, 1984, pp. 292-3). 
Against such divisions, my reading of the texts argues for the interactive 
relationship between finalizability and unfinalizability, where fundamental values 
and/or obdurate historical facts set the tone and direction of a text, and the 
silences and ambiguities of the works provide the ‘space’ within which we are 
free to speculate and imagine. Take, for example, the scene in Darkness at Noon 
when Rubashov and Ivanov discuss Crime and Punishment as night turns into 
early dawn in the seclusion of a confined Moscow cell. As earlier noted, 
Rubashov observes that ‘twice two are not four when mathematical units are 
human beings’, and Ivanov retorts ‘history is a priori amoral; it has no conscience 
… to want to conduct history according to the maxims of a Sunday school means 
to leave everything unchanged’ (Darkness at Noon, p. 127). In literary/political 
terms something quite dense and tricky happens here, whereby the exchange 
combines the elusiveness of the unfinalizable, as it spins out to a great range of 
literary and political suppositions, with the logic of the finalizable, as it ties 
together the events that will inexorably carry Rubashov to a meaningless 
execution. Each of these elements takes its meaning from the other; neither can 
stand on its own. We are, at one and the same time, convinced and at a loss.  
In earlier discussing the significance of the creative space, I stressed that I was not 




and artistic creativity. Let me now elaborate on this point with reference to Romeo 
Castellucci’s statement that:  
The theatre which tries to produce a sense of resolution is unacceptable. It 
gives me the impression of being back at school. It’s worse actually because 
this type of theatre would like us to believe that it’s telling the truth. Even 
Brecht makes the mistake of dogmatic presentation. It is much more accurate 
for the theatre to convey anxiety. It’s preferable because then we ask the 
people who are watching to continue the story, to produce the missing part. 
(Castellucci, 2001, my emphasis)  
My submission is that Castellucci’s ‘missing part’ only makes sense within a 
wider narrative wherein we look for sense or coherence in the first instance. This 
is particularly significant in the context of the mid-twentieth century, where the 
need to account for the trauma, terror, and killings is coupled with a recognition 
that the nature of such developments withstands the attempt to render them 
comprehensible. There is thus a simultaneous sense of knowing what the search is 
about and an unknowing in the recognition that our search cannot be brought to 
any satisfactory conclusion. One of the most haunting examples of this comes in 
Everything Flows, when Anna Sergeyevna, having spent the night describing the 
events leading to the Ukraine famine, turns exhausted to Ivan Grigoryevich in the 
early morning and says: 
 ‘And nothing is left of all that. Where can all that life have gone? And that 
suffering, that terrible suffering? Can there really be nothing left? Is it really 
true that no one will be held to account for it? That it will all be forgotten 
without a trace?’  
 ‘Grass has grown over it.’ 
‘How can this be—I ask you.’  
‘Look—it’s getting light. Our night’s over now. It’s time we both got ready 
to go out to work’. (Everything Flows, p. 138)
 
 
Here Ivan’s silence signifies Castellucci’s ‘missing part’, leaving us to resolve the 
dilemma that Anna has raised: that is, how it is possible that ‘a group of ordinary 
muddle-headed people’ can assist in the death by famine of thousands of others 
(p. 117). This silence achieves its significance from within the totality of Anna’s 
narrative, which describes how the kulaks were taken to the railway station, 
‘where trains of empty freight wagons were waiting in the sidings’ (p. 121) and 
how during the journey, many were ‘put down in the middle of nowhere … left to 
fend for themselves in the middle of the snow’ with the result that ‘the weak froze 




how history’s trauma both demand and withstand explanation, but also because it 
reflects the phenomenon whereby, in our everyday lives, we both search for 
coherent meaning and know that something pivotal will almost invariably escape 
us.  
To better understand how search and silence combine, I compare Ricoeur’s notion 
of ‘narrative’, which emphasizes explication and resolution, with Bakhtin’s notion 
of the ‘idea’, which stresses obliqueness and unsettlement. While narrative does 
not imply causality in any mechanical sense, it does entail the essential connection 
between phenomena whether we are referring to emotion and motivation or the 
outcome of events and actions. For Ricoeur, it ‘grasps together and integrates into 
one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing 




Under this interpretation, there is meaning to be found in the world, a form of 
meaning that can be expressed in the temporal, relational form of the narrative. 
The trouble is that this cannot deal with those moments where the meaning of a 
passage lies precisely in the fact that there is no ‘meaning’ (conclusion, enduring 
sense, human value) to be drawn from developments. As, for example, when 
Voshchev comes to believe that:  
Like it or not there was no truth in the world – or maybe there had been 
once, in some plant or heroic creature, but then a wandering beggar had 
come by and eaten the plant, or trampled this creature there on the ground in 
lowliness, and then the beggar had died in an autumn gully and the wind had 
blown his body clean into nothing. (The Foundation Pit, pp. 102-3)
 
 
In contrast to the rationalities of the narrative stand the indeterminacies of 
Bakhtin’s ‘idea’. As we have seen, Bakhtin maintains that the Dostoevskian hero 
is not a carrier of some ‘pre-planned plot’, but rather ‘an idea-hero’, who 
represents within him- or herself the unstable and always contested nature of the 
idea (Emerson, 1997, p. 127). To understand the significance of the idea, Bakhtin 
(1963/1984, p. 28) insists, is to think in terms of space rather than time: the 
‘fundamental category’ in Dostoevsky’s poetics is that he thought ‘not in terms of 
evolution, but coexistence and interaction’ and ‘saw and conceived his world 
primarily in terms of space, not time’. On this basis, Bakhtin’s ‘idea’, with its 




illuminating how texts such as The Foundation Pit can extend our insights 
precisely through their lack of resolution and the dissolution of their heroes. 1   
But there are problems with Bakhtin’s account too. Just as the notion of narrative 
does not deal adequately with the fragmentary nature of our recollections, so 
Bakhtin’s idea can provide little or no clue as to how events unfold over time. As 
Emerson comments: 
As a rule, Bakhtin does not do beginnings or ends. Wholly committed to 
process and to the dynamics of response, he concerns himself very little with 
how something starts (a personality, a responsibility) or how it might be 
brought to an effective well-shaped end. This neglect of genesis and overall 
indifference to closure left a profound trace on his thought, imparting to his 
literary readings their strange, aerated, often fragmented nature. (Emerson, 
1997, p. 157) 
There is also the difficulty that in sacrificing ‘plot’ for ‘idea’, Bakhtin may bypass 
the political and ethical concerns of the texts. Natalia Reed, who concentrates 
specifically on this issue, contends that any ‘refusal to finalize any judgement’ 
would represent ‘an escape from the consequences of authentic residence in the 
world’ (cited by Emerson, 1997, p. 143). Further, the desire to make sense of life, 
to have a set of durable commitments, is central to the struggles of the heroes of 
the selected texts, with this holding for characters as different as Kostoglotov in 
Cancer Ward and Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four. In a reflection bearing 
on this, Emerson (1997, p. 143) observes that Dostoevsky’s heroes ‘want 
desperately to believe and to be believed’, and quotes Alexei Kirillov in The 
Demons, as saying: 
‘All my life, I did not want it to be only words. This is why I lived, because I 
kept on not wanting it. And now, too, every day I want it not to be words’. 
(The Demons, 2008, p. 615, cited by Emerson, 1997, p. 145)  
The point is that Kirillov wants to be committed to something—and something 
quite definite and durable. And so too may we, for Ricoeur (1984a) is surely right 
when he contends that as humans we desire to make the reason for our existence 
intelligible to ourselves.  
                                                 
1
 W. G. Sebald’s novels—most particularly, Austerlitz (2001) and The Emigrants (2002)—
illustrate the failures of narrative and provide a poetic alternative to it. As Eric Homberger notes, 
Sebald distances himself from the ‘grinding noises of the plot’, and searches instead ‘for a literary 
form responsive to the waves of human tragedy, which spread out across generations and nations, 




I acknowledge that the notion of narrative is implicit in Bakhtin’s idea, just as the 
notion of idea is implicit in Ricoeur’s narrative; the ‘shadow theme’ that underlies 
the dominant concept. It is, one could say, all a matter of emphasis. But the 
difficulty is that the strength of the emphasis in binary thinking systematically 
obscures what happens at the interface. The implications are clear: if we are to 
better understand the density of the artistic/political relationship, we should cease 
once and for all in positioning finalizability and unfinalizability in oppositional 
terms, and instead give detailed and careful consideration to their points of 
intersection. With these considerations challenging a central distinction in the 
artistic/political binary, let me turn to the carrying power of imagination and its 
implications for the resonating potential of the texts.  
Imagination: ‘beyond words’ 
Imagination is the most fundamental of my considerations, for each of Bakhtin’s 
major literary practices depend on it. It is imagination that anticipates responses 
and intuits meaning; imagination that creates a character that ‘is evolving and 
developing, who learns from life’ (Bakhtin, 1941/1981, p. 75 and p. 10); and 
imagination that creates the time/space configurations of chronotope where ‘time, 
as it were, thickens, takes on flesh’ and space ‘becomes charged and responsive to 
the movements of time, plot and history’ (Bakhtin, 1937/1981, p. 84). But how 
does imagination do its work? Can we ever understand it? I turn to the classics for 
assistance. 
Early on, Aristotle observed that ‘the soul never thinks without a mental image’ 
and attributed this image-forming ability to imagination (De Anima. 431/1957, 
cited by Thomas 2002, p. 2). In expanding on this, Hume (1739-1740/1978) 
distinguishes between impressions and ideas (impressions being the immediate 
sensation of events, and ideas the later recollection of those sensations), and 
argues that imagination underlies the idea-forming capacity, which, through 
association, allows us to produce general categories such as ‘power’ or ‘ideology’. 
In a more specific rendering, he contrasts imagination with memory, suggesting 
that while memory is ‘tied to the production of ideas, joined as they were and in 
the order in which they originally came as impressions’, imagination is able to 




imagination represents something not materially or actually present. As Arendt 
summarizes it:  
Re-presentation, making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s 
unique gift, and since our whole mental terminology is based on metaphors 
drawn from the vision’s experience, this gift is called imagination, defined 
by Kant as “the faculty of intuition without the presence of the object”. 
(Arendt, 1978, p. 76) 
In an observation directly relevant to the selected texts, Kant (1781-1787/1933, p. 
181) proposes that imagination has a transcendental power through which 
phenomena are commonly recognized and understood. It is to this quality that 
Coleridge refers when he proposes that imagination is able to ‘conjure up an 
image’ and ‘make us see that image as universally significant’ (cited by Warnock 
1976, p. 82). An important qualifying point arises: namely, that while the 
Romantics have phenomena such as creativity, wonder and joy in mind, 
imagination can also serve a directly political purpose in illuminating the dark and 
dystopian (see, Booker 1994a, 1994b; Booker & Juraga 1995; Gottlieb 2001; 
Marks 2015). This is well illustrated in the texts, where, for example, Grossman 
portrays the devastations of history in describing how on her death in the prison 
camp, the young mother Masha was placed in a box ‘that the timber inspectors 
had rejected for any other use’ (Everything Flows, p. 14). 
This illustrates how imagination can move us beyond the formal structure of 
words to create an image that is experienced (visualized, heard, felt in the body) 
rather than a proposition that is simply thought. This is vital because words are in 
so many ways the sticking point in the art/politics problematic. On the one hand, 
everything depends on them; on the other, it is they that embody the 
pedagogical/didactic qualities seen to be so antithetical to the artistic. Imagination 
takes us well beyond this, reflecting Bakhtin’s observation that ‘the author’s 
creative consciousness is not a language’, but an almost sculptural ability to carve 
certain moments deeply into our consciousness (cited by Emerson, 1997, p. 211, 
original emphasis). To illustrate, let me compare two passages, the first dependent 
on the analytical thrust of words and the second on the evocative power of the 
image. Both deal with freedom, and both are taken from Grossman’s Everything 




The State without freedom, the State built by Stalin, still lives. The apparatus 
of power—heavy industry, the armed forces, the security organs—is still in 
the hands of the Party … the State without freedom has now entered its third 
phase. It was founded by Lenin. It was constructed by Stalin. And now phase 
three has begun. The State, as an engineer might say, has been put into 
construction. (Everything Flows, p. 198) 
There is imagery here but it is almost entirely overwhelmed by the pedagogical 
force of the text. In the second example, the balance is reversed. Here Grossman 
describes how Ivan Grigoryevich, on his return to Moscow after three decades in 
the Gulag, experiences a sense of ‘irredeemable loneliness’, for to him it appears 
that: 
The whole city was like a single great mechanism, schooled to freeze on the 
red light and move again on the green … During the thousand years of her 
history, Russia had seen many great things … [but] has there was only one 
thing that Russia had not seen during these thousand years: freedom. 
(Everything Flows, p. 49) 
I submit that the resonating potential of the text, its power to linger somewhere 
deep in one’s consciousness, lies in the imagery of the second passage, with the 
‘irredeemable loneliness’ of Ivan Grigoryevich and ‘whole city schooled to freeze 
on the red light and move again on the green’. Some of the most sustained 
examples of this kind of poetic/political evocation come in The Foundation Pit, 
where Platonov’s ‘fluid form of consciousness’ (Bullock, 2011, p. 82) resists any 
single sticking point and instead pervades our own consciousness as readers. 
Thus, for example, we read how the bodies of the diggers are ‘thin, as if they had 
died’, with the ‘cramped space between each man’s skin and his bones … 
occupied by veins …[showing] … how much blood they must let pass during the 
tension of labour’ (p. 10). On another memorable occasion, the peasant Yelisey 
walks over the hill to reclaim the hundred coffins earlier stockpiled by his 
community and we read how, in dragging them back over the hill, he: 
Took the end of the front rope of the coffins over his shoulders, ... leaned 
forward and, like a barge hauler, began to heave these objects across the dry 
ups and downs of life’s everyday sea. (The Foundation Pit, p. 63)  
This fragment has so much invested within it: the unexpectedness of Yelisey’s 
appearance; the metaphor of the coffins; the image of Yelisey as he crosses the 
‘dry ups and downs of life’s everyday sea’; and the fact that these coffins are later 




imaginative joining of the artistic and the political occurs. It simply does, and the 
effect is pervasive and enduring. In such instances, the political is simply there, 
and in its ‘there-ness’ is so closely woven into the artistic that their separation 
only makes sense at an analytic level.  
When authors rely on imagery, they have to leave their texts open, subject to our 
imaginative re-creations as readers. And here they take a risk, for our responses 
may or may not correspond with their own concerns and intentions. In illustration, 
I turn to Platonov’s description of the death and burial of the child Nastya. On 
Platonov’s account, the ‘little girl’s death’ represented his own ‘excessive alarm 
on behalf of something beloved, whose loss is tantamount to the destruction not 
only of all the past but also of the future’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 150). But as a 
western reader in the early part of the twenty-first century, and sharing none of 
Platonov’s dreams and aspirations, I am almost entirely moved by the death of the 
child and the thought that she might be mine. Chiklin, Platonov records, dug a 
grave so wide and deep that neither a worm nor the root of a plant, nor warmth 
nor cold should be able to penetrate it’ and so that ‘the child should never be 
disturbed by the noise of life from the earth’s surface’ (p. 149). I have no idea 
what it is like to be Chiklin, separated as we are by time, nation, history, class, 
gender, age and belief. He lives in the pages of a book; I make a claim to walk the 
streets of my neighbourhood. All my children are alive; his only adopted one is 
dead. But I imagine that it is one of my own that has died and start to cry for that 
child, for both Chiklin and myself, and for sadness in all its innumerable 
manifestations. 
These considerations have important implications for how a work might resonate 
across time and space. In a comment bearing on this, Rorty (1989, p. 169) 
contends that ‘Orwell’s best novels will be widely read only as long as we 
describe the politics of the twentieth century as he did’. In saying this, he also 
refers to Howe’s suggestion that Orwell and Silone’s novels: 
May not survive their time, for what makes them so valuable and so 
enduring to their contemporaries—that mixture of desperate topicality and 
desperate tenderness—is not likely to be a quality conducive to the greatest 




I am uneasy with both proposals. Rorty’s appears to privilege a particular form of 
political reading over and above the manifold reasons a text might attract our 
attention, while Howe’s begs the question of whether the notion of ‘the greatest 
art’ sits at all comfortably with the novel given its anti-genre qualities. In my 
view, literature shapes our consciousness more obliquely, where it is not any 
particular work in its entirety that is important, but rather certain literary 
‘fragments’ or ‘memories’ that resonate across time and space. There is such a 
moment, for example, when Winston Smith leaves Mr Charrington’s shop 
reflecting on ‘the illusion of a lost London that still existed somewhere or other, 
disguised and forgotten’ (Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 103). Or, to give another 
example, when Rubashov betrays the stammering Richard under the Pietà with 
her ageless, folded hands, and a Nazi officer stands guard at the door. If asked 
what binds these moments together, I would find it difficult to explain, pointing, 
perhaps, to the inexorable passage of time and the fact that there are actions and 
events that cannot be undone. But even in beginning such an explanation, I lose 
what it is that I had in mind, for the process, by its very nature, escapes theoretical 
analysis. 
I have proposed that imagination can move us beyond words and that its 
resonating potential lies in particular fragments or moments rather than the 
interpretation of particular events or axioms. What are the implications for our 
understandings of the artistic/political relationship? In his article, ‘Beautiful truth 
and truthful beauty’, Henry Jansen (2015, p. 64) maintains that when we assent to 
the ‘truths’ of a text, ‘we interiorize them and are influenced by them in our life 
and the choices we make’. In adapting this insight, I submit that the same happens 
when we interiorize a poetic image. When, for example, we absorb the image of 
Masha’s dead body being placed in a box that ‘the timber inspectors had rejected 
for any other use’, and know that this is the only way that she can ‘return to 
freedom’ (Everything Flows, p. 14), we can undergo a shift in our internal worlds 
with real implications for our political choices and social relationships. This 




Suffering: portrayal and response 
The texts’ intimations of suffering are core to their poetics. True to the traditions 
of the novel, it is the characters that carry the burden of trauma, reminding us that 
politics matters because people matter. It matters when Rubashov is shot in the 
back and ‘memories carried him, like streaks of mist on the water’ into eternity 
(Darkness at Noon, p. 211); when Ivan the Homeless is left adrift with nothing but 
his disappearing memories to comfort him; and when Yefrem Podduyev has no 
idea how to face death for ‘the whole of his life had prepared him for living not 
for dying’ (Cancer Ward, p. 107). In all such instances, something happens to a 
living being we have come to care about, and something about their suffering 
resonates in our consciousness.2  
But what exactly is involved here? Is it just a matter of the texts invoking our 
empathy, and thus getting us to confront the devastations of the political? It 
certainly is this, but I argue that something else is also at work, whereby the 
images of the texts speak to the nature of suffering itself. This proposal hinges on 
the basis on which suffering is artistically represented and to which we, as 
readers, respond. In explaining what I have in mind, I draw an approximate 
distinction between a largely western tradition, which suggests that the sufferings 
of others can be intuited through an act of imaginative self-identification, and 
Bakhtin’s ‘outsideness’, where the artist is required to acknowledge the absolute 
otherness of the other, and to view his or her suffering from a position of 
compassionate distance, with this corresponding more closely to the ‘eastern’ 
notion of respectful withdrawal. Building on this, I suggest that something else is 
involved yet again: namely, the texts’ power to evoke the ‘qualia’ of grief and 
suffering.  
As the issues are complex, I ground my discussion in Platonov’s portrayal of the 
sufferings of Prushevsky, the site engineer in The Foundation Pit. Prushevsky, it 
will be remembered, had once trusted that the ‘all-proletarian home’ would stand 
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in the place of the old town, where people lived ‘by fencing themselves off into 
households’, hoping that ‘the walls of his architecture would not be in vain’ and 
‘the building would be inhabited by people … who were filled by that surplus of 
warmth called the soul’ (The Foundation Pit, p. 19). As his hopes for the project 
dwindle, he contemplates suicide, and is only comforted by receiving a card from 
his sister, which he would ‘carry around in his pocket for a long time, and on re-
reading it, he would sometimes cry’ (p. 60). In one of the most evocative passages 
of the text, we read that he cannot bear the sight of ‘some peaceful white buildings 
that shone with more light than there was in the air around them’, for ‘an alien and 
distant happiness awoke shame and alarm in him—what he would have liked, 
without admitting it, was for the whole world, forever under construction but 
never constructed, to be like his own destroyed life’ (p. 60).  
How far can we apprehend Prushevsky’s grief? On what basis do we come to 
know him? Do we come to know him at all? In a discussion embodying many 
aspects of the western tradition, James Wood (2008, p. 169) suggests that ‘from 
Samuel Johnson on’, it is ‘a commonplace that sympathetic identification with 
characters is in some way dependent on fiction’s true mimesis’. In elaborating on 
this, he proposes that we come to understand the nature of the suffering of another 
by identifying with them, where he refers to Adam Smith’s notion that ‘the source 
of our fellow-feeling’ for the sufferings of another relies on our ‘changing places 
in fancy with the sufferer’ (p. 170). Under this line of interpretation, we come to 
feel for Prushevsky because drawing on our own experiences, we are able to 
imagine what it might be like to be him.3   
Bakhtin’s contrasting interpretation derives from his ‘bedrock supposition’ that 
there is a fundamental difference in the way we experience another (‘the other for 
me’) and how we experience one’s self (‘an I-for-myself’) (Emerson, 2005, pp. 
642-3). On this basis, the artistic representation of suffering involves the author’s 
‘loving removal of himself … from the field of his hero’s life, his clearing of the 
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whole field of life for the hero and his existence’ (Bakhtin, 1990, p, 97, cited by 
Emerson, 2005, p. 641). Under this construction:  
Only the act of getting outside will guarantee an author the excess or surplus 
of vision … that is essential to conceptualize—however provisionally—the 
whole of another person. Since artists must always work with some 
approximation of a whole, this distancing gesture is mandatory for the 
coming-into-being of any aesthetic image. (Emerson, 2005, p. 642)
  
Thus we have a distinction between a view that emphasizes the importance of the 
shared elements of human experience and one that stresses the importance of 
removing oneself altogether so as to be open to the other, with these views 
crossing the boundaries between ‘literature’ and ‘real life’.4 In responding to these 
contending perspectives, let me return to the passage in The Foundation Pit where 
Platonov describes how Prushevsky cannot bear the sight of ‘the peaceful white 
buildings that shone with more light than there was in the air around them’, for:  
On an earthly extinct star, it was more comfortable for [Prushevsky] to feel 
sadness; an alien and distant happiness awoke shame and alarm in him – 
what he would have liked, without admitting it, was for the whole world, 
forever under construction but never constructed, to be like his own 
destroyed life. (The Foundation Pit, p. 60) 
It will be remembered that in his sorrow, Prushevsky walks away from his fellow-
workers; he cannot explain his grief and estrangement and needs to be alone. So 
perhaps neither should we, the readers, advance too close to him, pretending to 
understand his situation and offering him our sympathy. In this respect, we come 
to see Prushevsky in the manner that Bakhtin might wish: at a distance, sitting on 
a hill, looking ‘quietly into all of nature’s misty old age’ (p. 60). But is this all that 
can be said? Is there nothing about the nature of Prushevsky’s predicament that 
we can glimpse? I suggest that there is, and that to understand it we need to turn 
to Shklovsky’s (1917/1988, p. 20) proposal that art ‘returns sensation to life … to 
make a stone feel stony’. In the passage cited above, where Platonov sits aloof, 
bewildered and alone, we intuit something about the ‘estrangement of 
estrangement’, deepening and confirming something about the human condition 
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our ‘willingness to embark on a mutual dialectic of recognition, whereby each side strives to attain 




that, at some level, we do indeed already ‘know’. On this basis, I suggest that the 
most compelling moments of the texts depend neither on self-identification, nor 
the moral respect of distancing, nor even the interaction between the two, but on 
the poetic evocation of qualia. 
In another poetic example, Bulgakov portrays something of the ‘loneliness of 
loneliness’ when he describes how Pilate sits hunched in his stone chair, enframed 
against a moonlit sky, unapproachable in his anguish. As in Prushevsky’s case, we 
cannot approach too close, but see Pilate at a distance, enframed against a 
moonlight sky. We also hear Woland explain that: 
He says one and the same thing, that even the moon gives him no peace, and 
that his is a bad job. That is what he always says when he is not asleep, and 
when he is asleep, he dreams one and the same thing: there is a path of 
moonlight, and he wants to walk down it and talk with the prisoner Yeshua 
Ha-Nozri, because, as he insists he never finished what he was saying that 
time, long ago, on the fourteenth day of the spring month of Nisan. (The 
Master and Margarita, p. 381) 
My point is that in listening to Woland, we come to see how Pilate so desperately 
wishes for that last meeting with Yeshua—a meeting that we know will never take 
place. This does not mean that we identify with Pilate, but rather that we 
recognize the nature of his suffering—it makes sense to us, emotionally and 
experientially—and we start to understand something in a way that we did not 
before. And this brings with it an awareness of the breadth and depth of suffering: 
sorrow for suffering, sorrow for all those who suffer, sorrow for the human 
condition, and sorrow for the whole tragic mess of things. It also gives way to a 
sense of longing, of longing that things might be better, of regret for the past and a 
desire (but not necessarily an optimism) for a more just and humane future.  
So we come again to the carrying power of imagination and its ability to move us 
beyond words. In making this point, I underscore the indirect and pervasive nature 
of the texts’ imaginative/emotive calls. In The Company We Keep, Booth (1988, 
p. 211) suggests that ‘if genuine “literature” should be read as offering no 
unequivocal advice about “real life” ... then centuries of informed witnesses have 
deceived us—or they have been deliberately self-deceived’. I agree entirely. But I 
also propose that in their evocations the texts may shape the whole trajectory of 




political and personal worlds, hence again emphasizing the importance of 
Bullock’s (2011) notion of the fluidity of consciousness.   
Concluding reflections: reading at the interface 
 I suggest that we ‘read at the interface’ at numerous levels: in the junctures 
between the centripetal and centrifugal qualities of languages, the dialogical and 
monological, and finalizability and unfinalizability. We also read through the 
crossways of our intellectual, emotional and imaginative understandings, 
producing new ways of responding to and apprehending our personal, social and 
political worlds. Critically too, we read in a liminal space, a place wherein we 
both arrive and depart, a threshold, signifying unsettlement, change and ambiguity 
as well as stability, conviction and coherence.  
In building on the insights of van Delden and Grenier (2012), I have suggested 
that the artistic and the political represent two imperatives, with the artistic 
exemplifying the creative and open-ended, and the political pressing toward 
coherence and commitment. Under this configuration, each element is 
fundamental to the other: creativity allows commitment to be expressed in 
original and striking ways, while commitment gives creativity its shape and 
direction. Each also stands to be impoverished without the other: without 
creativity, commitment can become impervious to alternatives and the 
opportunities for change, and without commitment, creativity can become 
formless, an aesthetic end in itself. Importantly too, there is a productive tension 
between the two elements, with the ‘in-itself’ of creativity pulling in an opposite 
direction to the ‘for something else’ of commitment.  
To think in terms of creativity and commitment is to acknowledge that texts are 
produced, often at cost, by living beings. For all the authors considered here, there 
is the obstinate courage of the creative artist: the determination to get words right, 
to create images that work, and to return to a piece again and again until it says 
what it is meant to say in the way that it is meant to say it. As noted, Silone 
(1949/2001, p. 81) records that ‘writing has not been, and never could be, except 
in a few favoured moments of grace, a serene aesthetic enjoyment, but rather the 




of artistic integrity included isolation, persecution, and fundamental risks to 
freedom and ultimately to life itself. On this, I recall that having at one time 
burned his own manuscript, Bulgakov continued to work on it through the worst 
of the 1930s, inscribing 'Lord, help me to finish my novel’ in the upper right hand 
corner of his notebook (Pevear, 2007, p. xv). The seriousness of the 
literary/political enterprise is sobering and awe inspiring: when Woland drily 
observed that ‘manuscripts don’t burn’ (The Master and Margarita, p. 287), he 
described how Russian authors committed the entirety of their works to memory 
in order to preserve them.  
I was in the process of putting these thoughts on paper, when a friend sent me a 
copy of Charlotte Wood’s Stella Prize acceptance speech, awarded for her novel 
The Natural Way of Things.5 It was one of those moments when the ideas one 
struggles to express, appear, as it were, complete and fresh before one. So let me 
quote freely from Wood’s speech. She starts by reflecting on the hard labour 
involved in writing and the intellectual freedom that the opportunity represents: 
Showing up to that blank space with curiosity and courage is an exercise in 
the greatest freedom we can know – intellectual freedom, to explore your 
obsession with something nobody but you cares about, to pursue your own 
strange thoughts and dreams, to climb right inside your own dark wormhole 
of fascination and stay there. (Wood, 2016, np)   
Wood also recounts that, ‘on one very bad day’, she thought about giving up on 
her novel, but came up with five reasons to continue: 
To make something beautiful. Beauty does not have to mean prettiness, but 
can emerge from the scope of one’s imagination, the precision of one’s 
words, the steadiness and honesty of one’s gaze.  
To make something truthful. ‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty.’ 
To make use of what you have and who you are. Even a limited talent brings 
an obligation to explore it, develop it, exercise it, be grateful for it.  
To make, at all. To create is to defy emptiness. It is generous, it affirms. 
To make is to add to the world, not subtract from it. It enlarges, does not 
diminish.  
Because as Iris Murdoch said, paying attention is a moral act. To write 
truthfully is to honour the luck and intricate detail of being alive. (Wood, 
2016, np)   
                                                 





In such ways, Wood identifies something that I have found difficult to express: 
quite simply, the energy of the whole literary/political enterprise. When authors 
put words to paper, and when we respond to their works and re-create them in our 
minds and hearts, there is a happening. New images and ideas float across our 
horizons, hastening across time and space. I remember that at his 1966 trial, 
Daniel said that his greatest concern in writing his novel This is Moscow Speaking 
was to show that:  
A human being should remain a human being, no matter in what 
circumstances he may find himself, no matter under what pressure and from 
what quarter. He should remain true to himself, to himself alone, and have 
nothing to do with anything that his conscience rejects and that goes against 
human instinct. (Labedz and Hayward, 1966, p. 62) 
So above all, I stress that we owe the counter-totalitarian literature a debt of 
gratitude for helping preserve the space on which our political imaginations 
depend and in enlarging the horizons through which we come to perceive and 
experience our worlds. In such ways, and as Helena Grehan (2015, p. 2) proposes 
in relation to theatre, literature offers us something of a ‘gift’ or a ‘space’ in which 
we may come ‘to see and feel things differently, to engage or re-engage, to reflect 
and ultimately to take responsibility for people, events and things’. In the manner 
of gifts, this is not something that can be directly repaid. But it means that we 
should respond to works as living things, as subjects invoking and meriting a 
response, rather than objects exposed to the force of a disengaged critic. On all 
these grounds a key notion is respect: respect for the literary/political project, and 
respect for the sustained effort involved in the creation of the works contributing 
to it. Most critically, the nature of the gift asks us that we receive, and in receiving 
we listen, really listen, as we read.  
Writing this thesis has been much like following a track bounded by two cliffs, 
whose shape is determined by the time of day, the direction in which one walks, 
the travellers one meets, the instructions carried in one’s pack, and most 
important, the reading one does along the way. From the outset I sensed the 
complementarity between the artistic and the political as distinct fields of 
creative/committed energy, and I simply reiterate this in my conclusion. This 




been with me every step of the way, would undoubtedly have foreseen. So my 









Adorno, T. (1970/2004) Aesthetic Theory, (R. Hullot-Kentor, Trans.), London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing.  
Adorno, T. (1973/2007) ‘Commitment’, in Adorno, T., Benjamin, W., Bloch, E., 
Brecht, B. & Lukács, G., Aesthetics and Politics (pp. 177-96), London: Verso.  
Althusser, L. (1971) Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays, London: New Left 
Books. 
Applebaum, A. (2003) Gulag: A History, New York: Doubleday. 
Arch Getty, J. (2013) Practicing Stalinism: Bolsheviks, Boyars and the 
Persistence of Tradition, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Aristotle, (1987) De Anima, H. Lawson-Tancred (Ed), London: Penguin Books. 
Arendt, H. (1951/1967) The Origins of Totalitarianism, London: George Allen 
and Unwin.  
Arendt, H. (1978) The Life of the Mind, London: Secker and Warburg. 
Arnold, M. (1869/2009) Culture and Anarchy, Jane Garnett (Ed.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
Arzhak, N. (Yuri Daniel) (1961/1969) This is Moscow Speaking and Other 
Stories, New York: E. P. Dutton.’ 
Bakhtin, M. (1930/1989) ‘Preface to Volume 13 [Complete Works of Tolstoi]: 
Resurrection’, in Morson, G. S. & Emerson, C. (1989) (Eds) Rethinking Bakhtin, 
Extensions and Challenges, pp. 237-56, (C. Emerson, Trans.), Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Bakhtin, M. (1935/1981) ‘Discourse in the novel’, in The Dialogical Imagination: 
Four Essays, (pp. 259-421), M. Holquist (Ed.), (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, 
Trans.), Austin: University of Texas Press.  
Bakhtin, M. (1937/1981) ‘Forms of time and of the chronotope in the novel’ in 
The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays (pp. 84-258), Austin: University of 
Texas Press.   
Bakhtin, M. (1940/1981) ‘From the prehistory of novelistic discourse’, in The 
Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays (pp. 41-83), Austin: University of Texas 
Press.  
Bakhtin, M. (1941/1981) ‘Epic and the novel’, in The Dialogical Imagination: 




Bakhtin, M. (1963/1984) Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, (C. Emerson, Ed. & 
Trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Bakhtin, M. (1965/1984) Rabelais and his World, (H. Iswolsky, Trans.), 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Bakhtin, M. (1986) Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, C. Emerson & M. 
Holquist (Eds.), (V.W. McGee, Trans.), Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. (1990) Art and Answerability, M. Holquist & V. Liapunov (Eds.), (V. 
Liapunov, Trans. & Notes), Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barber, B. (1969) ‘Conceptual foundations of totalitarianism’, in C. Freidrich, M. 
Curtis & B. Barber (Eds.), Totalitarianism in Perspective, Three Views (pp. 3-52), 
London: Pall Mall Press. 
Barrett, A. (1996a) ‘The Master and Margarita in recent criticism’, in L. Weeks 
(Ed.), The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion (pp. 84-118), Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Barrett, A. (1996b) ‘Beyond parody: The Goethe connection’, in L. Weeks (Ed.), 
The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion (pp. 113-22), Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Barthes, R. (1967/1981) ‘The discourse of history’, in E. Shaffer (Ed.), Rhetoric 
and History: Comparative Criticism Yearbook (pp. 3-21), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Barthes, R. (1967/1988) ‘Death of the author’, in D. Lodge (Ed.), Modern 
Criticism and Literary Theory (pp. 167-72), London and New York: Longman.  
Bergman, J. (1992) ‘Soviet dissidents on the Russian intelligentsia, 1965-1985: 
The search for a usable past’, Russian Review, 51(1), pp. 16-35. 
Berlin, I. (1958/2002) ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in H. Hardy (Ed.), Isaiah Berlin: 
Liberty (pp. 166-218), Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bernard-Donals, M. (1994) ‘Mikhail Bakhtin: Between phenomenology and 
Marxism’, College English, 56 (2), pp. 170-88. 
Bettleheim, B. (1976) The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of 
Fairy Tales, New York: Knopf.   
Biocca, D. & Canali, M. (2000) L’informatore: Silone, i Comunisti, e la Polizia 
(The Informer: Silone, the Communists, and the Police), Milan: Luni Editrice. 
Bitov, A. (1987/1998) Pushkin House, (S. Brownsberger, Trans.), Evanston: 
Dalkey Archive Press. 
Blake, P. (1968) ‘A diseased body politic’, The New York Times, October 27, 





Blustein, J. (2008) The Moral Demands of Memory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Boobbyer, P. (2005) Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Booker, M. K. (1994a) Dystopian Literature: A Theory and Research Guide, 
Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Booker, M. K. (1994b) The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature, Westport: 
Greenwood Press. 
Booker, M. K. & Juraga, D. (1995) Bakhtin, Stalin and Modern Russian Fiction: 
Carnival, Dialogism, and History, Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Booth, W. (1961) The Rhetoric of Fiction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Booth, W. (1984) ‘Introduction’, in M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s 
Poetics, C. Emerson (Ed. & Trans.), (pp. xiii-xxv), Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Booth, W. (1988) The Company We Keep: an ethics of fiction, Berkeley, 
University of California Press. 
Booth, W. (1998) ‘The ethics of teaching literature’, College English, 61 (1), pp. 
41-55. 
Bourdieu, P. (1993) The Field of Cultural Production, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bowker, G. (2003) Inside George Orwell: A Biography, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Brandist, C. (2002) The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, 
London: Pluto Press. 
Brandist, C. (2005) ‘The Bakhtin Circle’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/bakhtin. 
Brecht, B. (1949/1964) ‘A short organum for the theatre’, in J. Willett (Ed. & 
Trans.), Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic (pp. 179-209), 
London: Methuen.  
Brodsky, J. (1987) ‘Catastrophes in the air’, in Less than One: Selected Essays, 
London: Penguin Books.  
Brown, C. (1993) ‘Introduction’, in We (pp. xi-xxx), London: Penguin Books.  
Brown, E. J. (1976) Brave New World, 1984, and We: An Essay on Anti-Utopia, 
Ardis Essay Series No 4, Ann Arbor: Ardis Publishers.  
Bulgakov, M. (1925/1994) The Heart of a Dog, (M. Ginsburg, Trans.), New 




Bulgakov, M. (1926, 1927, 1928) The Early Plays of Mikhail Bulgakov, (1972), 
(C. R. Proffer & E. Proffer, Trans.), Dana Point: Ardis Publishers.  
Bulgakov, M. (1939/2007) The Master and Margarita, (R. Pevear & L. 
Volokhonsky, Trans.), London: Penguin Books.  
Bullock, P. (2005) The Feminine in the Prose of Andrey Platonov, London: 
Legenda. 
Bullock, P. (2011) ‘Utopia and the novel after the revolution’, in E. Dobrenko & 
M. Balino, The Cambridge Companion to Twentieth Century Russian Literature 
(pp. 79-96), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Bullock, P. (2013) ‘Platonov and Theories of Modernism’, Russian Literature, 1/2 
pp. 301-22 
Bullock, P. (2014) ‘The Mountain of the Mind: The Politics of the Gaze in Andrei 
Platonov’s “Dzhan”’, Slavic Review, 73/4 751-71 
Burnham, J. (1941) The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World, 
New York: John Day. 
Burrowes, R. (1969) ‘Totalitarianism: The revised standard version’, World 
Politics, 21 (2), pp. 271-294.   
Camus, A. (1948) The Plague, (S. Gilbert, Trans.), London: Penguin Books. 
Camus, A. (1951/2000) The Rebel, (A. Bower, Trans.), London: Penguin Books.  
Camus, A. (1955/2000) The Myth of Sisyphus, (J. O’Brien, Trans.), London: 
Penguin Books.  
Camus, A. (1949/1958) Caligula and Three Other Plays, (J. O’Brien, Trans.), 
New York: Random House. 
Camus, A. (1978) Notebooks: 1942-1951, (J. O’Brien, Trans.), New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Carey, J. (2006) What Good are the Arts? New York: Oxford University Press. 
Carr, E. H. (1961/2001) What is History? Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Castellucci, R. (2001) in Tackles, B. ‘Interview with Romeo Castellucci’. 
Discussed in Grehan, H. (2009) Performance, Ethics and Spectatorship in a 
Global Age, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Caute, D. (2010) Politics and the Novel During the Cold War, Somerset, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Chandler, R. (2009a) ‘Afterword’, in The Foundation Pit (pp. 153-177), New 
York: New York Review of Books. 
Chandler, R. (2009b) ‘Introduction’, in Everything Flows (pp. vii-xii). New York: 




Chandler, R. (2010), ‘A Russian titan revealed’. Retrieved from 
http://thebookserf.blogspot.com.au. 
Chandler, R. (2011) ‘Introduction’, in Life and Fate (pp. ix-xxxviii), London: 
Vintage. 
Chernyshevsky, N. (1863/1961) What is to be Done? (B. Tucker, Trans.), New 
York: Vintage.  
Clark, K. & Holquist, M. (1984) Mikhail Bakhtin, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Clendinnen, I. (1998) Reading the Holocaust, Melbourne: Text Publishing. 
Connelly, J. (2010) ‘Totalitarianism: Defunct theory, useful word’, Kritika, 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 11(4), pp. 819-35. 
Crick, B. (2000) ‘Introduction’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. vi-xxv), London: 
Penguin Books 
Crick, B. (2007) ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four: Context and controversy’ in J. Rodden 
(Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell (pp. 146-160), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Crossman, R. (Ed.) (1949/2001) The God that Failed, New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Cunningham, G. (2013) ‘Getting to “no”: Snowball’s chance, Animal Farm, and 
“exemplary truth”’, Los Angeles Book Review. Retrieved from 
http://larevMidiewofbooks.org. 
Curtis, J. A. E. (1991) Manuscripts Don’t Burn: Mikhail Bulgakov, a Life in 
Letters and Diaries, London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Dauenhauer, B. & Pellauer, D. (2011), ‘Paul Ricoeur’, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/ricoeur/. 
Davison, P. (2000) ‘A note on the text’, in Orwell, G. (2000) Nineteen Eighty- 
Four (pp. xviii-xxi), London: Penguin Books. 
Demidenko, H. (1994) The Hand that Signed the Paper, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Derrida, J. (1976) Of Grammatology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Dickstein, M. (2004) ‘Hope against hope: Orwell’s posthumous novel’, The 
American Scholar, 73 (2), pp. 101-12. 
Dickstein, M. (2007) ‘Animal Farm: History as Fable’, in J. Rodden (Ed.), The 





Dobrenko, E. (2011) ‘Socialist realism’, in E. Dobrenko & M. Balina (Eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Twentieth-Century Russian Literature (pp. 97-115), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dobrenko, E. & Balina, M. (2011) ‘Preface’, in E. Dobrenko & M. Balina (Eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Twentieth-Century Russian Literature (pp. xxi-
xxv), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dostoevsky, F. (1864/2004) Notes from Underground, (R. Pevear & L. 
Volokhonsky, Trans.), London: Dent, Everyman’s Library. 
Dostoevsky, F. (1866/1996) Crime and Punishment, (D. McDuff, Trans.), 
London: Penguin Books. 
Dostoevsky, F. (1871/2008) The Demons, (R. A. Maguire, Trans.), London: 
Penguin Books. 
Dostoevsky, F. (1880/2003) The Brothers Karamazov, A Novel in Four Parts and 
an Epilogue, (D. McDuff, Trans.), London: Penguin Books. 
Duckworth, A. (1979) ‘Review of Wolfgang Iser: The Act of Reading: A Theory 
of Aesthetic Response’, Nineteenth Century Fiction, 34 (3), pp. 337-43. 
Dudinstev, V. (1958) Not by Bread Alone, (E. Bone, Trans.), New York: Dutton. 
Eagleton, T. (1976) Marxism and Literary Criticism, London: Blackwell. 
Eagleton, T. (1990) The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Ehrenburg, I. (1954) The Thaw, Washington, DC: Regnery. 
Eliot, T. S. (1968) The Four Quartets, New York: Mariner Books.  
Emerson, C. (1985) ‘The Tolstoy connection in Bakhtin’, Publications Modern 
Language Association, (PMLA), 100 (1), pp. 68-80. 
Emerson, C. (1997) The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Emerson, C. (2005) ‘Shklovsky’s ostranenie, Bakhtin’s vnenakhodimost (how 
distance serves an aesthetics of pain of arousal differently from an aesthetics 
based on pain), Poetics Today, 26 (4), pp. 638-63.  
Emerson, C. (2008) The Cambridge Introduction to Russian Literature, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Emerson, C. & Holquist, M. (1981) ‘Glossary’, in M. Bakhtin, The Dialogical 
Imagination: Four Essays (pp. 423-34), Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Engerman, D. (2001) ‘Foreword’, in R. Crossman (Ed.), (1949/2001) The God 
that Failed (pp. vii-xxxix), New York: Columbia University Press. 
Erdinast-Vulcan, D. (2008) ‘Between the face and the voice: Bakhtin meets 




Fainsod, M. (1953) How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Felski, R. (2011) ‘Context stinks!’ New Literary History, 42 (4), pp. 573-591. 
Figes, O. (2007) The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia, New York: 
Picador. 
Fish, S. (1980) Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Fisher, T. (2011) ‘Aesthetics and the political: An essay on Francis Alÿs’s Green 
Line’, Cultural Critique, 78, pp. 1-26. 
Fitzpatrick, S. (1986) ‘Afterword: Revisionism revisited’, The Russian Review, 
45, pp. 409-115. 
Fitzpatrick, S. (1994) Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian 
Village after Collectivization, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fitzpatrick, S. (2000) Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Forster, E. M. (1938) ‘What I believe’. Retrieved from 
http://spichtinger.net/otexts/believe.html. 
Forster, E. M. (1956) Aspects of the Novel, London: Penguin Books. 
Foucault, M. (1969/1988) ‘What is an author?’ in D. Lodge (Ed.), Modern 
Criticism and Literary Theory (pp. 197-211), London and New York: Longman.  
Frank, A. (1995/2013) The Wounded Story Teller, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Franklin, R. (2011) A Thousand Darknesses; Truth and Lies in Holocaust Fiction, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Friedländer, S. (1992) Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the 
Final Solution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Garrard, J.G. (Ed.) (1983) The Russian Novel from Pushkin to Pasternak, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Gasperetti, D. (1997) The Rise of the Russian Novel: Carnival, Stylisation, and 
Mockery of the West, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 
Gerlach, C. & Werth, N. (2009) ‘State violence—violent societies’, in M.E. Geyer 
& S. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared 
(pp. 133-80), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Geyer, M. (2009) ‘Introduction’, in M.E. Geyer & S. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Beyond 
Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (pp. 1-41), Cambridge: 




Geyer, M. E. & Fitzpatrick, S. (Eds.) (2009) Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism 
and Nazism Compared, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gill, G. (2002) The Origins of the Stalinist Political System, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gladkov, A. (1925/1994) Cement, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Chicago: 
Aldine Transaction. 
Gleason, A. (1995) Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War, Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gorlizki, Y. & Mommsen, H. (2009) ‘The political (dis)orders of Stalinism and 
national socialism’, in M.E. Geyer & S. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Beyond 
Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (pp. 41-82), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gottlieb, E. (1992) The Orwell Conundrum: A Cry of Despair or Faith in the 
Spirit of Man?’, Ottawa: Carlton University Press. 
Gottlieb, E. (2001) Dystopian Fiction East and West: Universe of Terror and 
Trial, Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Gottlieb, E. (2007) ‘Orwell, a bibliographical essay’, in J. Rodden (Ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to George Orwell (pp.190-200), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Greenblatt, S. (2005) The Greenblatt Reader, M. Payne (Ed.), Hoboken: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Grehan, H. (2009) Performance, Ethics and Spectatorship in a Global Age, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grehan, H. (2015), ‘Love and information: Ethical spectatorship, freedom and the 
limits of time’, Murdoch University, unpublished paper. 
Grenier, Y. (2006) ‘Milan Kundera and the novel’, History of Intellectual Culture, 
6 (1), ISBN 1492-7810. Retrieved from http://www.ucalgary.ca/hic.  
Grossman, V. (1944) The Hell of Treblinka, (R. Chandler, Trans.). Retrieved from 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com. 
Grossman, V. (1970/2009) Everything Flows, (R. Chandler, Trans.), New York: 
New York Review of Books.  
Grossman, V. (1945/2005) ‘The killing ground of Berdichev’, in Beevor, A. & 
Vonogradova, L. (Ed. & Trans.), A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red 
Army 1941-1945 (pp. 247-62), London: Harvill Press.  




Halbwachs, M. (1992) On Collective Memory, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Healy, P. (2011) ‘Situated cosmopolitanism and the conditions of possibility: 
Transformative dialogue as a response to the challenge of difference’, Cosmos 
and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 7 (2), pp. 157-78. 
Herzen, A. (1847/1984) Who is to Blame? A Novel in Two Parts, (M. Katz 
Trans.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Herzen, A. (1848/1979) From the Other Shore and The Russian People and 
Socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Herzen, A. (1861/1968) My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander 
Herzen, (C. Garnett, Trans.), New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Hirschkop, K. (1999) Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hirschkop, K. (2001) ‘Bakhtin in the sober light of day’, in K. Hirschkop & D. 
Shepherd (Eds.), Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, (3rd edn.) (pp. 1-26), Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Hitchens, C. (2002) Why Orwell Matters, New York: Basic Books. 
Hitchens, C. (2007) ‘Why Orwell still matters’, in J. Rodden (Ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to George Orwell (pp. 201-7), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Holquist, M. (1981) ‘Introduction’, in M. Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination: 
Four Essays, (pp. xv-xxxiii), Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Holquist, M. (1990) Dialogism, London: Routledge. 
Homberger, E. (2001) ‘W.B. Sebald, Obituary’, The Guardian, Monday, 
17 December. Retrieved from 2001 file:///Obituary: web archive. 
Howe, I. (1957/2002) Politics and the Novel, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers.  
Hume, D. (1739-40/1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Huxley, A. (1932/2006) Brave New World, New York: Harper Perennial. 
Iser, W. (1974) The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction 
from Bunyan to Beckett, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Iser, W. (1978) The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press. 
Jakobson, R. (1960/1988) ‘Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics’, in D. 
Lodge (Ed.), Modern Criticism and Literary Theory (pp. 32-57), London and New 




Jansen, H. (2015) ‘Beautiful truth and truthful beauty; on the cognitive value of 
art’, Literature and Aesthetics, 25, pp. 49-64. 
Jay, A. (1984) Adorno, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Judt, T. (2009) Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century, 
London: Vintage. 
Judt, T. with Snyder, T. (2012) Thinking the Twentieth Century, London: Penguin 
Books. 
Kahn, A. (2011) ‘Poetry of the revolution’, in E. Dobrenko and M. Balina (Eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Twentieth-Century Russian Literature (pp. 41-58), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, E. (1781-1787/1933) Critique of Pure Reason, (N.K. Smith, Trans.), 
London: Macmillan.  
Kearney, R. (1988) The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture, 
New York: Routledge. 
Kellner, D. (nd) ‘Brecht’s Marxist aesthetics’, Illuminations. Retrieved from 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell3.htm. 
Koestler, A. (1940/1994) Darkness at Noon, London: Vintage.   
Koestler, A. (1949/2001) ‘Arthur Koestler’, in R. Crossman (Ed.), The God that 
Failed (pp. 15-76), New York: Columbia University Press.  
Krapp, J. (2002) An Aesthetics of Morality: pedagogical voice and moral dialogue 
in Mann, Camus, Conrad and Dostoevsky, South Carolina: University of South 
Carolina Press. 
Krasnov, V. (1980) Solzhenitsyn and Dostoevsky: A Study in the Polyphonic 
Novel, Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
Krishnan, M. (2011), ‘Transformation of the human consciousness: The origins of 
socialist realism in the Soviet Union’, Concord Review, 21, pp. 225-241.  
Kundera, M. (1967/1993) The Joke, New York: Harper Perennial.  
Kundera, M. (1977) The Farewell Party (Writers from the Other Europe), (E. 
Pochoda, Trans.), London: Faber and Faber. 
Kundera, M. (1988) The Art of the Novel, (L. Asher, Trans.), New York: Grove 
Press. 
Kundera, M. (1995) Testaments Betrayed: An Essay in Nine Parts, (L. Asher, 
Trans.), New York: Harper Perennial. 
Kundera, M. (1999) Immortality, New York: Harper Perennial. 





Labedz, L. & Hayward, M. (Eds.), (1966) On Trial: The Soviet State versus 
“Abram Tertz” and “Nikolai Arzhak”, London: Harvill. 
LaCapra, D. (2001) Writing History, Writing Trauma, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Lakshin, V. (1968/1996) ‘M. Bulgakov’s novel The Master and Margarita’ in L. 
Weeks (Ed.), The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion (pp. 73-84), 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
Lang, B. (2000) Holocaust Representation: Art Within the Limits of History and 
Ethics, Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press. 
Latour, B. (2005) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network 
Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lavender, A. (2012) ‘Viewing and acting (and points in between): The trouble 
with spectating after Rancière’, Contemporary Theatre Review, 22 (3), pp. 307-
26.  
Leake, E. (2003) The Reinvention of Ignazio Silone, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Lenin, V. (1917/1992) State and Revolution, London: Penguin Books.  
Levinas, E. (1969) Totality and Infinity, (A. Lingis, Trans.), Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. 
Lieber, E. (2011) On the distinctiveness of the Russian novel, The Brothers 
Karamazov and the English tradition. (PhD thesis, Graduate School of Arts and 
Sciences, Columbia University). 
Lodge D. (1984) Small World: An Academic Romance, London: Penguin Books. 
Lodge, D. (1990) After Bakhtin: Essays on Fiction and Criticism, London: 
Routledge.  
Lodge, D. (2001) Thinks …, London: Penguin Books. 
Lodge, D. (2002) Consciousness and the Novel, London: Penguin Books. 
Lucas, S. (2003) Orwell, London: Hans Publishing.  
Lukács, G. (1915/1976) The Theory of the Novel, Boston: MIT Press.  
Lukács, G. (1937/1983) The Historical Novel, (S. Mitchell, Trans.), Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press.  
McAuley, M. (1992) Soviet Politics 1917-1991, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McDonald, M. (2001) ‘Il caso Silone’, The National Interest, Fall 2001. Retrieved 
from www.michaelmcdonaldweb.com/essays/ilcasosilone.htm. 




McEwan, I. (2011) Jerusalem prize acceptance speech. Retrieved from 
http://ianmcewan.com/bib/articles/jerusalemprize.html. 
McKeon, M. (2000) ‘Generic transformation and social change: Rethinking the 
rise of the novel’, in M. McKeon (Ed.), Theory of the Novel: A Historical 
Approach (pp.382-99), Baltimore and London: John’s Hopkins University Press. 
Malpas, J. (2006) ‘Beginning in wonder: Placing the origin of thinking’, in N. 
Kompridis (Ed.), Philosophical Romanticism (pp. 282-299), Oxon: Routledge. 
Mann, T. (1995) The Magic Mountain, (J. Woods, Trans.), New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Manne, R. (1994) ‘The strange case of Helen Demidenko’. Retrieved from 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/ 
Marks. P. (2015) Imagining Surveillance: Eutopian and Dystopian Literature and 
Film, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Mazower, M. (1999) Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, London: 
Penguin. 
Medvedev, P. (1928/1991) The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A 
Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, (A. Wherle, Trans.), Baltimore: 
John’s Hopkins University Press. 
Meerson, O. (1997) ‘Svobodnaia veshch’, Poetika Neostranenia u Andreia 
Platanova, Berkeley: Berkeley Slavic Specialties. 
Milton, J. (1644) Areopagitica: a speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing to 
the Parliament of England, retrieved from 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/areopagitica/text.shtml 
Morson, G.S. (1979) ‘Socialist realism and literary theory’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 38 (2), pp. 121-33. 
Morson, G.S (1981) ‘Tolstoy’s absolute language’, Critical Inquiry, 7 (4), pp. 
667-87. 
Morson, G.S. (1988) The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer 
and the Traditions of Literary Utopia, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Morson, G.S. (2010) ‘Tradition and counter-tradition: The radical intelligentsia 
and classical Russian literature’, in W. Leatherbarrow & D. Orford (Eds.), A 
History of Russian Thought (pp. 141-68), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Morson, G. S. & Emerson, C. (1989) (eds) Rethinking Bakhtin, Extensions and 
Challenges, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Morson, G.S. & Emerson, C. (1990) Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, 




Mosse, G. (1987) Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of 
Reality, Wayne: Wayne State University Press. 
Mussolini, G. (1935) The Doctrine of Fascism. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldfuturefund/org/wffmaster/reading/germany/mussolini.htm. 
Nagel, T. (1974)’What is it like to be a bat?’, The Philosophical Review, 83 (4), 
pp. 435–50. 
Newsinger, J. (2007) ‘Orwell, anti-semitism and the holocaust’, in J. Rodden 
(Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell (pp. 112-126), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nussbaum, M. (1992) Love’s Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Orwell, G. (1937) The Road to Wigan Pier, San Diego: Harcourt. 
Orwell, G. (1939/2000) ‘Charles Dickens’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. 35-78), 
London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (1940/2000) ‘Inside the whale’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. 101-
133), London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (1941/2000) ‘Wells, Hitler and the world state’, in George Orwell: 
Essays (pp. 188-93), London: Penguin.  
Orwell, G. (1944/2000) ‘Arthur Koestler’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. 267-78), 
London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (1945/1951) Animal Farm, London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (January 1946) ‘Review of “We” by E. I. Zamyatin’, Tribune, January 
1946. Retrieved from http://orwell.ru/library/reviews. 
Orwell, G. (1946a/2000) ‘Why I write’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. 1-7), 
London: Penguin Books. 
Orwell, G. (1946b) George Orwell: Life in letters, selected by Peter Davison. 
New York: Liveright Publishing. Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jul/11/animal-farm-what-orwell-
really-meant/. 
Orwell, G. (1946c/2000) ‘The prevention of literature’, in George Orwell: Essays 
(pp. 328-41), London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (1946d/2000) ‘Politics versus literature: An examination of Gulliver’s 
Travels’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp.370-97), London: Penguin Books.  
Orwell, G. (1948/2000) ‘Writers and Leviathan’, in George Orwell: Essays (pp. 
453-459), London: Penguin.  




Orwell, G. (1968) Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism, S. Orwell & I. Angus 
(Eds.), New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Parthé, K. (2004) Russia’s Dangerous Texts, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
Pasternak, B. (1957/1991) Doctor Zhivago, (M. Hayward, Trans.), London: Dent, 
Everyman’s Library. 
Paxton, R. (2005) The Anatomy of Fascism, US: Vintage Books. 
Pevear, R. (2007) ‘Introduction’ and ‘Notes’, in Bulgakov, M. (1967/2007) The 
Master and Margarita, (R. Pevear & L. Volokhonsky, Trans.), (pp. xxiii-xxiv and 
397-412), London: Penguin Books. 
Pimlott, B. (2000) ‘Introduction’, in Orwell, G. Nineteen Eighty-Four (pp. v-xvii), 
London: Penguin. 
Pipes, R. (1995) Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, London: Vintage. 
Platonov, A. (1926-7/1991) ‘The factory of literature’ Oktiabr, 10, pp. 195-202. 
Platonov, A. (1928/1978) Chevengur, (A. Olcott, Trans.), Ann Arbor: Ardis 
Publishers. 
Platonov, A. (1930/2009) The Foundation Pit, (R. Chandler, E. Chandler & O. 
Meerson, Trans.), New York: New York Review of Books.  
Platonov, A. (1934) ‘On the first socialist tragedy’. Retrieved from 
http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article760299.ece. 
Platonov, A. (1934/2007) Soul (Dzhan) (R. Chandler, Trans.) New York: New 
York Review Book Classics. 
Platonov. A. (1935/2012) Happy Moscow, (R. Chandler, Trans.) New York: New 
York Review Book Classics. 
Polkinghorne, D. (1988) Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, Albany: 
New York Press.   
Pomerantsev, V. (1953) ‘Ob iskrennosti v literature’ (‘On sincerity in literature’), 
Novy Mir, December 1953, pp. 218-45.  
Poole, B. (1997) ‘Bakhtin and Cassirer: The philosophical origins of Bakhtin’s 
carnival Messianism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 3/4 (Summer/Fall), pp. 537-78. 
Popper, K. (1945) The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge.  
Popper, K. (1957/1986) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge. 
Proffer, E. (1996) ‘Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita: Genre and motif’, in 
L. Weeks (Ed.), The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion (pp. 98-113), 




Pugliese, S. (2009) Bitter Spring: A Life of Ignazio Silone, New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux. 
Radford, C. (1975) ‘How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?’ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Vol. 49, pp. 67-80. 
Radishchev, A. (1790/1958) A Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow, (L. 
Weiner, Trans.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Rancière, J. (2004) The Politics of Aesthetics, (G. Rockhill, Trans.), London: 
Continuum. 
Rancière, J. (2010) Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, (S. Corcoran, Trans.), 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Rancière, J. (2011) The Politics of Literature, (J. Rose, Trans.), London: Polity 
Press. 
Reed, N. (1994) ‘Reading Lermontov’s Geroj nasego vremeni: Problems of 
poetics and reception’, PhD thesis, Harvard University.  
Ricoeur, P. (1970) Oneself as Another, (K. Blaney, Trans.), Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1984a) Time and Narrative, (Volume One) (K. Blamey & D. 
Pellauer, Trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1984b) Time and Narrative, (Volume Two) (K. Blamey & D. 
Pellauer, Trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1999a) ‘Memory and forgetting’, in M. Dooley & K. Kearney (Eds.), 
Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Continental Philosophy (pp. 5-12), 
London: Routledge. 
Ricoeur, P. (1999b) ‘Imagination, testimony and trust: A dialogue with Paul 
Ricoeur’, in M. Dooley & K. Kearney (Eds.), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary 
Debates in Continental Philosophy (pp. 12-18), London: Routledge.  
Ricoeur, P. (2004) Memory, History and Forgetting, (K. Blaney & D. Pellauer, 
Trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (2005) The Course of Recognition, (D. Pellauer, Trans.), Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Rimmon-Kenan, S. (1983/2002) Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, 
London: Routledge.  
Rockhill, G. (2011) ‘Rancière’s productive contradictions: From the politics of 
aesthetics to the social politicity of artistic practice’, Symposium, 15(2), pp. 28-56. 
Rodden, J. (Ed.) (1994) Understanding Orwell’s Animal Farm in Historical 




Rodden, J. (2003) Scenes from an Afterlife: The Legacy of George Orwell, 
Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books.  
Rodden, J. (Ed.) (2007a) The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rodden, J. (2007b) ‘Orwell for today’s reader: An open letter’ in J. Rodden (Ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell (pp. 179-90), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rodden, J. (2010) Every Intellectual’s Big Brother: George Orwell’s Literary 
Siblings, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Rodden, J. & Cushman, T. (Eds.), (2004) George Orwell into the Twenty-First 
Century, Boulder: Paradigm Press. 
Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rybakov, A. (1966/1988) Children of the Arbat, (H. Shukman, Trans.), Boston: 
Little Brown. 
Sartre, J-P. (1936/1962) Imagination: A Psychological Critique, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.   
Sartre, J-P. (1948/2001) What is Literature?, (B. Frechtman, Trans.), London: 
Routledge.  
Scammell, M. (1998) ‘The Solzhenitsyn Archipelago,’ The New York Review of 
Books, December 3, 1998. Retrieved from 
http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/michael-scammell-2. 
Scammell, M. (2009) Koestler: The Literary and Political Odyssey of a 
Twentieth- Century Skeptic, New York: Random House. 
Scammell, M. (2011) ‘Circles of hell,’ The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 
from http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/michael-scammell-2. 
Scammell, M. (2016) ‘A different Darkness at Noon’, The New York Review of 
Books. Retrieved fromhttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/07/a-different-
darkness-at-noon/ 
Schapiro, L. (1960) The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, New York: 
Random House. 
Scott. M. (2012) The Warlock (The Secrets of the Immortal Nicholas Flamel), 
Delacorte Press: New York. 
Sebald, W.G. (2001) Austerlitz, (A. Bell, Trans.), New York: Random House. 




Seifrid, T. (1992) Andrei Platonov: Uncertainties of Spirit, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Seifrid, T. (2009) A Companion to Andrei Platonov’s The Foundation Pit, Boston: 
Academic Studies Press. 
Seifrid, T. (2013) ‘Platonov and dissidence’ Russian Literature, 1/2 pp. 285-300. 
Service, R. (2009) From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Century: The Penguin 
History of Modern Russia, London: Penguin Books. 
Shalamov, V. (1996/1994) Kolyma Tales, (J. Glad, Trans.), London: Penguin.  
Shane, A. (2007) ‘Yevgeny Ivanovich Zamyatin (1884–1937)’, Gale Virtual 
Reference Library. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id: 
GALE|CX1386900230. 
Shatz, M. (1980) Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shin, U. (1985) Conscience, Lies and Suffering in Solzhenitsyn’s The First Circle. 
Retrieved from http://www.mmisi.org/ma/29_04/shin.pdf.  
Shklovsky, V. (1917/1988) ‘Art as technique’, in D. Lodge (Ed.), Modern 
Criticism and Literary Theory (pp. 16-31), London and New York: Longman.  
Sholokhov, M. (1934) And Quiet Flows the Don, (S. Garry, Trans.), New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
Silone, I. (1933/2000) Fontamara, in The Abruzzo trilogy, (E. Mosbacher, Trans., 
& revised by D. Silone), (pp. 1-175), Vermont: Steerforth Italiana. 
Silone, I. (1937/2000) Bread and Wine in The Abruzzo Trilogy, (E. Mosbacher, 
Trans. & revised by D. Silone) (pp. 175-463), Vermont: Steerforth Italiana.  
Silone, I. (1949/2001) ‘Ignazio Silone’, in R. Crossman (Ed.), The God that 
Failed (pp. 76-115), New York: Columbia University Press.  
Silone, I. (1960/2000) ‘Author’s note’, The Abruzzo Trilogy (pp. 177-80), 
Vermont: Steerforth Italiana. 
Simpson, L. (2001) Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, 
London: Routledge. 
Sinyavsky, A. (1960/1982) The Trial Begins and On Socialist Realism, (M. 
Hayward, Trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Sinyavsky, A. (1965/1989) The Makepeace Experiment, (M. Harari, Trans.), 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  





Snyder, T. (2010) Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York: 
Basic Books. 
Snyder, T. (2011) ‘Who killed more? Hitler or Stalin?’ The New York Review of 
Books, March 10. Retrieved from 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/10/hitler-vs-stalin-who-
killed-more/. 
Sokolov, S. (1969/2015) A School for Fools, (A. Boguslawski, Trans.), New 
York: New York Review of Books.  
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1970) ‘One word of truth’, The Nobel Speech on Literature, 
London: Bodley Head. 
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1971) Cancer Ward, (N. Bethell & D. Berg, Trans.), 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1973) The Gulag Archipelago, New York: Harper and Rowe. 
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1978) ‘A world split apart’, Harvard Address. Retrieved from 
https://pryazhnikov.files.wordpress.com.
 
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1962/1998) One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, (H. T. 
Willets, Trans.), New York: Signet.  
Solzhenitsyn, A. (1978/2009) In the First Circle, (H. T. Willets, Trans.), New 
York: Harper Perennial.  
Spender, S. (1949/2001) ‘Stephen Spender’, in R. Crossman (Ed.), The God that 
Failed (pp. 229-73), New York: Columbia University Press. 
Spender, S. (1972) ‘The truth about Orwell’, The New York Review of Books. 
Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/stephen-spender. 
Springate, L. (2009) Dystopian Present and Future: The Temporal Orientation of 
Evgenii Zamiatin’s We and Andrei Platonov’s The Foundation Pit (Master of Arts 
in Russian thesis, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada). 
Steiner, G. (2009) George Steiner at The New Yorker, New York: New Directions 
Publishing. 
Stille, A. (2001) ‘Foreword’, The Abruzzo Trilogy (pp. vi-xxvi), Steerforth 
Italiana: Vermont. 
Stonor Saunders, F. (2014) ‘The “Zhivago” affair’, London Review of Books, 
September 2014, pp. 5-9. 
Suleiman, S. (1983) Authoritarian Fictions: The Ideological Novel as a Literary 
Genre, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Surma, A. (2013) ‘Writing otherwise: A critical cosmopolitan approach to 
reflecting on writing and reading practices in fiction and non-fiction’, TEXT, 17 




Tamburrano, G. (2001) Processo a Silone: La Disavventura di un Povero 
Cristiano (Silone on Trial: The Misadventure of a Poor Christian), Manduria: 
Piero Lacaita. 
Tertz, A. (Sinyavsky, Andrei) (1960/1982) The Trial Begins and On Socialist 
Realism, (M. Hayward, Trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Tertz, A. (Sinyavsky, Andrei) (1963/1989) The Makepeace Experiment, (M. 
Harari, Trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
Thomas, P. (2002) Entry on ‘Imagination’ in Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. 
Retrieved from http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/imagination.html. 
Todorov, T. (1985) Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Toker, M. (1997) ‘Towards a poetics of documentary prose: From the perspective 
of Gulag testimonies’, Poetics Today, 18, pp. 187-222. 
Toker, L. (2000) Return from the Archipelago: Narratives of Survivors, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Tolstoy, L. (1898/1996) What is Art?, (R. Pevear, Trans.), London: Penguin 
Books.  
Transcript, First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers (1934). Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/art/lit_crit/sovietwritercongress/resolutions.htm. 
Trilling, L. (1951) The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society, 
New York: Viking Press. 
Trotsky, L. (1924) Literature and Revolution. Retrieved from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lit_revo/. 
Turgenev, I. (1862/1962) Fathers and Sons, (B. Isaacs, Trans.), New York: 
Washington Square Press. 
van Delden, M. & Grenier, Y. (2012) Gunshots at the Fiesta: Literature and 
Politics in Latin America, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
Voinovich, V. (1987) Moscow 2042, (R. Lourie, Trans.) San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace and Janovich. 
Voloshinov, V. (1929/1986) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, (L. 
Matejka & I. R. Titunik, Trans.), Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Voloshinov, V. (1976) Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, (I. R. Titunik, Trans.), 
London: Verso. 
Walzer, M. (1988) In the Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political 
Commitment in the Twentieth Century, New York: Basic Books. 




Watt, I. (1957/2000) The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and 
Fielding, London: Pimlico.  
Weeks, L. (Ed.) (1996) The Master and Margarita: A Critical Companion, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
White, H. (1973) Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century 
Europe, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
White, H. (1984) ‘The question of narrative in contemporary historical theory’, 
History and Theory, 23 (1), pp. 1-33. 
Williams, R. (1958/1983) Culture and Society, 1780-1950, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Williams, R. (1971) George Orwell, London: Fontana. 
Williams, R. (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, E. (1972) ‘Marxism and literature’, in D. Lodge (Ed.), Twentieth-century 
Literary Criticism (pp. 251-4), London: Longman. 
Wood, C. (2015) The Natural Way of Things, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Wood, C. (2016) Stella Prize acceptance speech. Retrieved from 
http://thestellaprize.com.au/2016/04/charlotte-woods-stella-prize-acceptance-
speech 
Wood, J. (2008) How Fiction Works, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. 
Yevtushenko, Y. (1961) ‘Heirs of Stalin’. Retrieved from 
http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/the-heirs-of-stalin. 
Young, I. M. (1997), ‘Asymmetrical reciprocity: On moral respect, wonder, and 
enlarged thought’, Constellations, 3 (3), pp. 341-63. 
Zamyatin, Y. (1921/1970) A Soviet Heretic, Essays by Evgeny Zamyatin, (M. 
Ginsburg, Trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Zamyatin, Y. (1923/1970) ‘On literature, revolution, entropy and other matters’. 
Retrieved from http://evildrclam.blogspot.com/2008/11/on-literature-revolution-
entropy-and.html. 
Zamyatin, Y. (1924/1993) We, (C. Brown, Trans.), London: Penguin Books.  
Zinoviev, A. (1976) The Yawning Heights, (G. Clough, Trans.), New York: 
Random House. 
Žižek, S. (2011) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Four Interventions in the 
(Mis)use of a Notion, London: Verso. 
 
 
